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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM 
November 12, 1982 Conference 





Cert to Wisconsin S.Ct. 
(Callow, for the Ct) 
(Abrahamson & Heffernan, diss.) 
State/Criminal Timely 
1. SUMMARY: Petr contends that his Fourth Amendment rights 
were violated when police arrested him in his home, without a 
warrant, on account of a l vil traffic offense. 
2. FACTS and PROCEEDINGS BELOW: At about 8:30 one evening, 
a witness saw petr driving a car which was weaving from side to 
side. The car then drove into a field and stopped. The witness 
spoke to petr, and formed the impression that he was either 
intoxicated or sick. Petr left the scene, abandoning the car in 
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the field. The police arrived approximately twenty minutes 
later, and the witness described the foregoing events. 
A police license check revealed that petr was the registered 
owner of the car, lived near by, and had been arrested several 
weeks earlier in connection with "an alcohol-related 
disturbance." Armed with this information, but without a 
warrant, two police officers proceeded to petr's house. They 
knocked on the door and ~ admitted by petr's stepdaughter, who 
told them petr had just "stumbled in" and beckoned them toward 
the stairs. As the officers were going upstairs, they 
encountered petr' s wife who asked what was going on. The 
officers told her there had been an accident, that petr might be 
involved, and that they thought petr might be intoxicated. 
'- Petr's wife told the officers that petr had just got into bed, 
said that "something has to be done," and motioned them toward 
the bedroom. 
Petr was lying on the bed, and appeared very intoxicated. 
The officers informed him that he was under arrest for driving 
while under the influence of intoxicants, a civil violation under 
Wisconsin law. Although neither the petn nor the Wis.S.Ct.'s 
opinion describes the subsequent events, it appears that petr was 
taken down to the police station where he refused to submit to a 
breathalyzer test. Pursuant to Wis.Stat. §343.305(2) (a), petr's 
driver's license was revoked for sixty days for failure to take 
the test. 
Petr challenged the license revocation, contending that the 
officers' entry into his home and warrantless arrest violated his 
/ 
r rights under the Fourth Amendment and the Wisconsin Constitution. 
The Wis.Ct.App. agreed that the warrantless entry into the home 
was unreasonable, but remanded for a finding regarding consent to 
the entry. The Wis.S.Ct. reversed and reinstated the TC's 
decision revoking petr's license. Citing Payton v. New York, 445 
U.S. 573 (1980) , and Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.s. 200 (1979) , 
the majority held that a warrantless arrest in a person's home 
could be justified by probable cause and exigent circumstances. 
The majority ruled that at the time the officers entered petr's 
house, they had probable cause to believe petr had been driving 
under the influence of intoxicants. The lack of a warrant for 
the arrest was justified by exigent circumstances: the officers 
needed to perform the breathalyzer test before petr' s 
intoxication had time to wear off. This might not have been 
possible if the officers had taken time to get a warrant first. 
The ct found it unnecessary to reach the question whether the 
entry was consensual. 
Two justices dissented. They asserted that neither 
Wisconsin law nor the Constitution permits warrantless arrests 
for civil traffic offenses committed outside an officer's 
presence: that exigent circumstances cannot justify a warrantless 
entry into a person's home to arrest for a civil traffic offense: 
that the officers did not have probable cause at the time they 
entered petr's home: 
circumstances. 
and that there were no exigent 
3. CONTENTIONS: In a very brief petn, petr contends that 
the Fourth Amendment does not permit a warrantless, non-
( consensual entry into the home to arrest for a non-jailable 
offense. Petr also contends that the decision of the Wis.S.Ct. 
conflicts with Payton v. New York, because there was no showing 
that the officers could not have obtained a warrant. Petr does 
not challenge the finding of probable cause. He asserts that the 
issue whether the entry was consensual is not before the Court. 
( 
4. DISCUSSION: If the entry into petr' s home was non-
consensual, this case appears to raise two issues left open by 
Payton v. New York: whether exigent circumstances can justify a 
warrantless entry into a home to effect an arrest and, if so, 
whether the entry can be justified if the offense is a non-
jailable civil violation. In Payton, the Court stated that 
exigent circumstances "arguably" might justify a warrantless 
entry, 445 u.s., at 583, but the issue was left open. Payton 
involved a felony arrest, so the civil-violation issue did not 
arise. 
Although these are issues the Court may eventually wish to 
address, this does not appear to be an . appropriate case. 
Although the courts below did not reach the issue, it seems clear 
that the entry into petr 's home was consensual. The officers 
knocked on petr's door and were admitted by petr's stepdaughter, 
and both the stepdaughter and petr' s wife acquiesced in the 
officers going up to petr' s bedroom. Moreover, even if the 
warrantless arrest had violated petr's Fourth Amendment rights, 
it is not clear that the Fourth Amendment would bar the 
subsequent revocation of petr' s license for failure to take a 
breathalyzer test. License revocation is apparently a ci vi 1 
( penalty under Wisconsin law. To my knowledge, this Court has 
never held that the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule applies 
to subsequent civil proceedings. Neither petr nor the Wis.s . ct. 
has addressed this issue. 
5. RECOMMENDATION: There is no conflict, and the posture 
of this case makes it a poor one in which to review petr's Fourth 
Amendment claims. A response might be helpful to clarify the 
issues but I doubt whether one is necessary. Consequently, I 
recommend denial. 
There is no response. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
EDWARD G. WELSH v. WISCONSIN 
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME 
COURT OF WISCONSIN 
No. 82-5466. Decided January-, 1983 
The petition for writ of certiorari is denied. 
JUSTICE MARSHALL, dissenting from the denial of 
certiorari. 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld a warrantless, 
nighttime entry into petitioner's home to arrest him for a sus-
pected violation of the state motor vehicle code. The court 
concluded that exigent circumstances justified the entry. In 
my view, this decision is inconsistent with the Fourth 
Amendment. It is also at odds with decisions from several 
other jurisdictions. I would grant certiorari to consider 
what circumstances are sufficiently exigent to justify a war-
rantless entry to arrest, a question we explicitly left open in 
Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573, 583 (1980). 
I 
On the rainy night of April27, 1978, a lone witness, Randy 
J ablonic, saw a car swerve and leave the road, eventually 
coming to a stop in an open field. J ablonic stopped his truck 
and asked a passerby to call the police. Prior to the arrival 
of the police, the driver of the car emerged from it and ap-
proached Jablonic's truck. The driver asked Jablonic for a 
ride home but J ablonic told him that they should wait for as-
sistance in removing or repairing the car rather than leave it 
in the field. The driver nevertheless left the scene. Jab-
lonic remained behind. A few minutes later, the police ar-
rived. J ablonic told one officer what he had seen and that he 
thought the driver was either very inebriated or very sick. 
The officer checked the motor vehicle registration of the 
2 WELSH v. WISCONSIN 
abandoned vehicle and learned that it was registered to 
petitioner. 
Without securing a warrant, the police proceeded to peti-
tioner's home and arrived at about 9:00p.m. When petition-
er's step-daughter answered the door, the police successfully 
sought entry into the house. 1 They proceeded upstairs to 
petitioner's bedroom where they found him lying naked in 
bed. The police then placed petitioner under arrest for op-
erating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxi-
cants, in violation of Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1). Petitioner was 
taken to the police station where he refused to undergo a 
breathalyzer test required by § 343.305(2)(b). 
On September 5, 1980, a hearing was held to determine the 
reasonableness of petitioner's refusal to submit to the breath-
alyzer test. The primary issue at the hearing was whether 
petitioner was under a valid arrest at the time he was re-
quested to submit to the test. See § 343.305(2)(b)(1) and 
(7)(c). After receiving evidence, the trial court concluded 
that exigent circumstances made the warrantless arrest 
valid, and that the petitioner's refusal to take the test was 
therefore improper. 2 Accordingly, the court issued an order 
suspending petitioner's operating license for 60 days. The 
Wisconsin Court of Appeals vacated the suspension order. 3 
The appellate court concluded that the warrantless arrest of 
petitioner in his home violated the Fourth Amendment be-
cause the State had not established the existence of exigent 
circumstances. The Wisconsin Supreme Court in turn re-
1 The state trial court never decided whether there was consent to the 
entry, because it deemed decision of that issue unnecessary in light of its 
finding that exigent circumstances were present. The Wisconsin Court of 
Appeals had remanded for consideration of this issue, but was reversed by 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court. 
2 Prior to the hearing on the refusal to take the breathalyzer test, an 
evidentiary hearing was held on petitioner's motion attacking the circuit 
court's jurisdiction on the ground that the arrest was invalid. The court's 
ruling on this issue formed the basis for its ruling at the refusal hearing. 
8 The court remanded the case for further findings as to whether the 
police had entered petitioner's home with permission. See note 2, supra. 
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versed the court of appeals. In doing so, the majority relied 
upon three putative exigent circumstances: the need for "hot 
pursuit" of a suspect, the need to prevent physical harm to 
the offender and the public, and the need to prevent destruc-
tion of the evidence of intoxication. 108 Wis. 2d 319, 
336--338 (1982). 
II 
Absent exigent circumstances, the police may not enter a 
person's home to make a felony arrest without a warrant. 
Payton v. New York, 445 U. S., at 590. "[P]hysical entry of 
the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the 
Fourth Amendment is directed," United States v. United 
States District Court, 407 U. S. 297, 313 (1972), and this 
Court has repeatedly declared that "the Fourth Amendment 
accords special protection to the home." United States v. 
Johnson,-- U.S.,--,--, n. 13 (1982). 4 The Court 
has thus refused to excuse the absence of a warrant "without 
a showing by those who seek exemption from the constitu-
tional mandate that the exigencies of the situation made that 
cause imperative." McDonald v. United States, 335 U. S. 
451, 456 (1948). 
In my view, the nature of the offense in this case precludes 
any claim of exigency. When the police entered petitioner's 
home, they suspected only that he had violated Wis. Stat. 
§ 346.63(1), which prohibits driving while under the influence 
of an intoxicant. Under state law, a first offense of 
§ 346.63(1) is not a crime but rather is merely a civil "traffic 
regulation" requiring forfeiture of one's license. § 346.65(2); 
State v. Albrecht, 98 Wis. 2d 663, 673, 298 N. W. 2d 196 (Ct. 
App. 1980). A second or subsequent offense within a five-
year period converts the violation into a misdemeanor, but 
the record does not show that petitioner has any prior 
•see, e. g., Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 211 (1981); United 
States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U. S. 543, 561 (1976); Coolidge v. New 
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,474-475 (1971); McDonald v. United States, 335 
U. S. 451, 456 (1948); Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10, 13-15 (1948); 
Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 630 (1886). 
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record. 5 Nonetheless, the State argues that the existence of 
exigent circumstances does not "depend on the seriousness of 
the crime the suspect is believed to have committed." 6 I 
disagree. While a serious crime by itself does not create any 
exigency, a minor offense severely undercuts application of 
the exigent circumstance exception to the warrant require-
ment. In particular, the kind of offense for which petitioner 
was arrested simply cannot justify the egregious intrusion 
into petitioner's privacy that resulted from the warrantless 
entry. 7 See Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10, 14-15 
(1948) (finding of exceptional circumstances depends on bal-
ancing of need for law enforcement with right to privacy). 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court erroneously invoked a vari-
ety of exigencies traditionally discussed in the context of fel-
ony arrests in order to justify the intrusion here. First, the 
court below referred to the "hot pursuit" doctrine, but this 
Court has applied that doctrine only when the police were "in 
hot pursuit of a fleeing felon." Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U. S. 
30, 35 (1970) (citing prior cases) (emphasis added). More-
5 See State v. Welsh, 108 Wis. 2d 319, 343 n. 1 (1982) (Abramson, J., 
dissenting); Reply Br. of State of Wisconsin in Wis. Sup. Ct., at 2. 
6 Br. in Wise. Sup. Ct., at 14. Thus, it contended that the "same exi-
gent circumstances can justify the warrantless, nonconsensual entry to ar-
rest for a misdemeanor as to arrest for a felony." !d. , at 14-15. 
7 Respondent asserts that petitioner never raised this particular issue in 
the courts below. The record suggests otherwise. For example, in his 
brief before the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, petitioner's primary argu-
ment was that the warrantless arrest was unconstitutional absent exigent 
circumstances. At page 5 of his Brief, Petitioner stated that: 
In the present case, the entry of the defendant's dwelling without con-
sent was to effect a warrantless arrest in a civil-type of special proceeding. 
It is highly doubtful whether the seriousness of this offense under any 
circumstance could justify such an intrusion into one's home by the 
State .. . . " 
Similarly, in arguing for affirmance of the Court of Appeals' decision before 
the State Supreme Court, petitioner noted that a first violation of§ 346.63 
was not a crime and also relied upon the Court of Appeals' analysis as to 
the absence of exigent circumstances due in part to the relatively minor 
nature of the offense. Brief at 4, &-7. 
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over, this case did not involve circumstances even resembling 
"hot pursuit." The lower court also thought that an immi-
nent threat to safety existed, but this case is far removed 
from those involving entries to arrest armed felons. See 
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294, 29S-299 (1967). There 
was simply no evidence that petitioner was "armed, violent 
or dangerous to himself or others," Ct. App. at 5, particularly 
since his car lay abandoned in a field. See 108 Wis. 2d, at 
356-357 (Abramson, J., dissenting). Finally, the lower 
court relied upon the possibility that evidence of the traffic 
offense would be lost over time because alcohol metabolizes 
relatively quickly in the blood. However, the threatened de-
struction of evidence of the violation of a civil traffic regula-
tion can not justify a warrantless entry into a home. 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court compounded its error by 
adopting a "presumption favoring warrantless arrests which 
are a result 'of an ongoing investigation in the field.'" 108 
Wis. 2d 319, 338 (quoting W. LaFave, Search and Seizure 
§ 6.1, at 391 (1978 ed.)). Any such "presumption" eviscer-
ates the constitutional mandate that the decision whether to 
invade an individual's privacy should "as a rule, ... be de-
cided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or government 
enforcement agent." Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S., 
at 14. If warrantless arrests inside a home were "pre-
sumed" to be valid, the special protection afforded the home 
in our past Fourth Amendment decisions would have little 
meaning. Indeed, as the Court declared in Payton v. New 
York, a case involving afelony arrest, it is a "'basic principle 
of Fourth Amendment law'" that warrantless arrests inside a 
home are "presumptively unreasonable." 445 U. S., at 586 
(emphasis added). 
The State Supreme Court's decision in this case is plainly 
inconsistent with numerous lower court decisions holding 
that the gravity of an offense is an important consideration in 
determining the presence of exigent circumstances. The 
most frequently cited case in this area, 8 Dorman v. United 
8 Donnino & Girese, Exigent Circumstances for a Warrantless Home 
6 WELSH v. WISCONSIN 
States, 435 F. 2d 385 (CADC 1970), describes the gravity of 
an offense as a principal factor bearing upon the existence of 
exigent circumstances. I d., at 392. Both federal and state 
courts have repeatedly relied upon the seriousness of an of-
fense in evaluating a claim of exigency. See, e. g., United 
States v. Campbell, 581 F. 2d 22 (CA2 1978) (armed rob-
bery); Virgin Islands v. Gereau, 502 F. 2d 914 (CA3 1974) 
(murder); United States v. Shye, 492 F. 2d 886 (CA6 1974) 
(bank robbery); State v. Allison, 298 N.C. 135, 257 S. E. 2d 
417 (1979) (murder); Commonwealth v. Williams, 483 Pa. 
293, 396 A. 2d 640, cert. denied, 446 U. S. 912 (1979) (mur-
der); Cook v. State, 35 Md. App. 430, 371 A. 2d 433 (1977) 
(armed robbery); People v. Fitzpatrick, 32 N. Y. 2d 499, 346 
N.Y.S. 2d 793, 300 N. E. 2d 139 (1973) (murder). Cf. People 
v. Sanders, 59 Ill. App. 3d 6, 16 Ill. Dec. 437, 374 N. E. 2d 
1315 (1978) (burglary without weapons not a crime of violence 
for this purpose); State v. Bennett, 295 N. W. 2d 5 (S.D. 
1980) (distribution of controlled substances not a grave of-
fense). By contrast, the Wisconsin Supreme Court andre-
spondent have not cited a single case finding exigent circum-
stances when a minor offense was involved. 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court decision permits a warrant-
less entry into a home to arrest someone suspected of com-
mitting at most a misdemeanor. Because this decision has 
serious implications for the special protection afforded the 
home under the Fourth Amendment, and because it conflicts 
with prevailing case law, I would grant certiorari. 
Arrest, 45 Alb. L. Rev. 90, 99 (1980). 
s~ · ~. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
EDWARD G. WELSH v. WISCONSIN 
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME 
COURT OF WISCONSIN 
No. 82-5466. Decided January-, 1983 
Opinion of JusTICE O'CONNOR respecting the denial of the 
petition for a writ of certiorari. 
In my view, there are at least two compelling reasons to 
deny a writ of certiorari in this case, and the dissent from de-
nial neglects both reasons. 
First, the facts of the case, as reported in the decision 
below, show clearly that when the police officer proceeded to 
petitioner's residence, both petitioner's wife and his step-
daughter consented to the officer's entry into the residence. 
When the 'stepdaughter answered thedoor, she stated to the 
police officer that petitioner had "'just stumbled in . . . . ' 'He 
is upstairs, and motioned the way-towards the stairs, allow-
ing us to pass."' State v. Welsh, 108 Wis. 2d 319, 325 (1982). 
When the officer began to ascend the stairs, he encountered 
petitioner's wife, who, according to the officer, "gave her 
consent for us to go up, because she said, 'Yes, he is in bed. 
He just got into bed. And something has to be done,' 
.... and motioned us to the bedroom." Id., at 325--326. 
The dissent from denial states that "[t]he state trial court 
never decided whether there was consent to the entry, be-
cause it deemed decision of that issue unnecessary in light of 
its finding that exigent circumstances were present." Ante, 
at 2, n. 1. Nevertheless, where the facts of the case, as 
adopted by the Wisconsin Supreme Court, show that resolu-
tion of the issue presented for review may prove unnecessary 
since the judgment below was clearly correct on another 
ground, it would be inappropriate to grant certiorari. See 
The Monrosa v. Carbon Black Export, Inc., 359 U. S. 180 
(1959). 
Second, in the court below, petitioner only questioned 
2 WELSH v. WISCONSIN 
whether the police had probable cause to believe that a mis-
demeanor had been committed because "the police had no 
·. ·idea that the defendant had ever been charged much less con-
victed of a prior violation of operating a motor vehicle while 
intoxicated." Brief for Defendant-Appellant in Wisconsin 
Supreme Court 6. * The petitioner did not argue below that 
that the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibited a 
warrantless arrest for non-jailable offenses. Therefore, the 
petitioner may not raise this argument for the first tim~ in 
this Court. See Cardinale v. Louisiana, 394 U. S. 437 
(1969). 
Irrespective of any possible conflict between the decision 
below and prevailing case-law, the factual and procedural 
posture of this particular case makes it a poor vehicle for 
resolution of any constitutional issues presented. 
*In the response to the petition, the respondent states that "[u]ntil he 
filed his responding brief in Wisconsin Supreme Court, the petitioner al-
ways treated the case as one involving a misdemeanor and only contended 
that the issues were whether the police possessed probable cause and 
whether exigent circumstances existed to justify the warrantless arrest." 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
EDWARD G. WELSH v. WISCONSIN 
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME 
COURT OF WISCONSIN 
No. 82-5466. Decided February-, 1983 
The petition for writ of certiorari is denied. 
JUSTICE MARSHALL, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN joins, 
dissenting from the denial of certiorari. 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld a warrantless, 
nighttime entry into petitioner's home to arrest him for a sus-
pected violation of the state motor vehicle code. The court 
concluded that exigent circumstances justified the entry. In 
my view, this decision is inconsistent with the Fourth 
Amendment. It is also at odds with decisions from several 
other jurisdictions. I would gr3nt !!.ertiorari to~~der 
what circumstances are sufficiently~nt to justify a war-
rant ess en ry to arrest, a question we explicitly left open in 
Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573, 583 (1980). 
I 
On the rainy night of April27, 1978, a lone witness, Randy 
Jablonic, saw a car swerve and leave the road, eventually 
coming to a stop in an open field. J ablonic stopped his truck 
and asked a passerby to call the police. Prior to the arrival 
of the police, the driver of the car emerged from it and ap-
proached Jablonic's truck. The driver asked Jablonic for a 
ride home but J ablonic told him that they should wait for as-
sistance in removing or repairing the car rather than leave it 
in the field. The driver nevertheless left the scene. Jab-
lonic remained behind. A few minutes later, the police ar-
rived. J ablonic told one officer what he had seen and that he 
thought the driver was either very inebriated or very sick. 
The officer checked the motor vehicle registration of the 
>IJJ~. ~ 
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2 WELSH v. WISCONSIN 
abandoned vehicle and learned that it was registered to 
petitioner. 
Without securing a warrant, the police proceeded to peti-
tioner's home and arrived at about 9:00p.m. When petition-
er's step-daughter answered the door, the police successfully 
sought entry into the house. 1 They proceeded upstairs to 
petitioner's bedroom where they found him lying naked in 
bed. The police then placed petitioner under arrest for op-
erating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxi-
' The state trial court never decided whether there was consent to the 
entry, because it deemed decision of that issue unnecessary in light of its 
finding that exigent circumstances were present. The Wisconsin Court of 
Appeals had remanded for consideration of this issue, but was reversed by 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court. 
JUSTICE O'CONNOR asserts that "the facts of the case" demonstrate con-
sent to the warrantless entry so that the "judgment below was clearly cor-
rect on another ground." Ante, at 1. However, the "facts" on which Jus-
TICE O'CONNOR relies consist primarily of verbatim quotations from the 
testimony of one of the arresting officers. This version of the facts was 
highly disputed at the trial court. For instance, petitioner's wife denied 
having consented to the entry into the house and her testimony contra-
dicted that of the arresting officer in several other ways. Moreover, even 
under the officer's version, consent to a warrantless entry cannot be 
readily inferred. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10, 13 (1948) 
("Entry to defendant's living quarters . . . was granted in submission to 
authority rather than as an understanding and intentional waiver of a con-
stitutional right."). 
The trial court never addressed the conflict in the testimony, never made 
factual findings pertinent to the issue of consent, and never ruled on the 
issue. That is precisely why the Wisconsin Court of Apeals remanded the 
case for findings as to consent. Decision of Wis. Ct. App. at 7 ("Because 
consent is an undecided issue, the trial court's findings are inadequate."). 
Similarly, the issue of consent was neither bried nor argued before the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court, nor did that court even purport to analyze the 
matter, let alone resolve factual disputes in the record. 
A dubious decision should not stand simply because, after a remand, a 
trial court might make factual findings that would lead to reinstatement of 
the original judgment on an entirely different ground. The Monrosa v. 
Carbon Black Export, Inc., 359 U. S. 180 (1959), is in my view inapposite. 
This is hardly a case where the issue raised by petitioner is posed "ab-
stractly," id., at 184, or where the Court would not be deciding a case "in 
the context of meaningful litigation," ibid. 
WELSH v. WISCONSIN 3 
cants, in violation of Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1). Petitioner was 
taken to the police station where he refused to undergo a 
breathalyzer test required by § 343.305(2)(b). 
On September 5, 1980, a hearing was held to determine the 
reasonableness of petitioner's refusal to submit to the breath-
alyzer test. The primary issue at the hearing was whether 
petitioner was under a valid arrest at the time he was re-
quested to submit to the test. See ~43.305(2)(b)(l) and 
(7)(c). After receiving evidence, the trial court concluded 
that ~igent circumstances made the warrantless arrest 
valid, and that the petitioner's refusal to take the test was 
therefore improper. 2 Accordingly, the court issued an order 
suspending petitioner's operating license for 60 days. The 
Wisconsin Court of Appeals vacated the suspension order. 3 
The appellate court concluded that the warrantless arrest of 
petitioner in his home violated the Fourth Amendment be-
cause the State had not established the existence of exigent 
circumstances. The Wisconsin Supreme Court in turn re-
versed the court of appeals. In doing so, the majority relied 
upon three putative exigent circumstances: the need for "hot 
pursuit" of a suspect, the need to prevent physical harm to 
the offender and the public, and the need to prevent destruc-
tion of the evidence of intoxication. 108 Wis. 2d 319, 
336--338 (1982). 
II 
Absent exigent circumstances, the police may not enter a 
person's home to make a felony arrest without a warrant. 
Payton v. New York, 445 U. S., at 590. "[P]hysical entry of 
the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the 
Fourth Amendment is directed," United States v. United 
States District Court, 407 U. S. 297, 313 (1972), and this 
2 Prior to the hearing on the refusal to take the breathalyzer test, an 
evidentiary hearing was held on petitioner's motion attacking the circuit 
court's jurisdiction on the ground that the arrest was invalid. The court's 
ruling on this issue formed the basis for its ruling at the refusal hearing. 
3 The court remanded the case for further findings as to whether the 
police had entered petitioner's home with permission. See note 2, supra. 
4 WELSH v. WISCONSIN 
Court has repeatedly declared that "the Fourth Amendment 
accords special protection to the home." United States v. 
Johnson,-- U.S.,--,--, n. 13 (1982). 4 The Court 
has thus refused to excuse the absence of a warrant "without 
a showing by those who seek exemption from the constitu-
tional mandate that the exigencies of the situation made that 
cause imperative." McDonald v. United States, 335 U. S. 
451, 456 (1948). 
In my view, th nature of the offense in tl}is case pr~des 
an:L claim of exigency. e e po 1ce entered petitioner's 
home, they suspected only that he had violated Wis. Stat. 
§ 346.63(1), which prohibits driving while under the influence 
of an intoxicant. Under state law, a first offense of 
§ 346.63(1) is not a crime but rather is merely a civil "traffic 
re~ion" requiriniforfeiture of one's license. § 346.65(2); 
State v. Albrecht, 98 Wis. 2d 663, 673, 298 N. W. 2d 196 (Ct. 
App. 1980). A second or subsequent offense within a five-
year period converts the violation into a misdemeanor, but 
the record does not show that petitioner has any prior 
record. 5 Nonetheless, the State argues that the existence of 
exigent circumstances does not "depend on the seriousness of 
the crime the suspect is believed to have committed." 6 I 
disagree. While a serious crime by itself does not create any 
exigency, a minor offense severely undercuts application of 
the exigent circumstance exception to the warrant require-
ment. In particular, the kind of offense for which petitioner 
was arrested simply cannot justify the egregious intrusion 
into petitioner's privacy that resulted from the warrantless 
'See, e. g., Steagald v. United States, 451 U. S. 204, 211 (1981); United 
States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U. S. 543, 561 (1976); Coolidge v. New 
Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 474-475 (1971); McDonald v. United States, 335 
U. S. 451, 456 (1948); Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10, 13-15 (1948); 
Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 630 (1886). 
5 See State v. Welsh, 108 Wis. 2d 319, 343 n. 1 (1982) (Abramson, J., 
dissenting); Reply Br. of State of Wisconsin in Wis. Sup. Ct., at 2. 
6 Br. in Wise. Sup. Ct., at 14. Thus, it contended that the "same exi-
gent circumstances can justify the warrantless, nonconsensual entry to ar-
rest for a misdemeanor as to arrest for a felony." Id., at 14-15. 
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entry. 7 See Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10, 14-15 
(1948) (finding of exceptional circumstances depends on bal-
ancing of need for law enforcement with right to privacy). 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court erroneously invoked a vari-
ety of exigencies traditionally discussed in the context of fel-
ony arrests in order to justify the intrusion here. First, the 
court below referred to the "hot pursuit" doctrine, but this 
Court has applied that doctrine only when the police were "in 
hot pursuit of a fleeing felon." Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U. S. 
30, 35 (1970) (citing prior cases) (emphasis added). More-
over, this case did not involve circumstances even resembling 
"hot pursuit." The lower court also thought that an immi-
nent threat to safety existed, but this case is far removed 
from those involving entries to arrest armed felons. See 
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294, 29~299 (1967). There 
was simply no evidence that petitioner was "armed, violent 
or dangerous to himself or others," Ct. App. at 5, particularly 
7 Respondent asserts that petitioner never raised this particular issue in 
the courts below, and JUSTICE O'CONNOR contends that petitioner is at- { 
tempting to raise an argument "for the first time in this Court." Ante, at 
2. The record suggests otherwise. For example, in his brief before the 
Wisconsin Court of Appeals, petitioner's primary argument was that the 
warrantless arrest was unconstitutional absent exigent circumstances. At 
page 5 of his Brief, Petitioner stated that: 
"In the present case, the entry of the defendant's dwelling without con-
sent was to effect a warrantless arrest in a civil-type of special proceeding. 
It is highly doubtful whether the seriousness of this offense under any 
circumstance could justify such an intrusion into one's home by the 
State .... " 
Thus, the issue addressed in the petition was raised in haec verba by pe-
titioner in the Court of Appeals. That court agreed with petitioner and 
ruled that the offense was not sufficiently grave to justify the severe intru-
sion into petitioner's home. It therefore reversed the trial court's ruling 
as to exigent circumstances. The State then brought an appeal to the Wis-
consin Supreme Court and argued in part that the existence of exigent cir-
cumstances does not "depend on the seriousness of the crime the suspect is 
believed to have committed." Br. in Wise. Sup. Ct. at 14. As appellee in 
the state supreme court, petitioner chose to rely primarily on the decision 
of the Court of Appeals, arguing that it was "correct and founded upon 
good law." Br. at 7. 
6 WELSH v. WISCONSIN 
since his car lay abandoned in a field. See 108 Wis. 2d, at 
356-357 (Abramson, J., dissenting). Finally, the lower 
court relied upon the possibility that evidence of the traffic 
offense would be lost over time because alcohol metabolizes 
relatively quickly in the blood. However, the threatened de':) / 
struction of evidence of the violation of a civil traffic regula- J 
tion can not justify a warrantless entry into a home. 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court compounded its error by 
adopting a "presumption favoring warrantless arrests which 
are a result 'of an ongoing investigation in the field."' 108 
Wis. 2d 319, 338 (quoting W. LaFave, Search and Seizure 
§ 6.1, at 391 (1978 ed.)). Any such "presumption" eviscer-
ates the constitutional mandate that the decision whether to 
invade an individual's privacy should "as a rule, ... be de-
cided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or government 
enforcement agent." Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S., 
at 14. If warrantless arrests inside a home were "pre-
sumed" to be valid, the special protection afforded the home 
in our past Fourth Amendment decisions would have little 
meaning. Indeed, as the Court declared in Payton v. New 
York, a case involving afelony arrest, it is a "'basic principle 
of Fourth Amendment law'" that warrantless arrests inside a 
home are "presumptively unreasonable." 445 U. S., at 586 
(emphasis added). 
The State Supreme Court's decision in this case is plainly 
inconsistent with numerous lower court decisions holding 
that the gravity of an offense is an important consideration in 
determining the presence of exigent circumstances. The 
most frequently cited case in this area, 8 Dorman v. United 
States, 435 F. 2d 385 (CADC 1970), describes the gravity of 
an offense as a principal factor bearing upon the existence of 
exigent circumstances. I d., at 392. Both federal and state 
courts have repeatedly relied upon the seriousness of an of-
fense in evaluating a claim of exigency. See, e. g., United 
States v. Campbell, 581 F. 2d 22 (CA2 1978) (armed rob-
8 Donnino & Girese, Exigent Circumstances for a Warrantless Home 
Arrest, 45 Alb. L. Rev. 90, 99 (1980). 
/ 
/ 
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bery); Virgin Islands v. Gereau, 502 F. 2d 914 (CA3 1974) 
(murder); United States v. Shye, 492 F. 2d 886 (CA6 1974) 
(bank robbery); State v. Allison, 298 N.C. 135, 257 S. E. 2d 
417 (1979) (murder); Commonwealth v. Williams, 483 Pa. 
293, 396 A. 2d 640, cert. denied, 446 U. S. 912 (1979) (mur-
der); Cook v. State, 35 Md. App. 430, 371 A. 2d 433 (1977) 
(armed robbery); People v. Fitzpatrick, 32 N. Y. 2d 499, 346 
N. Y.S. 2d 793, 300 N. E. 2d 139 (1973) (murder). Cf. People 
v. Sanders, 59 Ill. App. 3d 6, 16 Ill. Dec. 437, 374 N. E. 2d 
1315 (1978) (burglary without weapons not a crime of violence 
for this purpose); State v. Bennett, 295 N. W. 2d 5 (S.D. 
1980) (distribution of controlled substances not a grave of-
fense). By contrast, the Wisconsin Supreme Court andre-
spondent have not cited a single case finding exigent circum-
stances when a minor offense was involved. 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court decision permits a warrant-
less entry into a home to arrest someone suspected of com-
mitting at most a misdemeanor. Because this decision has 
serious implications for the special protection afforded the 
home under the Fourth Amendment, and because it conflicts 
with prevailing case law, I would grant certiorari. 
Court ................... . 'Voted on .................. , 19 .. . 
Argued ................... , 19 .. . Assigned .................. , 19 . . . 
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In April 1978, police entered petitioner's home at night 
to make a warrantless arrest for drunk driving. After making the 
arrest, the police took petitioner "downtown" for a blood-alcohol 
test. Under state law, petitioner could refuse to take the test, -but because he was under arrest a refusal would result in a 60 
day forfeiture of driving privileges. Nevertheless, petitioner 
refused to take the test. When later notified of the impending 
forfeiture, petitioner requested a hearing at which he argued 
that the arrest was unconstitutional under the fourth amendment 
and thus that his refusal to submit to the test was not grounds 
for forfeiture under state law. The state court held that the 
~ nonconsensual entry and warrantless arrest were lawful under the 
fourth amendment and ordered forfeiture. Petitioner contests the 
constitutional ruling made in that civil proceeding. 
II. -ACKGROUND: STATE STATUTES 
In Wisconsin it is unlawful to drive "under the 
requiring forfeiture of "not more than $200." 346.65(2) Wise 
1975 eond~ within 5 years of the first ~ ~ 
misdemeanor, carrying a penalty of imprisonment for not less 
,....----... 
5 days nor more than a year and a potential fine of not more 
$500. 346.65(2) Wise. Stat. 1975 
The state authorizes police to make warrantless arrests 
for any traffic violation, including drunk driving, "if the 
officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the person is ---violating or has violated a traffic regulation." 345.22 Wise. 
Stat. 1975 Wisconsin also provides that any person who drives on 
the state's public roads "shall be deemed to have given consent 
~to a chemical test ~is breath, blood or urine, for the purpose 
~~f determining the alcoholic content of his blood if arrested and 
issued a citation for driving •••• while under the influence of 
an intoxicant." 343 -305(1) Wise. Stat. 1975 If, after arrest and 
citation, a person refuses to take a chemical test for alcohol, 
"no test shall be given." However, if the refusal is 
unreasonable, the state shall suspend the suspect's driving 
privilege for 60 days. 343.305(2) Wise. Stat. 1975 
III. FACTS & DECISIONS BELOW 
On the evening of April 24, 1978, petitioner ran his car 
off the road into a field. No one was hurt in the accident. A 
eyewitness called the police, but petitioner walked away from the 
scene before the police arrived. The eyewitness told the police 
that petitioner seemed drunk and had staggered off in a 
northwesterly direction. The police checked the license on the 
abandonned car and determined that it belonged to petitioner. 
They drove directly to petitioner's house, arriving there within 
30 minutes of the accident. The time was approximately 9:00p.m. 
Petitioner's two 16 year old stepdaughters answered the 
---, 
officers' knock and informed them that petitioner was upstairs in 
bed. It is unclear what else was said at the door or whether the 
stepdaughters invited the officers in. In any event, the 
officers entered the house and proceeded up the stairs to 
petitioner's bedroom. Somewhere along the way, they encountered 
petitioner's wife. It is unclear whether ~nsented to the 
entry. 
The officers found petitioner lying naked on his bed. 
They ordered him to get up and dress, which he did. As soon as 
he was dressed, the police arrested him and took him downtown for 
a blood-alcohol test. Petitioner was told that because he was 
under arrest refusal to take the test would result in a 60 day 
. ~ 
~~- forfeiture of driving privileges.l Nevertheless, petitioner 
refused to take the test and the test was not administered. On 
April 26, 1978, petitioner was notified that his driving 
privileges would be suspended. On May 4, he requested a hearing 
on the reasonableness of the refusal to take the test. 




received a prior drunk driving citation within the past -----...,.. --
years. Because a second offense of drunk driving is a ~ 
misdemeanor, the state vacated the citation and filed a criminal 2.. ~ 
complaint against petitioner charging him with the misdemeanor ~
~d..-> 
1under state law, a person who is not under arrest for drunk 
driving may refuse to submit to a blood-alcohol test without 
penalty. 343.305 Wise. Stat. 1975 {A-3) 
·~ 
offense. For some reason, this complaint was not filed until 
February 1980. In March 1980, petitioner filed a motion to 
dismiss the criminal complaint on the ground that his arrest was 
illegal and thus that the court had no in personam jurisdiction. 
After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found that the 
warrantless entry and arrest were lawful and dismissed the 
motion. Petitioner has not appealed that decision. In September 
~~0, the ~easonableness hearin~( that petitioner had requested in 
~ ~~( 1978 was held. Petitioner's driving privileges had not been 
~~· 
forfeited up to that point, and there is no explanation for the 
~ more than two-year delay in granting petitioner's hearing 
request. 
It \1 
At the reasonableness hearing, the trial court held that 
the arrest was lawful under the fourth amendment and thus that 
petitioner's refusal to submit to the blood-alcohol test 
warranted forfeiture. The trial court based its decision on a ._ . . J-
1 "' CD &t~· find~ of ewo exigent circumstances -hot pursuit and ~  
pres~tion of evidence. Because the trial court found that the 
entry and warrantless arrest were justified by the exigent 
circumstances, it did not resolve the question whether the entry 
was consensual. 
The state court of appeals held that the exigent 
found by the trial court did not justify as a 
matter of law the entry and warrantless arrest in this case. The 
court reversed and remanded on the issue of consent. The state 
~~erne court reversed the appellate cou·r·~ and re-enstated the 
'\.. 
trial court's order. The supreme court held that three exigent 
circumstances justified the entry and arrest - imminent threat to 
safety, hot pursuit, and preservation of evidence. 
Meanwhile, petitioner's misdemeanor trial was held in 
the trial court. A footnote in petitioner's brief informs the 
--·--·- ·---·----......,. 
Court that testimony concerning petitioner's intoxication was 
obtained by the allegedly unlawful entry and arrest and was used 
in that trial. -~tioner was convicted on the misdemeanor 
charge and appealed to the Wisconsin Court of Appeals. That 
appeal is stayed pending decision in this case. No appeal of - ---
' that criminal proceeding is before this Court. 
--------------------------------------
IV. JURISDICTION & PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
This is a civil forfeiture case. In the cert memos and 
in Mark's notes to you there was some concern that the order 
appealed from asked this Court to apply the exclusionary rule in 
a civil proceeding - something this Court has never done. 
However, petitioner. does not rely on the exclusionary rule to 
vindicate his fourth amendment rights. Instead, he claims that 
I\ \\ 
~~brS under state law his refusal to submit to the blood-alcohol 
~should not result in forfeiture of his driving privileges. 
Petitioner argues that under state law) refusal is grounds for 
forfeiture only if made while he is under lawful a irest 
-:;::::::::__ 
his arrest was unlawful under the fourth amendment. 
Although it is not clear that state law required a 
lawful arrest before refusal became grounds for forfeiture, 2 the 
Footnote(s) 2 will appear on following pages • 
. ·; 
bench memo: Welsh -- Wisconsin No. 82-5466 page 8 
state court reached the fourth amendment question and held that 
the arrest was lawful. An adequate and independent state ground 
would deprive this Court of jurisdiction to review the forfeiture 
decision. Unfortunately, there does not seem to be one. The 
/)..(...f) 





prove the co-existence of probable cause and exigent 
circumstances, justifying the officer's conduct at the 
defendant's residence." It is clear that the state court 
I) ~ 
analyzed these two factors under the fourth amendment. 
Petitioner does not contest the state court's determination of ~ cf 
~i-D 
probable cause. Moreover, the issue of consent is not curr
before the Court. Although there is convincing evidence that the 
~--~~­officers made a consensual entry, the state court expressly 
refused to resolve this issue. If this Court finds that the 
exigent circumstances did not justify the nonconsensual entry, it 
must remand for resolution of the consent issue. Because there 
---------~, ~---- ----
is ~me conflicting t~stimony on this issue, ~ two crucial 
~ 
~Alf 
witnesses have never testified, 3 I disagree with Justice 
~wv/Ai._ 
2After the reasonableness hearing, the state amended 343.305 so SO~ 
that refusal to submit to a blood-alcohol test was grounds for 
forfeiture only if the suspect were under lawful arrest at the 
time. The trial court at one point hinted that forfeiture was 
appropriate as long as petitioner had been told that he was under 
arrest when he refused the test, whether or not the arrest was 
lawful. Unfortunately the supreme court did not bear this out. 
Footnote(s} 3 will appear on following pages. 
·. 
bench memo: Welsh · Wisconsin No. 82-5466 page 8 
state court reached the fourth amendment question and held that 
the arrest was lawful. An adequate and independent state ground ~ 
would deprive this Court of jurisdiction to review the forfeiture ~~ 
decision. Unfortunately, there does not seem to be one. The 
~ 
supreme court stated: "To prevail in this case, the state must  
-~ 
prove the co-existence of probable cause and exigent /2-;;tJ...i 
~ circumstances, justifying the officer's conduct at the defendant's residence." It is clear that the state court 
I) ~ _____-/ 
analyzed these two factors under the fourth amendment • 
.. 
Petitioner does not cont;:t the state court's determination of ~ Lf 
dYt- iD 
probable cause. Moreover, the issue of consent is not curr~
before the Court. Although there is convincing evidence tliat the 
~-
officers made a consensual entry, the state court expre 
refused to resolve this issue. If this Court finds tha . 
~ 
exigent circumstances did not justify the nonconsensual --
must remand for resolution of the consent issue. Becau .. , --=:--.........-
two cr ... ~---is some conflicting testimony on this issue, ~ 
witnesses have never testified, 3 I disagree with Justice  
~Alr 
~~ 
2After the reasonableness hearing, the state amended 343.305 so SD ~ 
that refusal to submit to a blood-alcohol test was grounds for 
forfeiture only if the suspect were under lawful arrest at the 
time. The trial court at one point hinted that forfeiture was 
appropriate as long as petitioner had been told that he was under 
arrest when he refused the test, whether or not the arrest was 
lawful. Unfortunately the supreme court did not bear this out. 
Footnote(s) 3 will appear on following pages. 
O'Connor's suggestion that this Court may affirm on the ground of 
consent. 
It seems that cert. should never have been granted in 
c::;.__.. 
this case. The issue of consent and the testimony of the two ---- - ----· ---
stepdaughters is crucial to the determination of whether there 
was a constitutional violation in this case. A decision by this 
Court on what exigent circumstances may justify a nonconsensual 
nighttime entry into the horne to make a warrantless arrest will 
be a major decision in the a,_r_ea of fourth amendment law. This 
~ ~tle casJ>) hardly seems the vehicle for such a decision, 
~specially since the case probably could be resolved on far 
simpler grounds. If it is possible to DIG this case, I believe 
that would be the wisest course. 
VI. DISCUSSION 
In Payton v. New York, 445 u.s. 573, 576 (1979), this 
Court held that the fourth amendment "prohibits the police from 
making a warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a suspect's 
horne in order to make a routine felony arrest." In that case, 
the Court had "no occasion to consider the sort of emergency or 
dangerous situation ••• that would justify a warrantless entry 
into a horne for the purposes of ••• arrest." 445 U.S. at 583 
3The two stepdaughters were unavailable at the hearing and the 
trial court found it unnecessary to call them to testify in light 
of its holding on exigent circumstances • 
. i.t ' " 
Other cases have relied on exigent circumstances to uphold 
nonconsensual entry into a suspect's horne to make a warrantless 
felony arrest. See, e.g., United States v. Santana, 427 u.s. 38 
(1976) (hot pursuit justifies nonconsensual entry to make 
warrantless felony arrest); Warden v. Hayden, 387 u.s. 294 (1967) 
(same) This case presents two issues as yet unresolved by this 
Court. ~may exigent circumstances ever justify 
nonconsensual entry to make a warrantless arrest for a non-felony ---
off~?~ if so do the exigent circumstances found by the 
state court in this case justify as a matter of law the 
nonconsensual entry to make a warrantless arrest for the non-
criminal offense of drunk driving? 
If the Court holds that the exigent circumstances found 
here do not justify the warrantless entry and arrest, it need not 
address the broader question whether exigent circumstances ever 
may justify nonconsensual entry into the horne to make a 
warrantless arrest for a non-felony offense. I believe that a 
categorical "no" would be unwise. As petitoner's brief points 
out, battery is a misdemeanor in Wisconsin. It seems 
inconceivable that a call from a wife that her husband has just 
beaten her and is ~t horne threatening to beat her again would not 
justify a nonconsensual entry to make a warrantless arrest. 
There may be rna~ other misdemeanors that will justify 
nonconsensual entries and warrantless arrests. The 
reasonableness of a nonconsensual entry to make a warrantless 
arrest depends on whether the state's interest in making the 
entry and arrest in the manner chosen outweighs the privacy 
interests compromised by the intrusion. This "balancing act" 
___.>-
requires a case-by-case analysis. The nature of the offense is 
but one of the factors that should weigh in the balance. 




:7 ~ the nonco sual entry 
t.-y. /-;S;) 
) ~hree exi ent circumstances justified 
and warrantless arrest 1 imminent threat 
an~servation of evidence. However, I ~to safet¥r1fot pursuit, 
believe that for the most part the first two exigencies collapse 
l o.. 
into the third, making preservation of evidence the only exigency 
offered to justify the entry and arrest~
A. Imminent Threat to Public Safety 
Applying the "imminent threat to safety doctrine," the 
state court reasoned that if arrest were not made promptly, the 
blood-alcohol test would be ineffective, prosecution and 
conviction unlikely, and the safety of the state's roads 
jeopardized. While this may be true, inability to convict 
because of loss of evidence does not pose an imminent threat to 
safety. The only imminency here was the destruction of evidence. 
B. Hot Pursuit 
The exigency of "hot pursuit" is more applicable, but 
standing alone it does not justify the warrantless entry and 
·~ arrest. This Court twice has relied on the exigency of hot 
pursuit to justify nonconsensual entry into a home to make a 
·.,.-. 
. _ ..... ___ -··--···-. ··- ---· .. - ... --- -··-- -·· --·-. -- - . ..., ..., 
warrantless arrest. United States v. Santana, 427 u.s. 38 
{1976); warden v. Hayden, 387 u.s. 294 {1966) In both cases, the 
Court was careful not to use the doctrine of hot pursuit as a 
talisman to open the doors of suspects' homes automatically. 
Instead, the Court carefully evaluated the totality of the 
circumstances before finding that a warrantless entry and arrest 
were justified. 
In Hayden, the police, acting on the information of two 
eyewitnesses, pursued an armed robber to his residence, arriving 
minutes after he did. The officers entered the house without 
consent in order to search for and arrest the suspect. Because 
they were in "hot pursuit" of an armed felon, the Court found 
that the police had acted reasonably when they made a 
nonconsensual entry into the suspect's home. 
In Santana, the police were informed that defendant had 
just been given some marked money in a heroin transaction. When 
they drove the two blocks to defendant's residence, they saw her 
standing in the doorway of her home holding a brown paper bag. 
When they approached her shouting "police," she retreated into 
the vestibule of her house. The officers followed her through 
the open door and caught her in the vestibule. The Court held 
that the warrantless entry and arrest were justified by the "hot 
pursuit" for several reasons. First, the arrest began when the 
police shouted their identity and while defendant was in a public 
place. She could not defeat the arrest by retreating into a 
'-. private place. Second, once the defendant saw the police, there 
was a realistic expectation that she immediately would destroy 
the incriminating evidence - in this case the heroin and marked 
money that she held in her hand. 
The~t pursuit in this case does not raise the same 
concerns as either Hayden or Santana. Unlike Hayden, petitioner 
was unarmed and not suspected of any crime. Unlike Santana, 
~------------ ------------------~ 
petitioner was not standing in his open doorway but was upstairs 
in bed when the police made their arrest. Moreover, it would 
have been impossible for petitioner immediately to dispose of the 
incriminating evidence of intoxication. In this case, the state 
court found that obtaining an arrest warrant would have created 
an undue delay because the "inherent nature of the offense 
demanded the suspect's immediate apprehension to accomodate the 
dictates of the blood-alcohol test statute." Thus, the hot 
pursuit exigency collapses into the need to preserve evidence 
from imminent destruction. Although the fact that the police 
were in "hot pursuit" is a factor that should be considered in 
applying the exigency exception, standing alone it adds little to 
the analysis. 
c. Imminent Destruction of Evidence ~  
The state court found that because blood metabolizes 
alcohol rapidly, an immediate arrest was necessary so that a 
blood-alcohol test could be performed. It found further that 
"this situation did not afford the officer ample time in which to 
obtain a warrant." The court thus held that the exigencies made 
.1.--;J- --
nonconsensual entry and a warrantless arrest reasonable under the 
fourth amendment. I disagree for several reasons. 
First, the exigency exception, although flexible and 
highly fact specific, should be construed as a narrow exception 
Q 
to the warrant requirement. The government has the burden of 
proving that its actions fit within that narrow exception. I do 
not believe that the government has met its burden in this case. 
Application of the exigency exception is essentially a balancing 
process. The government must show that its interest in making 
the arrest in the manner that it did outweighs the privacy 
interests compromised by the intrusion. In this case, the police 
believed that immediate seizure of petitioner was necessary to 
secure probative evidence. However, assuming that this was so, 
the record does not establish that the police proceeded in the J?~ 
least intrusiv~nner possible: it is not clear that they ~!:'~ 
attempted to avoid the intrusion by giving petitioner the ~~~~ 
opportunity to surrender at his doorstep. The record shows that~ 
~Jv. 
the police knocked on the door, identified themselves, and asked
if petitioner was at home. When they received an affirmative ~ 
~
reply, they entered the house and started up the stairs to 
petitioner's bedroom. The state court expressly failed to ~~~ 
resolve what if any other conversation occurred at the door. 
Thus, it is unclear whether the police obtained consent to enter 
or requested that petitioner come to the door. In cases such as 
this where it would pose no danger to the police or to the 
preservation of evidence, nor increase the chances of escape, I 
believe that the police should give the suspect the opportunity 




to surrender himself and thus to avoid the invasion of privacy 
involved in entry into the horne. If the suspect willingly would 
surrender at the door, the intrusion would be unnecessary. If 
the intrusion is unnecessary to protect a substantial government 
interest, it is unreasonable under the fourth amendment. 
Second, assuming that the warrantless entry and arrest 
were necessary to preserve probative evidence, I am not certain 
that in this case the government has shown that its need to 
obtain the evidence outweighed the privacy interests compromised 
by the intrusion. At the time of the arrest, the police had 
probable cause_:~believ~~~ ~hat pet i tioner had committed a 
~lvil offense subject to a maximum forfeiture of $200. --Conviction for that offense would not have deprived petitioner of 
his driving privileges nor subjected him to any criminal 
sanctions. Drunk driving is a serious problem, and states have a 
significant interest in prosecuting and convicting offenders. 
However, the state in this case has provided some measure of its 
interest in deterring and penalizing the conduct by 
characterizing it as a civil rather than a criminal offense and 
by the penalty it has prescribed. I am not sure that the state's 
expressed interest warrants the intrusion here. Furthermore, 
under state law petitioner's arrest does not guarantee 
preservation of the evidence sought. 
A drunk driving suspect may defeat the state's interest 
in obtaining probative evidence of intoxication even after a 
valid arrest. Under state law, a person arrested for drunk 
driving may refuse to submit to any sort of chemical analysis, 
-~ ------- - ~~::;,.;-.;...- - - --- - -------- ---- -- ----
and the state will respect that refusal. 343.305 Wise. Stat. 1975 
The state seeks to deter such a refusal by requiring that a 
suspect who exercises his right to refuse the test forfeit his 
driving privileges for 60 days. In this case, that deterrent did 
not stop petitioner from exercising his right to refuse the test. 
Thus, by virtue of its own law, the state never obtained the 
evidence it claims justified its warrantless entry and arrest. 
The~te argues that in ~hmerber v. California, 384 
u.s. 757 (1965), this Court manifested its belief that the 
state's interest in obtaining meaningful blood-alcohol tests may 
justify warrantless and nonconsensual intrusions of a J?' ~~-
significance similar to the one at issue here. ~ermerber is ~ 
troubling but ultimately distinguishable. '"chermerber, the 
drunk driving suspect had been involved in an accident in which 
others were injured. He was placed under arrest for a 
misdemeanor offense and taken to the hospital for treatment of 
his own injuries. Over defendant's objection and without 
obtaining a warrant, the police ordered a blood-alcohol test. 
The Court held that the intrusion was significant but was 
justified by the exigencies. The only exigencies that the Court 
mentioned were that the body metabolizes alcohol quickly and that 
no search warrant could be obtained in time to perform a 
successful blood-alcohol test. The state court found that the 
same exigencies existed in this case. 
It would be hard to argue that intrusion into the home 
requires a more substantial state interest and more compelling 
exigencies than intrusion into the body. However, Schmerber is 
__ .... ..._ ....... u'-"''-• ... _....._._. ..... v • -, -,.~"-'"-'"&----c;;a..&& .a; .. v. u~~~""ZUO 
distinguishable on other grounds. In Schmerber, the intrusion 
was not only necessary but sufficient to obtain the desired 
evidence. In this case the warrantless entry and arrest may have 
been necessary to obtain the probative evidence, but they were 
not sufficient. As discussed above, state law allowed petitioner 
to prevent the state from acquiring the evidence merely by --------ret~U~S~l=n=g~t~o~s~u~b=m~l~.t~~t=o~t~he blood test. Although Schmerber makes 
the conclusion troubling, I do not believe that the state's 
interest in acquiring the evidence justified the warrantless 
entry and arrest in this case. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
/r 
This is an unfortunate case. I strongly believe that 
the police would not have entered petitioner's home and his 
second floor bedroom absent some sort of consent. Unfortunately, 
the state court refused to resolve the consent issue. Assuming,~ 
as this Court must, that there was no consent, I find 




~circumstances justified the warrantless entry and arrest. Absent 
~~ consent, the entry and arrest were graphically intrusive and the 
f:~ offense was a non-violent civil offense. The only legitimate 
~~~st~icat~on offered for the intrusion is the preservation of 
~  · In my view, the state did not meet its burden of 
proving that the intrusion was necessary to obtain that evidence. 
First, it did not show that petitioner was given an opportunity 
to surrender at his doorstep rather than suffer arrest as he lay 
--••-•• •••-•••-• ,._,.......,,.. v• ....... ...,......,-....,.a..., .... &.& .. ,......,. '-'"""' J~VV 
naked on his bed. However, this is hardly the government's 
fault. The government could have met that burden only if the two 
stepdaughters had been called as witnesses. The trial court took 
great pains to avoid having to do that. If the court was willing 
to uphold the arrest without requiring the government to bring on 
two crucial witnesses, we can hardly fault the government for not 
bring them forth. 
Second, assuming that the government has shown that the 
intrusion was necessary to make a prompt arrest, I am not 
completely satsified that it has shown that a prompt arrest was 
sufficient to preserve the evidence that justified the intrusion. 
State law allowed petitioner to defeat the state's interest in 
obtaining the evidence simply by refusing to submit to the blood-
alcohol test. However, I am uncomfortable suggesting that this 
Court rush into an analysis of the state's interest in obtaining 
certain kinds of evidence or in prosecuting various offenses. 
Although this is necessary in balancing the need to intrude 
against privacy rights, it seems somewhat offensive for this 
Court to be second guessing the state's interest. Furthermore, 
it would lead to innumerable petitions requesting the Court to 
re-evaluate a state's interest in any warrantless intrusion. 
Unless five members of the Court can be persuaded to DIG 
this case, the best way to deal with it may be to hold that a 
-
arrest for a non-criminal traffic offense is per se unreasonable -
~ under the fourth amendment. Although generally such categorical 
statements are unwise, it may be the narrowest holding possible 
in this case. A decision affirming or reversing on any other 
ground would constitute a major decision in the area of fourth 
amendment law. Such a decison is unwarranted in this messy 
little case. 
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CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE w,. , J . BRENNAN, JR. 
October 11, 1983 
Re: Welsh v. Wisconsin, No. 82-5466 
Dear Chief: 
You suggested in the assignment sheet that a more 
complete explanation of the Conference decision in the above 
case would appear in a Per Curiam if a dissent was to be 
written. This prompts me to advise you that I do intend to 
circulate a dissent fran ·the dec is ion to DIG the case. I 
would, of course, prefer to frame a dissent addressed to the 
grounds upon which the Per Curiam rests. 
Chief Justice Burger 









JUSTICE w .. . J . BRENNAN, JR. 
~u:prtntt <!fttnrl of f:lrt ,-m±tb ~hdt$ 
:.as!pngto:tt. ~· Q}. 2llp'!-~ 
October 17, 1983 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
No. 82-5466 
Welsh v. Wisconsin 
Supplementing my memorandum of 
October 11, 1983 in the above, I have 
decided that I shall write in dissent. 
Sincerely, 
-. 
.... , ,~ 
I - -· 
- .-
CHAMBERS OF' 
.JUSTICE WILLIAM H . RE.HNQUIST 
~lt.Fnnt <!f"lttt "f tift ~tb ,»tatts 
-ulfington. Jl. ~· 211~~~ 
October 19, 1983 
Re: No. 82-5466 Welsh v. Wisconsin 
Dear Chief: 
Please join me in your Per Curiam. 
Sincerely~ 
The Chief Justice 
cc: The Conference 
OctohPr lD, 1~83 
A2-5466 Welsh v . Wisconsin 
Dear ~hjef: 
I aar~e with vour Per, Curiam. 
Si.ncet'Ply, 
~he Chjef Justic~ 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 
2nd DRAFT 








From: The Chief Justice ., 
Circulated: _________ _ 
SUPREME COURT OF ffiE UNITED STATES 
No. 82--5466 
EDWARD G. WELSH, PETITIONER v. WISCONSIN 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT 
OF WISCONSIN 
[October - , 1983] 
PER CURIAM. 
After hearing oral argument and fully exammmg the 
record, we conclude that the totality of the circumstances did 
not warrant bringing the case here. Accordingly, the writ of 
certiorari is dismissed as improvidently granted. 
CHAMBERS OF 
.in.prtmt Qiottd ltf tqt )tnitth .itzdt,&' 
JI'IU'lfingtltn, ~. ar. 2ll&t~~ 
JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
October 19, 1983 
No. 82-5466 Welsh v. Wisconsin 
Dear Chief, 
I agree with the per curiam. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 




~ttprtmt C!Jltlttt nf tlft ~tb .jbdt.e' 
~~·~·~ 20~~~ 
..JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE 
October 20, 1983 




The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
cprn 





-~·· ~ ~ 
··;,:,It~;· · I ' appreciate your gi.ving me th~ opportuni.ty to 
think further about this case. I believe, however., that i.t 
is best for me to stay with my DIG vote. ,, 
•· ··r consistently voted to "~eny" when the. cert pet.i-
tion was under consideration. As Thurgood said at Confer-
ence, there is "no purpose in our deciding this case as no 
other state has laws like wtsconRi~"· ' 
~~ 
,, . '• After·· the case was grante~ am arqued, T was in- ., ·~ 
clin~d to vote to reverse, thouqh I continued to think we ~• 
had made a mistake in addressing a unique and a very foolish , 
statute •' Nhen it came my turn to ''cte at Conference, the 
Chief had voted to affirm or DIG, Byron agreed wi.th the 
Chief, " and 'T'hurqood and Rar:ry also vote~ to DIG. I was then 
content• to_ qo along with a DIG. .. " . · ·' 
1 
~ ' , __ r - :tu 
You ate right in implying that perhaps I did not 
recall Justice Harlan's view with respect to when it is ap-
propriate to DIG. ' My sense of what we have done in the past 
is that few of us have heeded cons is tent ly his quite, loq leal .. ·~,;;, 
argument. _,-·"¥ 
In sum, Bill, at this late datfl',' and havi .. ng ad-
heren t o my DIG vote after Aeeinq the dissents by you and 
Harry, ! ju~t do not think it appropriate to change a circu-
lated vot~ that reflects the view I always have had ·of this 





THE CHIEF .JUSTICE 
ilnprtntt Clfltltrl of tlrt ~b i\lattg 
._aslfinghtn. ~. <fl. 20~'!~ 
January 6, 1984 
Re: 82-5466 - Welsh v. Wisconsin 
Dear Bill: 
/ 
Will you take on a draft opinion in this case1 -
Justice Rehnquist 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMI!IERS Of' 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
ilupunu Qf4turl qf tlf.t ~in jltaU• 
JluJrin:ghm. ~. <!f. 2Ll.;i'l' 
January 6, 1984 
Re: 82-5466 - Welsh v. Wisconsin 
Dear Bill: 
In order to forestall any possible 
misunderstanding, I would like to reserve the right to 
take a somewhat different approach to the Rule of Four 
issue discussed in part III of your circulating 
dissent. I have not yet written anything on this 
subject because, as I suggested at conference today, I 
find it hard to believe that the majority will actually 
dismiss the case as improvidently granted after it has 
been argued and over the dissent of the four members of 
the Court who voted to grant. As I think we all agreed 
at conference today, that has never happened while any 
present member of the Court has been on the Court. At 
least, that's my impression of the discussion. 
As you know, I think reasonable judges can differ 
concerning the wisdom of the Rule of Four, but if it is 
to continue as a part of our routine procedures, I 
surely think that it should be administered in a 
uniform fashion. 
Justice Brennan 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS Of' 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
~ltpfmtt (ij~nrl ~f tlft ~tb .lltatt• 
._u!finghm. ~. <!f. 2llp'!~ 
January 9, 1984 
Re: No. 82-5466 Welsh v. Wisconsin 
Dear Chief: 
I will try to draft a Per Curiam to support the 
order for a DIG. 
Sincerely, r 
The Chief Justice 
cc: The Conference 
• 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE w .. . J . BRENNAN, JR. 
.hprtntt Clf!turl!tf firt ~b .Jbt±t.s 
'JfuJringhm. ~. <!}. 2ll~~~ 
December 27, 198 3 
Re: Welsh v. Wisconsin, No. 82-5466 
Dear Lewis: 
At our Conference after oral argument on this case, the 
Court agreed to dismiss the writ of certiorari as 
improvidently granted. If I recall our Conference 
correctly, while noting that you would not dissent from a ~ 
DIG, you also agreed that the judgment below should be ____. 
reversed. Thurgood and Harry, who originally proposed the 
DIG, now agree that a DIG is inappropriate. Given their 
change in position, we are now faced with a situation in 
which the four who originally voted to grant the writ of 
certiorari are dissenting from the DIG. 
Although there are obviously no set rules that control 
the propriety of a DIG, the Court has previously 
acknowledged that the five Justices who originally voted to 
deny the writ will DIG a case only in the most narrow of 
circumstances. As Justice Harlan explained in the leading 
case in this area: 
"I think the Court should not have heard any of 
these four cases. Nevertheless, the cases having been 
taken, I have conceived it to be my duty to consider 
them on their merits, because I cannot reconcile voting 
to dismiss the writs as "improvidently granted" with 
the Court' s "rule of four." In my opinion due 
adherence to that rule requires that once certiorari 
has been granted a case should be disposed of on the 
premise that it is properly here, in the absence of 
considerations appearing which were not manifest or 
fully apprehended at the time certiorari was granted." 
Ferguson v. Moore-MCCormack Lines, Inc., 352 u.s. 521, 
559 (1957) (separate op1n1on). 
See The Monrosa v. Carbon Black Export, Inc., 359 u.s. 180 (1959) 
(DIG appropriate when "[e]xam1nation of a case on the merits, on 
oral argument, ••• bring[s] into 'proper focus' a consideration 
which, though present in the record at the time of granting the 
writ, only later indicates that the grant was improvident"}. 
Compare Triangle Improvement Council v. Ritchie, 402 u.s. 497, 
502 (1971} (Harlan, J., concurring} (DIG appropriate "in light of 
••. changed posture of the case} with id., at 508 (Douglas, J., 
dissenting) (so as not to impair the "rule of four", it is "the 
duty of the five opposing certiorari to persuade others at 
Conference, but, failing that, to vote on the merits of the 
case"). See also Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 u.s. 637, 648 
(Stewart, J., concurring} ("If as many as four Justices remain so 
minded after oral argument, due adherence to that rule requires 
me to address the merits of a case, however strongly I may feel 
that it does not belong in this Court."}. 
In this case, there has been no intervening change in 
circumstances since the writ was granted. Nor did consideration 
of the case on the merits after oral argument focus the Court on 
any factors that were not known at the time the case was granted. 
Indeed, if anything, I believe the posture of the case has been 
clarified since last February, when the original vote to grant 
was taken. Therefore, because the case does not fall within any 
of our established criteria to justify a DIG, don't you think 
that it is our responsibility to decide the case on its merits? 
If so, I would be hap~ to turn the narrow conclusion of Part II-






JUSTICE SANDRA DAY o'CONNOR 
.Sn;rrtmt QJ.LtUrt .ttf tqt 'Jttittb .Stalt,g-
11Juftingt.ott, ~. QJ. 2ll.;t.l!~ 
January 27, 1984 
No. 82-5466 Welsh v. Wisconsin 
Dear Bill, 
I agree with your Per Curiam. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Rhenquist 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMIS£RS 01' 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
.iu.prnnt <!fourt of tlrt ~a .itatt• 
'Jfufringhtn. J. Of. 2llp,., 
January 30, 1984 
RE: 82-5466 - Welsh v. Wisconsin 
Dear Bill: 
I join your January 26th per curiam. 
Regards, 
Justice Rehnquist 
Copies to the Conference 
.Su:prtlltl' Clfltud ttf tlrt ~b .Statts 
'ma.etrin-ghtn. ~. <!f. 2ll.;i'!~ 
CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
January 30, 1984 
Re: No. 82-5466-Welsh v. Wisconsin 
Dear Bill: 
I agree with the first paragraph and the 





cc: The Conference 
CHAMI!IERS 01'" 
THE CHIEF .JUSTICE 
jlu.prnn~ OfDlUi .of tlr~ ~a i'tatts 
Jfaslfhtghtn. ~. ~· 20.?,.~ 
January 31, 1984 
Re: 82-5466 - Welsh v. Wisconsin 
Dear Bill: 
I join your January 31 Per Curiam. 
Regards, 
Justice Rehnquist 




JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
~u.prtmt <!Jll1trl ci t4t ~mu~ .§mtta 
~a:alfin.gton. 10. <!J. 2Ll,?J!~ 
Re: No. 82-5466 - Welsh v. Wisconsin 
Dear Bill: 
February 2, 1984 
I am still with you as I was before, that is, I join 




cc: The Conference 
. ·' 
j;upunu <!Jnmt llf tlyt ~b jita±ts 
'maslyinghtn. ~. <!J. 2ll.;t~~ 
CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
February 2, 1984 
Re: No. 82-5466-Welsh v. Wisconsin 
Dear Bill: 
I hope I am no longer confused in this case. 
As of now, I would like to be permitted to withdraw 






cc: The Conference 
t l I I 
.iiupr.tntt' (!Jcnrt of t!r.t ~b ~tnt.ts 
'llaslfingi:cn. ~.(!f. 20,?~~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
February 2, 1984 
Re: No. 82-5466-Welsh v. Wisconsin 
Dear Bill: 
I hope I am no longer confused in this case. 
As of now, I would like to be permitted to withdraw 









.JUSTICE .JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
•• lUll Clf.mri .ctf tJt.t ,-nit~ .Blatt• 
••.lfinfhtu. ~. elf. 2Ll~,.~ 
February 8, 1984 
Re: 82-5466 - Welsh v. Wisconsin 
Dear Bill: 





Copies to the Conference 
J;tqtrnttt <!fcuri ttf Urt ~tb' j;tatts-
.. a5-lfingbm, ~. QI. 2ll&J'-!~ 1;u; /-
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, .JR. 
February 22, 1984 
82-5466 Welsh v. Wisconsin 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
I circulate herewith a brief opinion concurring in 
a DIG. 
As stated therein, my view of this case has not 
changed. I voted consistently to deny certiorari. But 
after the case was granted and argued, I went to the Confer-
ence prepared to reverse on the merits because of the ille-
gality of the arrest. When it came my turn to vote, the CJ, 
BRW, TM and HAB had voted to DIG. I therefore was glad to 
make a fifth vote to dispose of this unhappy case, but also 
stated - as my notes indicate - that I would vote to reverse 
on the merits if we reached them. 
Earlier drafts of op1n1ons in this case have de-
bated the applicability of the Rule of Four, and I am now 
persuaded that the Rule has not been as consistently applied 
as perhaps it should have been. In this connection, we may 
have a similar situation 82-1724 New York v. Uplinger. In 
any event, believing still that we made a mistake to take 
this case of little or no precedential value, and being fur-
ther persuaded by the wide divergence of the views expressed 
here, I reaffirm my vote to DIG. 
L.F.P., Jr. 
ss 
February 22, 1984 
82-5466 ~-7eleh v. Wisconsin 
MEMORANDUM TO T'fiE CONFERENCE: 
I circulate here\>Iith a brief opinion concurrinq in 
4!11 DIG. 
~s stated therein, my view of this case has not 
chanaed. I vote~ consistently to deny c~rttorari. ?ut 
aft~r the case was gr~nted and argued, I went to the ~onfer­
ence oreoared to reverse on the meritq becausP of the ill~­
qalitv of the arrest. Nhen it came my turn to vot~, the r.J, 
BRl-7, ""M and Hl\B had voted to DIG. r therefore was glan to 
make a fifth vote to dispose of this unhappy ca~e, but also 
stat~d - as mv notes indi .. cate - that I would vote to reverse 
on the merits if we reached them. 
Earlier drafts of opinions in this case have de-
bated the applicability of the Rule o€ Four, an~ r am now 
pet:suaded that the Rule has not been as consic:stently applied 
as oerhaps it should have been. In this connection, we •~Y 
have a c;imilar si.tuation 82-1724 New York v. UPlinger. In 
any event, believinq still that we maAe a mistake to take 
this case of little or no precedential value, and being fur-
ther persuaded by the wide divergence of the views expressed 







January 26, 1984 
RE: Welsh v. Wisconsin, No. 82-5466 --
TO: Justice Powell 
FROM: Cammie 
I still believe that this case deserves a DIG, but I 
have some problems with this P.C. First, Justice Rehnquist plays 
a little loose with the facts surrounding the entry (p.l). These 
~---------------------are hotly disg~ed a~ th~~Court must assume that the entry/ was 
'-
Second, I dis-n~consensuJl: the tone of the P.C. is otherwise. 
7)-
agree with the assertion that the connection between the federal 
. \,\.... d th ~ 1 . ' "" ' 1 ( 4) '-..__T_h_ t ----..:. 
1ssue an e 1cense suspension 1s unc ear p. . a connec-
_..---
tion is, I think, perfectly clear. The J eal proble3 is identi-
fied at p.S, n.S: it is unclear whether, under the state law ap-
pl icable to this case, an "unreasonable" refusal to submit to a 
blood-alcohol test has anything to do with the legality of the 
arrest. If it does not, there is no reason to reach the federal 
question and the license suspension would be upheld on adequate 
and independent state grounds. 
This is a to have generated so many problems. 
I think it is a pr for a DIG, but the rule of four 
has much to commend it. At the original conference, Just ices 
Marshall & Blackmun, both of whom had voted to grant, voted to 
DIG and everything was fine. The problem, of course, came when 







Blackmun has been the model .of inconsistency on this one. First 
he voted to deny the petit ion. Then he switched to become the 
fourth vote for a grant. After oral argument, he voted to DIG. 
Now he votes to address the merits!) I do not believe that the 
Conference generally should let 5 votes prevail for a DIG over 
the 4 original votes to grant. However, I confess I am at a loss 
as to what to recommend at this late date. I'll stick with the 












From: Justice Stevens 
Circulated: _________ _ 
Recirculated: ---'F'-'E=--=B:::........=:lc..:::4'--1:...::.9-=-84--'------
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 82-5466 
EDWARD G. WELSH, PETITIONER v. WISCONSIN 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT 
OF WISCONSIN 
[February-, 1984] 
JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting. 
The analysis in Part II-A of JUSTICE BRENNAN's dissent-
ing opinion is certainly persuasive; moreover, I am inclined to 
believe that JusTICE BRENNAN is correct in concluding that 
"the Fourth Amendment imposes an absolute ban on war-
rantless home arrests for certain minor offenses." Ante, at 
10. Nevertheless, in my view it is unnecessary to decide 
that question in this case. The reasoning in the remainder of 
the opinion, to which I subscribe, provides a sufficient basis 
for vacating the judgment of the Supreme Court of Wiscon-
sin. The summary in Part III of his opinion is surely cor-
rect. Accordingly, I join in all but Part II-A of JUSTICE 
BRENNAN's opinion, and I respectfully dissent from the 
Court's disposition of this case. 
CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE w .. . J . BRENNAN, JR. 
.iu:prtntt <l}ourl Df tlrt ~b .itait.s 
~!p:ttgbnt. ~. <!}. 21lbi~~ 
February 27, 1984 
No. 82-5466 
Welsh v. Wisconsin 
Dear Chief, 
In view of Lewis' circulation and 
Bill Rehnquist's note, am I not to 
assign the opinion for the Court? 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBE R S OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
~upunu QJ!turl 4lf Hrt ~tb •tattg 
._asfri:ngbm, ~- <!J. 20~'!~ 
February 27, 1984 
Re: No. 82-5466 Welsh v. Wisconsin 
Dear Chief, 
In view of the fact that the Per Curiam opinion which I 
drafted has not commanded majority support, I think the 
opinion should be reassigned to someone who believes the 
merits should be reached and the judgment of the Supreme 
Court of Wisconsin reversed. 
Sincerely, 
~ 
The Chief Justice 
cc: The Conference 
CMAMIIERS 01'" 
THE CHIEF" .JUSTICE 
I. i'uprmu <q.mrt Df tift ~a .itatt• 
._u4inght~ ~. <!f. 20~,.~ 
February 27, 1984 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: 82-5466 - Welsh v. Wisconsin 
You have Bill Rehnquist's memo of February 27, 1984 
"withdrawing" because too many have withdrawn. 




,jtqtrtm~ "Jttltrl o-f tlrt 'Jnifta .iWtll' 
~fritt.ghtn. !J. (1}. 2 0~){.~ 
.JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
February 14, 1984 
Re: 82-5466 - Welsh v. Wisconsin 
Dear Bill, 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Rehnquist 
Copies to the Conference 
cpm 
CHAMISERS OF 
.JUSTICE w ... .J. BRENNAN, .JR. 
~~mu~aurlaf~t~b~mug 
~a,g~ ~. <q. 2ll&f'l-~ 
February 28, 1984 
No. 82-5466 




I'll try my hand at an opinion for 
the Court in the above. 
Sincerely, , 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
March 1, 1984 
82-5466 We1Rh v. Wf.sconsin 
near Chief: 
This refPrs to your note statinq th~t vou vote to ntG 
because "too manv h8VP withnrawn". r han not come to rest 
finally unti 1 my ~ circnlati.on of Febru."!try 27th. 
I votPd not to take this case for the reasons mentioned 
in my opinion. At Conference, there were four votes to DIG 
when the discussion reached me. T stated that r could join 
a OIG, but would reverse if the merits were reached. 
The reasons advanced in Bill Rehnquist's opinion for 
not addressing the merits are not the ones that caused me to 
think we should not take the case. The case was granted and 
opinions have been circulated. Accordingly, I now think we 
should decide the merits. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
LFP/vde 
·~----------'-~-~---··-· ,, .......... 
I • '' 
CH ...... BI!:A!I Or 
..JUSTICE ..JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
.Aluprmtt CIJ&nttt #f tJtr J{nitt~ .Altatt# 
.__.Jtinghnt. ~. CIJ. 2D~~' 
March 6, 1984 
Re: 82-5466 - Welsh v. Wisconsin 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me. 
Justice Brennan 





JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
.®lt}trttttt <!ftmrl o-f t4t ~ttit.tb ~fa.tts 
~~sJrbtgtott. ~. <!f. 20.?~~ 
Re: No. 82-5466 - Welsh v. Wisconsin 
Dear Bill: 
/ 
March 6, 1984 
Please join me in your proposed opinion for the Court. 
I shall probably retain my separate writing with the 
necessary revisions. 
Justice Brennan 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
.iltJlrnm <!fonrt cf tltt ~b j;Udtg 
'llM4ittghtn. ~. af. 2ll.;i'l~ 
March 7, 1984 
Re: No. 82-5466~Welsh v. Wisconsin 
Dear Bill: 






cc: The Conference 
March 8, 1984 
82-5466 Welsh v. Wisconsin 
Dear Bill: 
I am certainly with you on the judgment, and agree 
with most of your opinion. I do have some reservations. 
As this case involves only a traffic offense, not 
even classified as a misdemeanor, tt is unnecessary to ar-
ticulate qeneral rules with respect to the determination of 
exigent circumstances. The Court declined to undertake this 
in Payton, and it is unnecessary in this case, involving 
only a traffic offense, to enunciate view~ that mav apply in 
all casps involving exigent circumstances. The exigent cir-
cumstances exception to the Warrant Clause always has been 
applied ln light of the facts and circumstances of each 
case. 
r would prefer, therefore, not to announce a broad 
general rule. If we undertake this, there are some portions 
of your opini.on, T cannot join. r certainly agree, as the 
plurality stated in Payton, that searches and seizures in-
side a home without a warrant are "presumptively unreason-
able". I also agree with Justice Jackson's McDonald state-
ment that whether "urgent circumstances" iustify a warrant-
less entry "depend somewhat upon the gravity of the offense 
thought to be in process ••• " 
I would not hold that "the government is required 
to demonstrate a compelling need that overcomes the presump-
tion of unreasonableness that attaches to all warrantless 
home entries." P. 9, your opinion. In everv case involving 
alleged exigent circumstances, defense counsel would be en-
couraged to demand a shrn·ling of "compelling neen", our high-
est burden of proof. A.lso, I am troubled by the portion of 
your "holding" paragraph (p. 12) that states: 
~-~~.··' 
"[Tlhe application of the exigent circum-
stances exception in the context of. a home 
entry should rarely be sanctioned where there 
is probable cause to believe that only a 
minor offense has been committed". 
The term "minor offense" usually distinguishes misdemeanors 
from felonies, and the laws of the several states are far 
from consistent in their classification of cri.minal conduct 
into these categories. Some offenses classified as "misde-
meanors" may be quite serious, whereas offenses classified 
as felonies may be quite minor. See, for example, South 
Dakota's classification of offenses in my opinion last Term 
in Solem v. Helm. 
Although J would prefer not to enunciate rules of 
general application with respect to exigent circumstances in 
a case that involves only a traffic offense, t believe I 
could join all of your opinion if you modified the sentence 
on page 9 that would require the showing of a "compelling 
need". It should be sufficient, in light of the remainder 
of your opinion, merely to say the "burden is on the govern-
ment to overcome the presumption ••• " In addition, per-
haps you would be willing to omit entirely the final sen-
tence on page 12. 
If you prefer to keep the opinion in its present 
form, I will join all of Part I, and if you would create 
subdivisions for Part II I could join pages 7-9 and 13-14, 
including Part III. I would also write briefly, makinq the 
points mentioned abo,,e. 
This case has presented a good deal of di-fficulty 
for the Court. I think we are on the right path now. I 







JUSTICE w ... J. BRENNAN, JR. 
Re: 
Dear Lewis: 
March 12, 1984 
Welsh v. Wisconsin, No. 82-5466 
Thank you for your letter of March 8. Mary and I just 
returned from a brief visit to Berkeley, California, so I 
have just had a chance to review your suggestions for the 
proposed opinion. 
I appreciate your concern that we not articulate 
general rules that will cover all determinations of exigent 
circumstances. To that extent, the proposed opinion is only 
intended to suggest an approach for cases involving 
warrantless home arrests in which the underlying offense is 
extremely minor. Indeed, those lower courts that have been 
faced with such cases have floundered in their attempts to 
articulate any meaningful guidelines, and the years that 
have passed since Payton suggest that it is time for the 
Court to address at least this narrow area. 
As for your specific suggestions, you are quite correct 
in focusing on the "compelling need" language on page 9. In 
line with your suggestion, I propose to change tnat sentence 
to read as follows: "Before agents of the government may 
invade the sanctity of the home, the burden is on the 
government to demonstrate exigent c1rcumstances that 
overcome the presumption of unreasonableness that attaches 
to all warrantless home entries." As for the language on 
page 12, I would prefer not to eliminate this clause in its 
entirety. At the same time, the term "minor offense" is not 
intended to cover all nonfelony crimes. Although, as my 
prior draft dissent in this case indicated, I believe there 
is a strong argument in support of an absolute ban on 
warrantless home arrests for certain offenses, the opinion 
i nten ti onally leaves that issue unresolved. To eliminate 
any inference that "minor offense" will be interpreted to 
mean all nonfelonies, I propose that the following clause be 
added: "application of the exigent-circumstances exception 
in the context of a home entry should rarely be sanctioned 
when there is probable cause to believe that only a minor 
offense, such as the kind at issue in this case, has been 
committed." 






.JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
.i1q1rtntt ClfDurt 1tf l4t 'Pnittb .italt.s' 
'JlMlfi:n:gton, ~. <fl. 21lbf'l' 
March 12, 1984 
No. 82-5466 \'Elsh v. Wisconsin 
Dear Bill, 
Please join rre. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Brennan 
Cq;>ies to the Ccnference 
1 
March 13 , 1984 
82-5466 N~lsh v . Wisconsin 
Dear 'A\ 11 : 
Please join me . 
,Just ice Brennan 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 
Sincer.elv , 
----·--.. --~l''-------·- -~' J 
CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
.Su.p:rtmt Qf01ttf qf Hrt ~tb .Statts 
-u!pnghm, ~.<!f. 2llp~~ 
May 4, 1984 
Re: No. 82-5466 Welsh v. Wisconsin 
Dear Byron: 
Please join me in your dissent. 
Sincerely(~ 
Justice White 
cc: The Conference 
r~: t, • 
CHAMbERS 01'" 
THE CHIEF .JUSTICE 
.§JqJrmu <flottrl Df tltt~b .1\bdts 
Jtasqinghtn. ~. <If. 2llp'!>~ 
May 9, 1984 
Re: 82-5466 - Welsh v. Wisconsin 
Dear Bill: 
Please show me 
\ 
"The Chief Justice would dismiss 
the writ as having been improvi-
dently granted and defer resolu-
tion of the question presented 
to a more appropriate case." 
Justice Brennan 
Copies to the Conference 
,ti 
&82-5466 Welsh v. Wisconsin (Cammie) 
WJB for the Court 
1st draft 3/5/84 
2nd draft 3/13/84 
3rd draft 5/10/84 
Joined by JPS 3/6/84 
Joined by HAB 3/6/84 (will maintain separate writing) 
Joined by TM 3/7/84 
Joined by SOC 3/12/84 
LFP 3/13/84 
HAB concurring 
1st draft 3/7/84 
BRW dissenting 
1st draft 4/30/84 
2nd draft 5/7/84 
Joined by WHR 5/4/84 
CJ would DIG 5/9/84 
82-5466 Welch v. Wisconsin (Cammie) 
WJB for the Court 2/28/84 
PC 10/7/83 
1st draft 10/18/83 
2nd draft 10/19/83 




WJB dissent 12/14/83 
2nd draft 12/23/83 
3rd draft 12/29/83 
4th draft 1/6/84 · 
5th draft 2/2/84 
Joined by TM 12/14/83 
JPS joins all but Part II-A 
HAB still with WJB in. joining all except Part IIA 
2/2/84 
JPS joins 2/8/84 
JPS dissent 
Typed draft 12/14/83 
1st printed draft 12/20/83 
3rd draft 2/14/84 
HAB dissent · 
1st draft 12/23/83 
Reassigned to Justice Rehnquist 1/6/84 
Will draft PC 1/9/84 
1st draft 1/26/84 
2nd draft 1/31/84 
3rd draft 2/4/84 
Joined by SOC 1/27/84 
Joined by CJ 1/31/84 
Joined by BRW 2/14/84 
TM withdraws join in parts of opinion 2/2/84 
JPS dissent 
1st draft 2/10/84 
WHR requesting opinion be reassigned 2/27/84 
LFP letter to CJ case should be decided on merits 3/1/84 
l 
i 
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From: Justice Brennan 
r~ Circulated: ---+<·4jrH--';('-4(fl~Y'J -----
Recirculated: ________ _ 
1st DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 82-5466 
EDWARD G. WELSH, PETITIONER v. WISCONSIN 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF 
WISCONSIN 
[December -, 1983] 
JUSTICE BRENNAN, dissenting. 
In Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573 (1980), the Court 
concluded that, absent probable cause and exigent circum-
stances, warrantless arrests in the home are prohibited by 
the Fourth Amendment. At the same time, we explicitly re-
fused "to consider the sort of emergency or dangerous situa-
tion, described in our cases as 'exigent circumstances,' that 
would justify a warrantless entry into a home for the purpose 
of either arrest or search." I d., at 583. Certiorari was 
originally granted in this case to decide at least one aspect of 
the unresolved question: whether, and if so under what cir-
cumstances, the Fourth Amendment prohibits the police 
from making a warrantless night entry of a person's home in 
order to arrest him for violation of a nonjailable traffic of-
fense. Because, in my view, this case presents a record that 
compels us to decide that question, I cannot agree that the 
Court should dismiss the writ of certiorari as improvidently 
granted. I therefore reach the merits of the question pre-
sented and would reverse the judgment of the Supreme 
Court of Wisconsin. 
I 
A 
Shortly before 9:00 p. m. on the rainy night of April 24, 
1978, a lone witness, Randy Jablonic, observed a car that was 
being driven erratically. Mter changing speeds and veering 
from side to side, the car eventually swerved off the road and 
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came to a stop in an open field. No damage to any person or 
property occurred. Apparently worrying about the driver 
and fearing that the car would get back on the highway, 
J ablonic drove his truck up behind the car so as to block it 
from returning to the road. Another passerby also stopped 
at the scene, and Jablonic asked her to call the police. Be-
fore the police arrived, however, the driver of the car 
emerged from his vehicle, approached Jablonic's truck, and 
asked J ablonic for a ride home. J ablonic instead suggested 
that they wait for assistance in removing or repairing the car. 
Ignoring J ablonic's suggestion, the driver walked away from 
the scene. 
A few minutes later, the police arrived and questioned 
J ablonic. He told one officer what he had seen, specifically 
noting that the driver was either very inebriated or very 
sick. The officer checked the motor vehicle registration of 
the abandoned car and learned that it was registered to the 
petitioner, Edward G. Welsh. In addition, the officer noted 
that the petitioner's residence was a short distance from the 
scene, and therefore easily within walking distance. 
Without securing any type of warrant, the police pro-
ceeded to the petitioner's home, arriving about 9:00 p. m. 
When the petitioner's stepdaughter answered the door, the 
police successfully sought entry into the house. 1 They pro-
ceeded upstairs to the petitioner's bedroom, where they 
found him lying naked in bed. At this point, the petitioner 
was placed under arrest for driving or operating a motor ve-
hicle while under the influence of an intoxicant, in violation of 
' The state trial court never decided whether there was consent to the 
entry because it deemed decision of that issue unnecessary in light of its 
finding that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless arrest. After 
reversing the lower court's finding of exigent circumstances, the Wisconsin 
Court of Appeals remanded for full consideration of the consent issue. See 
State v. Welsh, No. 80-1686, App. 114-125. That remand never occurred, 
however, because the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed its court of ap-
peals and reinstated the trial court's judgment. See State v. Welsh , 108 
Wis. 2d 319, 321 N. W. 2d 245 (1982). 
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Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1) (1977). 2 The petitioner was taken to 
the police station, where he refused to submit to a breatha-
lyzer test. 
B 
As a result of these events, the petitioner was subjected to 
two separate but related proceedings: one concerning his re-
fusal to submit to a breath test and the other involving the 
alleged code violation for driving while intoxicated. Under 
the Wisconsin vehicle code as it appeared in April1978, any-
one arrested for driving while intoxicated under § 346. 63(1) 
could be requested by a law enforcement officer to provide 
breath, blood, or urine samples for the purpose of determin-
ing the presence or quantity of alcohol. Wis. Stat. 
§ 343.305(1) (1975). If such a request was made, the arrestee 
was required to submit to the appropriate testing or risk a 
revocation of operating privileges. Cf. South Dakota v. 
Neville,-- U. S. -- (1983) (admission into evidence of a 
defendant's refusal to submit to a blood-alcohol test does not 
offend constitutional right against self-incrimination). The 
arrestee could challenge the officer's request, however, by 
refusing to undergo testing and then asking for a hearing to 
determine whether the refusal was justified. If, after the 
hearing, it was determined that the refusal was not justified, 
the arrestee's operating privileges would be revoked for 60 
days. 3 
2 Since the time of the petitioner's arrest, § 346.63 has been amended to 
provide for a code violation if someone drives or operates a motor vehicle 
while under the influence of an intoxicant or while evidencing certain 
blood- or breath-alcohol levels. See Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(a)-(b) 
(1981-1982). This amendment, however, has no bearing on the issues 
raised by the present case. 
3 Since the time of the petitioner's arrest, this statute also has been 
amended, with the current version found at Wis. Stat. § 343.305 
(1981-1982). Although the procedures to be followed by the law enforce-
ment officer and the arrestee have remained essentially unchanged, 
§ 343.305(3), (8), the potential length of any revocation of operating privi-
leges has been increased, depending on the arrestee's prior driving record, 
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The statute also set forth specific criteria to be applied by a 
court when determining whether an arrestee's refusal to take 
a breath test was justified. Included among these criteria 
was a requirement that, before revoking the arrestee's op-
erating privileges, the court determine that "the refusal ... 
to submit to a test was unreasonable." § 343.305(2)(b)(5) 
(1975). It is not disputed that an arrestee's refusal to take a 
breath test would be reasonable, and therefore operating 
privileges could not be revoked, if the underlying arrest was 
not lawful. Indeed, state law has consistently provided that 
a valid arrest is a necessary prerequisite to the imposition of 
a breath test. See Scales v. State, 64 Wis. 2d 485, 494, 219 
N. W. 2d 286, 292 (1974). Although the statute in effect in 
April 1978 referred to reasonableness, the current version of 
§ 343.305 explicitly recognizes that one of the issues that an 
arrestee may raise at a refusal hearing is "whether [he] was 
lawfully placed under arrest for violation of s.346.63(1)." 
§ 343.305(3)(b)(5)(a), (8)(b) (1981-82). See also 67 Op. Wis. 
Atty. Gen. 93-78 (Dec. 27, 1978) ("statutory scheme ... con-
templates that a lawful arrest be made prior to a request for 
submission to a test"). 4 
Separate statutory provisions control the penalty that 
might be imposed for the substantive offense of driving while 
intoxicated. At the time in question, the vehicle code pro-
vided that a first offense for driving while intoxicated was a 
noncriminal violation subject to a civil forfeiture proceeding 
for a maximum fine of $200; a second or subsequent offense in 
the previous five years was a potential misdemeanor that 
could be punished by imprisonment for up to one year and a 
§ 343.305(9)(a)-(b). An arrestee who improperly refuses to submit to are-
quired test may also be required to comply with an assessment order and a 
driver safety plan. § 343.305(9)(c}-(e). These amendments, however, 
also have no direct bearing on the issues raised by the present case. 
• Because state law provides that evidence of the petitioner's refusal to 
submit to a breath test is inadmissible if the underlying arrest was unlaw-
ful, this case does not implicate the exclusionary rule under the Federal 
Constitution. 
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maximum fine of $500. Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2) (1975). Since 
that time, the state has made only minor amendments to 
these penalty provisions. Indeed, the statute continues to 
categorize a first offense as a civil violation that allows for 
only a monetary forfeiture of no more than $300. 
§ 346.65(2)(a) (1981-82). See State v. Albright, 98 Wis. 2d 
663, 672-673, 298 N. W. 2d 196, 202 (App. 1980). 
c 
As noted, in this case the petitioner refused to submit to a 
breath test; he subsequently filed a timely request for a re-
fusal hearing. Before that hearing was held, however, the 
state filed a criminal complaint against the petitioner for 
driving while intoxicated. 5 The petitioner responded by fil-
ing a motion to dismiss the complaint, relying on his conten-
tion that the underlying arrest was invalid. After receiving 
evidence at a hearing on this motion in July 1980, the trial 
court concluded that the criminal complaint would not be dis-
missed because the existence of both probable cause and exi-
gent circumstances justified the warrantless arrest. The de-
cision at the refusal hearing, which was not held until 
September 1980, was therefore preordained. In fact, the 
primary issue at the refusal hearing-whether the petitioner 
acted reasonably in refusing to submit to a breath test be-
cause he was unlawfully placed under arrest, see supra, at 
---h. ad now been determined two months earlier by the 
same trial court. · 
5 The petitioner was charged with a criminal misdemeanor because this 
was his second such citation in the previous five years. See § 346. 65(2) 
(1975). Although the petitioner was subject to a criminal charge, the po-
lice conducting the warrantless entry of his home did not know that the 
petitioner had ever been charged with, or much less convicted of, a prior 
violation for driving while intoxicated. It must be assumed, therefore, 
that at the time of the arrest the police were acting as if they were investi-
gating and eventually arresting for a civil violation only. See Beck v. 
Ohio, 379 U. S. 89, 91, 96 (1964). 
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As expected, after the refusal hearing, the trial court con-
cluded that the arrest of the petitioner was lawful and that 
the petitioner's refusal to take the breath test was therefore 
unreasonable. 6 Accordingly, the court issued an order sus-
pending the petitioner's operating license for 60 days. On 
appeal, the suspension order was vacated by the Wisconsin 
Court of Appeals. See State v. Welsh, No. 80-1686, App. 
114-125. Contrary to the trial court, the appellate court 
concluded that the warrantless arrest of the petitioner in his 
home violated the Fourth Amendment because the State, al-
though demonstrating probable cause to arrest, had not es-
tablished the existence of exigent circumstances. The peti-
tioner's refusal to submit to a breath test was therefore 
reasonable. 7 The Wisconsin Supreme Court in turn re-
versed the court of appeals, relying on the existence of three 
factors that it believed constituted exigent circumstances: 
the need for "hot pursuit" of a suspect, the need to prevent 
physical harm to the offender and the public, and the need to 
prevent destruction of evidence. See State v. Welsh, 108 
Wis. 2d 319, 336--338, 321 N. W. 2d 245, 254-255 (1982). Be-
cause of the important Fourth Amendment implications of 
the decision below, we granted certiorari. -- U. S. --
(1983). 8 
• When ruling from the bench after the refusal hearing, the trial judge 
specifically indicated: 
"[T]he Court is bound by its ealier ruling that that was a valid arrest. 
And, I think [counsel for the petitioner] certainly will have the right to 
challenge that on appeal if he appeals this matter, as well as the previous 
ruling should there be a conviction on the underlying charge." App. 111. 
See also App. 112-113. 
7 The court remanded the case for further findings as to whether the 
police had entered the petitioner's home with consent. See note 1, supra. 
8 Although the state courts differed in their respective conclusions con-
cerning exigent circumstances, they each found that the facts known to the 
police at the time of the warrantless home entry were sufficient to establish 
probable cause to arrest. The petitioner has not challenged that finding 
before this Court. 
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II 
It is axiomatic that "the physical entry of the home is the 
chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amend-
ment is directed." United States v. United States District 
Court, 407 U. S. 297, 313 (1972). And a principal protection 
against unnecessary intrusions into private dwellings is the 
warrant requirement imposed by the Fourth Amendment on 
agents of the government who seek to enter the home for 
purposes of search or arrest. See Johnson v. United States, 
333 U. S. 10, 13-14 (1948). 9 It is not surprising, therefore, 
that the Court has recognized, as "a 'basic principle of Fourth 
Amendment law[,]' that searches and seizures inside a home 
without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable." Pay-
ton v. New York, 445 U. S., at 586. See Coolidge v. New 
Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 474-475 (1971) ("a search or sei-
zure carried out on a suspect's premises without a warrant is 
per se unreasonable, unless the police can show ... the pres-
ence of 'exigent circumstances'"). See also Steagald v. 
The parallel criminal proceedings against the petitioner, see supra, at 
--, resulted in a misdemeanor conviction for driving while intoxicated. 
During the jury trial, held in early 1982, the state introduced evidence of 
the petitioner's refusal to submit to a breath test. His appeal from that 
conviction, now before the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, has been stayed 
pending our decision in this case. See Brief for Petitioner 17, n. 5. 
9 In Johnson, Justice Jackson eloquently explained the warrant require-
ment in the context of a home search: 
"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by 
zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the 
usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protec-
tion consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and 
detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the 
often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. . . . The right of offi-
cers to thrust themselves into a home is ... a grave concern, not only to 
the individual but to a society which chooses to dwell in reasonable security 
and freedom from surveillance. When the right of privacy must reason-
ably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial 
officer, not by a policeman or government enforcement agent." Id., at 
13-14 (footnote omitted). 
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United States, 451 U. S. 204, 211-212 (1981); McDonald v. 
United States, 335 U. S. 451, 456 (1948); Johnson v. United 
States, supra, at 1:>--15; Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 
630 (1886). 
Consistent with these long-recognized principles, the 
Court decided in Payton v. New York, supra, that warrant-
less arrests in the home are prohibited by the Fourth Amend-
ment, absent probable cause and exigent circumstances. 
Id., at 58:>--590. Although one might infer from the Court's 
decision that all home arrests would be subject to the same 
rule, the Court expressly framed its opinion in terms of "rou-
tine felony arrests," see id., at 574, 602. This formulation of 
the holding in Payton implies two separate, but related limi-
tations that have yet to be acknowledged completely by the 
Court, but which control the present case. In particular, by 
its own terms the holding in Payton-limited to "routine fel-
ony arrests"-was neither intended to cover arrests for non-
serious offenses nor applied to arrests that are considered 
nonroutine because they are justified by exigent 
circumstances. 
A 
By concluding that the Fourth Amendment prohibits home 
entries to make warrantless felony arrests in the absence of 
probable cause and exigent circumstances, the Court in 
Payton decided, a fortiori, that warrantless home arrests are 
similarly prohibited for offenses less serious than felonies. 
It does not necessarily follow, however, that warrantless 
home arrests for nonserious offenses would be proper, even if 
probable cause and exigent circumstances are found to exist. 
That question, yet to be decided by the Court, is presented 
by the record in this case. I therefore reach the issue and 
conclude that the Fourth Amendment imposes an absolute 
ban on warrantless home arrests for certain minor offenses. 
In United States v. Watson, 423 U. S. 411 (1976), the 
Court upheld a warrantless "midday public" arrest for a fel-
ony. In so doing, the Court relied heavily on the common-
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law rule that "a peace officer was permitted to arrest without 
a warrant for a misdemeanor or felony committed in his 
presence as well as for a felony not committed in his presence 
if there was reasonable ground for making the arrest." I d., 
at 418 (emphasis added) (citing sources); id., at 438 (MAR-
SHALL, J., dissenting). Although not necessary to the result 
in Watson, the italicized portion of the common-law rule sug-
gests that warrantless public arrests for misdemeanors, even 
if supported by probable cause and exigent circumstances, 
should be prohibited unless the underlying offense is commit-
ted in the presence of the arresting officer. See generally 
W. LaFave, Arrest 231-243 (1965). Therefore, even accept-
ing the Court's view in Watson that the Fourth Amendment 
grants broad authority for warrantless public arrests, adher-
ence to the common-law rule would allow warrantless misde-
meanor arrests in public areas only in the most narrow cir-
cumstances. 10 It logically follows that warrantless home 
1° For purposes of this case only, I assume that the common-law rule 
identified in Watson applied in its literal sense to all misdemeanors. 
There is substantial evidence, however, that public arrests were justified 
under the common law, even for offenses committed in the officer's pres-
ence, only for breaches of the peace-a category of offenses much nar-
rower, and far more serious, than all misdemeanors. See, e. g., W. 
LaFave, Arrest 231 (1965); Bohlen & Shulman, Arrest With and Without a 
Warrant, 75 U. Pa. L. Rev. 485 (1927). As explained by the New York 
Colp't of Appeals: 
"The right of a peace officer at common law to arrest summarily was a 
limited one. 'The common law did not authorize the arrest of persons 
guilty or suspected of misdemeanors, except in cases of an actual breach of 
the peace either by an affray or by violence to an individual. In such cases 
the arrest had to be made not so much for the purpose of bringing the of-
fender to justice as in order to preserve the peace, and the right to arrest 
was accordingly limited to cases in which the person to be arrested was 
taken in the act or immediately after its conclusion.' (Stephen's History of 
the Criminal Law of England, p. 193; Chase's Blackstone [4th ed.], pp. 998, 
999; 6 C. J. S. Arrest, § 6, subd. c.)" People v. Phillips, 284 N. Y. 235, 
237, 30 N. E. 2d 488, 489 (1940). 
Moreover, I remain convinced that it is incorrect to base current inter-
pretations of the Fourth Amendment solely on the literal words of the com-
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entries to make arrests for public misdemeanors would also 
be prohibited, possibly with a similarly narrow exception for 
persons committing such misdemeanors in the presence of an 
officer and then fleeing, upon hot pursuit, into the home. 
Cf. United States v. Santana, 427 U. S. 38, 42-43 (1976) (hot 
pursuit of fleeing felon); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294 
(1967) (same). And, although the rules for home arrests at 
the time of the adoption of the Fourth Amendment were far 
from clear, see Payton v. New York, 445 U. S., at 591-598, it 
appears that such a severe restriction on home arrests for 
misdemeanors was the prevailing view of the common law. 
See, e. g., The Queen v. Marsden, 1 L. R.-Cr. Cas. Res. 131 
(1868); Wilgus, Arrest Without a Warrant, 22 Mich. L. Rev. 
541, 798, 803 (1924) ("Of course since ... an officer ... has 
[no] authority to arrest for a past breach of the peace without 
a warrant, neither would [he] have the right to break doors in 
an attempted arrest therefor, except for one committed in his 
presence and on fresh pursuit."). See also Handcock v. 
Baker, 126 Eng. Rep. 1270 (1800); Adair v. Williams, 24 
Ariz. 422, 210 P: 853 (1922); Wilgus, supra, at 804. There-
fore, even if exigent circumstances exist, the common law 
suggests that warrantless home arrests for misdemeanors 
should be prohibited, with the possible exception of hot pur-
suit from the commission of a misdemeanor in the officer's 
presence. 
Surely, the prohibitions of the Fourth Amendment go at 
least as far-prohibiting warrantless entries of the home to 
arrest for certain minor offenses under all circumstances, 
even if probable cause and exigent circumstances are shown 
mon-law rules of arrest. Rather, the Fourth Amendment "must be inter-
preted 'in light of contemporary norms and conditions. ' " Steagald v. 
United States, 451 U. S. 204, 217 and n. 10 (1981), quoting Payton v. New 
York , 445 U. S. 573, 591 and n. 33 (1980). See also United States v. Wat-
son, 423 U. S. 411, 433, 438-443 (1976) (MARSHALL, J ., dissenting). For 
purposes of this case, however, even acceptance of the common-law rule 
compels the conclusion that the petitioner's arrest was unlawful. 
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to exist. Before agents of the government may invade the 
sanctity of the home, the government must be required to 
demonstrate a compelling need that overcomes the presump-
tion of unreasonableness that attaches to all warrantless 
home entries. See Payton v. New York, supra, at 586. 
When the government's interest is only to arrest for a minor 
offense, that presumption of unreasonableness should be 
irrebuttable, and the government should be allowed to make 
such an arrest only with a warrant issued upon probable 
cause by a neutral and detached magistrate. Accordingly, I 
conclude that there are no circumstances under which a war-
rantless home entry to arrest for a minor offense could be jus-
tified.11 The Fourth Amendment, in my view, compels such 
an absolute ban. 
Application of this bright-line principle to the facts of this 
case proves quite simple. The State of Wisconsin has chosen 
to classify the first offense for driving while intoxicated as a 
noncriminal, civil forfeiture offense for which no imprison-
ment is possible. See Wis. Stat. § 346. 65(2) (1975); id., 
§ 346.65(2)(a) (1981-82); supra, at--. This is the best indi-
cation of the State's interest in precipitating an arrest, and is 
one that can be easily identified both by the courts and by of-
ficers faced with a decision to arrest. See supra, note 5. 
An offense for which no imprisonment is possible, however, 
does not suffice to overcome the presumption of unreason-
ableness that attaches to a warrantless entry of the home to 
arrest. 12 The arrest of the petitioner in this case, therefore, 
11 Even the dissenters in Payton v. Ne:w York, 445 U. S. 573 (1980), al-
though believing that warrantless home arrests are not prohibited by the 
Fourth Amendment, recognized the importance of the felony limitation on 
such arrests. See i d. , at 603, 616-617 (WHITE, J., dissenting) ("The felony 
requirement guards against abusive or arbitrary enforcement and ensures 
that invasions of the home occur only in case of the most serious crimes."). 
I see little reason to remove this general restriction even if there is ample 
support for a finding of exigent circumstances. 
12 Although I have previously joined in noting the danger of drawing con-
stitutional lines based on legislative classifications of statutory crimes, see 
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was prohibited by the Fourth Amendment. As a result of 
this unlawful arrest, state law provides that the revocation of 
his operating privileges was also improper. See Wise. Stat. 
§ 343.305(2)(b)(5) (1975); id., § 343.305(3)(b)(5)(a) (1981-82); 
supra, at--. Accordingly, the judgment of the Supreme 
Court of Wisconsin should be vacated, and the case remanded 
for further proceedings. 
B 
Even if I were to conclude that an absolute ban on warrant-
less home arrests for certain nonserious offenses is not com-
pelled by the Fourth Amendment, I would conclude that the 
petitioner's arrest was prohibited by the Fourth Amendment 
because of the absence of exigent circumstances. 
In Payton v. New York, 445 U. S., at 583, the Court de-
clined to consider the scope of any exception for exigent cir-
cumstances that might justify warrantless home arrests, 
thereby leaving to the lower courts the initial application of 
the exigent-circumstances exception. Prior decisions of this 
Court, however, have emphasized that exceptions to the war-
rant requirement are "few in number and carefully delin-
United States v. Watson, 423 U. S., at 438-442, 454-455 (MARSHALL, J. , 
dissenting), it is not necessary to decide in this case whether the Fourth 
Amendment prohibits warrantless home arrests for all nonfelonious 
crimes. Rather, given the facts of this case, I would simply hold that such 
arrests are constitutionally prohibited at least for all minor offenses, de-
fined primarily by looking to the extent of punishment provided for by the 
state statute. 
Nor do I mean to suggest that the prevention of drunk driving is not 
properly of major concern to the States. The State of Wisconsin, how-
ever, along with several other states, see, e. g. , Minn. Stat.§ 169.121 subd. 
4 (1982); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 39-669.07(1) (Supp. 1982); S. D. Codified Laws 
§ 32-23-2 (Supp. 1983), has chosen to limit severely the penalties that may 
be imposed after a first conviction for driving while intoxicated. Given 
that the classification of state crimes differs widely among the States, the 
penalty that may attach to any particular offense seems to provide the 
clearest and most consistent indication of the state's interest in arresting 
individuals suspected of committing that offense. 
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eated," United States v. United States District Court, 407 
U. S., at 318, and that the police have a heavy burden to 
meet when attempting to demonstrate an urgent need that 
might justify warrantless searches or arrests. Indeed, the 
Court has recognized only a few such emergency conditions, 
see, e. g., United States v. Santana, 427 U. S., at 42-43 
(1976) (hot pursuit of a fleeing felon); Warden v. Hayden, 387 
U. S., at 29~299 (1967) (same); Schmerber v. California, 384 
U. S. 757, 770-771 (1966) (destruction of evidence); Michigan 
v. Tyler, 436 U. S. 499, 509 (1978) (ongoing fire), and has ac-
tually applied only the "hot pursuit" doctrine to arrests in the 
home, see Santana, supra. The record in this case, how-
ever, requires that the Court clarify this area of Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence. In so doing, I conclude that an 
important factor to be considered when determining whether 
any exigency exists is the gravity of the underlying offense 
for which the arrest is being made. Moreover, although no 
exigency is created simply because there is probable cause to 
believe that a serious crime has been committed, I conclude 
that application of the exigent-circumstances exception 
should be severely restricted when only a minor offense is 
involved. 
This is not a novel idea. Writing in concurrence in M c-
Donald v. United States, 335 U. S. 451 (1948), Justice Jack-
son explained why a finding of exigent circumstances to jus-
tify a warrantless home entry should be severely restricted: 
"Even if one were to conclude that urgent circum-
stances might justify a forced entry without a warrant, 
no such emergency was present in this case. This 
method of law enforcement displays a shocking lack of all 
sense of proportion. Whether there is reasonable ne-
cessity for a search without waiting to obtain a warrant 
certainly depends somewhat upon the gravity of the of-
fense thought to be in progress as well as the hazards of 
the method of attempting to reach it. . . . It is to me a 
shocking proposition that private homes, even quarters 
14 
82-5466---DISSENT 
WELSH v. WISCONSIN 
in a tenement, may be indiscriminately invaded at the 
discretion of any suspicious police officer engaged in 
following up offenses that involve no violence or threats 
of it. While I should be human enough to apply the let-
ter of the law with some indulgence to officers acting to 
deal with threats or crimes of violence which endanger 
life or security, it is notable that few of the searches 
found by this Court to be unlawful dealt with that cate-
gory of crime. . . . While the enterprise of parting fools 
from their money by the "numbers" lottery is one that 
ought to be suppressed, I do not think that its suppres-
sion is more important to society than the security of the 
people against unreasonable searches and seizures. 
When an officer undertakes to act as his own magistrate, 
he ought to be in a position to justify it by pointing to 
some real immediate and serious consequences if he post-
poned action to get a warrant." ld., at 459-460 (Jack-
son, J., concurring) (footnote omitted). 
Consistent with this approach, the lower courts have 
looked to the nature of the underlying offense as an impor-
tant factor to be considered in the exigent-circumstances cal-
culus. In the leading federal case defining exigent circum-
stances, for example, the en bane United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia recognized that the 
gravity of the underlying offense was a principal factor to be 
weighed. Dorman v. United States, 435 F. 2d 385, 392 
(CADC 1970). 13 Without approving all of the factors in-
cluded in the standard adopted by that court, it is sufficient 
to note that many other lower courts have also considered the 
gravity of the offense an important part of their constitu-
tional analysis. 
13 See generally Donnino & Girese, Exigent Circumstances for a War-
rantless Home Arrest, 45 Alb. L. Rev. 90 (1980); Harbaugh & Faust, 
"Knock on Any Door"-Home Arrests After Payton and Steagald, 86 
Dick. L. Rev. 191, 220-233 (1982); Note, Exigent Circumstances for War-
rantless Home Arrests, 23 Ariz. L. Rev. 1171 (1981). 
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As a result, courts have permitted warrantless home ar-
rests for major felonies if identifiable exigencies, independent 
of the gravity of the offense, existed at the time of the arrest. 
Compare United States v. Campbell, 581 F. 2d 22 (CA2 1978) 
(allowing warrantless home arrest for armed robbery when 
exigent circumstances existed), with Commonwealth v. Wil-
liams, 483 Pa. 293, 396 A. 2d 1177 (1978) (disallowing war-
rantless home arrest for murder due to absence of exigent 
circumstances). But I am aware of no case that has permit-
ted a warrantless home arrest for a nonfelonious crime. Cf. 
People v. Sanders, 59 Ill. App. 3d 6, 374 N. E. 2d 139 (1978) 
(burglary without weapons not grave offense of violence for 
this purpose); State v. Bennett, 295 N. W. 2d 5 (S. D. 1980) 
(distribution of controlled substances not a grave offense for 
these purposes). This should not be surprising. It is, in-
deed, difficult to conceive of a warrantless home arrest that 
would not be unreasonable when the underlying offense is 
relatively minor. I therefore conclude that the common-
sense result reached by most lower courts is required by the 
Fourth Amendment prohibition on "unreasonable searches 
and seizures," and would hold that application of the exigent-
circumstances exception in the context of a home entry is se-
verely restricted when there is probable cause to believe that 
only a minor offense has been committed. 
Again, application of this principle to the facts of the 
present case is relatively straightforward. The petitioner 
was arrested in the privacy of his own bedroom for a non-
criminal, traffic offense. The State attempts to justify the 
arrest by relying on the hot-pursuit doctrine, on the threat to 
public safety, and on the need to preserve evidence of the pe-
titioner's blood-alcohol level. The claim of hot pursuit is un-
convincing, however, because there was no immediate or con-
tinuous pursuit of the petitioner from the scene of a crime. 
Moreover, because the petitioner had already arrived home, 
and had abandoned his car at the scene of the accident, there 
was little remaining threat to the public safety. Hence, the 
,. 
82-5466---DISSENT 
16 WELSH v. WISCONSIN 
only potentially viable emergency claimed by the State was 
the need to ascertain the petitioner's blood-alcohol level. 
But even assuming that the underlying facts would support a 
finding of this exigent circumstance, mere similarity to other 
cases involving the imminent destruction of evidence is not 
suffient. In the context of a minor, nonjailable traffic of-
fense, a warrantless home arrest simply cannot be upheld us-
ing this otherwise plausible justification. The principles of 
the Fourth Amendment do not sanction such unreasonable 
police behavior. 
III 
For unexplained reasons, the Court has chosen to dismiss 
the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted. As a result, 
the Court lets stand a warrantless, nighttime entry into the 
petitioner's home to arrest him for violation of a civil traffic 
offense. In my view, such an arrest is clearly prohibited by 
prevailing case law and by the special protection afforded the 
home under the Fourth Amendment. The petitioner's ar-
rest was therefore invalid, the judgment of the Supreme 
Court of Wisconsin should be vacated, and the case remanded 
for further proceedings. 
I respectfully dissent. 
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JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom JUSTICE MARSHALL joins, 
and with whom JUSTICE STEVENS joins in all but Part II-A, 
dissenting. 
In Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573 (1980), the Court 
concluded that, absent probable cause and exigent circum-
stances, warrantless arrests in the home are prohibited by 
the Fourth Amendment. At the same time, we explicitly re-
fused "to consider the sort of emergency or dangerous situa-
tion, qescribed in our cases as 'exigent circumstances,' that 
would justify a warrantless entry into a home for the purpose 
of either arrest or search." I d., at 583. Certiorari was 
originally granted in this case to decide at least one aspect of 
the unresolved question: whether, and if so under what cir-
cumstances, the Fourth Amendment prohibits the police 
from making a warrantless night entry of a person's home in 
order to arrest him for violation of a nonjailable traffic of-
fense. Because, in my view, this case presents a record that 
compels us to decide that question, I cannot agree that the 
Court should dismiss the writ of certiorari as improvidently 
granted. I therefore reach the merits of the question pre-
sented and would reverse the judgment of the Supreme 
Court of Wisconsin. 
I 
A 
Shortly before 9:00 p. m. on the rainy night of April 24, 
1978, a lone witness, Randy J al;>lonic, observed a car that was 
v 
82-5466-DISSENT 
2 WELSH v. WISCONSIN 
being driven erratically. After changing speeds and veering 
from side to side, the car eventually swerved off the road and 
came to a stop in an open field. No damage to any person or 
property occurred. Apparently worrying about the driver 
and fearing that the car would get back on the highway, 
J ablonic drove his truck up behind the car so as to block it 
from returning to the road. Another passerby also stopped 
at the scene, and J ablonic asked her to call the police. Be-
fore the police arrived, however, the driver of the car 
emerged from his vehicle, approached Jablonic's truck, and 
asked J ablonic for a ride home. J ablonic instead suggested 
that they wait for assistance in removing or repairing the car. 
Ignoring Jablonic's suggestion, the driver walked away from 
the scene. 
A few minutes later, the police arrived and questioned 
J ablonic. He told one officer what he had seen, specifically 
noting that the driver was either very inebriated or very 
sick. The officer checked the motor vehicle registration of 
the abandoned car and learned that it was registered to the 
petitioner, Edward G. Welsh. In addition, the officer noted 
that the petitioner's residence was a short distance from the 
scene, and therefore easily within walking distance. 
Without securing any type of warrant, the police pro-
ceeded to the petitioner's home, arriving about 9:00 p. m. 
When the petitioner's stepdaughter answered the door, the 
police successfully sought entry into the house. 1 They pro-
ceeded upstairs to the petitioner's bedroom, where they 
found him lying naked in bed. At this point, the petitioner 
' The state trial court never decided whether there was consent to the 
entry because it deemed decision of that issue unnecessary in light of its 
finding that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless arrest. After 
reversing the lower court's finding of exigent circumstances, the Wisconsin 
Court of Appeals remanded for full consideration of the consent issue. See 
State v. Welsh, No. 80-1686, App. 114-125. That remand never occurred, 
however, because the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed its court of ap-
peals and reinstated the trial court's judgment. See State v. Welsh, 108 
Wis. 2d 319, 321 N. W. 2d 245 (1982). 
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was placed under arrest for driving or operating a motor ve-
hicle while under the influence of an intoxicant, in violation of 
Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1) (1977). 2 The petitioner was taken to 
the police station, where he refused to submit to a breatha-
lyzer test. 
B 
As a result of these events, the petitioner was subjected to 
two separate but related proceedings: one concerning his re-
fusal to submit to a breath test and the other involving the 
alleged code violation for driving while intoxicated. Under 
the Wisconsin vehicle code as it appeared in April1978, any-
one arrested for driving while intoxicated under § 346.63(1) 
could be requested by a law enforcement officer to provide 
breath, blood, or urine samples for the purpose of determin-
ing the presence or quantity of alcohol. Wis. Stat. 
§ 343.305(1) (1975). If such a request was made, the arrestee 
was required to submit to the appropriate testing or risk a 
revocation of operating privileges. Cf. South Dakota v. 
Neville, 459 U. S. -- (1983) (admission into evidence of a 
defendant's refusal to submit to a blood-alcohol test does not 
offend constitutional right against self-incrimination). The 
arrestee could challenge the officer's request, however, by 
refusing to undergo testing and then asking for a hearing to 
determine whether the refusal was justified. If, after the 
hearing, it was determined that the refusal was not justified, 
the arrestee's operating privileges would be revoked for 60 
days. 3 
2 Since the time of the petitioner's arrest, § 346.63 has been amended to 
provide for a code violation if someone drives or operates a motor vehicle 
while under the influence of an intoxicant or while evidencing certain 
blood- or breath-alcohol levels. See Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(a)-(b) 
(1981-1982). This amendment, however, has no bearing on the issues 
raised by the present case. 
3 Since the time of the petitioner's arrest, this statute also has been 
amended, with the current version found at Wis. Stat. § 343.305 
(1981-1982). Although the procedures to be followed by the law enforce-
ment officer and the arrestee have remained essentially unchanged, 
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The statute also set forth specific criteria to be applied by a 
court when determining whether an arrestee's refusal to take 
a breath test was justified. Included among these criteria 
was a requirement that, before revoking the arrestee's op-
erating privileges, the court determine that "the refusal ... 
to submit to a test was unreasonable." § 343.305(2)(b)(5) 
(1975). It is not disputed that an arrestee's refusal to take a 
breath test would be reasonable, and therefore operating 
privileges could not be revoked, if the underlying arrest was 
not lawful. Indeed, state law has consistently provided that 
a valid arrest is a necessary prerequisite to the imposition of 
a breath test. See Scales v. State, 64 Wis. 2d 485, 494, 219 
N. W. 2d 286, 292 (1974). Although the statute in effect in 
April 1978 referred to reasonableness, the current version of 
§ 343.305 explicitly recognizes that one of the issues that an 
arrestee may raise at a refusal hearing is "whether [he] was 
lawfully placed under arrest for violation of s.346.63(1)." 
§ 343.305(3)(b)(5)(a), (8)(b) (1981--82). See also 67 Op. Wis. 
Atty. Gen. 93--78 (Dec. 27, 1978) ("statutory scheme ... con-
templates that a lawful arrest be made prior to a request for 
submission to a test"). 4 
Separate statutory provisions control the penalty that 
might be imposed for the substantive offense of driving while 
intoxicated. At the time in question, the vehicle code pro-
vided that a first offense for driving while intoxicated was a 
noncriminal violation subject to a civil forfeiture proceeding 
for a maximum fine of $200; a second or subsequent offense in 
§ 343.305(3), (8), the potential length of any revocation of operating privi-
leges has been increased, depending on the arrestee's prior driving record, 
§ 343.305(9)(a)-(b). An arrestee who improperly refuses to submit to are-
quired test may also be required to comply with an assessment order and a 
driver safety plan. § 343.305(9)(c)-(e). These amendments, however, 
also have no direct bearing on the issues raised by the present case. 
• Because state law provides that evidence of the petitioner's refusal to 
submit to a breath test is inadmissible if the underlying arrest was unlaw-
ful, this case does not implicate the exclusionary rule under the Federal 
Constitution. 
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the previous five years was a potential misdemeanor that 
could be punished by imprisonment for up to one year and a 
maximum fine of $500. Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2) (1975). Since 
that time, the state has made only minor amendments to 
these penalty provisions. Indeed, the statute continues to 
categorize a first offense as a civil violation that allows for 
only a monetary forfeiture of no more than $300. 
§ 346.65(2)(a) (1981-82). See State v. Albright, 98 Wis. 2d 
663, 672-673, 298 N. W. 2d 196, 202 (App. 1980). 
c 
As noted, in this case the petitioner refused to submit to a 
breath test; he subsequently filed a timely request for a re-
fusal hearing. Before that hearing was held, however, the 
state filed a criminal complaint against the petitioner for 
driving while intoxicated. 5 The petitioner responded by fil-
ing a motion to dismiss the complaint, relying on his conten-
tion that the unde-rlying arrest was invalid. After receiving 
evidence at a hearing on this motion in July 1980, the trial 
court concluded that the criminal complaint would not be dis-
missed because the existence of both probable cause and exi-
gent circumstances justified the warrantless arrest. The de-
cision at the refusal hearing, which was not held until 
September 1980, was therefore preordained. In fact, the 
primary issue at the refusal hearing-whether the petitioner 
acted reasonably in refusing to submit to a breath test be-
cause he was unlawfully placed under arrest, see supra, at 
6 The petitioner was charged with a criminal misdemeanor because this 
was his second such citation in the previous five years. See § 346.65(2) 
(1975). Although the petitioner was subject to a criminal charge, the po-
lice conducting the warrantless entry of his home did not know that the 
petitioner had ever been charged with, or much less convicted of, a prior 
violation for driving while intoxicated. It must be assumed, therefore, 
that at the time of the arrest the police were acting as if they were investi-
gating and eventually arresting for a civil violation only. See Beck v. 
Ohio, 379 U. S. 89, 91, 96 (1964). 
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4-had now been determined two months earlier by the same 
trial court. 
As expected, after the refusal hearing, the trial court con-
cluded that the arrest of the petitioner was lawful and that 
the petitioner's refusal to take the breath test was therefore 
unreasonable. 6 Accordingly, the court issued an order sus-
pending the petitioner's operating license for 60 days. On 
appeal, the suspension order was vacated by the Wisconsin 
Court of Appeals. See State v. Welsh, No. 80-1686, App. 
114-125. Contrary to the trial court, the appellate court 
concluded that the warrantless arrest of the petitioner in his 
home violated the Fourth Amendment because the State, al-
though demonstrating probable cause to arrest, had not es-
tablished the existence of exigent circumstances. The peti-
tioner's refusal to submit to a breath test was therefore 
reasonable. 7 The Wisconsin Supreme Court in turn re-
versed the court of appeals, relying on the existence of three 
factors that it b~lieved constituted exigent circumstances: 
the need for "hot pursuit" of a suspect, the need to prevent 
physical harm to the offender and the public, and the need to 
prevent destruction of evidence. See State v. Welsh, 108 
Wis. 2d 319, 336--338, 321 N. W. 2d 245, 254-255 (1982). Be-
cause of the important Fourth Amendment implications of 
the decision below, we granted certiorari. 459 U. S. --
(1983).8 . 
6 When ruling from the bench after the refusal hearing, the trial judge 
specifically indicated: 
"[T]he Court is bound by its earlier ruling that that was a valid arrest. 
And, I think [counsel for the petitioner] certainly will have the right to 
challenge that on appeal if he appeals this matter, as well as the previous 
ruling should there be a conviction on the underlying charge." App. 111. 
See also App. 112-113. 
7 The court remanded the case for further findings as to whether the 
police had entered the petitioner's home with consent. Seen. 1, supra. 
8 Although the state courts differed in their respective conclusions con-
cerning exigent circumstances, they each found that the facts known to the 
police at the time of the warrantless home entry were sufficient to establish 
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II 
It is axiomatic that "the physical entry of the home is the 
chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amend-
ment is directed." United States v. United States District 
Court, 407 U. S. 297, 313 (1972). And a principal protection 
against unnecessary intrusions into private dwellings is the 
warrant requirement imposed by the Fourth Amendment on 
agents of the government who seek to enter the home for 
purposes of search or arrest. See Johnson v. United States, 
333 U. S. 10, 13-14 (1948). 9 It is not surprising, therefore, 
that the Court has recognized, as "a 'basic principle of Fourth 
Amendment law[,]' that searches and seizures inside a home 
without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable." Pay-
ton v. New York, 445 U. S., at 586. See Coolidge v. New 
Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 474-475 (1971) ("a search or sei-
zure carried out on a suspect's premises without a warrant is 
probable cause to arrest. The petitioner has not challenged that finding 
before this Court. 
The parallel criminal proceedings against the petitioner, see supra, at 5 
and n. 5, resulted in a misdemeanor conviction for driving while intoxi-
cated. During the jury trial, held in early 1982, the state introduced evi-
dence of the petitioner's refusal to submit to a breath test. His appeal 
from that conviction, now before the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, has been 
stayed pending our decision in this case. See Brief for Petitioner 17, n. 5. 
9 In Johnson, Justice Jackson eloquently explained the warrant require-
ment in the context of a home search: 
"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by 
zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the 
usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protec-
tion consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and 
detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the 
often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. . . . The right of offi-
cers to thrust themselves into a home is ... a grave concern, not only to 
the individual but to a society which chooses to dwell in reasonable security 
and freedom from surveillance. When the right of privacy must reason-
ably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial 
officer, not by a policeman or government enforcement agent." Id., at 
13-14 (footnote omitted). 
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per se unreasonable, unless the police can show ... the pres-
ence of 'exigent circumstances'"). See also Steagald v. 
United States, 451 U. S. 204, 211-212 (1981); McDonald v. 
United States, 335 U. S. 451, 456 (1948); Johnson v. United 
States, supra, at 13-15; Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 
630 (1886). 
Consistent with these long-recognized principles, the 
Court decided in Payton v. New York, supra, that warrant-
less arrests in the home are prohibited by the Fourth Amend-
ment, absent probable cause and exigent circumstances. 
Id., at 583-590. Although one might infer from the Court's 
decision that all home arrests would be subject to the same 
rule, the Court expressly framed its opinion in terms of "rou-
tine felony arrests," see id., at 574, 602. This formulation of 
the holding in Payton implies two separate, but related limi-
tations that have yet to be acknowledged completely by the 
Court, but which control the present case. In particular, by 
its own terms the holding in Payton-limited to "routine fel-
ony arrests"-was neither intended to cover arrests for non-
serious offenses nor applied to arrests that are considered 
nonroutine because they are justified by exigent 
circumstances. 
A 
By concluding that the Fourth Amendment prohibits home 
entries to make warrantless felony arrests in the absence of 
probable cause and exigent circumstances, the Court in 
Payton decided, a fortiori, that warrantless home arrests are 
similarly prohibited for offenses less serious than felonies. 
It does not necessarily follow, however, that warrantless 
home arrests for nonserious offenses would be proper, even if 
probable cause and exigent circumstances are found to exist. 
That question, yet to be decided by the Court, is presented 
by the record in this case. I therefore reach the issue and 
conclude that the Fourth Amendment imposes an absolute 
ban on warrantless home arrests for certain minor offenses. 
82-546&---DISSENT 
WELSH v. WISCONSIN 9 
In United States v. Watson, 423 U. S. 411 (1976), the 
Court upheld a warrantless "midday public" arrest for a fel-
ony. In so doing, the Court relied heavily on the common-
law rule that "a peace officer was permitted to arrest without 
a warrant for a misdemeanor or felony committed in his 
presence as well as for a felony not committed in his presence 
if there was reasonable ground for making the arrest." I d., 
at 418 (emphasis added) (citing sources); id., at 438 (MAR-
SHALL, J., dissenting). Although not necessary to the result 
in Watson, the italicized portion of the common-law rule sug-
gests that warrantless public arrests for misdemeanors, even 
if supported by probable cause and exigent circumstances, 
should be prohibited unless the underlying offense is commit-
ted in the presence of the arresting officer. See generally 
W. LaFave, Arrest 231-243 (1965). Therefore, even accept-
ing the Court's view in Watson that the Fourth Amendment 
grants broad authority for warrantless public arrests, adher-
ence to the common-law rule would allow warrantless misde-
meanor arrests in public areas only in the most narrow cir-
cumstances. 10 It logically follows that warrantless home 
'°For purposes of this case only, I assume that the common-law rule 
identified in Watson applied in its literal sense to all misdemeanors. 
There is substantial evidence, however, that public arrests were justified 
under the common law, even for offenses committed in the officer's pres-
ence, only for breaches of the peace-a category of offenses much nar-
rower, and far more serious, than all misdemeanors. See, e. g., W. 
LaFave, Arrest 231 (1965); Bohlen & Shulman, Arrest With and Without a 
Warrant, 75 U. Pa. L. Rev. 485 (1927). As explained by the New York 
Court of Appeals: 
"The right of a peace officer at common law to arrest summarily was a 
limited one. 'The common law did not authorize the arrest of persons 
guilty or suspected of misdemeanors, except in cases of an actual breach of 
the peace either by an affray or by violence to an individual. In such cases 
the arrest had to be made not so much for the purpose of bringing the of-
fender to justice as in order to preserve the peace, and the right to arrest 
was accordingly limited to cases in which the person to be arrested was 
taken in the act or immediately after its conclusion.' (Stephen's History of 
the Criminal Law of England, p. 193; Chase's Blackstone [4th ed.], pp. 998, 
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entries to make arrests for public misdemeanors would also 
be prohibited, possibly with a similarly narrow exception for 
persons committing such misdemeanors in the presence of an 
officer and then fleeing, upon hot pursuit, into the home. 
Cf. United States v. Santana, 427 U. S. 38, 42-43 (1976) (hot 
pursuit of fleeing felon); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294 
(1967) (same). And, although the rules for home arrests at 
the time of the adoption of the Fourth Amendment were far 
from clear, see Payton v. New York, 445 U. S., at 591-598, it 
appears that such a severe restriction on home arrests for 
misdemeanors was the prevailing view of the common law. 
See, e. g., The Queen v. Marsden, 1 L. R.-Cr. Cas. Res. 131 
(1868); Wilgus, Arrest Without a Warrant, 22 Mich. L. Rev. 
541, 798, 803 (1924) ("Of course since ... an officer ... has 
[no] authority to arrest for a past breach of the peace without 
a warrant, neither would [he] have the right to break doors in 
an attempted arrest therefor, except for one committed in his 
presence and on fresh pursuit."). See also Handcock v. 
Baker, 126 Eng. -Rep. 1270 (1800); Adair v. Williams, 24 
Ariz. 422, 210 P. 853 (1922); Wilgus, supra, at 804. There-
fore, even if exigent circumstances exist, the common law 
suggests that warrantless home arrests for misdemeanors 
should be prohibited, with the possible exception of hot pur-
suit from the commission of a misdemeanor in the officer's 
presence. 
999; 6 C. J. S. Arrest, § 6, subd. c.)" People v. Phillips, 284 N. Y. 235, 
237, 30 N. E. 2d 488, 489 (1940). 
Moreover, I remain convinced that it is incorrect to base current inter-
pretations of the Fourth Amendment solely on the literal words of the com-
mon-law rules of arrest. Rather, the Fourth Amendment "must be inter-
preted 'in light of contemporary norms and conditions.' " Steagald v. 
United States, 451 U. S. 204, 217 and n. 10 (1981), quoting Payton v. New 
York, 445 U. S. 573, 591 and n. 33 (1980). See also United States v. Wat-
son, 423 U. S. 411, 433, 438-443 (1976) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). For 
purposes of this case, however, even acceptance of the common-law rule 
compels the conclusion that the petitioner's arrest was unlawful. 
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Surely, the prohibitions of the Fourth Amendment go at 
least as far-prohibiting warrantless entries of the home to 
arrest for certain minor offenses under all circumstances, 
even if probable cause and exigent circumstances are shown 
to exist. Before agents of the government may invade the 
sanctity of the home, the government must be required to 
demonstrate a compelling need that overcomes the presump-
tion of unreasonableness that attaches to all warrantless 
home entries. See Payton v. New York, supra, at 586. 
When the government's interest is only to arrest for a minor 
offense, that presumption of unreasonableness should be 
irrebuttable, and the government should be allowed to make 
such an arrest only with a warrant issued upon probable 
cause by a neutral and detached magistrate. Accordingly, I 
conclude that there are no circumstances under which a war-
rantless home entry to arrest for a minor offense could be jus-
tified.11 The Fourth Amendment, in my view, compels such 
an absolute ban. 
Application of this bright-line principle to the facts of this 
case proves quite simple. The State of Wisconsin has chosen 
to classify the first offense for driving while intoxicated as a 
noncriminal, civil forfeiture offense for which no imprison-
ment' is possible. See Wis. Stat. § 346. 65(2) (1975); id., 
§ 346.65(2)(a) (1981-82); supra, at 4-5. This is the best indi-
cation of the state's interest in precipitating an arrest, and is 
one that can be easily identified both by the courts aHd by of-
ficers faced with a decision to arrest. See supra, note 5. 
An offense for which no imprisonment is possible, however, 
does not suffice to overcome the presumption of unreason-
11 Even the dissenters in Payton v. New York , 445 U. S. 573 (1980), al-
though believing that warrantless home arrests are not prohibited by the 
Fourth Amendment, recognized the importance of the felony limitation on 
such arrests. See id. , at 603, 616-Q17 (WHITE, J., dissenting) ("The felony 
requirement guards against abusive or arbitrary enforcement and ensures 
that invasions of the home occur only in case of the most serious crimes."). 
I see little reason to remove this general restriction even if there is ample 
support for a finding of exigent circumstances. 
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ableness that attaches to a warrantless entry of the home to 
arrest. 12 The arrest of the petitioner in this case, therefore, 
was prohibited by the Fourth Amendment. As a result of 
this unlawful arrest, state law provides that the revocation of 
his operating privileges was also improper. See Wise. Stat. 
§ 343.305(2)(b)(5) (1975); id., § 343.305(3)(b)(5)(a) (1981-82); 
supra, at 4 and n. 4. Accordingly, the judgment of the Su-
preme Court of Wisconsin should be vacated, and the case re-
manded for further proceedings. 
B 
Even if I were to conclude that an absolute ban on warrant-
less home arrests for certain nonserious offenses is not com-
pelled by the Fourth Amendment, I would conclude that the 
petitioner's arrest was prohibited by the Fourth Amendment 
because of the absence of exigent circumstances. 
In Payton v. New Y ark, 445 U. S., at 583, the Court de-
clined to consider· the scope of any exception for exigent cir-
cumstances that might justify warrantless home arrests, 
thereby leaving to the lower courts the initial application of 
12 Although I have previously joined in noting the danger of drawing con-
stitutional lines based on legislative classifications of statutory crimes, see 
United States v. Watson, 423 U. S., at 438-442, 454-455 (MARSHALL, J., 
dissenting), it is not necessary to decide in this case whether the Fourth 
Amendment prohibits warrantless home arrests for all nonfelonious 
crimes. Rather, given the facts of this case, I would simply hold that such 
arrests are constitutionally prohibited at least for all minor offenses, de-
fined primarily by looking to the extent of punishment provided for by the 
state statute. 
Nor do I mean to suggest that the prevention of drunk driving is not 
properly of major concern to the States. The State of Wisconsin, how-
ever, along with several other States, see, e. g., Minn. Stat. § 169.121 
subd. 4 (1982); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 39--669.07(1) (Supp. 1982); S. D. Codified 
Laws § 32-23-2 (Supp. 1983), has chosen to limit severely the penalties 
that may be imposed after a first conviction for driving while intoxicated. 
Given that the classification of state crimes differs widely among the 
States, the penalty that may attach to any particular offense seems to pro-
vide the clearest and most consistent indication of the state's interest in 
arresting individuals suspected of committing that offense. 
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the exigent-circumstances exception. Prior decisions of this 
Court, however, have emphasized that exceptions to the war-
rant requirement are "few in number and carefully delin-
eated," United States v. United States District Court, 407 
U. S., at 318, and that the police have a heavy burden to 
meet when attempting to demonstrate an urgent need that 
might justify warrantless searches or arrests. Indeed, the 
Court has recognized only a few such emergency conditions, 
see, e. g., United States v. Santana, 427 U. S., at 42--43 
(1976) (hot pursuit of a fleeing felon); Warden v. Hayden, 387 
U. S., at 298-299 (1967) (same); Schmerber v. California, 384 
U. S. 757, 77~771 (1966) (destruction of evidence); Michigan 
v. Tyler, 436 U. S. 499, 509 (1978) (ongoing fire), and has ac-
tually applied only the "hot pursuit" doctrine to arrests in the 
home, see Santana, supra. The record in this case, how-
ever, requires that the Court clarify this area of Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence. In so doing, I conclude that an 
important factor to be considered when determining whether 
any exigency exists is the gravity of the underlying offense 
for which the arrest is being made. Moreover, although no 
exigency is created simply because there is probable cause to 
believe that a serious crime has been committed, I conclude 
that application of the exigent-circumstances exception 
should be severely restricted when only a minor offense is 
involved. 
This is not a novel idea. Writing in concurrence in M c-
Donald v. United States, 335 U. S. 451 (1948), Justice Jack-
son explained why a finding of exigent circumstances to jus-
tify a warrantless home entry should be severely restricted: 
"Even if one were to conclude that urgent circum-
stances might justify a forced entry without a warrant, 
no such emergency was present in this case. This 
method of law enforcement displays a shocking lack of all 
sense of proportion. Whether there is reasonable ne-
cessity for a search without waiting to obtain a warrant 
certainly depends somewhat upon the gravity of the of-
14 
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fense thought to be in progress as well as the hazards of 
the method of attempting to reach it. . . . It is to me a 
shocking proposition that private homes, even quarters 
in a tenement, may be indiscriminately invaded at the 
discretion of any suspicious police officer engaged in 
following up offenses that involve no violence or threats 
of it. While I should be human enough to apply the let-
ter of the law with some indulgence to officers acting to 
deal with threats or crimes of violence which endanger 
life or security, it is notable that few of the searches 
found by this Court to be unlawful dealt with that cate-
gory of crime. . . . While the enterprise of parting fools 
from their money by the 'numbers' lottery is one that 
ought to be suppressed, I do not think that its suppres-
sion is more important to society than the security of the 
people against unreasonable searches and seizures. 
When an officer undertakes to act as his own magistrate, 
he ought to be in a position to justify it by pointing to 
some real immediate and serious consequences if he post-
poned action to get a warrant." I d., at 459-460 (Jack-
son, J., concurring) (footnote omitted). 
Consistent with this approach, the lower courts have 
looked to the nature of the underlying offense as an impor-
tant factor to be considered in the exigent-circumstances cal-
culus. In the leading federal case defining exigent circum-
stances, for example, the en bane United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia recognized that the 
gravity of the underlying offense was a principal factor to be 
weighed. Dorman v. United States, 435 F. 2d 385, 392 
(CADC 1970). 13 Without approving all of the factors in-
cluded in the standard adopted by that court, it is sufficient 
13 See generally Donnino & Girese, Exigent Circumstances for a War-
rantless Home Arrest, 45 Alb. L. Rev. 90 (1980); Harbaugh & Faust, 
"Knock on Any Door"-Home Arrests After Payton and Steagald, 86 
Dick. L. Rev. 191, 220-233 (1982); Note, Exigent Circumstances for War-
rantless Home Arrests, 23 Ariz. L. Rev. 1171 (1981). 
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to note that many other lower courts have also considered the 
gravity of the offense an important part of their constitu-
tional analysis. 
As a result, courts have permitted warrantless horne ar-
rests for major felonies if identifiable exigencies, independent 
of the gravity of the offense, existed at the time of the arrest. 
Compare United States v. Campbell, 581 F. 2d 22 (CA2 1978) 
(allowing warrantless horne arrest for armed robbery when 
exigent circumstances existed), with Commonwealth v. Wil-
liams, 483 Pa. 293, 396 A. 2d 1177 (1978) (disallowing war-
rantless horne arrest for murder due to absence of exigent 
circumstances). But I am aware of no case that has permit-
ted a warrantless horne arrest for a nonfelonious crime. Cf. 
People v. Sanders, 59 Ill. App. 3d 6, 374 N. E. 2d 139 (1978) 
(burglary without weapons not grave offense of violence for 
this purpose); State v. Bennett, 295 N. W. 2d 5 (S. D. 1980) 
(distribution of controlled substances not a grave offense for 
these purposes) . . This should not be surprising. It is, in-
deed, difficult to conceive of a warrantless horne arrest that 
would not be unreasonable when the underlying offense is 
relatively minor. I therefore conclude that the common-
sense result reached by most lower courts is required by the 
Fourth Amendment prohibition on "unreasonable searches 
and seizures," and would hold that application of the exigent-
circumstances exception in the context of a horne entry is se-
verely restricted when there is probable cause to believe that 
only a minor offense has been committed. 
Again, application of this principle to the facts of the 
present case is relatively straightforward. The petitioner 
was arrested in the privacy of his own bedroom for a non-
criminal, traffic offense. The State attempts to justify the 
arrest by relying on the hot-pursuit doctrine, on the threat to 
public safety, and on the need to preserve evidence of the pe-
titioner's blood-alcohol level. The claim of hot pursuit is un-
convincing, however, because there was no immediate or con-
tinuous pursuit of the petitioner from the scene of a crime. 
8~66-DISSENT 
16 WELSH v. WISCONSIN 
Moreover, because the petitioner had already arrived home, 
and had abandoned his car at the scene of the accident, there 
was little remaining threat to the public safety. Hence, the 
only potentially viable emergency claimed by the State was 
the need to ..-ascertain the petitioner's blood-alcohol level. 
But even assuming that the underlying facts would support a 
finding of this exigent circumstance, mere similarity to other 
cases involving the imminent destruction of evidence is not 
sufficient. In the context of a minor, nonjailable traffic of-
fense, a warrantless home arrest simply cannot be upheld us-
ing this otherwise plausible justification. The principles of 
the Fourth Amendment do not sanction such unreasonable 
police behavior. 
III 
For unexplained reasons, the Court has chosen to dismiss 
the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted. As a result, 
the Court lets stand a warrantless, nighttime entry into the 
petitioner's home to arrest him for violation of a civil traffic 
offense. In my v:iew, such an arrest is clearly prohibited by 
prevailing case law and by the special protection afforded the 
home under the Fourth Amendment. The petitioner's ar-
rest was therefore invalid, the judgment of the Supreme 
Court of Wisconsin should be vacated, and the case remanded 
for further proceedings. 
I respectfully dissent. 
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JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom JUSTICE MARSHALL joins,) 
and with whom JUSTICE BLACKMUN and JUSTICE STEVENS 
join in all but Part II-A, dissenting. 
In Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573 (1980), the Court 
concluded that, absent probable cause and exigent circum-
stances, warrantless arrests in the home are prohibited by 
the Fourth Amendment. At the same time, we explicitly re-
fused "to consider the sort of emergency or dangerous situa-
tion, described in our cases as 'exigent circumstances,' that 
would justify a warrantless entry into a home for the purpose 
of either arrest or search." I d., at 583. Certiorari was 
originally granted in this case to decide at least one aspect of 
the unresolved question: whether, and if so under what cir-
cumstances, the Fourth Amendment prohibits the police 
from making a warrantless night entry of a person's home in 
order to arrest him for violation of a nonjailable traffic of-
fense. Because, in my view, this case presents a record that 
compels us to decide that question, I cannot agree that the 
Court should dismiss the writ of certiorari as improvidently 
granted. I therefore reach the merits of the question pre-
sented and would reverse the judgment of the Supreme 
Court of Wisconsin. 
I 
A 
Shortly before 9:00 p. m. on the rainy night of April 24, 
1978, a lone witness, Randy Jablonic, observed a car that was 
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being driven erratically. After changing speeds and veering 
from side to side, the car eventually swerved off the road and 
came to a stop in an open :field. No damage to any person or 
property occurred. Apparently worrying about the driver 
and fearing that the car would get back on the highway, 
J ablonic drove his truck up behind the car so as to block it 
from returning to the road. Another passerby also stopped 
at the scene, and J ablonic asked her to call the police. Be-
fore the police arrived, however, the driver of the car 
emerged from his vehicle, approached Jablonic's truck, and 
asked J ablonic for a ride home. J ablonic instead suggested 
that they wait for assistance in removing or repairing the car. 
Ignoring Jablonic's suggestion, the driver walked away from 
the scene. 
A few minutes later, the police arrived and questioned 
J ablonic. He told one officer what he had seen, specifically 
noting that the driver was either very inebriated or very 
sick. The officer checked the motor vehicle registration of 
the abandoned car and learned that it was registered to the 
petitioner, Edward G. Welsh. In addition, the officer noted 
that the petitioner's residence was a short distance from the 
scene, and therefore easily within walking distance. 
Without securing any type of warrant, the police pro-
ceeded to the petitioner's home, arriving about 9:00 p. m. 
When the petitioner's stepdaughter answered the door, the 
police successfully sought entry into the house. 1 They pro-
ceeded upstairs to the petitioner's bedroom, where they 
found him lying naked in bed. At this point, the petitioner 
1 The state trial court never decided whether there was consent to the 
entry because it deemed decision of that issue unnecessary in light of its 
finding that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless arrest. After 
reversing the lower court's finding of exigent circumstances, the Wisconsin 
Court of Appeals remanded for full consideration of the consent issue. See 
State v. Welsh, No. 80-1686, App. 114-125. That remand never occurred, 
however, because the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed its court of ap-
peals and reinstated the trial court's judgment. See State v. Welsh, 108 
Wis. 2d 319, 321 N. W. 2d 245 (1982). 
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was placed under arrest for driving or operating a motor ve-
hicle while under the influence of an intoxicant, in violation of 
Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1) (1977). 2 The petitioner was taken to 
the police station, where he refused to submit to a breatha-
lyzer test. 
B 
As a result of these events, the petitioner was subjected to 
two separate but related proceedings: one concerning his re-
fusal to submit to a breath test and the other involving the 
alleged code violation for driving while intoxicated. Under 
the Wisconsin vehicle code as it appeared in April1978, any-
one arrested for driving while intoxicated under § 346.63(1) 
could be requested by a law enforcement officer to provide 
breath, blood, or urine samples for the purpose of determin-
ing the presence or quantity of alcohol. Wis. Stat. 
§ 343.305(1) (1975). If such a request was made, the arrestee 
was required to submit to the appropriate testing or risk a 
revocation of operating privileges. Cf. South Dakota v. 
Neville, 459 U. S. -- (1983) (admission into evidence of a 
defendant's refusal to submit to a blood-alcohol test does not 
offend constitutional right against self-incrimination). The 
arrestee could challenge the officer's request, however, by 
refusing to undergo testing and then asking for a hearing to 
determine whether the refusal was justified. If, after the 
hearing, it was determined that the refusal was not justified, 
the arrestee's operating privileges would be revoked for 60 
days. 3 
2 Since the time of the petitioner's arrest, § 346.63 has been amended to 
provide for a code violation if someone drives or operates a motor vehicle 
while under the influence of an intoxicant or while evidencing certain 
blood- or breath-alcohol levels. See Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(a)-(b) 
(1981-82). This amendment, however, has no bearing on the issues raised 
by the present case. 
3 Since the time of the petitioner's arrest, this statute also has been 
amended, with the current version found at Wis. Stat. § 343.305 (1981-82). 
Although the procedures to be followed by the law enforcement officer and 
the arrestee have remained essentially unchanged, § 343.305(3), (8) , the po-
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The statute also set forth specific criteria to be applied by a 
court when determining whether an arrestee's refusal to take 
a breath test was justified. Included among these criteria 
was a requirement that, before revoking the arrestee's op-
erating privileges, the court determine that "the refusal ... 
to submit to a test was unreasonable." § 343.305(2)(b)(5) 
(1975). It is not disputed that an arrestee's refusal to take a 
breath test would be reasonable, and therefore operating 
privileges could not be revoked, if the underlying arrest was 
not lawful. Indeed, state law has consistently provided that 
a valid arrest is a necessary prerequisite to the imposition of 
a breath test. See Scales v. State, 64 Wis. 2d 485, 494, 219 
N. W. 2d 286, 292 (1974). Although the statute in effect in 
April 1978 referred to reasonableness, the current version of 
§ 343.305 explicitly recognizes that one of the issues that an 
arrestee may raise at a refusal hearing is "whether [he] was 
lawfully placed under arrest for violation of s.346.63(1)." 
§ 343.305(3)(b)(5)(a), (8)(b) (1981-82). See also 67 Op. Wis. 
Atty. Gen. 93-78 (Dec. 27, 1978) ("statutory scheme ... con-
templates that a lawful arrest be made prior to a request for 
submission to a test"). 4 
Separate statutory provisions control the penalty that 
might be imposed for the substantive offense of driving while 
intoxicated. At the time in question, the vehicle code pro-
vided that a first offense for driving while intoxicated was a 
noncriminal violation subject to a civil forfeiture proceeding 
for a maximum fine of $200; a second or subsequent offense in 
tentiallength of any revocation of operating privileges has been increased, 
depending on the arrestee's prior driving record , § 343.305(9)(a)-(b). An 
arrestee who improperly refuses to submit to a required test may also be 
required to comply with an assessment order and a driver safety plan. 
§ 343.305(9)(c)-(e). These amendments, however, also have no direct 
bearing on the issues raised by the present case. 
• Because state law provides that evidence of the petitioner's refusal to 
submit to a breath test is inadmissible if the underlying arrest was unlaw-
ful, this case does not implicate the exclusionary rule under the Federal 
Constitution. 
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the previous five years was a potential misdemeanor that 
could be punished by imprisonment for up to one year and a 
maximum fine of $500. Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2) (1975). Since 
that time, the state has made only minor amendments to 
these penalty provisions. Indeed, the statute continues to 
categorize a first offense as a civil violation that allows for 
only a monetary forfeiture of no more than $300. 
§ 346.65(2)(a) (1981--82). See State v. Albright, 98 Wis. 2d 
663, 672-673, 298 N. W. 2d 196, 202 (App. 1980). 
c 
As noted, in this case the petitioner refused to submit to a 
breath test; he subsequently filed a timely request for a re-
fusal hearing. Before that hearing was held, however, the 
state filed a criminal complaint against the petitioner for 
driving while intoxicated. 5 The petitioner responded by fil-
ing a motion to dismiss the complaint, relying on his conten-
tion that the underlying arrest was invalid. After receiving 
evidence at a hearing on this motion in July 1980, the trial 
court concluded that the criminal complaint would not be dis-
missed because the existence of both probable cause and exi-
gent circumstances justified the warrantless arrest. The de-
cision at the refusal hearing, which was not held until 
September 1980, was therefore preordained. In fact, the 
primary issue at the refusal hearing-whether the petitioner 
acted reasonably in refusing to submit to a breath test be-
cause he was unlawfully placed under arrest, see supra, at 
• The petitioner was charged with a criminal misdemeanor because this 
was his second such citation in the previous five years. See § 346.65(2) 
(1975). Although the petitioner was subject to a criminal charge, the po-
lice conducting the warrantless entry of his home did not know that the 
petitioner had ever been charged with, or much less convicted of, a prior 
violation for driving while intoxicated. It must be assumed, therefore, 
that at the time of the arrest the police were acting as if they were investi-
gating and eventually arresting for a civil violation only. See Beck v. 
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4--had now been determined two months earlier by the same 
trial court. 
As expected, after the refusal hearing, the trial court con-
cluded that the arrest of the petitioner was lawful and that 
the petitioner's refusal to take the breath test was therefore 
unreasonable. 6 Accordingly, the court issued an order sus-
pending the petitioner's operating license for 60 days. On 
appeal, the suspension order was vacated by the Wisconsin 
Court of Appeals. See State v. Welsh, No. 80-1686, App. 
114-125. Contrary to the trial court, the appellate court 
concluded that the warrantless arrest of the petitioner in his 
home violated the Fourth Amendment because the State, al-
though demonstrating probable cause to arrest, had not es-
tablished the existence of exigent circumstances. The peti-
tioner's refusal to submit to a breath test was therefore 
reasonable. 7 The Wisconsin Supreme Court in turn re-
versed the court of appeals, relying on the existence of three 
factors that it believed constituted exigent circumstances: 
the need for "hot pursuit" of a suspect, the need to prevent 
physical harm to the offender and the public, and the need to 
prevent destruction of evidence. See State v. Welsh, 108 
Wis. 2d 319, 33&-338, 321 N. W. 2d 245, 254-255 (1982). Be-
cause of the important Fourth Amendment implications of 
the decision below, we granted certiorari. 459 U. S. --
(1983). 8 
6 When ruling from the bench after the refusal hearing, the trial judge 
specifically indicated: 
"[T]he Court is bound by its earlier ruling that that was a valid arrest. 
And, I think [counsel for the petitioner] certainly will have the right to 
challenge that on appeal if he appeals this matter, as well as the previous 
ruling should there be a conviction on the underlying charge." App. 111. 
See also App. 112-113. 
7 The court remanded the case for further findings as to whether the 
police had entered the petitioner's home with consent. See n. 1, supra. 
8 Although the state courts differed in their respective conclusions con-
cerning exigent circumstances, they each found that the facts known to the 
police at the time of the warrantless home entry were sufficient to establish 
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II 
It is axiomatic that "the physical entry of the home is the 
chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amend-
ment is directed." United States v. United States District 
Court, 407 U. S. 297, 313 (1972). And a principal protection 
against unnecessary intrusions into private dwellings is the 
warrant requirement imposed by the Fourth Amendment on 
agents of the government who seek to enter the home for 
purposes of search or arrest. See Johnson v. United States, 
333 U. S. 10, 13--14 (1948). 9 It is not surprising, therefore, 
that the Court has recognized, as "a 'basic principle of Fourth 
Amendment law[,]' that searches and seizures inside a home 
without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable." Pay-
ton v. New York, 445 U. S., at 586. See Coolidge v. New 
Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 474-475 (1971) ("a search or sei-
zure carried out on a suspect's premises without a warrant is 
probable cause to arrest. The petitioner has not challenged that finding 
before this Court. 
The parallel criminal proceedings against the petitioner, see supra, at 5 
and n. 5, resulted in a misdemeanor conviction for driving while intoxi-
cated. During the jury trial, held in early 1982, the state introduced evi-
dence of the petitioner's refusal to submit to a breath test. His appeal 
from that conviction, now before the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, has been 
stayed pending our decision in this case. See Brief for Petitioner 17, n. 5. 
• In Johnson, Justice Jackson eloquently explained the warrant require-
ment in the context of a home search: 
"The point of the Fourth Amehdment, which often is not grasped by 
zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the 
usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protec-
tion consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and 
detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the 
often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. . . . The right of offi-
cers to thrust themselves into a home is ... a grave concern, not only to 
the individual but to a society which chooses to dwell in reasonable security 
and freedom from surveillance. When the right of privacy must reason-
ably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial 
officer, not by a policeman or government enforcement agent." Id., at 
13-14 (footnote omitted). 
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per se unreasonable, unless the police can show ... the pres-
ence of 'exigent circumstances'"). See also Steagald v. 
United States, 451 U. S. 204, 211-212 (1981); McDonald v. 
United States, 335 U. S. 451, 456 (1948); Johnson v. United 
States, supra, at 1~15; Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 
630 (1886). 
Consistent with these long-recognized principles, the 
Court decided in Payton v. New York, supra, that warrant-
less arrests in the home are prohibited by the Fourth Amend-
ment, absent probable cause and exigent circumstances. 
Id., at 58~90. Although one might infer from the Court's 
decision that all home arrests would be subject to the same 
rule, the Court expressly framed its opinion in terms of "rou-
tine felony arrests," see id., at 574, 602. This formulation of 
the holding in Payton implies two separate, but related limi-
tations that have yet to be acknowledged completely by the 
Court, but which control the present case. In particular, by 
its own terms the holding in Payto~limited to "routine fel-
ony arrests"-was neither intended to cover arrests for 
nonserious offenses nor applied to arrests that are consid-
ered nonroutine because they are justified by exigent 
circumstances. 
A 
By concluding that the Fourth Amendment prohibits home 
entries to make warrantless felony arrests in the absence of 
probable cause and exigent circumstances, the Court in 
Payton decided, a fortiori, that warrantless home arrests are 
similarly prohibited for offenses less serious than felonies. 
It does not necessarily follow, however, that warrantless 
home arrests for nonserious offenses would be proper, even if 
probable cause and exigent circumstances are found to exist. 
That question, yet to be decided by the Court, is presented 
by the record in this case. I therefore reach the issue and 
conclude that the Fourth Amendment imposes an absolute 
ban on warrantless home arrests for certain minor offenses. 
82-5466--DISSENT 
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In United States v. Watson, 423 U. S. 411 (1976), the 
Court upheld a warrantless "midday public" arrest for a fel-
ony. In so doing, the Court relied heavily on the common-
law rule that "a peace officer was permitted to arrest without 
a warrant for a misdemeanor or felony committed in his 
presence as well as for a felony not committed in his presence 
if there was reasonable ground for making the arrest." I d., 
at 418 (emphasis added) (citing sources); id., at 438 (MAR-
SHALL, J., dissenting). Although not necessary to the result 
in Watson, the italicized portion of the common-law rule sug-
gests that warrantless public arrests for misdemeanors, even 
if supported by probable cause and exigent circumstances, 
should be prohibited unless the underlying offense is commit-
ted in the presence of the arresting officer. See generally 
W. LaFave, Arrest 231-243 (1965). Therefore, even accept-
ing the Court's view in Watson that the Fourth Amendment 
grants broad authority for warrantless public arrests, adher-
ence to the common-law rule would allow warrantless misde-
meanor arrests in public areas only in the most narrow cir-
cumstances. 10 It logically follows that warrantless home 
'°For purposes of this case only, I assume that the common-law rule 
identified in Watson applied in its literal sense to all misdemeanors. 
There is substantial evidence, however, that public arrests were justified 
under the common law, even for offenses committed in the officer's pres-
ence, only for breaches of the peace-a category of offenses much nar-
rower, and far more serious, than all misdemeanors. See, e. g., W. 
LaFave, Arrest 231 (1965); Bohlen & Shulman, Arrest With and Without a 
Warrant, 75 U. Pa. L. Rev. 485 (1927). As explained by the New York 
Court of Appeals: 
"The right of a peace officer at common law to arrest summarily was a 
limited one. 'The common law did not authorize the arrest of persons 
guilty or suspected of misdemeanors, except in cases of an actual breach of 
the peace either by an affray or by violence to an individual. In such cases 
the arrest had to be made not so much for the purpose of bringing the of-
fender to justice as in order to preserve the peace, and the right to arrest 
was accordingly limited to cases in which the person to be arrested was 
taken in the act or immediately after its conclusion.' (Stephen's History of 
the Criminal Law of England, p. 193; Chase's Blackstone [4th ed.], pp. 998, 
• 
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entries to make arrests for public misdemeanors would also 
be prohibited, possibly with a similarly narrow exception for 
persons committing such misdemeanors in the presence of an 
officer and then fleeing, upon hot pursuit, into the home. 
Cf. United States v. Santana, 427 U. S. 38, 42-43 (1976) (hot 
pursuit of fleeing felon); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294 
(1967) (same). And, although the rules for home arrests at 
the time of the adoption of the Fourth Amendment were far 
from clear, see Payton v. New York, 445 U. S., at 591-598, it 
appears that such a severe restriction on home arrests for 
misdemeanors was the prevailing view of the common law. 
See, e. g., The Queen v. Marsden, 1 L. R.-Cr. Cas. Res. 131 
(1868); Wilgus, Arrest Without a Warrant, 22 Mich. L. Rev. 
541, 798, 803 (1924) ("Of course since ... an officer ... has 
[no] authority to arrest for a past breach of the peace without 
a warrant, neither would [he] have the right to break doors in 
an attempted arrest therefor, except for one committed in his 
presence and on fresh pursuit."). See also H andcock v. 
Baker, 126 Eng. Rep. 1270 (1800); Adair v. Williams, 24 
Ariz. 422, 210 P. 853 (1922); Wilgus, supra, at 804. There-
fore, even if exigent circumstances exist, the common law 
suggests that warrantless home arrests for misdemeanors 
should be prohibited, with the possible exception of hot pur-
suit from the commission of a misdemeanor in the officer's 
presence. 
999; 6 C. J. S. Arrest, § 6, subd. c.)" People v. Phillips, 284 N. Y. 235, 
237, 30 N. E. 2d 488, 489 (1940). 
Moreover, I remain convinced that it is incorrect to base current inter-
pretations of the Fourth Amendment solely on the literal words of the com-
mon-law rules of arrest. Rather, the Fourth Amendment "must be inter-
preted 'in light of contemporary norms and conditions.'" Steagald v. 
United States, 451 U. S. 204, 217 and n. 10 (1981), quoting Payton v. New 
York, 445 U. S. 573, 591 and n. 33 (1980). See also United States v. Wat-
son, 423 U. S. 411, 433, 438--443 (1976) (MARSHALL, J. , dissenting). For 
purposes of this case, however, even acceptance of the common-law rule 
compels the conclusion that the petitioner's arrest was unlawful. 
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Surely, the prohibitions of the Fourth Amendment go at 
least as far-prohibiting warrantless entries of the home to 
arrest for certain minor offenses under all circumstances, 
even if probable cause and exigent circumstances are shown 
to exist. Before agents of the government may invade the 
sanctity of the home, the government must be required to 
demonstrate a compelling need that overcomes the presump-
tion of unreasonableness that attaches to all warrantless 
home entries. See Payton v. New York, supra, at 586. 
When the government's interest is only to arrest for a minor 
offense, that presumption of unreasonableness should be 
irrebuttable, and the government should be allowed to make 
such an arrest only with a warrant issued upon probable 
cause by a neutral and detached magistrate. Accordingly, I 
conclude that there are no circumstances under which a war-
rantless home entry to arrest for a minor offense could be jus-
tified.11 The Fourth Amendment, in my view, compels such 
an absolute ban. 
Application of this bright-line principle to the facts of this 
case proves quite simple. The State of Wisconsin has chosen 
to classify the first offense for driving while intoxicated as a 
noncriminal, civil forfeiture offense for which no imprison-
ment is possible. See Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2) (1975); id., 
§ 346.65(2)(a) (1981--82); supra, at 4-5. This is the best indi-
cation of the state's interest in precipitating an arrest, and is 
one that can be easily identified both by the courts and by of-
ficers faced with a decision to arrest. See n. 5, supra. An 
offense for which no imprisonment is possible, however, does 
not suffice to overcome the presumption of unreasonableness 
11 Even the dissenters in Payton v. New York , 445 U. S. 573 (1980) , al-
though believing that warrantless home arrests are not prohibited by the 
Fourth Amendment, recognized the importance of the felony limitation on 
such arrests. See id., at 603, 616--617 (WHITE, J., dissenting) ("The felony 
requirement guards against abusive or arbitrary enforcement and ensures 
that invasions of the home occur only in case of the most serious crimes."). 
I see little reason to remove this general restriction even if there is ample 
support for a finding of exigent circumstances. 
I 
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that attaches to a warrantless entry of the home to arrest. 12 
The arrest of the petitioner in this case, therefore, was pro-
hibited by the Fourth Amendment. As a result of this un-
lawful arrest, state law provides that the revocation of his op-
erating privileges was also improper. See Wise. Stat. 
§ 343.305(2)(b)(5) (1975); id., § 343.305(3)(b)(5)(a) (1981-82); 
supra, at 4 and n. 4. Accordingly, the judgment of the Su-
preme Court of Wisconsin should be vacated, and the case re-
manded for further proceedings. 
B 
Even if I were to conclude that an absolute ban on warrant-
less home arrests for certain nonserious offenses is not com-
. pelled by the Fourth Amendment, I would conclude that the 
petitioner's arrest was prohibited by the Fourth Amendment 
because of the absence of exigent circumstances. 
In Payton v. New York, 445 U. S., at 583, the Court de-
clined to consider the scope of any exception for exigent cir-
cumstances that might justify warrantless home arrests, 
thereby leaving to the lower courts the initial application of 
12 Although I have previously joined in noting the danger of drawing con-
stitutional lines based on legislative classifications of statutory crimes, see 
United States v. Watson, 423 U. S., at 438-442, 454-455 (MARSHALL, J., 
dissenting), it is not necessary to decide in this case whether the Fourth 
Amendment prohibits warrantless home arrests for all nonfelonious 
crimes. Rather, given the facts of this case, I would simply hold that such 
arrests are constitutionally prohibited at least for all minor offenses, de-
fined primarily by looking to the extent of punishment provided for by the 
state statute. 
Nor do I mean to suggest that the prevention of drunk driving is not 
properly of major concern to the States. The State of Wisconsin, how-
ever, along with several other States, see, e. g., Minn. Stat. § 169.121 
subd. 4 (1982); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 39--669.07(1) (Supp. 1982); S. D. Codified 
Laws § 32-23-2 (Supp. 1983), has chosen to limit severely the penalties 
that may be imposed after a first conviction for driving while intoxicated. 
Given that the classification of state crimes differs widely among the 
States, the penalty that may attach to any particular offense seems to pro-
vide the clearest and most consistent indication of the state's interest in 
arresting individuals suspected of committing that offense. 
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the exigent-circumstances exception. Prior decisions of this 
Court, however, have emphasized that exceptions to the war-
rant requirement are "few in number and carefully delin-
eated," United States v. United States District Court, 407 
U. S., at 318, and that the police have a heavy burden to 
meet when attempting to demonstrate an urgent need that 
might justify warrantless searches or arrests. Indeed, the 
Court has recognized only a few such emergency conditions, 
see, e. g., United States v. Santana, 427 U. S., at 42-43 
(1976) (hot pursuit of a fleeing felon); Warden v. Hayden, 387 
U.S., at 298-299 (1967) (same); Schmerberv. California, 384 
U. S. 757, 770-771 (1966) (destruction of evidence); Michigan 
v. Tyler, 436 U. S. 499, 509 (1978) (ongoing fire), and has ac-
tually applied only the "hot pursuit" doctrine to arrests in the 
home, see Santana, supra. The record in this case, how-
ever, requires that the Court clarify this area of Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence. In so doing, I conclude that an 
important factor to be considered when determining whether 
any exigency exists is the gravity of the underlying offense 
for which the arrest is being made. Moreover, although no 
exigency is created simply because there is probable cause to 
believe that a serious crime has been committed, I conclude 
that application of the exigent-circumstances exception 
should be severely restricted when only a minor offense is 
involved. 
This is not a novel idea. Writing in concurrence in M c-
Donald v. United States, 335 U. S. 451 (1948), Justice Jack-
son explained why a finding of exigent circumstances to jus-
tify a warrantless home entry should be severely restricted: 
"Even if one were to conclude that urgent circum-
stances might justify a forced entry without a warrant, 
no such emergency was present in this case. This 
method of law enforcement displays a shocking lack of all 
sense of proportion. Whether there is reasonable ne-
cessity for a search without waiting to obtain a warrant 
certainly depends somewhat upon the gravity of the of-
14 
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fense thought to be in progress as well as the hazards of 
the method of attempting to reach it. . . . It is to me a 
shocking proposition that private homes, even quarters 
in a tenement, may be indiscriminately invaded at the 
discretion of any suspicious police officer engaged in 
following up offenses that involve no violence or threats 
of it. While I should be human enough to apply the let-
ter of the law with some indulgence to officers acting to 
deal with threats or crimes of violence which endanger 
life or security, it is notable that few of the searches 
found by this Court to be unlawful dealt with that cate-
gory of crime. . . . While the enterprise of parting fools 
from their money by the 'numbers' lottery is one that 
ought to be suppressed, I do not think that its suppres-
sion is more important to society than the security of the 
people against unreasonable searches and seizures. 
When an officer undertakes to act as his own magistrate, 
he ought to be in a position to justify it by pointing to 
some real immediate and serious consequences if he post-
poned action to get a warrant." I d., at 459-460 (Jack-
son, J., concurring) (footnote omitted). 
Consistent with this approach, the lower courts have 
looked to the nature of the underlying offense as an impor-
tant factor to be considered in the exigent-circumstances cal-
culus. In the leading federal case defining exigent circum-
stances, for example, the en bane United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia recognized that the 
gravity of the underlying offense was a principal factor to be 
weighed. Dorman v. United States, 435 F. 2d 385, 392 
(CADC 1970). 13 Without approving all of the factors in-
cluded in the standard adopted by that court, it is sufficient 
13 See generally Donnino & Girese, Exigent Circumstances for a War-
rantless Home Arrest, 45 Alb. L. Rev. 90 (1980); Harbaugh & Faust, 
"Knock on Any Door"-Home Arrests Mter Payton and Steagald, 86 
Dick. L. Rev. 191, 220-233 (1982); Note, Exigent Circumstances for War-
rantless Home Arrests, 23 Ariz. L. Rev. 1171 (1981). 
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to note that many other lower courts have also considered the 
gravity of the offense an important part of their constitu-
tional analysis. 
As a result, courts have permitted warrantless home ar-
rests for major felonies if identifiable exigencies, in~ependent 
of the gravity of the offense, existed at the time of the arrest. 
Compare United States v. Campbell, 581 F. 2d 22 (CA2 1978) 
(allowing warrantless home arrest for armed robbery when 
exigent circumstances existed), with Commonwealth v. Wil-
liams, 483 Pa. 293, 396 A. 2d 1177 (1978) (disallowing war-
rantless home arrest for murder due to absence of exigent 
circumstances). But I am aware of no case that has permit-
ted a warrantless home arrest for a nonfelonious crime. Cf. 
People v. Sanders, 59 Ill. App. 3d 6, 374 N. E. 2d 139 (1978) 
(burglary without weapons not grave offense of violence for 
this purpose); State v. Bennett, 295 N. W. ·2d 5 (S. D. 1980) 
(distribution of controlled substances not a grave offense for 
these purposes). This should not be surprising. It is, in-
deed, difficult to conceive of a warrantless home arrest that 
would not be unreasonable when the underlying offense is 
relatively minor. I therefore conclude that the common-
sense re&ult reached by most lower courts is required by the 
Fourth Amendment prohibition on "unreasonable searches 
and seizures," and would hold that application of the exigent-
circumstances exception in the context of a home entry is se-
verely restricted when there is probable cause to believe •that 
only a minor offense has been committed. 
Again, application of this principle to the facts of the 
present case is relatively straightforward. The petitioner 
was arrested in the privacy of his own bedroom for a non-
criminal, traffic offense. The State attempts to justify the 
arrest by relying on the hot-pursuit doctrine, on the threat to 
public safety, and on the need to preserve evidence of the pe-
titioner's blood-alcohol level. The claim of hot pursuit is un-
convincing, however, because there was no immediate or con-
tinuous pursuit of the petitioner from the scene of a crime. 
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Moreover, because the petitioner had already arrived home, 
and had abandoned his car at the scene of the accident, there 
was little remaining threat to the public safety. Hence, the ) 
only potential emergency claimed by the State was the need 
to ascertain the petitioner's blood-alcohol level. But even 
assuming that the underlying facts would support a finding of 
this exigent circumstance, mere similarity to other cases in-
volving the imminent destruction of evidence is not sufficient. 
In the context of a minor, nonjailable traffic offense, a war-
rantless home arrest simply cannot be upheld using this oth-
erwise plausible justification. The principles of the Fourth 
Amendment do not sanction such unreasonable police 
behavior. 
III 
The Court's dismissal of the writ as improvidently granted 
is especially troublesome because it seriously impairs the 
Court's Rule of Four, under which the votes of four Justices 
to grant the writ requires that the case be set for full brief-
ing, oral argument, and plenary consideration on the merits. 
When, as in this case, those four Justices remain persuaded 
that the merits of the case should be decided, adherence to 
the Court's orderly procedures requires that a decision on the 
merits be reached, absent any intervening change in circum-
stances or the revelation of any factors suggesting that the 
original grant of certiorari was inappropriate. Otherwise, 
the Court's discretionary jurisdiction becomes an essentially 
arbitrary jurisdiction. See generally Burrell v. McCray, 
426 U. S. 471, 473 (1976) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting). 
Various Justices of this Court have previously acknowl-
edged that the Rule of Four requires decision on the merits in 
this situation. As Justice Harlan explained in his much-
quoted discussion of this area: 
"I think the Court should not have heard any of these 
four cases. Nevertheless, the cases having been taken, 
I have conceived it to be my duty to consider them on 
their merits, because I cannot reconcile voting to dismiss 
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the writs as 'improvidently granted' with the Court's 
'rule of four.' In my opinion due adherence to that rule 
requires that once certiorari has been granted a case 
should be disposed of on the premise that it is properly 
here, in the absence of considerations appearing which 
were not manifest or fully apprehended at the time cer-
tiorari was granted." Ferguson v. Moore-McCormack 
Lines, Inc., 352 U. S. 521, 559 (1957) (separate opinion). 
See The Monrosa v. Carbon Black Export, Inc., 359 U. S. 
180 (1959) (dismissal only appropriate when "[e]xamination of 
a case on the merits, on oral argument, ... bring[s] into 
'proper focus' a consideration which, though present in the 
record at the time of granting the writ, only later indicates 
that the grant was improvident"). Compare Triangle Im-
provement Council v. Ritchie, 402 U. S. 497, 502 (1971) 
(Harlan, J., concurring) (dismissal appropriate "in light of 
... changed posture of the case") with id., at 508 (Douglas, 
J., dissenting, joined by Black, BRENNAN, and MARSHALL, 
JJ.) (so as not to impair the Rule of Four, it is "the duty of 
the five opposing certiorari to persuade others at Conference, 
but, failing that, to vote on the merits of the case"). See also 
Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U. S. 637, 648 (1974) (Stew-
art, J., .concurring, joined by WHITE, J.) ("If as many as four 
Justices remain so minded after oral argument, due adher-
ence to that rule requires me to address the merits of a case, 
however strongly I may feel that it does not belong in this 
Court."); Burrell v. McCray, 426 U. S. 471, 472 (1976) (STE-
J . ) 14 VENS, . , concurrmg . 
"In Burrell v. McCray, 426 U.S. 471, 474-475 (1976) (BRENNAN, J., 
dissenting), I explained when, in my view, a Justice who has initially voted 
to deny certiorari may nonetheless join in dismissing the writ as improvi-
dently granted. 
"Further, a Justice who originally voted to deny the petition for writ of 
certiorari is, of course, privileged to participate in a dismissal as improvi-
dently granted that is justified under the Monrosa standard. See Fergu-
son v. Moore-McCorrnack Lines, 352 U. S. 521, 559 (1957) (Harlan, J., con-
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In this case, neither the Court nor the parties have even 
attempted to suggest any change in circumstances that has 
occurred since the writ of certiorari was granted last Term. 
Nor has consideration of the case on the merits focused the 
Court on any factors that were unknown at the time the case 
was originally set for oral argument. Indeed, if anything, I 
believe the posture of the case has been clarified by the writ-
ten briefs and oral arguments presented to the Court. In 
the absence of any explanation for the Court's action, there-
fore, I can only conclude that the Court is willing to ignore 
the Rule of Four that has traditionally controlled the Court's 
docket. 15 
curring and dissenting); United States v. Shannon, 342 U. S. 288, 294 
(1952). But I hold the view that impennissible violence is done the Rule of 
Four when a Justice who voted to deny the petition for certiorari partici-
pates after oral argument in a dismissal that, as here, is not justified under 
the governing standard, but which rather reflects only the factors that mo-
tivated the original vote to deny. Ferguson v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 
supra, at 559--462 (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting). In this circum-
stance, I share the view stated by Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting in 
United States v. Shannon, supra, at 298: 
"A Justice who has voted to deny the writ of certiorari is in no position 
after argument to vote to dismiss the writ as improvidently granted. 
Only those who have voted to grant the writ have that privilege. The 
reason strikes deep. If after the writ is granted or after argument, 
those who voted to deny certiorari vote to dismiss the writ as improvi-
dently granted, the integrity of our certiorari jurisdiction is impaired. 
By long practice-announced to the Congress and well-known to this 
Bar-it takes four votes out of a Court of nine to grant a petition for 
certiorari. If four can grant and the opposing five dismiss, then the 
four cannot get a decision of the case on the merits. The integrity of 
the four-vote rule on certiorari would then be impaired." 
Given that the Court has offered absolutely no reason for its decision to 
dismiss the writ in this case, I can only conclude that there are no justifi-
able reasons for the dismissal that were unknown last Term when at least 
four Justices, who remain persuaded that the case should be decided on the 
merits, originally voted to give plenary consideration to the case. 
16 The dismissal of the writ in this case despite the votes of four Justices 
to decide the case on the merits is even more troubling because of the pend-
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IV 
For unexplained reasons, the Court has chosen to dismiss 
the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted. As a result, 
the Court lets stand a warrantless, nighttime entry into the 
petitioner's home to arrest him for violation of a civil traffic 
offense. In my view, such an arrest is clearly prohibited by 
prevailing case law and by the special protection afforded the 
home under the Fourth Amendment. The petitioner's ar-
rest was therefore invalid, the judgment of the Supreme 
Court of Wisconsin should be vacated, and the case remanded 
for further proceedings. 
I respectfully dissent. 
ing criminal action against the petitioner. See n. 8, supra. It indeed 
would be ironic if his conviction were affirmed by the Wisconsin courts, and 
the petitioner then filed another petition for certiorari from that state court 
judgment. If (as is not improbable) the four Justices dissenting today 
would vote to grant that petition, the Court would be forced either to de-
cide precisely the same question presented by this case or to do even more 
damage to the Rule of Four. 
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JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom JUSTICE MARSHALL joins, 
and with whom JUSTICE BLACKMUN and JUSTICE STEVENS 
join in all but Part II-A, dissenting. 
In Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573 (1980), the Court 
concluded that, absent probable cause and exigent circum-
stances, warrantless arrests in the home are prohibited by 
the Fourth Amendment. At the same time, we explicitly re-
fused "to consider the sort of emergency or dangerous situa-
tion, described in our cases as 'exigent circumstances,' that 
would justify a warrantless entry into a home for the purpose 
of either arrest or search." Id., at 583. Certiorari was 
originally granted in this case to decide at least one aspect of 
the unresolved question: whether, and if so under what cir-
cumstances, the Fourth Amendment prohibits the police 
from making a warrantless night entry of a person's home in 
order to arrest him for violation of a nonjailable traffic of-
fense. Because, in my view, this case presents a record that 
compels us to decide that question, I cannot agree that the 
Court should dismiss the writ of certiorari as improvidently 
granted. I therefore reach the merits of the question pre-
sented and would reverse the judgment of the Supreme 
Court of Wisconsin. 
I 
A 
Shortly before 9:00 p. m. on the rainy night of April 24, 
1978, a lone witness, Randy J ablonic, observed a car that was 
No~~· 
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being driven erratically. After changing speeds and veering 
from side to side, the car eventually swerved off the road and 
came to a stop in an open field. No damage to any person or 
property occurred. Apparently worrying about the driver 
and fearing that the car would get back on the highway, 
J ablonic drove his truck up behind the car so as to block it 
from returning to the road. Another passerby also stopped 
at the scene, and Jablonic asked her to call the police. Be-
fore the police arrived, however, the driver of the car 
emerged from his vehicle, approached Jablonic's truck, and 
asked J ablonic for a ride home. J ablonic instead suggested 
that they wait for assistance in removing or repairing the car. 
Ignoring J ablonic's suggestion, the driver walked away from 
the scene. 
A few minutes later, the police arrived and questioned 
J ablonic. He told one officer what he had seen, specifically 
noting that the driver was either very inebriated or very 
sick. The officer checked the motor vehicle registration of 
the abandoned car and learned that it was registered to the 
petitioner, Edward G. Welsh. In addition, the officer noted 
that the petitioner's residence was a short distance from the 
scene, and therefore easily within walking distance. 
Without securing any type of warrant, the police pro-
ceeded to the petitioner's home, arriving about 9:00 p. m. 
When the petitioner's stepdaughter answered the door, the 
police successfully sought entry into the house. 1 They pro-
ceeded upstairs to the petitioner's bedroom, where they 
found him lying naked in bed. At this point, the petitioner 
' The state trial court never decided whether there was consent to the 
entry because it deemed decision of that issue unnecessary in light of its 
finding that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless arrest. After 
reversing the lower court's finding of exigent circumstances, the Wisconsin 
Court of Appeals remanded for full consideration of the consent issue. See 
State v. Welsh , No. 80-1686, App. 114-125. That remand never occurred, 
however, because the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed its court of ap-
peals and reinstated the trial court's judgment. See State v. Welsh, 108 
Wis. 2d 319, 321 N. W. 2d 245 (1982). 
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was placed under arrest for driving or operating a motor ve-
hicle while under the influence of an intoxicant, in violation of 
Wis. Stat. § 346. 63(1) (1977). 2 The petitioner was taken to 
the police station, where he refused to submit to a breatha-
lyzer test. 
B 
As a result of these events, the petitioner was subjected to 
two separate but related proceedings: one concerning his re-
fusal to submit to a breath test and the other involving the 
alleged code violation for driving while intoxicated. Under 
the Wisconsin vehicle code as it appeared in April1978, any-
one arrested for driving while intoxicated under § 346.63(1) 
could be requested by a law enforcement officer to provide 
breath, blood, or urine samples for the purpose of determin-
ing the presence or quantity of alcohol. Wis. Stat. 
§ 343.305(1) (1975). If such a request was made, the arrestee 
was required to submit to the appropriate testing or risk a 
revocation of operating privileges. Cf. South Dakota v. 
Neville, 459 U. S. -- (1983) (admission into evidence of a 
defendant's refusal to submit to a blood-alcohol test does not 
offend constitutional right against self-incrimination). The 
arrestee could challenge the officer's request, however, by 
refusing to undergo testing and then asking for a hearing to 
determine whether the refusal was justified. If, after the 
hearing, it was determined that the refusal was not justified, 
the arrestee's operating privileges would be revoked for 60 
days.3 
2 Since the time of the petitioner's arrest, § 346.63 has been amended to 
provide for a code violation if someone drives or operates a motor vehicle 
while under the influence of an intoxicant or while evidencing certain 
blood- or breath-alcohol levels. See Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(a}-(b) 
(1981--82). This amendment, however, has no bearing on the issues raised 
by the present case. 
3 Since the time of the petitioner's arrest, this statute also has been 
amended, with the current version found at Wis. Stat. § 343.305 (1981--82). 
Although the procedures to be followed by the law enforcement officer and 
the arrestee have remained essentially unchanged, § 343.305(3), (8), the po-
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The statute also set forth specific criteria to be applied by a 
court when determining whether an arrestee's refusal to take 
a breath test was justified. Included among these criteria 
was a requirement that, before revoking the arrestee's op-
erating privileges, the court determine that "the refusal . . . 
to submit to a test was unreasonable." § 343.305(2)(b)(5) 
(1975). It is not disputed that an arrestee's refusal to take a 
breath test would be reasonable, and therefore operating 
privileges could not be revoked, if the underlying arrest was 
not lawful. Indeed, state law has consistently provided that 
a valid arrest is a necessary prerequisite to the imposition of 
a breath test. See Scales v. State, 64 Wis. 2d 485, 494, 219 
N. W. 2d 286, 292 (1974). Although the statute in effect in 
April 1978 referred to reasonableness, the current version of 
§ 343.305 explicitly recognizes that one of the issues that an 
arrestee may raise at a refusal hearing is "whether [he] was 
lawfully placed under arrest for violation of s.346.63(1)." 
§ 343.305(3)(b)(5)(a), (8)(b) (1981-82). See also 67 Op. Wis. 
Atty. Gen. 93-78 (Dec. 27, 1978) ("statutory scheme ... con-
templates that a lawful arrest be made prior to a request for 
submission to a test"). 4 
Separate statutory provisions control the penalty that 
might be imposed for the substantive offense of driving while 
intoxicated. At the time in question, the vehicle code pro-
vided that a first offense for driving while intoxicated was a 
noncriminal violation subject to a civil forfeiture proceeding 
for a maximum fine of $200; a second or subsequent offense in 
tentiallength of any revocation of operating privileges has been increased, 
depending on the arrestee's prior driving record, § 343.305(9)(a)-(b). An 
arrestee who improperly refuses to submit to a required test may also be 
required to comply with an assessment order and a driver safety plan. 
§ 343.305(9)(c)-(e). These amendments, however, also have no direct 
bearing on the issues raised by the present case. 
• Because state law provides that evidence of the petitioner's refusal to 
submit to a breath test is inadmissible if the underlying arrest was unlaw-
ful, this case does not implicate the exclusionary rule under the Federal 
Constitution. 
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the previous five years was a potential misdemeanor that 
could be punished by imprisonment for up to one year and a 
maximum fine of $500. Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2) (1975). Since 
that time, the state has made only minor amendments to 
these penalty provisions. Indeed, the statute continues to 
categorize a first offense as a civil violation that allows for 
only a monetary forfeiture of no more than $300. 
§ 346.65(2)(a) (1981-82). See State v. Albright, 98 Wis. 2d 
663, 672-673, 298 N. W. 2d 196, 202 (App. 1980). 
c 
As noted, in this case the petitioner refused to submit to a 
breath test; he subsequently filed a timely request for a re-
fusal hearing. Before that hearing was held, however, the 
state filed a criminal complaint against the petitioner for 
driving while intoxicated. 5 The petitioner responded by fil-
ing a motion to dismiss the complaint, relying on his conten-
tion that the underlying arrest was invalid. After receiving 
evidence at a hearing on this motion in July 1980, the trial 
court concluded that the criminal complaint would not be dis-
missed because the existence of both probable cause and exi-
gent circumstances justified the warrantless arrest. The de-
cision at the refusal hearing, which was not held until 
September 1980, was therefore preordained. In fact, the 
primary issue at the refusal hearing-whether the petitioner 
acted reasonably in refusing to submit to a breath test be-
cause he was unlawfully placed under arrest, see supra, at 
' The petitioner was charged with a criminal misdemeanor because this 
was his second such citation in the previous five years. See § 346.65(2) 
(1975). Although the petitioner was subject to a criminal charge, the po-
lice conducting the warrantless entry of his home did not know that the 
petitioner had ever been charged with, or much less convicted of, a prior 
violation for driving while intoxicated. It must be assumed, therefore, 
that at the time of the arrest the police were acting as if they were investi-
gating and eventually arresting for a civil violation only. See Beck v. 
Ohio, 379 U. S. 89, 91, 96 (1964). 
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4--had now been determined two months earlier by the same 
trial court. 
As expected, after the refusal hearing, the trial court con-
cluded that the arrest of the petitioner was lawful and that 
the petitioner's refusal to take the breath test was therefore 
unreasonable. 6 Accordingly, the court issued an order sus-
pending the petitioner's operating license for 60 days. On 
appeal, the suspension order was vacated by the Wisconsin 
Court of Appeals. See State v. Welsh, No. 80-1686, App. 
114-125. Contrary to the trial court, the appellate court 
concluded that the warrantless arrest of the petitioner in his 
home violated the Fourth Amendment because the State, al-
though demonstrating probable cause to arrest, had not es-
tablished the existence of exigent circumstances. The peti-
tioner's refusal to submit to a breath test was therefore 
reasonable. 7 The Wisconsin Supreme Court in turn re-
versed the court of appeals, relying on the existence of three 
factors that it believed constituted exigent circumstances: 
the need for "hot pursuit" of a suspect, the need to prevent 
physical harm to the offender and the public, and the need to 
prevent destruction of evidence. See State v. Welsh, 108 
Wis. 2d 319, 336-338, 321 N. W. 2d 245, 254-255 (1982). Be-
cause of the important Fourth Amendment implications of 
the decision below, we granted certiorari. 459 U. S. --
(1983). 8 
6 When ruling from the bench after the refusal hearing, the trial judge 
specifically indicated: 
"[T]he Court is bound by its earlier ruling that that was a valid arrest. 
And, I think [counsel for the petitioner] certainly will have the right to 
challenge that on appeal if he appeals this matter, as well as the previous 
ruling should there be a conviction on the underlying charge." App. 111. 
See also App. 112-113. 
7 The court remanded the case for further findings as to whether the 
police had entered the petitioner's home with consent. See n. 1, supra. 
8 Although the state courts differed in their respective conclusions con-
cerning exigent circumstances, they each found that the facts known to the 
police at the time of the warrantless home entry were sufficient to establish 
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II 
It is axiomatic that "the physical entry of the home is the 
chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amend-
ment is directed." United States v. United States District 
Court, 407 U. S. 297, 313 (1972). And a principal protection 
against unnecessary intrusions into private dwellings is the 
warrant requirement imposed by the Fourth Amendment on 
agents of the government who seek to enter the home for 
purposes of search or arrest. See Johnson v. United States, 
333 U. S. 10, 13-14 (1948). 9 It is not surprising, therefore, 
that the Court has recognized, as "a 'basic principle of Fourth 
Amendment law[,]' that searches and seizures inside a home 
without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable." Pay-
ton v. New York, 445 U. S., at 586. See Coolidge v. New 
Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 474-475 (1971) ("a search or sei-
zure carried out on a suspect's premises without a warrant is 
probable cause to arrest. The petitioner has not challenged that finding 
before this Court. 
The parallel criminal proceedings against the petitioner, see supra, at 5 
and n. 5, resulted in a misdemeanor conviction for driving while intoxi-
cated. During the jury trial, held in early 1982, the state introduced evi-
dence of the petitioner's refusal to submit to a breath test. His appeal 
from that conviction, now before the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, has been 
stayed pending our decision in this case. See Brief for Petitioner 17, n. 5. 
9 In Johnson, Justice Jackson eloquently explained the warrant require-
ment in the context of a home search: 
"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by 
zealous· officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the 
usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protec-
tion consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and 
detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the 
often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. . . . The right of offi-
cers to thrust themselves into a home is ... a grave concern, not only to 
the individual but to a society which chooses to dwell in reasonable security 
and freedom from surveillance. When the right of privacy must reason-
ably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial 
officer, not by a policeman or government enforcement agent." Id., at 
13-14 (footnote omitted). 
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per se unreasonable, unless the police can show ... the pres-
ence of 'exigent circumstances'"). See also Steagald v. 
United States, 451 U. S. 204, 211-212 (1981); McDonald v. 
United States, 335 U. S. 451, 456 (1948); Johnson v. United 
States, supra, at 1~15; Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 
630 (1886). 
Consistent with these long-recognized principles, the 
Court decided in Payton v. New York, supra, that warrant-
less arrests in the home are prohibited by the Fourth Amend-
ment, absent probable cause and exigent circumstances. 
I d., at 58~90. Although one might infer from the Court's 
decision that all home arrests would be subject to the same 
rule, the Court expressly framed its opinion in terms of "rou-
tine felony arrests," see id., at 574, 602. This formulation of 
the holding in Payton implies two separate, but related limi-
tations that have yet to be acknowledged completely by the 
Court, but which control the present case. In particular, by 
its own terms the holding in Payton-limited to "routine fel-
ony arrests"-was neither intended to cover arrests for 
nonserious offenses nor applied to arrests that are consid-
ered nonroutine because they are justified by exigent 
circumstances. 
A 
By concluding that the Fourth Amendment prohibits home 
entries to make warrantless felony arrests in the absence of 
probable cause and exigent circumstances, the Court in 
Payton decided, a fortiori, that warrantless home arrests are 
similarly prohibited for offenses less serious than felonies. 
It does not necessarily follow, however, that warrantless 
home arrests for nonserious offenses would be proper, even if 
probable cause and exigent circumstances are found to exist. 
That question, yet to be decided by the Court, is presented 
by the record in this case. I therefore reach the issue and 
conclude that the Fourth Amendment imposes an absolute 
ban on warrantless home arrests for certain minor offenses. 
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In United States v. Watson, 423 U. S. 411 (1976), the 
Court upheld a warrantless "midday public" arrest for a fel-
ony. In so doing, the Court relied heavily on the common-
law rule that "a peace officer was permitted to arrest without 
a warrant for a misdemeanor or felony committed in his 
presence as well as for a felony not committed in his presence 
if there was reasonable ground for making the arrest." I d., 
at 418 (emphasis added) (citing sources); id., at 438 (MAR-
SHALL, J., dissenting). Although not necessary to the result 
in Watson, the italicized portion of the common-law rule sug-
gests that warrantless public arrests for misdemeanors, even 
if supported by probable cause and exigent circumstances, 
should be prohibited unless the underlying offense is commit-
ted in the presence of the arresting officer. See generally 
W. LaFave, Arrest 231-243 (1965). Therefore, even accept-
ing the Court's view in Watson that the Fourth Amendment 
grants broad authority for warrantless public arrests, adher-
ence to the common-law rule would allow warrantless misde-
meanor arrests in public areas only in the most narrow cir-
cumstances. 10 It logically follows that warrantless home 
'° For purposes of this case only, I assume that the common-law rule 
identified in Watson applied in its literal sense to all misdemeanors. 
There is substantial evidence, however, that public arrests were justified 
under the common law, even for offenses committed in the officer's pres-
ence, only for breaches of the peace-a category of offenses much nar-
rower, and far more serious, than all misdemeanors. See, e. g., W. 
LaFave, Arrest 231 (1965); Bohlen & Shulman, Arrest With and Without a 
Warrant, 75 U. Pa. L. Rev. 485 (1927). As explained by the New York 
Court of Appeals: 
"The right of a peace officer at common law to arrest summarily was a 
limited one. 'The common law did not authorize the arrest of persons 
guilty or suspected of misdemeanors, except in cases of an actual breach of 
the peace either by an affray or by violence to an individual. In such cases 
the arrest had to be made not so much for the purpose of bringing the of-
fender to justice as in order to preserve the peace, and the right to arrest 
was accordingly limited to cases in which the person to be arrested was 
taken in the act or immediately after its conclusion.' (Stephen's History of 
the Criminal Law of England, p. 193; Chase's Blackstone [4th ed.], pp. 998, 
t 
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entries to make arrests for public misdemeanors would also 
be prohibited, possibly with a similarly narrow exception for 
persons committing such misdemeanors in the presence of an 
officer and then fleeing, upon hot pursuit, into the home. 
Cf. United States v. Santana, 427 U. S. 38, 42-43 (1976) (hot 
pursuit of fleeing felon); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294 
(1967) (same). And, although the rules for home arrests at 
the time of the adoption of the Fourth Amendment were far 
from clear, see Payton v. New York, 445 U. S., at 591-598, it 
appears that such a severe restriction on home arrests for 
misdemeanors was the prevailing view of the common law. 
See, e. g., The Queen v. Marsden, 1 L. R.-Cr. Cas. Res. 131 
(1868); Wilgus, Arrest Without a Warrant, 22 Mich. L. Rev. 
541, 798, 803 (1924) ("Of course since ... an officer ... has 
[no] authority to arrest for a past breach of the peace without 
a warrant, neither would [he] have the right to break doors in 
an attempted arrest therefor, except for one committed in his 
presence and on fresh pursuit."). See also Handcock v. 
Baker, 126 Eng. Rep. 1270 (1800); Adair v. Williams, 24 
Ariz. 422, 210 P. 853 (1922); Wilgus, supra, at 804. There-
fore, even if exigent circumstances exist, the common law 
suggests that warrantless home arrests for misdemeanors 
should be prohibited, with the possible exception of hot pur-
suit from the commission of a misdemeanor in the officer's 
presence. 
999; 6 C. J. S. Arrest, § 6, subd. c.)" People v. Phillips, 284 N. Y. 235, 
237, 30 N. E. 2d 488, 489 (1940). 
Moreover, I remain convinced that it is incorrect to base current inter-
pretations of the Fourth Amendment solely on the literal words of the com-
mon-law rules of arrest. Rather, the Fourth Amendment "must be inter-
preted 'in light of contemporary norms and conditions.'" Steagald v. 
United States , 451 U. S. 204, 217 and n. 10 (1981), quoting Payton v. New 
York, 445 U. S. 573, 591 and n. 33 (1980). See also United States v. Wat-
son, 423 U. S. 411, 433, 438-443 (1976) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). For 
purposes of this case, however, even acceptance of the common-law rule 
compels the conclusion that the petitioner's arrest was unlawful. 
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Surely, the prohibitions of the Fourth Amendment go at 
least as far-prohibiting warrantless entries of the home to 
arrest for certain minor offenses under all circumstances, 
even if probable cause and exigent circumstances are shown 
to exist. Before agents of the government may invade the 
sanctity of the home, the government must be required to 
demonstrate a compelling need that overcomes the presump-
tion of unreasonableness that attaches to all warrantless 
home entries. See Payton v. New York, supra, at 586. 
When the government's interest is only to arrest for a minor 
offense, that presumption of unreasonableness should be 
irrebuttable, and the government should be allowed to make 
such an arrest only with a warrant issued upon probable 
cause by a neutral and detached magistrate. Accordingly, I 
conclude that there are no circumstances under which a war-
rantless home entry to arrest for a minor offense could be jus-
tified.11 The Fourth Amendment, in my view, compels such 
an absolute ban. 
Application of this bright-line principle to the facts of this 
case proves quite simple. The State of Wisconsin has chosen 
to classify the first offense for driving while intoxicated as a 
noncriminal, civil forfeiture offense for which no imprison-
ment is possible. See Wis. Stat. §346.65(2) (1975); id., 
§ 346.65(2)(a) (1981-82); supra, at 4-5. This is the best indi-
cation of the state's interest in precipitating an arrest, and is 
one that can be easily identified both by the courts and by of-
ficers faced with a decision to arrest. See n. 5, supra. An 
offense for which no imprisonment is possible, however, does 
not suffice to overcome the presumption of unreasonableness 
11 Even the dissenters in Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573 (1980), al-
though believing that warrantless home arrests are not prohibited by the 
Fourth Amendment, recognized the importance of the felony limitation on 
such arrests. See id., at 603, 616--Q17 (WHITE, J., dissenting) ("The felony 
requirement guards against abusive or arbitrary enforcement and ensures 
that invasions of the home occur only in case of the most serious crimes."). 
I see little reason to remove this general restriction even if there is ample 
support for a finding of exigent circumstances. 
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that attaches to a warrantless entry of the home to arrest. 12 
The arrest of the petitioner in this case, therefore, was pro-
hibited by the Fourth Amendment. As a result of this un-
lawful arrest, state law provides that the revocation of his op-
erating privileges was also improper. See Wise. Stat. 
§ 343.305(2)(b)(5) (1975); id., § 343.305(3)(b)(5)(a) (1981-82); 
supra, at 4 and n. 4. Accordingly, the judgment of the Su-
preme Court of Wisconsin should be vacated, and the case re-
manded for further proceedings. 
B 
Even if I were to conclude that an absolute ban on warrant-
less home arrests for certain nonserious offenses is not com-
pelled by the Fourth Amendment, I would conclude that the 
petitioner's arrest was prohibited by the Fourth Amendment 
because of the absence of exigent circumstances. 
In Payton v. New York, 445 U. S., at 583, the Court de-
clined to consider the scope of any exception for exigent cir-
cumstances that might justify warrantless home arrests, 
thereby leaving to the lower courts the initial application of 
12 Although I have previously joined in noting the danger of drawing con-
stitutional lines based on legislative classifications of statutory crimes, see 
United States v. Watson, 423 U. S., at 438-442, 454-455 (MARSHALL, J., 
dissenting), it is not necessary to decide in this case whether the Fourth 
Amendment prohibits warrantless home arrests for all nonfelonious 
crimes. Rather, given the facts of this case, I would simply hold that such 
arrests are constitutionally prohibited at least for all minor offenses, de-
fined primarily by looking to the extent of punishment provided for by the 
state statute. 
Nor do I mean to suggest that the prevention of drunk driving is not 
properly of major concern to the States. The State of Wisconsin, how-
ever, along with several other States, see, e. g., Minn. Stat. § 169.121 
subd. 4 (1982); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 39-669.07(1) (Supp. 1982); S. D. Codified 
Laws § 32-23-2 (Supp. 1983), has chosen to limit severely the penalties 
that may be imposed after a first conviction for driving while intoxicated. 
Given that the classification of state crimes differs widely among the 
States, the penalty that may attach to any particular offense seems to pro-
vide the clearest and most consistent indication of the state's interest in 
arresting individuals suspected of committing that offense. 
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the exigent-circumstances exception. Prior decisions of this 
Court, however, have emphasized that exceptions to the war-
rant requirement are "few in number and carefully delin-
eated," United States v. United States District Court, 407 
U. S., at 318, and that the police have a heavy burden to 
meet when attempting to demonstrate an urgent need that 
might justify warrantless searches or arrests. Indeed, the 
Court has recognized only a few such emergency conditions, 
see, e. g., United States v. Santana, 427 U. S., at 42-43 
(1976) (hot pursuit of a fleeing felon); Warden v. Hayden, 387 
U. S., at 298-299 (1967) (same); Schmerber v. California, 384 
U. S. 757, 770-771 (1966) (destruction of evidence); Michigan 
v. Tyler, 436 U. S. 499, 509 (1978) (ongoing fire), and has ac-
tually applied only the "hot pursuit" doctrine to arrests in the 
home, see Santana, supra. The record in this case, how-
ever, requires that the Court clarify this area of Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence. In so doing, I conclude that an 
important factor to be considered when determining whether 
any exigency exists is the gravity of the underlying offense 
for which the arrest is being made. Moreover, although no 
exigency is created simply because there is probable cause to 
believe that a serious crime has been committed, I conclude 
that application of the exigent-circumstances exception 
should be severely restricted when only a minor offense is 
involved. 
This is not a novel idea. Writing in concurrence in M c-
Donald v. United States, 335 U. S. 451 (1948), Justice Jack-
son explained why a finding of exigent circumstances to jus-
tify a warrantless home entry should be severely restricted: 
"Even if one were to conclude that urgent circum-
stances might justify a forced entry without a warrant, 
no such emergency was present in this case. This 
method of law enforcement displays a shocking lack of all 
sense of proportion. Whether there is reasonable ne-
cessity for a search without waiting to obtain a warrant 
certainly depends somewhat upon the gravity of the of-
14 
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fense thought to be in progress as well as the hazards of 
the method of attempting to reach it. . . . It is to me a 
shocking proposition that private homes, even quarters 
in a tenement, may be indiscriminately invaded at the 
discretion of any suspicious police officer engaged in 
following up offenses that involve no violence or threats 
of it. While I should be human enough to apply the let-
ter of the law with some indulgence to officers acting to 
deal with threats or crimes of violence which endanger 
life or security, it is notable that few of the searches 
found by this Court to be unlawful dealt with that cate-
gory of crime. . . . While the enterprise of parting fools 
from their money by the 'numbers' lottery is one that 
ought to be suppressed, I do not think that its suppres-
sion is more important to society than the security of the 
people against unreasonable searches and seizures. 
When an officer undertakes to act as his own magistrate, 
he ought to be in a position to justify it by pointing to 
some real immediate and serious consequences if he post-
poned action to get a warrant." Id., at 459--460 (Jack-
son, J., concurring) (footnote omitted). 
Consistent with this approach, the lower courts have 
looked to the nature of the underlying offense as an impor-
tant factor to be considered in the exigent-circumstances cal-
culus. In the leading federal case defining exigent circum-
stances, for example, the en bane United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia recognized that the 
gravity of the underlying offense was a principal factor to be 
weighed. Dorman v. United States, 435 F. 2d 385, 392 
(CADC 1970). 13 Without approving all of the factors in-
cluded in the standard adopted by that court, it is sufficient 
18 See generally Donnino & Girese, Exigent Circumstances for a War-
rantless Home Arrest, 45 Alb. L. Rev. 90 (1980); Harbaugh & Faust, 
"Knock on Any Door"-Home Arrests After Payton and Steagald, 86 
Dick. L. Rev. 191, 220-233 (1982); Note, Exigent Circumstances for War-
rantless Home Arrests, 23 Ariz. L. Rev. 1171 (1981). 
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to note that many other lower courts have also considered the 
gravity of the offense an important part of their constitu-
tional analysis. 
As a result, courts have permitted warrantless home ar-
rests for major felonies if identifiable exigencies, independent 
of the gravity of the offense, existed at the time of the arrest. 
Compare United States v. Campbell, 581 F. 2d 22 (CA21978) 
(allowing warrantless home arrest for armed robbery when 
exigent circumstances existed), with Commonwealth v. Wil-
liams, 483 Pa. 293, 396 A. 2d 1177 (1978) (disallowing war-
rantless home arrest for murder due to absence of exigent 
circumstances). But of those courts addressing the issue, 
most refuse to permit a . warrantless home arrest for a 
nonfelonious crime. See, e. g., State v. Guertin, 190 Conn. 
440, 453, 461 A. 2d 963, 970 (1983) ("The [exigent circum-
stances] exception is narrowly drawn to cover cases of real 
and not contrived emergencies. The exception is limited to 
the investigation of serious crimes; misdemeanors are ex-
cluded."); People v. Strelow, 96 Mich. App. 182, 190-193, 292 
N. W. 2d 517, 521--522 (1980). See also People v. Sanders, 
59 Ill. App. 3d 6, 374 N. E. 2d 139 (1978) (burglary without 
weapons not a grave offense of violence for these purposes); 
State v. Bennett, 295 N. W. 2d 5 (S. D. 1980) (distribution of 
controlled substances not a grave offense for these purposes). 
But cf. State v. Penas, 200 Neb. 387, 263 N. W. 2d 835 (1978) 
(allowing warrantless home arrest upon hot pursuit from 
commission of misdemeanor in the officer's presence; decided 
before Payton); State v. Niedermeyer, 48 Or. App. 665, 617 
P. 2d 911 (1980) (allowing warrantless home arrest upon hot 
pursuit from commission of misdemeanor in the officer's pres-
ence). This should not be surprising. It is, indeed, difficult 
to conceive of a warrantless home arrest that would not be 
unreasonable when the underlying offense is relatively 
minor. I therefore conclude that the commonsense result 
reached by most lower courts is required by the Fourth 
Amendment prohibition on "unreasonable searches and sei-
I 
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zures," and would hold that application of the exigent-circum-
stances exception in the context of a home entry is severely 
restricted when there is probable cause to believe that only a 
minor offense has been committed. 
Again, application of this principle to the facts of the 
present case is relatively straightforward. The petitioner 
was arrested in the privacy of his own bedroom for a non-
criminal, traffic offense. The State attempts to justify the 
arrest by relying on the hot-pursuit doctrine, on the threat to 
public safety, and on the need to preserve evidence of the pe-
titioner's blood-alcohollevel. The claim of hot pursuit is un-
convincing, however, because there was no immediate or con-
tinuous pursuit of the petitioner from the scene of a crime. 
Moreover, because the petitioner had already arrived home, 
and had abandoned his car at the scene of the accident, there 
was little remaining threat to the public safety. Hence, the 
only potential emergency claimed by the State was the need 
to ascertain the petitioner's blood-alcohol level. But even 
assuming that the underlying facts would support a finding of 
this exigent circumstance, mere similarity to other cases in-
volving the imminent destruction of evidence is not sufficient. 
In the context of a minor, nonjailable traffic offense, a war-
rantless home arrest simply cannot be upheld using this oth-
erwise plausible justification. The principles of the Fourth 
Amendment do not sanction such unreasonable police 
behavior. 
III 
The Court's dismissal of the writ as improvidently granted 
is especially troublesome because it seriously impairs the 
Court's Rule of Four, under which the votes of four Justices 
to grant the writ requires that the case be set for full brief-
ing, oral argument, and plenary consideration on the merits. 
When, as in this case, those four Justices remain persuaded 
that the merits of the case should be decided, adherence to 
the Court's orderly procedures requires that a decision on the 
merits be reached, absent any intervening change in circum-
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stances or the revelation of any factors suggesting that the 
original grant of certiorari was inappropriate. Otherwise, 
the Court's discretionary jurisdiction becomes an essentially 
arbitrary jurisdiction. See generally Burrell v. McCray, 
426 U. S. 471, 473 (1976) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting). 
Various Justices of this Court have previously acknowl-
edged that the Rule of Four requires decision on the merits in 
this situation. As Justice Harlan explained in his much-
quoted discussion of this area: 
See The Monrosa v. Carbon Black Export, InC:, 359 U. S. 
180 (1959) (dismissal only appropriate when "[e]xamination of 
a case on the merits, on oral argument, ... bring[s] into 
'proper focus' a consideration which, though present in the 
record at the time of granting the writ, only later indicates 
that the grant was improvident"). Compare Triangle Im-
provement Council v. Ritchie, 402 U. S. 497, 502 (1971) 
(Harlan, J., concurring) (dismissal appropriate "in light of 
... changed posture of the case") with id., at 508 (Douglas, 
J., dissenting, joined by Black, BRENNAN, and MARSHALL, 
JJ.) (so as not to impair the Rule of Four, it is "the duty of 
the five opposing certiorari to persuade others at Conference, 
but, failing that, to vote on the merits of the case"). See also 
Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U. S. 637, 648 (1974) (Stew-
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Justices remain so minded after oral argument, due adher-
ence to that rule requires me to address the merits of a case, 
however strongly I may feel that it does not belong in this 
Court."); Burrell v. McCray, 426 U. S. 471, 472 (1976) (STE-
J . ) 14 VENS, ., concurrmg. 
In this case, neither the Court nor the parties have even 
attempted to suggest any change in circumstances that has 
"In Burrell v. McCray, 426 U.S. 471, 474-475 (1976) (BRENNAN, J., 
dissenting), I explained when, in my view, a Justice who has initially voted 
to deny certiorari may nonetheless join in dismissing the writ as improvi-
dently granted: 
"Further, a Justice who originally voted to deny the petition for writ of 
certiorari is, of course, privileged to participate in a dismissal as improvi-
dently granted that is justified under the Monrosa standard. See Fergu-
son v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 352 U. S. 521, 559 (1957) (Harlan, J., con-
curring and dissenting); United States v. Shannon, 342 U. S. 288, 294 
(1952). But I hold the view that impermissible violence is done the Rule of 
Four when a Justice who voted to deny the petition for certiorari partici-
pates after oral argument in a dismissal that, as here, is not justified under 
the governing standard, but which rather reflects only the factors that mo-
tivated the original vote to deny. Ferguson v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 
supra, at 559-462 (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting). In this circum-
stance, I share the view stated by Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting in 
United States v. Shannon, supra, at 298: 
'A Justice who has voted to deny the writ of certiorari is in no position 
after argument to vote to dismiss the writ as improvidently granted. 
Only those who have voted to grant the writ have that privilege. The 
reason strikes deep. If after the writ is granted or after argument, 
those who voted to deny certiorari vote to dismiss the writ as improvi-
dently granted, the integrity of our certiorari jurisdiction is impaired. 
By long practice-announced to the Congress and well-known to this 
Bar-it takes four votes out of a Court of nine to grant a petition for 
certiorari. If four can grant and the opposing five dismiss, then the 
four cannot get a decision of the case on the merits. The integrity of 
the four-vote rule on certiorari would then be impaired."' 
Given that the Court has offered absolutely no reason for its decision to 
dismiss the writ in this case, I can only conclude that there are no justifi-
able reasons for the dismissal that were unknown last Term when at least 
four Justices, who remain persuaded that the case should be decided on the 
merits, originally voted to give plenary consideration to the case. 
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occurred since the writ of certiorari was granted last Term. 
Nor has consideration of the case on the merits focused the 
Court on any factors that were unknown at the time the case 
was originally set for oral argument. Indeed, if anything, I 
believe the posture of the case has been clarified by the writ-
ten briefs and oral arguments presented to the Court. In 
the absence of any explanation for the Court's action, there-
fore, I can only conclude that the Court is willing to ignore 
the Rule of Four that has traditionally controlled the Court's 
docket. 16 
IV 
For unexplained reasons, the Court has chosen to dismiss 
the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted. As a result, 
the Court lets stand a warrantless, nighttime entry into the 
petitioner's home to arrest him for violation of a civil traffic 
offense. In my view, such an arrest is clearly prohibited by 
prevailing case law and by the special protection afforded the 
home under the Fourth Amendment. The petitioner's ar-
rest was therefore invalid, the judgment of the Supreme 
Court of Wisconsin should be vacated, and the case remanded 
for further proceedings. 
I respectfully dissent. 
16 The dismissal of the writ in this case despite the votes of four Justices 
to decide the case on the merits is even more troubling because of the pend-
ing criminal action against the petitioner. See n. 8, supra. It indeed 
would be ironic if his conviction were affirmed by the Wisconsin courts, and 
the petitioner then filed another petition for certiorari from that state court 
judgment. If (as is not improbable) the four Justices dissenting today 
would vote to grant that petition, the Court would be forced either to de-
cide precisely the same question presented by this case or to do even more 
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~-4J~Tl BRENNA with whom JUSTICE MARSHALL joins, 
ho STICE BLACKMUN and JUSTICE STEVENS 
join in all but Part 11-A, dissenting. 
In Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573 (1980), the Court 
concluded that, absent probable cause and exigent circum-
stances, warrantless arrests in the home are prohibited by 
the Fourth Amendment. At the same time, we explicitly re-
fused "to consider the sort of emergency or dangerous situa-
tion, described in our cases as 'exigent circumstances,' that 
would justify a warrantless entry into a home for the purpose 
of either arrest or search." I d., at 583. Certiorari was 
originally granted in this case to decide at least one aspect of 
the unresolved question: whether, and if so under what cir-
cumstances, the Fourth Amendment prohibits the police 1 
from making a warrantless night entry of a person's home in 
order to arrest him for violation of a nonjailable traffic of-
fense. Because, in my view, this case presents a record that 
compels us to decide that question, I cannot agree that the 
Courtshouffi dismiss the writ of certiorari as improvidently 
granted. I therefore reach the merits of the question pre-
sented and would reverse the judgment of the Supreme 
Court of Wisconsin. 
I 
A 
Shortly before 9:00 p. m. on the rainy night of April 24, 
1978, a lone witness, Randy Jablonic, observed a car that was 
f 
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being driven erratically. After changing speeds and veering 
from side to side, the car eventually swerved off the road and 
came to a stop in an open field. No damage to any person or 
property occurred. Apparently worrying about the driver 
and fearing that the car would get back on the highway, 
J ablonic drove his truck up behind the car so as to block it 
from returning to the road. Another passerby also stopped 
at the scene, and J ablonic asked her to call the police. Be-
fore the police arrived, however, the driver of the car 
emerged from his vehicle, approached Jablonic's truck, and 
asked J ablonic for a ride home. J ablonic instead suggested 
that they wait for assistance in removing or repairing the car. 
Ignoring Jablonic's suggestion, the driver walked away from 
the scene. 
A few minutes later, the police arrived and questioned 
J ablonic. He told one officer what he had seen, specifically 
noting that the driver was either very inebriated or very 
sick. The officer checked the motor vehicle registration of 
the abandoned car and learned that it was registered to the 
petitioner, Edward G. Welsh. In addition, the officer noted 
that the petitioner's residence was a short distance from the 
scene, and therefore easily within walking distance. 
Without securing any type of warrant, the police pro-
ceeded to the petitioner's home, arriving about 9:00 p. m. 
When the petitioner's stepdaughter answered the door, the 
police successfully sought entry into the house. 1 They pro-
ceeded upstairs to the petitioner's bedroom, where they 
found him lying naked in bed. At this point, the petitioner 
' The state trial court never decided whether there was consent to the 
entry because it deemed decision of that issue unnecessary in light of its 
finding that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless arrest. After 
reversing the lower court's finding of exigent circumstances, the Wisconsin 
Court of Appeals remanded for full consideration of the consent issue. See 
State v. Welsh, No. 80-1686, App. 114-125. That remand never occurred, 
however, because the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed its court of ap-
peals and reinstated the trial court's judgment. See State v. Welsh, 108 
Wis. 2d 319, 321 N. W. 2d 245 (1982). 
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was placed under arrest for driving or operating a motor ve-
hicle while under the influence of an intoxicant, in violation of 
Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1) (1977). 2 The petitioner was taken to 
the police station, where he refused to submit to a breatha-
lyzer test. 
B 
As a result of these events, the petitioner was subjected to 
two separate but related proceedings: one concerning his re-
fusal to submit to a breath test and the other involving the 
alleged code violation for driving while intoxicated. Under 
the Wisconsin vehicle code as it appeared in April1978, any-
one arrested for driving while intoxicated under § 346.63(1) 
could be requested by a law enforcement officer to provide 
breath, blood, or urine samples for the purpose of determin-
ing the presence or quantity of alcohol. Wis. Stat. 
§ 343.305(1) (1975). If such a request was made, the arrestee 
was required to submit to the appropriate testing or risk a 
revocation of operating privileges. Cf. South Dakota v. 
Neville, 459 U. S. -- (1983) (admission into evidence of a 
defendant's refusal to submit to a blood-alcohol test does not 
offend constitutional right against self-incrimination). The 
arrestee could challenge the officer's request, however, by 
refusing to undergo testing and then asking for a hearing to 
determine whether the refusal was justified. If, after the 
hearing, it was determined that the refusal was not justified, 
the arrestee's operating privileges would be revoked for 60 
days. 3 
2 Since the time of the petitioner's arrest, § 346.63 has been amended to 
provide for a code violation if someone drives or operates a motor vehicle 
while under the influence of an intoxicant or while evidencing certain 
blood- or breath-alcohol levels. See Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(a)-(b) 
(1981--82). This amendment, however, has no bearing on the issues raised 
by the present case. 
8 Since the time of the petitioner's arrest, this statute also has been 
amended, with the current version found at Wis. Stat. § 343.305 (1981--82). 
Although the procedures to be followed by the law enforcement officer and 
the arrestee have remained essentially unchanged, § 343.305(3), (8), the po-
82-5466-DISSENT 
4 WELSH v. WISCONSIN 
The statute also set forth specific criteria to be applied by a 
court when detennining whether an arrestee's refusal to take 
a breath test was justified. Included among these criteria 
was a requirement that, before revoking the arrestee's op-
erating privileges, the court determine that "the refusal ... 
to submit to a test was unreasonable." §343.305(2)(b)(5) ~ 
(1975). It is not disputed that an arrestee's refusal to take al J ~ kvJ 
breath test would be reasonable, and therefore operating -
privileges could not be revoked, if the underlying arrest was jP 
not lawful. Indeed, state 1 has con is e 1 rov'ded that 
a v li est is a necessa rere ui ite to the imposition of 
a breath test. See Scales v. tate, 64 Wis. 2d 485, 494, 219 \2.-J.. 
N. W. 2d 286, 292 (1974). Although the statute in effect in 
1 
April 1978 referred to reasonableness, the current version of 
§ 343.305 explicitly recognizes that one of the issues that an 
[ 
arrestee may raise at a refusal hearing is "whether [he] was 
lawfully placed under arrest for violation of s.346.63(1)." 
§ 343.305(3)(b)(5)(a), (8)(b) (1981-82). See also 67 Op. Wis. 
Atty. Gen. 93-78 (Dec. 27, 1978) ("statutory scheme ... con-
templates that a lawful arrest be made prior to a request for 
submission to a test"). 4 
Separate statutory provisions control the penalty that 
might be imposed for the substantive offense of driving while 
intoxicated. At the time in question, the vehicle code pro-
vided that a first offense for driving while intoxicated was a 
noncriminal violation subject to a civil forfeiture proceeding 
for a maximum fine of $200; a second or subsequent offense in 
tentiallength of any revocation of operating privileges has been increased, 
depending on the arrestee's prior driving record, § 343.305(9)(a)-(b). An 
arrestee who improperly refuses to submit to a required test may also be 
required to comply with an assessment order and a driver safety plan. 
§ 343.305(9)(c)-(e). These amendments, however, also have no direct 
bearing on the issues raised by the present case. 
• Because state law provides that evidence of the petitioner's refusal to 
submit to a breath test is inadmissible if the underlying arrest was unlaw-
ful, this case does not implicate the exclusionary rule under the Federal 
Constitution. 
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the previous five years was a potential misd meanor that 
could be punished by imprisonment for up to o e year and a 
maximum fine of $500. Wis. Stat. § 75 . Since 
that time, the state has made oruy minor arne 
these penalty provisions. Indee , e- o 
categorize a first offense as a civil violation that allows for 
only a monetary forfeiture of no more than $300. 
§ 346.65(2)(a) (1981-82). See State v. Albright, 98 Wis. 2d 
663, 672-673, 298 N. W. 2d 196, 202 (App. 1980). 
c 
As noted, in this case the petitioner refused to submit to a 
breath test; he subsequently filed a timely request for a re-
fusal hearing. Before that hearing was held, however, the 
state filed a criminal complaint against the petitioner for 
driving while intoxicated. 5 The petitioner responded by fil-
ing a motion to dismiss the complaint, relying on his conten-
tion that the underlying arrest was invalid. After receiving 
evidence at a hearing on this motion in July 1980, the trial 
court concluded that the criminal complaint would not be dis-
missed because the existence of both probable cause and exi-
gent circumstances justified the warrantless arrest. The de-
cision at the refusal hearing, which was not held until 
September 1980, was therefore preordained. In fact, the 
primary issue at the refusal hearing-whether the petitioner 
acted reasonably in refusing to submit to a breath test be-
cause he was unlawfully placed under arrest, see supra, at 
' The petitioner was charged with a criminal misdemeanor because this 
was his second such citation in the previous five years. See § 346.65(2) 
(1975). Although the petitioner was subject to a criminal charge, the po-
lice conducting the warrantless entry of his home did not know that the 
petitioner had ever been charged with, or much less convicted of, a prior 
violation for driving while intoxicated. It must be assumed, therefore, 
that at the time of the arrest the police were acting as if they were investi-
gating and eventually arresting for a civil violation only. See Beck v. 
Ohio, 379 U. S. 89, 91, 96 (1964). 
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4-had now been determined two months earlier by the same 
trial court. 
As expected, after the refusal hearing, the trial court con-
cluded that the arrest of the petitioner was lawful and that 
the petitioner's refusal to take the breath test was therefore 
unreasonable. 6 Accordingly, the court issued an order sus-
pending the petitioner's operating license for 60 days. On 
appeal, the suspension order was vacated by the Wisconsin 
Co~¢ A~e_:ls. See State v. Welsh, No. 80-1686, App. 
114-125. ontrary to the trial court, the appellate ....c..ourt 
concluded that the warrantless arrest of the petitioner in his 
home violated the Fourth Amendment because the State, al-
though demonstrating probable cause to arrest, had not es-
tablished the existence of exi ent circumstances. The peti-
tioner's re~al to submit to a breat test was therefore 
reasonabl~ The~ Cou~ in turn re-
versed the court of :ppeas, :::::~ ex1; ence of three] 
factors that it believed constituted exigent circumstances: 
the need for "hot pursuit" of a suspect, the need to prevent 
physical harm to the offender and the public, and the need to 
prevent destruction of evidence. See State v. Welsh, 108 
Wis. 2d 319, 336-338, 321 N. W. 2d 245, 254-255 (1982). Be-
cause of the important Fourth Amendment implications of 
the decision below, we granted certiorari. 459 U. S. --
(1983). 8 
6 When ruling from the bench after the refusal hearing, the trial judge 
specifically indicated: 
"[T]he Court is bound by its earlier ruling that that was a valid arrest. 
And, I think [counsel for the petitioner] certainly will have the right to 
challenge that on appeal if he appeals this matter, as well as the previous 
ruling should there be a conviction on the underlying charge." App. 111. 
See also App. 112-113. 
7 The co emanded the case for further findings as to whether the 
police had enterectthe petitioner's home with consent. Seen. 1, supra. 
8 Although the state courts differed in their respective conclusions con-
cerning exigent circumstances, they each found that the facts known to the 
police at the time of the warrantless home entry were sufficient to establish 
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II 
It is axiomatic that "the physical entry of the home is the 
chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amend-
ment is directed." United States v. United States District 
Court, 407 U. S. 297, 313 (1972). And a principal protection 
against unnecessary intrusions into private dwellings is the 
warrant requirement imposed by the Fourth Amendment on 
agents of the government who seek to enter the home for 
purposes of search or arrest. See Johnson v. United States, 
333 U. S. 10, 13-14 (1948). 9 It is not surprising, therefore, 
that the Court has recognized, as "a 'basic principle of Fourth 
Amendment law[,]' that searches and seizures inside a home 
without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable." Pay-
ton v. New York, 445 U. S., at 586. See Coolidge v. New 
Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 474-475 (1971) ("a search or sei-
zure carried out on a suspect's premises without a warrant is 
probable cause to arrest. The petitioner has not challenged that finding 
before this Court. 
The parallel criminal proceedings against the petitioner, see supra, at 5 
and n. 5, resulted in a misdemeanor conviction for driving while intoxi-
cated. During the jury trial, held in early 1982, the state introduced evi-
dence of the petitioner's refusal to submit to a breath test. His appeal 
from that conviction, now before the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, has been 
stayed pending our decision in this case. See Brief for Petitioner 17, n. 5. 
9 In Johnson, Justice Jackson eloquently explained the warrant require-
ment in the context of a home search: 
"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by 
zealous· officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the 
usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protec-
tion consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and 
detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the 
often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. . . . The right of offi-
cers to thrust themselves into a home is ... a grave concern, not only to 
the individual but to a society which chooses to dwell in reasonable security 
and freedom from surveillance. When the right of privacy must reason-
ably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial 
officer, not by a policeman or government enforcement agent." Id., at 
13-14 (footnote omitted). 
82-5466---DISSENT 
8 WELSH v. WISCONSIN 
per se unreasonable, unless the police can show ... the pres-
ence of 'exigent circumstances'"). See also Steagald v. 
United States, 451 U. S. 204, 211-212 (1981); McDonald v. 
United States, 335 U. S. 451, 456 (1948); Johnson v. United 
States, supra, at 13-15; Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 
630 (1886). 
Consistent with these long-recognized principles, the 
Court decided in Payton v. New York, supra, that warrant-
less arrests in the home are prohibited by the Fourth Amend-
ment, absent probable cause and exigent circumstances. 
I d., at 583-590. Although one might infer from the Court's 
decision that all home arrests would be subject to the same 
rule, the Court expressly framed its opinion in terms of "rou-
tine felony arrests," see id., at 574, 602. This formulation of 
the holding in Payton implies two separate, but related limi-
tations that have yet to be acknowledged completely by the 
Court, but which control the present case. In particular, by 
its own terms the holding in Payton-limited to "routine fel-
ony arrests"-was neither intended to cover arrests for 
nonserious offenses nor applied to arrests that are consid-
ered nonroutine because they are justified by exigent 
circumstances. 
A 
By concluding that the Fourth Amendment prohibits home 
entries to make warrantless felony arrests in the absence of 
probable cause and exigent circumstances, the Court in 
Payton decided, a fortiori, that warrantless home arrests are 
similarly prohibited for offenses less serious than felonies. 
It does not necessarily follow, however, that warrantless 
home arrests for nonserious offenses would be proper, even if 
probable cause and exigent circumstances are found to exist. 
That question, yet to be decided by the Court, is presented 
by the record in this case. I therefore reach the issue and 
conclude that the Fourth Amendment imposes an absolute 
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In United States v. Watson, 423 U. S. 411 (1976), the 
Court upheld a warrantless "midday public" arrest for a fel-
ony. In so doing, the Court relied heavily on the common-
law rule that "a peace officer was permitted to arrest without 
a warrant for a misdemeanor or felony committed in his 
presence as well as for a felony not committed in his presence 
if there was reasonable ground for making the arrest." I d., 
at 418 (emphasis added) (citing sources); id., at 438 (MAR-
SHALL, J., dissenting). Although not necessary to the result 
in Watson, the italicized portion of the common-law rule sug-
gests that warrantless public arrests for misdemeanors, even 
if supported by probable cause and exigent circumstances, 
should be prohibited unless the underlying offense is commit-
ted in the presence of the arresting officer. See generally 
W. LaFave, Arrest 231-243 (1965). Therefore, even accept-
ing the Court's view in Watson that the Fourth Amendment 
grants broad authority for warrantless public arrests, adher-
ence to the common-law rule would allow warrantless misde-
meanor arrests in public areas only in the most narrow cir-
cumstances. 10 It logically follows that warrantless home 
'°For purposes of this case only, I assume that the common-law rule 
identified in Watson applied in its literal sense to all misdemeanors. 
There is substantial evidence, however, that public arrests were justified 
under the common law, even for offenses committed in the officer's pres-
ence, only for breaches of the peace-a category of offenses much nar-
rower, and far more serious, than all misdemeanors. See, e. g., W. 
LaFave, Arrest 231 (1965); Bohlen & Shulman, Arrest With and Without a 
Warrant, 75 U. Pa. L. Rev. 485 (1927). As explained by the New York 
Court of Appeals: 
"The right of a peace officer at common law to arrest summarily was a 
limited one. 'The common law did not authorize the arrest of persons 
guilty or suspected of misdemeanors, except in cases of an actual breach of 
the peace either by an affray or by violence to an individual. In such cases 
the arrest had to be made not so much for the purpose of bringing the of-
fender to justice as in order to preserve the peace, and the right to arrest 
was accordingly limited to cases in which the person to be arrested was 
taken in the act or immediately after its conclusion.' (Stephen's History of 
the Criminal Law of England, p. 193; Chase's Blackstone [4th ed.], pp. 998, 
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entries to make arrests for public misdemeanors would also 
be prohibited, possibly with a similarly narrow exception for 
persons committing such misdemeanors in the presence of an 
officer and then fleeing, upon hot pursuit, into the home. 
Cf. United States v. Santana, 427 U. S. 38, 42-43 (1976) (hot 
pursuit of fleeing felon); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294 
(1967) (same). And, although the rules for home arrests at 
the time of the adoption of the Fourth Amendment were far 
from clear, see Payton v. New York, 445 U. S., at 591-598, it 
appears that such a severe restriction on home arrests for 
misdemeanors was the prevailing view of the common law. 
See, e. g., The Queen v. Marsden, 1 L. R.-Cr. Cas. Res. 131 
(1868); Wilgus, Arrest Without a Warrant, 22 Mich. L. Rev. 
541, 798, 803 (1924) ("Of course since ... an officer ... has 
[no] authority to arrest for a past breach of the peace without 
a warrant, neither would [he] have the right to break doors in 
an attempted arrest therefor, except for one committed in his 
presence and on fresh pursuit."). See also Handcock v. 
Baker, 126 Eng. Rep. 1270 (1800); Adair v. Williams, 24 
Ariz. 422, 210 P. 853 (1922); Wilgus, supra, at 804. There-
fore, even if exigent circumstances exist, the common law] 
sugges s tha warran ess orne arrests for misdemeanors 
should be prohibited, with the possible exception of hot pur-
suit from the commission of a misdemeanor in the officer's 
presence. 
999; 6 C. J. S. Arrest, § 6, subd. c.)" People v. Phillips, 284 N. Y. 235, 
237, 30 N. E. 2d 488, 489 (1940). 
Moreover, I remain convinced that it is incorrect to base current inter-
pretations of the Fourth Amendment solely on the literal words of the com-
mon-law rules of arrest. Rather, the Fourth Amendment "must be inter-
preted 'in light of contemporary norms and conditions."' Steagald v. 
United States, 451 U. S. 204, 217 and n. 10 (1981), quoting Payton v. New 
York, 445 U. S. 573, 591 and n. 33 (1980). See also United States v. Wat-
son, 423 U. S. 411, 433, 438-443 (1976) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). For 
purposes of this case, however, even acceptance of the common-law rule 
compels the conclusion that the petitioner's arrest was unlawful. 
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Surely, the prohibitions of the Fourth Amendment go at 
least as far-prohibiting warrantless entries of the home to 
arrest for certain minor offenses under all circumstances, 
even if prob~t circumstances are shown 
to exist. Before agents of the government may invade the 
sanctity of the home, the government must be required to 
demonstrate a compelling need that overcomes the presump-
tion of unreasonableness that attaches to all warrantless 
home entries. See Payton v. New York, supra, at 586. 
When the government's interest is only to arrest for a minor 
offense, that presumption of unreasonableness should be 
irrebuttable, and the government should be allowed to make 
such an arrest only with a warrant issued upon probable 
cause by a neutral and detached magistra~. Accordingly, I 
conclude that there ar~ 'no circumstances ~nder which a war-
home entry to arrest for a minor offen coul us-
tified.11 The ourt mendment, in my view, compels such -an absolute ban. 
Application of this bright-line principle to the facts of this 
case proves quite simple. The State of Wisconsin has chosen 
to classify the first offense for driving while intoxicated as a 
noncriminal, civil forfeiture offense for which no imprison-
ment is possible. See Wis. Stat. § 346. 65(2) (1975); id., 
§ 346.65(2)(a) (1981-82); supra, at 4-5. This is the best indi-
cation of the state's interest in precipitating an arrest, and is 
one that can be easily identified both by the courts and by of-
ficers faced with a decision to arrest. See n. 5, supra. An 
offense for which no imprisonment is possible, however, does 
not suffice to overcome the presumption of unreasonableness 
11 Even the dissenters in Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573 (1980), al-
though believing that warrantless home arrests are not prohibited by the 
Fourth Amendment, recognized the importance of the felony limitation on 
such arrests. See id., at 603, 616-617 (WHITE, J., dissenting) ("The felony 
requirement guards against abusive or arbitrary enforcement and ensures 
that invasions of the home occur only in case of the most serious crimes."). 
I see little reason to remove this general restriction even if there is ample 
support for a finding of exigent circumstances. 
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that attaches to a warrantless entry of the home to arrest. 12 
The arrest of the petitioner in this case, therefore, was pro-
hibited by the Fourth Amendment. As a result of this un-
lawful arrest, state law provides that the revocation of his op-
erating privileges was also improper. See Wise. Stat. 
§ 343.305(2)(b)(5) (1975); id., § 343.305(3)(b)(5)(a) (1981-82); 
supra, at 4 and n. 4. Accordingly, the judgment of the Su-
preme Court of Wisconsin should be vacated, and the case re-
manded for further proceedings. 
B 
Even if I were to conclude that an absolute ban on warrant-
less home arrests for certain nonserious offenses is not com-
pelled by the Fourth Amendment, I would conclude that the 
petitioner's arrest was prohibited by the Fourth Amendment 
because of the absence of exi ent circumstances. 
In Payton v. New Y or , 44 U. . , at , the Court de-
clined to consider the scope of any exception for exigent cir-
cumstances that might justify warrantless home arrests, 
thereby leaving to the lower courts the initial application of 
12 Although I have previously joined in noting the danger of drawing con-
stitutional lines based on legislative classifications of statutory crimes, see 
United States v. Watson, 423 U. S., at 438-442, 454-455 (MARSHALL, J., 
dissenting), it is not necessary to decide in this case whether the Fourth 
Amendment prohibits warrantless home arrests for all nonfelonious 
crimes. Rather, given the facts of this case, I would simply hold that such 
arrests are constitutionally prohibited at least for all minor offenses, de-
fined primarily by looking to the extent of punishment provided for by the 
state statute. 
Nor do I mean to suggest that the prevention of drunk driving is not 
properly of major concern to the States. The State of Wisconsin, how-
ever, along with several other States, see, e. g., Minn. Stat. § 169.121 
subd. 4 (1982); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 39--669.07(1) (Supp. 1982); S. D. Codified 
Laws § 32-23-2 (Supp. 1983), has chosen to limit severely the penalties 
that may be imposed after a first conviction for driving while intoxicated. 
Given that the classification of state crimes differs widely among the 
States, the penalty that may attach to any particular offense seems to pro-
vide the clearest and most consistent indication of the state's interest in 
arresting individuals suspected of committing that offense. 
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the exigent-circumstances exception. Prior decisions of this 
Court, however, have emphasized that exceptions to the war-
rant requirement are "few in number and carefully delin-
eated," United States v. United States District Court, 407 
U. S., at 318, and that the police have a heavy burden to 
meet when attempting to demonstrate an urgent need that 
might justify warrantless searches or arrests. Indeed, the 
Court has recognized only a few such emergency conditions, 
see, e. g., United States v. Santana, 427 U. S., at 42-43 
(1976) (hot pursuit of a fleeing felon); Warden v. Hayden, 387 
U. S., at 29~299 (1967) (same); Schmerber v. California, 384 
U. S. 757, 770-771 (1966) (destruction of evidence); Michigan 
v. Tyler, 436 U. S. 499, 509 (1978) (ongoing fire), and has ac-
tually applied only the "hot pursuit" doctrine to arrests in the 
home, see Santana, supra. The record in this case, how-
ever, requires that the Court clarify this area of Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence. In so doing, I conclude that an 
important factor to be considered when determining whether 
any exigency exists is the gravity of the underlying offense 
for which the arrest is being made. Moreover, although no 
exigency is created simply because there is probable cause to 
believe that a serious crime has been committed, I conclude 
that application of the exigent-circumstances exception 
should be severely restricted when only a minor offense is 
involved. 
This is not a novel idea. Writing in concurrence in M c-
Donald v. United States, 335 U. S. 451 (1948) , Justice Jack-
son explained why a finding of exigent circumstances to jus-
tify a warrantless home entry should be severely restricted: 
"Even if one were to conclude that urgent circum-
stances might justify a forced entry without a warrant, 
no such emergency was present in this case. This 
method of law enforcement displays a shocking lack of all 
sense of proportion. Whether there is reasonable ne-
cessity for a search without waiting to obtain a warrant 
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fense thought to be in progress as well as the hazards of 
the method of attempting to reach it. . . . It is to me a 
shocking proposition that private homes, even quarters 
in a tenement, may be indiscriminately invaded at the 
discretion of any suspicious police officer engaged in 
following up offenses that involve no violence or threats 
of it. While I should be human enough to apply the let-
ter of the law with some indulgence to officers acting to 
deal with threats or crimes of violence which endanger 
life or security, it is notable that few of the searches 
found by this Court to be unlawful dealt with that cate-
gory of crime. . . . While the enterprise of parting fools 
from their money by the 'numbers' lottery is one that 
ought to be suppressed, I do not think that its suppres-
sion is more important to society than the security of the 
people against unreasonable searches and seizures. 
When an officer undertakes to act as his own magistrate, 
he ought to be in a position to justify it by pointing to 
some real immediate and serious consequences if he post-
poned action to get a warrant." ld., at 459-460 (Jack-
son, J., concurring) (footnote omitted). 
Consistent with this approach, the lower courts have 
looked to the nature of the underlying offense as an impor-
tant factor to be considered in the exigent-circumstances cal-
culus. In the leading federal case defining exigent circum-
stances, for example, the en bane United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia recognized that the 
gravity of the underlying offense was a principal factor to be 
weighed. Dorman v. United States, 435 F. 2d 385, 392 
(CADC 1970). 13 Without approving all of the factors in-
cluded in the standard adopted by that court, it is sufficient 
18 See generally Donnino & Girese, Exigent Circumstances for a War-
rantless Home Arrest, 45 Alb. L. Rev. 90 (1980); Harbaugh & Faust, 
"Knock on Any Door"-Home Arrests Mter Payton and Steagald, 86 
Dick. L. Rev. 191, 220-233 (1982); Note, Exigent Circumstances for War-
rantless Home Arrests, 23 Ariz. L. Rev. 1171 (1981). 
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to note that many other lower courts have also considered the 
gravity of the offense an important part of their constitu-
tional analysis. 
As a result, courts have permitted warrantless home ar-
rests for major felonies if identifiable exigencies, independent 
of the gravity of the offense, existed at the time of the arrest. 
Compare United States v. Campbell, 581 F. 2d 22 (CA21978) 
(allowing warrantless home arrest for armed robbery when 
exigent circumstances existed), with Commonwealth v. Wil-
liams, 483 Pa. 293, 396 A. 2d 1177 (1978) (disallowing war-
rantless home arrest for murder due to absence of exigent 
circumstances). But of those courts addressing the issue, 
most refuse to permit a warrantless home arrest for a 
nonfelonious crime. See, e. g., State v. Guertin, 190 Conn. 
440, 453, 461 A. 2d 963, 970 (1983) ("The [exigent circum-
stances] exception is narrowly drawn to cover cases of real 
and not contrived emergencies. The exception is limited to 
the investigation of serious crimes; misdemeanors are ex-
cluded."); People v. Strelow, 96 Mich. App. 182, 190-193, 292 
N. W. 2d 517, 521-522 (1980). See also People v. Sanders, 
59 Ill. App. 3d 6, 374 N. E. 2d 139 (1978) (burglary without 
weapons not a grave offense of violence for these purposes); 
State v. Bennett, 295 N. W. 2d 5 (S. D. 1980) (distribution of 
controlled substances not a grave offense for these purposes). 
But cf. State v. Penas, 200 Neb. 387, 263 N. W. 2d 835 (1978) 
(allowing warrantless home arrest upon hot pursuit from 
commission of misdemeanor in the officer's presence; decided 
before Payton); State v. Niedermeyer, 48 Or. App. 665, 617 
P. 2d 911 (1980) (allowing warrantless home arrest upon hot 
pursuit from commission of misdemeanor in the officer's pres-
ence). This should not be surprising. It is, indeed, difficult 
to conceive of a warrantless home arrest that would not be 
unreasonable when the underlying offense is relatively 
minor. I therefore conclude that the commonsense result 
reached by most lower courts is required by the Fourth 
Amendment prohibition on "unreasonable searches and sei-
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zures," and would hold that application of the exigent-circum-
stances exception in the context of a home entry is severely 
restricted when there is probable cause to believe that only a 
minor offense has been committed. 
Again, application of this principle to the facts of the 
present case is relatively straightforward. The petitioner 
was arrested in the privacy of his own bedroom for a non-
criminal, traffic offense. The State attempts to justify the 
arrest by relying on the hot-pursuit doctrine, on the threat to 
public safety, and on the need to preserve evidence of the pe-
titioner's blood-alcohollevel. The claim of hot pursuit is un-
convincing, however, because there was no immediate or con-
tinuous pursuit of the petitioner from the scene of a crime. 
Moreover, because the petitioner had already arrived home, 
and had abandoned his car at the scene of the accident, there 
was little remaining threat to the public safety. Hence, the 
only potential emergency claimed by the State was the need 
to ascertain the petitioner's blood-alcohol level. But even 
assuming that the underlying facts would support a finding of 
this exigent circumstance, mere similarity to other cases in-
volving the imminent destruction of evidence is not sufficient. 
In the context of a minor, nonjailable traffic offense, a war-
rantless home arrest simply cannot be upheld using this oth-
erwise plausible justification. The principles of the Fourth 
Amendment do not sanction such unreasonable police 
behavior. 
III 
The Court's dismissal of the writ as improvidently granted 
is especially troublesome because it seriously impairs the 
Court's Rule of Four, under which the votes of four Justices 
to grant the writ requires that the case be set for full brief-
ing, oral argument, and plenary consideration on the merits. 
When, as in this case, those four Justices remain persuaded 
that the merits of the case should be decided, adherence to 
the Court's orderly procedures requires that a decision on the 
merits be reached, absent any intervening change in circum-
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stances or the revelation of any factors suggesting that the 
original grant of certiorari was inappropriate. Otherwise, 
the Court's discretionary jurisdiction becomes an essentially 
arbitrary jurisdiction. See generally Burrell v. McCray, 
426 U. S. 471, 473 (1976) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting). 
Various Justices of this Court have previously acknowl-
edged that the Rule of Four · · · non the merits in 
this situation. As Justic Harlan expl · ed in his much-
quoted discussion of this are..,·,__ __ 
"I think the Court should not have heard any of these 
four cases. Nevertheless, the cases having been taken, 
I have conceived it to be my duty to consider them on 
their merits, because I cannot reconcile voting to dismiss 
the writs as 'improvidently granted' with the Court's 
'rule of four.' In my opinion due adherence to that rule 
requires that once certiorari has been granted a case 
should be disposed of on the premise that it is properly 
here, in the absence of considerations appearing which 
were not manifest or fully apprehended at the time cer-
tiorari was granted." Ferguson v. Moore-McCormack 
Lines, 352 U. S. 521, 559 (1957) (separate opinion). 
See The Monrosa v. Carbon Black Export, Inc., 359 U. S. 
180 (1959) (dismissal only appropriate when "[e]xamination of 
a case on the merits, on oral argument, ... bring[s] into 
'proper focus' a consideration which, though present in the 
record at the time of granting the writ, only later indicates 
that the grant was improvident"). Compare Triangle Im-
provement Council v. Ritchie, 402 U. S. 497, 502 (1971) 
(Harlan, J., concurring) (dismissal appropriate "in light of 
... changed posture of the case") with id., at 508 (Douglas, 
J., dissenting, joined by Black, BRENNAN, and MARSHALL, 
JJ.) (so as not to impair the Rule of Four, it is "the duty of 
the five opposing certiorari to persuade others at Conference, 
but, failing that, to vote on the merits of the case"). See also 
Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U. S. 637, 648 (1974) (Stew-
art, J., concurring, joined by WHITE, J.) ("If as many as four 
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Justices remain so minded after oral argument, due adher-
ence to that rule requires me to address the merits of a case, 
however strongly I may feel that it does not belong in this 
Court."); Burrell v. McCray, 426 U. S. 471, 472 (1976) (STE-
J . ) 14 VENS, . , concurrmg . 
In this case, neither the Court nor the parties have even 
attempted to suggest any change in circumstances that has 
"In Burrell v. McCray, 426 U.S. 471, 474-475 (1976) (BRENNAN, J., 
dissenting), I explained when, in my view, a Justice who has initially voted 
to deny certiorari may nonetheless join in dismissing the writ as improvi-
dently granted: 
"Further, a Justice who originally voted to deny the petition for writ of 
certiorari is, of course, privileged to participate in a dismissal as improvi-
dently granted that is justified under the Monrosa standard. See Fergu-
son v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 352 U. S. 521,559 (1957) (Harlan, J., con-
curring and dissenting); United States v. Shannon, 342 U. S. 288, 294 
(1952). But I hold the view that impermissible violence is done the Rule of 
Four when a Justice who voted to deny the petition for certiorari partici-
pates after oral argument in a dismissal that, as here, is not justified under 
the governing standard, but which rather reflects only the factors that mo-
tivated the original vote to deny. Ferguson v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 
supra, at 559-462 (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting). In this circum-
stance, I share the view stated by Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting in 
United States v. Shannon, supra, at 298: 
'A Justice who has voted to deny the writ of certiorari is in no position 
after argument to vote to dismiss the writ as improvidently granted. 
Only those who have voted to grant the writ have that privilege. The 
reason strikes deep. If after the writ is granted or after argument, 
those who voted to deny certiorari vote to dismiss the writ as improvi-
dently granted, the integrity of our certiorari jurisdiction is impaired. 
By long practice-announced to the Congress and well-known to this 
Bar-it takes four votes out of a Court of nine to grant a petition for 
certiorari. If four can grant and the opposing five dismiss, then the 
four cannot get a decision of the case on the merits. The integrity of 
the four-vote rule on certiorari would then be impaired.' " 
Given that the Court has offered absolutely no reason for its decision to 
dismiss the writ in this case, I can only conclude that there are no justifi-
able reasons for the dismissal that were unknown last Term when at least 
four Justices, who remain persuaded that the case should be decided on the 
merits, originally voted to give plenary consideration to the case. 
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occurred since the writ of certiorari was granted last Term. 
Nor has consideration of the case on the merits focused the 
Court on any factors that were unknown at the time the case 
was originally set for oral argument. Indeed, if anything, I 
believe the posture of the case has been clarified by the writ-
ten briefs and oral arguments presented to the Court. In 
the absence of any explanation for the Court's action, there-
fore, I can only conclude that the Court is willing to ignore 
the Rule of Four that has traditionally controlled the Court's 
docket. 15 
IV 
For unexplained reasons, the Court has chosen to dismiss 
the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted. As a result, 
the Court lets stand a warrantless, nighttime entry into the 
petitioner's home to arrest him for violation of a civil traffic 
offense. In my view, such an arrest is clearly prohibited by 
prevailing case law and by the special protection afforded the 
home under the Fourth Amendment. The petitioner's ar-
rest was therefore invalid, the judgment of the Supreme 
Court of Wisconsin should be vacated, and the case remanded 
for further proceedings. 
I respectfully dissent. 
16 The dismissal of the writ in this case despite the votes of four Justices 
to decide the case on the merits is even more troubling because of the pend-
ing criminal action against the petitioner. See n. 8, supra. It indeed 
would be ironic if his conviction were affirmed by the Wisconsin courts, and 
the petitioner then filed another petition for certiorari from that state court 
judgment. If (as is not improbable) the four Justices dissenting today 
would vote to grant that petition, the Court would be forced either to de-
cide precisely the same question presented by this case or to do even more 
damage to the Rule of Four. 
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JUSTICE BRENNAN, dissenting. I 
In Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573 (1980), the Court 
concluded that, absent probable cause and exigent circum-
stances, warrantless arrests in the home are prohibited by 
the Fourth Amendment. At the same time, we explicitly re-
fused "to consider the sort of emergency or dangerous situa-
tion, described in our cases as 'exigent circumstances,' that 
would justify a warrantless entry into a home for the purpose 
of either arrest or search." I d., at 583. · Certiorari was 
originally granted in this case to decide at least one aspect of 
the unresolved question: whether, and if so under what cir-
cumstances, the Fourth Amendment prohibits the police 
from making a warrantless night entry of a person's home in 
order to arrest him for violation of a nonjailable traffic of-
fense. Because, in my view, this case presents a record that 
compels us to decide that question, I cannot agree that the 
Court should dismiss the writ of certiorari as improvidently 
granted. I therefore reach the merits of the question pre-
sented and would reverse the judgment of the Supreme 
Court of Wisconsin. 
I 
A 
Shortly before 9:00 p. m. on the rainy night of April 24, 
1978, a lone witness, Randy Jablonic, observed a car that was 
being driven erratically. After changing speeds and veering 
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from side to side, the car eventually swerved off the road and 
came to a stop in an open field. No damage to any person or 
property occurred. Apparently worrying about the driver 
and fearing that the car would get back on the highway, 
J ablonic drove his truck up behind the car so as to block it 
from returning to the road. Another passerby also stopped 
at the scene, and Jablonic asked her to call the police. Be-
fore the police arrived, however, the driver of the car 
emerged from his vehicle, approached J ablonic's truck, and 
asked J ablonic for a ride home. J ablonic instead suggested 
that they wait for assistance in removing or repairing the car. 
Ignoring J ablonic's suggestion, the driver walked away from 
the scene. 
A few minutes later, the police arrived and questioned 
J ablonic. He told one officer what he had seen, specifically 
noting that the driver was either very inebriated or very 
sick. The officer checked the motor vehicle registration of 
the abandoned car and learned that it was registered to the 
petitioner, Edward G. Welsh. In addition, the officer noted 
that the petitioner's residence was a short distance from the 
scene, and therefore easily within walking distance. 
Without securing any type of warrant, the police pro-
ceeded to the petitioner's home, arriving about 9:00 p. m. 
When the petitioner's stepdaughter answered the door, the 
police successfully sought entry into the house. 1 They pro-
ceeded upstairs to the petitioner's bedroom, where they 
found him lying naked in bed. At this point, the petitioner 
was placed under arrest for driving or operating a motor ve-
1 The state trial court never decided whether there was consent to the 
entry because it deemed decision of that issue unnecessary in light of its 
finding that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless arrest. After 
reversing the lower court's finding of exigent circumstances, the Wisconsin 
Court of Appeals remanded for full consideration of the consent issue. See 
State v. Welsh, No. 80-1686, App. 114-125. That remand never occurred, 
however, because the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed its court of ap-
peals and reinstated the trial court's judgment. See State v. Welsh, 10$ 
Wis. 2d 319, 321 N. W. 2d 245 (1982). 
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hicle while under the influence of an intoxicant, in violation of 
Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1) (1977). 2 The petitioner was taken to 
the police station, where he refused to submit to a breatha-
lyzer test. 
B 
As a result of these events, the petitioner was subjected to 
two separate but related proceedings: one concerning his re-
fusal to submit to a breath test and the other involving the 
alleged code violation for driving while intoxicated. Under 
the Wisconsin vehicle code as it appeared in April 1978, any-
one arrested for driving while intoxicated under § 346.63(1) 
could be requested by a law enforcement officer to provide 
breath, blood, or urine samples for the purpose of determin-
ing the presence or quantity of alcohol. Wis. Stat. 
§ 343.305(1) (1975). If such a request was made, the arrestee 
was required to submit to the appropriate testing or risk a 
revocation of operating privileges. Cf. South Dakota v. 
Neville, 459 U. S. -- (1983) (admission into evidence of a 
defendant's refusal to submit to a blood-alcohol test does not 
offend constitutional right against self-incrimination). The 
arrestee could challenge the officer's request, however, by 
refusing to undergo testing and then asking for a hearing to 
determine whether the refusal was justified. If, after the 
hearing, it was determined that the refusal was not justified, 
the arrestee's operating privileges would be revoked for 60 
days. 3 
2 Since the time of the petitioner's arrest, § 346.63 has been amended to 
provide for a code violation if someone drives or operates a motor vehicle 
while under the influence of an intoxicant or while evidencing certain 
blood- or breath-alcohol levels. See Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(a)-(b) 
(1981--82). This amendment, however, has no bearing on the issues raised 
by the present case. 
3 Since the time of the petitioner's arrest, this statute also has been 
amended, with the current version found at Wis. Stat. § 343.305 (1981--82). 
Although the procedures to be followed by the law enforcement officer and 
the arrestee have remained essentially unchanged, § 343.305(3), (8), the po-
tential length of any revocation of operating privileges has been increased, 
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The statute also set forth specific criteria to be applied by a 
court when determining whether an arrestee's refusal to take 
a breath test was justified. Included among these criteria 
was a requirement that, before revoking the arrestee's op-
erating privileges, the court determine that "the refusal ... 
to submit to a test was unreasonable." § 343.305(2)(b)(5) 
(1975). It is not disputed that an arrestee's refusal to take a 
breath test would be reasonable, and therefore operating 
privileges could not be revoked, if the underlying arrest was 
not lawful. Indeed, state law has consistently provided that 
a valid arrest is a necessary prerequisite to the imposition of 
a breath test. 4 See Scales v. State, 64 Wis. 2d 485, 494, 219 
N. W. 2d 286, 292 (1974). Although the statute in effect in 
April1978 referred to reasonableness, the current version of 
§ 343.305 explicitly recognizes that one of the issues that an 
arrestee may raise at a refusal hearing is "whether [he] was 
la~fully ~E)d under arrest for violation -of s.346.63(1)." 
§ 343.30 (3 (b (5)(a), (8)(b) (1981-82). See also 67 Op. Wis. 
Atty. Gen. 93-78 (~c. 27, 1978) ("statutory scheme ... con-
depending on the arrestee's prior driving record, § 343.305(9)(a)-(b). An 
arrestee who improperly refuses to submit to a required test may also be 
required to comply with an assessment order and a driver safety plan. 
§ 343.305(9)(c)-(e). These amendments, however, also have no direct 
bearing on the issues raised by the present case. 
' Because state law provides that evidence of the petitioner's refusal to 
submit to a breath test is inadmissible if the underlying arrest was unlaw-
ful, this case does not implicate the exclusionary rule under the Federal 
Constitution. The Court's hesitation to apply the exclusionary rule to civil 
proceedings, see ante, at 3-4, and n. 3, is therefore totally irrelevant to 
this case. Likewise, it is difficult to understand the Court's cryptic sug-
gestion that "the Supreme Court of Wisconsin [did] not discuss any evi-
dence which Welsh sought to exclude, " ante, at 3. It has been clear to all 
parties throughout this litigation that, pursuant to state law, evidence of 
the petitioner's refusal to submit to an unreasonable breath test could not 
be used against the petitioner (i. e., must be excluded). And without evi-
dence of the petitioner's refusal, his operating privileges simply could not 
be revoked. 
82-546~DISSENT 
WELSH v. WISCONSIN 5 
templates that a lawful arrest be made prior to a request for 
submission to a test"). 5 
Separate statutory provisions control the penalty that 
might be imposed for the substantive offense of driving while 
• The Court attempts to cast doubt on whether Wisconsin applies fed-
eral constitutional standards to the reasonableness inquiry under Wis. 
Stat. § 343.305(2)(b)(5) (1975). But the Court is simply creating its own 
doubt, where none could possibly exist. All three state courts which have 
rendered decisions in this case have without question applied feder,al c.on-
stitutionalSranoaras. The Wisconsm Supreme Court could not have been 
clear~
"The trial court revoked the defendant's motor vehicle operator's license 
for sixty days pursuant to his unreasonable refusal to submit to a breatha-
lyzer test, as required by [state statute]. 
"The defendant challenges the officer's warrantless arrest in his resi-
dence as violating the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion and Article I, section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution. The [trial 
court] upheld this warrantless arrest concluding that probable cause to be-
lieve that the defendant had been operating a motor vehicle while under 
the influence of an intoxicant, coupled with the existence of exigent circum-
stances, justified the officers' entry into the defendant's residence .... 
[T]he court of appeals reversed the trial court, holding that, although the 
officers' warrantless arrest was unreasonable, thereby violating the 
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, the absence of a finding regarding 
the consensual entry necessitated remanding the case on that issue. We 
affirm the findings of the [trial court], holding that the co-existence of prob-
able cause and exigent circumstances in this case justifies the warrantless 
arrest .... 
"To prevail in this case, the state must prove the co-existence of probable 
cause and exigent circumstances, justifying the officer's conduct at the de-
fendant's residence. We hold that there was ample evidence supporting 
the trial court's ruling that the officer's entry was justified on the basis of 
both probable cause and exigent circumstances. Entry to effect a war-
rantless arrest in a residence is subject to the limitations imposed by both 
the United States and the Wisconsin Constitutions. U. S. Const. amend. 
IV; Wis. Const . art. I, sec. 11 ." 108 Wis. 2d, at 320-321, 326-327, 321 
N. W. 2d, at 24&-247, 249-250 (citations and footnotes omitted). 
As if this were not a sufficient expression of relevant state law, the 
Court also claims that there is "no authoritative construction from a state 
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intoxicated. At the time in question, the vehicle code pro-
vided that a first offense for driving while intoxicated was a 
noncriminal violation subject to a civil forfeiture proceeding 
for a maximum fine of $200; a second or subsequent offense in 
the previous five years was a potential misdemeanor that 
could be punished by imprisonment for up to one year and a 
maximum fine of $500. Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2) (1975). Since 
that time, the state has made only minor amendments to 
these penalty provisions. Indeed, the statute continues to 
categorize a first offense as a civil violation that allows for 
only a monetary forfeiture of no more than $300. 
§ 346.65(2)(a) (1981-82). See State v. Albright, 98 Wis. 2d 
663, 672-673, 298 N. W. 2d 196, 202 (App. 1980). 
c 
As noted, in this case the petitioner refused to submit to a 
breath test; he subsequently filed a timely request for a re-
fusal hearing. Before that hearing was held, however, the 
state filed a criminal complaint against the petitioner for 
driving while intoxicated. 6 The petitioner responded by fil-
court" for the view that the reasonableness inquiry incorporates constitu-
tional standards, ante, n. 5. But the Court ignores §_cales3 . State, 64 
Wis. 2d 485, 494, 219 N. W. 2d 286, 292 (1974), which clearly presaged the 
constitutional analysis undertaken in this case: 
"The implied consent law does not limit the right to take a blood sample as 
an incident to a lawful arrest. It should be emphasized, however, that the 
arrest, and therefore probable cause for making it, must precede the taking 
of the blood sample. We conclude that the sample was constitutionally 
taken incident to the lawful arrest." 
It is therefore the state supreme court, whose interpretations of state law 
are binding on this Court, which has read its statute to predicate operation 
of its implied consent law on the existence of a "lawful arrest." 
• The petitioner was charged with a criminal misdemeanor because this 
was his second such citation in the previous five years. See § 346.65(2) 
(1975). Although the petitioner was subject to a criminal charge, the po-
lice conducting the warrantless entry of his home did not know that the 
petitioner had ever been charged with, or much less convicted of, a prior 
violation for driving while intoxicated. It must be assumed, therefore, 
that at the time of the arrest the police were acting as if they were investi-
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ing a motion to dismiss the complaint, relying on his conten-
tion that the underlying arrest was invalid. After receiving 
evidence at a hearing on this motion in July 1980, the trial 
court concluded that the criminal complaint would not be dis-
missed because the existence of both probable cause and exi-
gent circumstances justified the warrantless arrest. The de-
cision at the refusal hearing, which was not held until 
September 1980, was therefore preordained. In fact, the 
primary issue at the refusal hearing-whether the petitioner 
acted reasonably in refusing to submit to a breath test be-
cause he was unlawfully placed under arrest, see supra, at 
4--had now been determined two months earlier by the same 
trial court. 
As expected, after the refusal hearing, the trial court con-
cluded that the arrest of the petitioner was lawful and that 
the petitioner's refusal to take the breath test was therefore 
unreasonable. 7 Accordingly, the court issued an order sus-
pending the petitioner's operating license for 60 days. On 
appeal, the suspension order was vacated by the Wisconsin 
Court of Appeals. See State v. Welsh, No. 80-1686, App. 
114-125. Contrary to the trial court, the appellate court 
concluded that the warrantless arrest of the petitioner in his 
home violated the Fourth Amendment because the State, al-
though demonstrating probable cause to arrest, had not es-
tablished the existence of exigent circumstances. The peti-
tioner's refusal to submit to a breath test was therefore 
gating and eventually arresting for a civil violation only. See Beck v. 
Ohio, 379 U. S. 89, 91, 96 (1964). 
' When ruling from the bench after the refusal hearing, the trial judge 
specifically indicated: 
"[T]he Court is bound by its earlier ruling that that was a valid arrest. 
And, I think [counsel for the petitioner] certainly will have the right to 
challenge that on appeal if he appeals this matter, as well as the previous 
ruling should there be a conviction on the underlying charge." App. 111. 
See also App. 112-113. 
,. 
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reasonable. 8 The Wisconsin Supreme Court in turn re-
versed the court of appeals, relying on the existence of three 
factors that it believed constituted exigent circumstances: 
the need for "hot pursuit" of a suspect, the need to prevent 
physical harm to the offender and the public, and the need to 
prevent destruction of evidence. See State v. Welsh, 108 
Wis. 2d 319, 336-338, 321 N. W. 2d 245, 254-255 (1982). Be-
cause of the important Fourth Amendment implications of 
the decision below, we granted certiorari. 459 U. S. --
(1983).9 
II 
It is axiomatic that "the physical entry of the home is the 
chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amend-
ment is directed." United States v. United States District 
Court, 407 U. S. 297, 313 (1972). And a principal protection 
against unnecessary intrusions into private dwellings is the 
warrant requirement imposed by the Fourth Amendment on 
agents of the government who seek to enter the home for 
purposes of search or arrest. See Johnson v. United States, 
333 U. S. 10, 13-14 (1948). 10 It is not surprising, therefore, 
8 The court remanded the case for further findings as to whether the 
police had entered the petitioner's home with consent. See n. 1, supra. 
9 Although the state courts differed in their respective conclusions con-
cerning exigent circumstances, they each found that the facts known to the 
police at the time of the warrantless home entry were sufficient to establish 
probable cause to arrest. The petitioner has not challenged that finding 
before this Court. 
The parallel criminal proceedings against the petitioner, see supra, at 5 
and n. 5, resulted in a misdemeanor conviction for driving while intoxi-
cated. During the jury trial, held in early 1982, the state introduced evi-
dence of the petitioner's refusal to submit to a breath test. His appeal 
from that conviction, now before the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, has been 
stayed pending our decision in this case. See Brief for Petitioner 17, n. 5. 
10 In Johnson, Justice Jackson eloquently explained the warrant require-
ment in the context of a home search: 
"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by 
zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the· support of the 
usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protec-
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that the Court has recognized, as "a 'basic principle of Fourth 
Amendment law[,]' that searches and seizures inside a home 
without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable." Pay-
ton v. New York, 445 U. S., at 586. See Coolidge v. New 
Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 474-475 (1971) ("a search or sei-
zure carried out on a suspect's premises without a warrant is 
per se unreasonable, unless the police can show ... the pres-
ence of 'exigent circumstances'"). See also Steagald v. 
United States, 451 U. S. 204, 211-212 (1981); McDonald v. 
United States, 335 U. S. 451, 456 (1948); Johnson v. United 
States, supra, at 1~15; Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 
630 (1886). 
Consistent with these long-recognized principles, the 
Court decided in Payton v. New York, supra, that warrant-
less arrests in the home are prohibited by the Fourth Amend-
ment, absent probable cause and exigent circumstances. 
I d., at 58~590. Although one might infer from the Court's 
decision that all home arrests would be subject to the same 
rule, the Court expressly framed its opinion in terms of "rou-
tine felony arrests," see id., at 574, 602. This formulation of 
the holding in Payton implies two separate, but related limi-
tations that have yet to be acknowledged completely by the 
Court, but which control the present case. In particular, by 
its own terms the holding in Payton--limited to "routine fel-
ony arrests"-was neither intended to cover arrests for 
nonserious offenses nor applied to arrests that are consid-
ered nonroutine because they are justified by exigent 
circumstances. 
tion consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and 
detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the 
often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. . . . The right of offi-
cers to thrust themselves into a home is ... a grave concern, not only to 
the individual but to a society which chooses to dwell in reasonable security 
and freedom from surveillance. When the right of privacy must reason-
ably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial 
officer, not by a policeman or government enforcement agent." !d., at 
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A 
By concluding that the Fourth Amendment prohibits home 
entries to make warrantless felony arrests in the absence of 
probable cause and exigent circumstances, the Court in 
Payton decided, a fortiori, that warrantless home arrests are 
similarly prohibited for offenses less serious than felonies. 
It does not necessarily follow, however, that warrantless 
home arrests for nonserious offenses would be proper, even if 
probable cause and exigent circumstances are found to exist. 
That question, yet to be decided by the Court, is presented 
by the record in this case. I therefore reach the issue and 
conclude that the Fourth Amendment imposes an absolute 
ban on warrantless home arrests for certain minor offenses. 
In United States v. Watson, 423 U. S. 411 (1976), the 
Court upheld a warrantless "midday public" arrest for a fel-
ony. In so doing, the Court relied heavily on the common-
law rule that "a peace officer was permitted to arrest without 
a warrant for a misdemeanor or felony committed in his 
presence as well as for a felony not committed in his presence 
if there was reasonable ground for making the arrest." I d., 
at 418 (emphasis added) (citing sources); id., at 438 (MAR-
SHALL, J., dissenting). Although not necessary to the result 
in Watson, the italicized portion of the common-law rule sug-
gests that warrantless public arrests for misdemeanors, even 
if supported by probable cause and exigent Circumstances, 
should be prohibited unless the underlying offense is commit-
ted in the presence of the arresting officer. See generally 
W. LaFave, Arrest 231-243 (1965). Therefore, even accept-
ing the Court's view in Watson that the Fourth Amendment 
grants broad authority for warrantless public arrests, adher-
ence to the common-law rule would allow warrantless misde-
meanor arrests in public areas only in the most narrow cir-
cumstances. 11 It logically follows that warrantless home 
11 For purposes of this case only, I assume that the common-law rule 
identified in Watson applied in its literal sense to all misdemeanors. 
There is substantial evidence, however, that public arrests were justified 
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entries to make arrests for public misdemeanors would also 
be prohibited, possibly with a similarly narrow exception for 
persons committing such misdemeanors in the presence of an 
officer and then fleeing, upon hot pursuit, into the home. 
Cf. United States v. Santana, 427 U. S. 38, 42-43 (1976) (hot 
pursuit · of fleeing felon); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294 
(1967) (same). And, although the rules for home arrests at 
the time of the adoption of the Fourth Amendment were far 
from clear, see Payton v. New York, 445 U. 8., at 591-598, it 
appears that such a severe restriction on home arrests for 
misdemeanors was the prevailing view of the common law. 
See, e. g., The Queen v. Marsden, 1 L. R.-Cr. Cas. Res. 131 
(1868); Wilgus, Arrest Without a Warrant, 22 Mich. L. Rev. 
under the common law, even for offenses committed in the officer's pres-
ence, only for breaches of the peace-a category of offenses much nar-
rower, and far more serious, than all misdemeanors. See, e. g., W. 
LaFave, Arrest 231 (1965); Bohlen & Shulman, Arrest With and Without a 
Warrant, 75 U. Pa. L. Rev. 485 (1927). As explained by the New York 
Court of Appeals: 
"The right of a peace officer at common law to arrest summarily was a 
limited one. 'The common law did not authorize the arrest of persons 
guilty or suspected of misdemeanors, except in cases of an actual breach of 
the peace either by an affray or by violence to an individual. In such cases 
the arrest had to be made not so much for the purpose of bringing the of-
fender to justice as in order to preserve the peace, and the right to arrest 
was accordingly limited to cases in which the person to be arrested was 
taken in the act or immediately after its conclusion.' (Stephen's History of 
the Criminal Law of England, p. 193; Chase's Blackstone [4th ed. ], pp. 998, 
999; 6 C. J. S. Arrest, § 6, subd. c.)" People v. Phillips , 284 N. Y. 235, 
237, 30 N. E. 2d 488, 489 (1940). 
Moreover, I remain convinced that it is incorrect to base current inter-
pretations of the Fourth Amendment solely on the literal words of the com-
mon-law rules of arrest. Rather, the Fourth Amendment "must be inter-
preted 'in light of contemporary norms and conditions.' " Steagald v. 
United States, 451 U. S. 204, 217 and n. 10 (1981), quoting Payton v. New 
York, 445 U. S. 573, 591 and n. 33 (1980). See also United States v. Wat-
son, 423 U. S. 411, 433, 438-443 (1976) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). For 
purposes of this case, however, even acceptance of the common-law rule 
compels the conclusion that the petitioner's arrest was unlawful. 
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541, 798, 803 (1924) ("Of course since ... an officer ... has 
[no] authority to arrest for a past breach of the peace without 
a warrant, neither would [he] have the right to break doors in 
an attempted arrest therefor, except for one committed in his 
presence and on fresh pursuit."). See also Handcock v. 
Baker, 126 Eng. Rep. 1270 (1800); Adair v. Williams, 24 
Ariz. 422, 210 P. 853 (1922); Wilgus, supra, at 804. There-
fore, even if exigent circumstances exist, the common law 
suggests that warrantless home arrests for misdemeanors 
should be prohibited, with the possible exception of hot pur-
suit from the commission of a misdemeanor in the officer's 
presence. 
Surely, the prohibitions of the Fourth Amendment go at 
least as far-prohibiting warrantless entries of the home to 
arrest for certain minor offenses under all circumstances, 
even if probable cause and exigent circumstances are shown 
to exist. Before agents of the government may invade the 
sanctity of the home, the government must be required to 
demonstrate a compelling need that overcomes the presump-
tion of unreasonableness that attaches to all warrantless 
home entries. See Payton v. New York, supra, at 586. 
When the government's interest is only to arrest for a minor 
offense, that presumption of unreasonableness should be 
irrebuttable, and the government should be allowed to make 
such an arrest only with a warrant issued upon probable 
cause by a neutral and detached magistrate. Accordingly, I 
conclude that there are no circumstances under which a war-
rantless home entry to arrest 1or a minor offense could be jus-
tified. 12 'I':tieFOurth Amenament, m my view, compels such 
an absolute ban. 
12 Even the dissenters in Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980), al-
though believing that warrantless home arrests are not prohibited by the 
Fourth Amendment, recognized the importance of the felony limitation on 
such arrests. See id., at 603, 616--Q17 (WHITE, J., dissenting) ("The felony 
requirement guards against abusive or arbitrary enforcement and ensures 
that invasions of the home occur only in case of the most serious crimes."). 
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Application of this bright-line principle to the facts of this 
case proves quite simple. The State of Wisconsin has chosen 
to classify the first offense for driving while intoxicated as a 
noncriminal, civil forfeiture offense for which no imprison-
ment is possible. See Wis. Stat. § 346. 65(2) (1975); id., 
§ 346.65(2)(a) (1981-82); supra, at 4-5. This is the best indi-
cation of the state's interest in precipitating an arrest, and is 
one that can be easily identified both by the courts and by of-
ficers faced with a decision to arrest. See n. 5, supra. An 
offense for which no imprisonment is possible, however, does 
not suffice to overcome the presumption of unreasonableness 
that attaches to a warrantless entry of the home to arrest. 13 
The arrest of the petitioner in this case, therefore, was pro-
hibited by the Fourth Amendment. As a result of this un-
lawful arrest, state law provides that the revocation of his op-
erating privileges was also improper. See Wise. Stat. 
§ 343.305(2)(b)(5) (1975); id., § 343.305(3)(b)(5)(a) (1981-82); 
supra, at 4 and n. 4. Accordingly, the judgment of the Su-
I see little reason to remove this general restriction even if there is ample 
support for a finding of exigent circumstances. 
18 Although I have previously joined in noting the danger of drawing con-
stitutional lines based on legislative classifications of statutory crimes, see 
United States v. Watson, 423 U. S., at 438-442, 454-455 (MARSHALL, J., 
dissenting), it is not necessary to decide in this case whether the Fourth 
Amendment prohibits warrantless home arrests for all nonfelonious 
crimes. Rather, given the facts of this case, I would simply hold that such 
arrests are constitutionally prohibited at least for all minor offenses, de-
fined primarily by looking to the extent of punishment provided for by the 
state statute. 
Nor do I mean to suggest that the prevention of drunk driving is not 
properly of major concern to the States. The State of Wisconsin, how-
ever, along with several other States, see, e. g., Minn. Stat. § 169.121 
subd. 4 (1982); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 39-669.07(1) (Supp. 1982); S. D. Codified 
Laws § 32-23-2 (Supp. 1983), has chosen to limit severely the penalties 
that may be imposed after a first conviction for driving while intoxicated. 
Given that the classification of state crimes differs widely among the 
States, the penalty that may attach to any particular offense seems to pro-
vide the clearest and most consistent indication of the state's interest in 
arresting individuals suspected of committing that offense. 
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preme Court of Wisconsin should be vacated, and the case re-
manded for further proceedings. 
B 
Even if I were to conclude that an absolute ban on warrant-
less home arrests for certain nonserious offenses is not com-
pelled by the Fourth Amendment, I would conclude that the 
petitioner's arrest was prohibited by the Fourth Amendment 
because of the absence of exigent circumstances. 
In Payton v. New York, 445 U. S., at 583, the Court de-
clined to consider the scope of any exception for exigent cir-
cumstances that might justify warrantless home arrests, 
thereby leaving to the lower courts the initial application of 
the exigent-circumstances exception. Prior decisions of this 
Court, however, have emphasized that exceptions to the war-
rant requirement are "few in number and carefully delin-
eated," United States v. United States District Court, 407 
U. S., at 318, and that the police have a heavy burden to 
meet when attempting to demonstrate an urgent need that 
might justify warrantless searches or arrests. Indeed, the 
Court has recognized only a few such emergency conditions, 
see, e. g., United States v. Santana, 427 U. S., at 42-43 
(1976) (hot pursuit of a fleeing felon); Warden v. Hayden, 387 
U. S., at 298-299 (1967) (same); Schmerber v. California, 384 
U. S. 757, 770-771 (1966) (destruction of evidence); Michigan 
v. Tyler, 436 U. S. 499, 509 (1978) (ongoing fire), and has ac-
tually applied only the "hot pursuit" doctrine to arrests in the 
home, see Santana, supra. The record in this case, how-
ever, requires that the Court clarify this area of Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence. In so doing, I conclude that an 
important factor to be considered when determining whether 
any exigency exists is the gravity of the underlying offense 
for which the arrest is being made. Moreover, although no 
exigency is created simply because there is probable cause to 
believe that a serious crime has been committed, I conclude 
that application of the exigent-circumstances exception 
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should be severely restricted when only a minor offense is 
involved. 
This is not a novel idea. Writing in concurrence in M c-
Donald v. United States, 335 U. S. 451 (1948), Justice Jack-
son explained why a finding of exigent circumstances to jus-
tify a warrantless home entry should be severely restricted: 
"Even if one were to conclude that urgent circum-
stances might justify a forced entry without a warrant, 
no such emergency was present in this case. This 
method of law enforcement displays a shocking lack of all 
sense of proportion. Whether there is reasonable ne-
cessity for a search without waiting to obtain a warrant 
certainly depends somewhat upon the gravity of the of-
fense thought to be in progress as well as the hazards of 
the method of attempting to reach it. . . . It is to me a 
shocking proposition that private homes, even quarters 
in a tenement, may be indiscriminately invaded at the 
discretion of any suspicious police officer engaged in 
following up offenses that involve no violence or threats 
of it. While I should be human enough to apply the let-
ter of the law with some indulgence to officers acting to 
deal with threats or crimes of violence which endanger 
life or security, it is notable that few of the searches 
found by this Court to be unlawful dealt with that cate-
gory of crime. . . . While the enterprise of parting fools 
from their money by the 'numbers' lottery is one that 
ought to be suppressed, I do not think that its suppres-
sion is more important to society than the security of the 
people against unreasonable searches and seizures. 
When an officer undertakes to act as his own magistrate, 
he ought to be in a position to justify it by pointing to 
some real immediate and serious consequences if he post-
poned action to get a warrant." ld., at 459-460 (Jack-
son, J., concurring) (footnote omitted). 
Consistent with this approach, the lower courts have 
looked to the nature of the underlying offense as an impor-
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tant factor to be considered in the exigent-circumstances cal-
culus. In the leading federal case defining exigent circum-
stances, for example, the en bane United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia recognized that the 
gravity of the underlying offense was a principal factor to be 
weighed. Dorman v. United States, 435 F. 2d 385, 392 
(CADC 1970). 14 Without approving all of the factors in-
cluded in the standard adopted by that court, it is sufficient 
to note that many other lower courts have also considered the 
gravity of the offense an important part of their constitu-
tional analysis. 
As a result, courts have permitted warrantless home ar-
rests for major felonies if identifiable exigencies, independent 
of the gravity of the offense, existed at the time of the arrest. 
Compare United States v. Campbell, 581 F. 2d 22 (CA2 1978) 
(allowing warrantless home arrest for armed robbery when 
exigent circumstances existed), with Commonwealth v. Wil-
liams, 483 Pa. 293, 396 A. 2d 1177 (1978) (disallowing war-
rantless home arrest for murder due to absence of exigent 
circumstances). But of those courts addressing the issue, 
most refuse to permit a warrantless home arrest for a 
nonfelonious crime. See, e. g., State v. Guertin, 190 Conn. 
440, 453, 461 A. 2d 963, 970 (1983) ("The [exigent circum-
stances] exception is narrowly drawn to cover cases of real 
and not contrived emergencies. The exception is limited to 
the investigation of serious crimes; misdemeanors are ex-
cluded."); People v. Strelow, 96 Mich. App. 182, 190-193, 292 
N. W. 2d 517, 521-522 (1980). See also People v. Sanders, 
59 Ill. App. 3d 6, 374 N. E. 2d 139 (1978) (burglary without 
weapons not a grave offense of violence for these purposes); 
State v. Bennett, 295 N. W. 2d 5 (S. D. 1980) (distribution of 
14 See generally Donnino & Girese, Exigent Circumstances for a War-
rantless Home Arrest, 45 Alb. L. Rev. 90 (1980); Harbaugh & Faust, 
"Knock on Any Door"-Home Arrests After Payton and Steagald, 86 
Dick. L. Rev. 191, 220-233 (1982); Note, Exigent Circumstances for War-
rantless Home Arrests, 23 Ariz. L. Rev. 1171 (1981). 
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controlled substances not a grave offense for these purposes). 
But cf. State v. Penas, 200 Neb. 387, 263 N. W. 2d 835 (1978) 
(allowing warrantless home arrest upon hot pursuit from 
commission of misdemeanor in the officer's presence; decided 
before Payton); State v. Niedermeyer, 48 Or. App. 665, 617 
P. 2d 911 (1980) (allowing warrantless home arrest upon hot 
pursuit from commission of misdemeanor in the officer's pres-
ence). This should not be surprising. It is, indeed, difficult 
to conceive of a warrantless home arrest that would not be 
unreasonable when the underlying offense is relatively 
minor. I therefore conclude that the commonsense result 
reached by most lower courts is required by the Fourth 
Amendment prohibition on "unreasonable searches and sei-
zures," and would hold that application of the exigent-circum-
stances exception in the context of a home entry is severely 
restricted when there is probable cause to believe that only a 
minor offense has been committed. 
Again, application of this principle to the facts of the 
present case is relatively straightforward. The petitioner 
was arrested in the privacy of his own bedroom for a non-
criminal, traffic offense. The State attempts to justify the 
arrest by relying on the hot-pursuit doctrine, on the threat to 
public safety, and on the need to preserve evidence of the pe-
titioner's blood-alcohol level. The claim of hot pursuit is un-
convincing, however, because there was no immediate or con-
tinuous pursuit of the petitioner from the scene of a crime. 
Moreover, because the petitioner had already arrived home, 
and had abandoned his car at the scene of the accident, there 
was little remaining threat to the public safety. Hence, the 
only potential emergency claimed by the State was the need 
to ascertain the petitioner's blood-alcohol level. But even 
assuming that the underlying facts would support a finding of 
this exigent circumstance, mere similarity to other cases in-
volving the imminent destruction of evidence is not sufficient. 
In the context of a minor, nonjailable traffic offense, a war-
rantless home arrest simply cannot be upheld using this oth-
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erwise plausible justification. The principles of the Fourth 
Amendment do not sanction such unreasonable poli;y-~.,4A1 1 o~ 
behavior. [_!2.)"~ · 
III 
For unconvincing reasons, the Court has chosen to dismiss I 
the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted. As a result, 
the Court lets stand a warrantless, nighttime entry into the 
petitioner's home to arrest him for violation of a civil traffic 
offense. In my view, such an arrest is clearly prohibited by 
prevailing case law and by the special protection afforded the 
home under the Fourth Amendment. The petitioner's ar-
rest was therefore invalid, the judgment of the Supreme 
Court of Wisconsin should be vacated, and the case remanded 
for further proceedings. 
I respectfully dissent. 
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JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573 (1980), held that, ab-
sent probable cause and exigent circumstances, warrantless 
arrests in the home are prohibited by the Fourth Amend-
ment. But the Court in that case explicitly refused "to con-
sider the sort of emergency or dangerous situation, described 
in our cases as 'exigent circumstances,' that would justify a 
warrantless entry into a home for the purpose of either arrest 
or search." I d., at 583. Certiorari was granted in this case 
to decide at least one aspect of the unresolved question: 
whether, and if so under what circumstances, the Fourth 
Amendment prohibits the police from making a warrantless 
night entry of a person's home in order to arrest him for vi-
olation of a nonjailable traffic offense. 
I 
A 
Shortly before 9:00 p. m. on the rainy night of April 24, 
1978, a lone witness, Randy Jablonic, observed a car being 
driven erratically. After changing speeds and veering from 
side to side, the car eventually swerved off the road and came 
to a stop in an open field. No damage to any person or prop-
erty occurred. Concerned about the driver and fearing that 
the car would get back on the highway, Jablonic drove his 
truck up behind the car so as to block it from returning to the 
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road. Another passerby also stopped at the scene, and 
J ablonic asked her to call the police. Before the police ar-
rived, however, the driver of the car emerged from his vehi-
cle, approached J ablonic's truck, and asked J ablonic for a ride 
home. J ablonic instead suggested that they wait for assist-
ance in removing or repairing the car. Ignoring Jablonic's 
suggestion, the driver walked away from the scene. 
A few minutes later, the police arrived and questioned 
J ablonic. He told one officer what he had seen, specifically 
noting that the driver was either very inebriated or very 
sick. The officer checked the motor vehicle registration of 
the abandoned car and learned that it was registered to the 
petitioner, Edward G. Welsh. In addition, the officer noted 
that the petitioner's residence was· a short distance from the 
scene, and therefore easily within walking distance. 
Without securing any type of warrant, the police pro-
ceeded to the petitioner's home, arriving about 9:00 p. m. 
When the petitioner's stepdaughter answered the door, the 
police gained entry into the house. 1 Proceeding upstairs to 
the petitioner's bedroom, they found him lying naked in bed. 
At this point, the petitioner was placed under arrest for driv-
ing or operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of 
an intoxicant, in violation of Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1) (1977). 2 
1 The state trial court never decided whether there was consent to the 
entry because it deemed decision of that issue unnecessary in light of its 
finding that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless arrest. After 
reversing the lower court's finding of exigent circumstances, the Wisconsin 
Court of Appeals remanded for full consideration of the consent issue. See 
State v. Welsh, No. 80-1686, App. 114-125. That remand never occurred, 
however, because the Supreme Court of Wisconsin reversed its court of 
appeals and reinstated the trial court's judgment. See State v. Welsh , 108 
Wis. 2d 319, 321 N. W. 2d 245 (1982). For purposes of this decision, 
therefore, we assume that there was no valid consent to enter the petition-
er's home. 
2 Since the petitioner's arrest, § 346.63 has been amended to provide 
that it is a code violation to drive or operate a motor vehicle while under 
the influence of an intoxicant or while evidencing certain blood- or breath-
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The petitioner was taken to the police station, where he re-
fused to submit to a breathalyzer test. 
B 
As a result of these events, the petitioner was subjected to 
two separate but related proceedings: one concerning his re-
fusal to submit to a breath test and the other involving the 
alleged code violation for driving while intoxicated. Under 
the Wisconsin vehicle code in effect in April 1978, one ar-
rested for driving while intoxicated under§ 346.63(1) could be 
requested by a law enforcement officer to provide breath, 
blood, or urine samples for the purpose of determining the 
presence or quantity of alcohol. Wis. Stat. § 343.305(1) 
(1975). .If such a request was made, the arrestee was re-
quired to submit to the appropriate testing or risk a revoca-
tion of operating privileges. Cf. South Dakota v. Neville, 
459 U. S. -- (1983) (admission into evidence of a defend-
ant's refusal to submit to a blood-alcohol test does not offend 
constitutional right against self-incrimination). The arrestee 
could challenge the officer's request, however, by refusing to 
undergo testing and then asking for a hearing to determine 
whether the refusal was justified. If, after the hearing, it 
was determined that the refusal was not justified, the arrest-
ee's operating privileges would be revoked for 60 days. 3 
The statute also set forth specific criteria to be applied by a 
court when determining whether an arrestee's refusal to take 
alcohol levels. See Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(a}-(b) (1981-82). This amend-
ment, however, has no bearing on the issues raised by the present case. 
3 Since the petitioner's arrest, this statute also has been amended, with 
the current version found at Wis. Stat. § 343.305 (1981-82). Although the 
procedures to be followed by the law enforcement officer and the arrestee 
have remained essentially unchanged, § 343.305(3), (8), the potential length 
of any revocation of operating privileges has been increased, depending on 
the arrestee's prior driving record, § 343.305(9)(a}-(b). An arrestee who 
improperly refuses to submit to a required test may also be required to 
comply with an assessment order and a driver safety plan. 
§ 343.305(9)(c)-(e). These amendments, however, also have no direct 
bearing on the issues raised by the present case. 
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a breath test was justified. Included among these criteria 
was a requirement that, before revoking the arrestee's op-
erating privileges, the court determine that "the refusal . . . 
to submit to a test was unreasonable." § 343.305(2)(b)(5) 
(1975). It is not disputed by the parties that an arrestee's 
refusal to take a breath test would be reasonable, and there-
fore operating privileges could not be revoked, if the underly-
ing arrest was not lawful. Indeed, state law has consistently 
provided that a valid arrest is a necessary prerequisite to the 
imposition of a breath test. See Scales v. State, 64 Wis. 2d 
485, 494, 219 N. W. 2d 286, 292 (1974). 4 Although the stat-
• "The implied consent law does not limit the right to take a blood sam-
ple as an incident to a lawful arrest. It should be emphasized, however, 
that the arrest, and therefore probable cause for making it, must precede 
the taking of the blood sample. We conclude that the sample was constitu-
tionally taken incident to the lawful arrest." 64 Wis. 2d, at 494, 219 
N. W. 2d, at 292 (emphasis added). 
Nor is there any doubt that the Supreme Court of Wisconsin applies fed-
eral constitutional standards when determining whether an arrest, even 
for a nonjailable traffic offense, is lawful. The court, for example, ex-
plained the basis for its holding in this case as follows: 
"The trial court revoked the defendant's motor vehicle operator's license 
for sixty days pursuant to his unreasonable refusal to submit to a breatha-
lyzer test, as required by [state statute]. 
"The defendant challenges the officer's warrantless arrest in his resi-
dence as violating the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion and Article I, section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution. The [trial 
court] upheld this warrantless arrest concluding that probable cause to be-
lieve that the defendant had been operating a motor vehicle while under 
the influence of an intoxicant, coupled with the existence of exigent circum-
stances, justified the officers' entry into the defendant's residence . ... 
[T]he court of appeals reversed the trial court, holding that, although the 
officers' warrantless arrest was unreasonable, thereby violating the 
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, the absence of a finding regarding 
the consensual entry necessitated remanding the case on that issue. We 
affirm the findings of the [trial court] , holding that the co-existence of prob-
able cause and exigent circumstances in this case justifies the warrantless 
arrest .... 
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ute in effect in April1978 referred to reasonableness, the cur-
rent version of § 343.305 explicitly recognizes that one of the 
issues that an arrestee may raise at a refusal hearing is 
"whether [he] was lawfully placed under arrest for violation 
of s.346.63(1)." § 343.305(3)(b)(5)(a), (8)(b) (1981-82). See 
also 67 Op. Wis. Atty. Gen. 93-78 (Dec. 27, 1978) ("statutory 
scheme ... contemplates that a lawful arrest be made prior 
to a request for submission to a test"). 5 
Separate statutory provisions control the penalty that 
might be imposed for the substantive offense of driving while 
intoxicated. At the time in question, the vehicle code pro-
vided that a first offense for driving while intoxicated was a 
noncriminal violation subject to a civil forfeiture proceeding 
for a maximum fine of $200; a second or subsequent offense in 
the previous five years was a potential misdemeanor that 
could be punished by imprisonment for up to one year and a 
maximum fine of $500. Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2) (1975). Since 
that time, the State has made only minor amendments to 
these penalty provisions. Indeed, the statute continues to 
categorize a first offense as a civil violation that allows for 
only a monetary forfeiture of no more than $300. 
§ 346.65(2)(a) (1981-82). See State v. Albright, 98 Wis. 2d 
663, 672-673, 298 N. W. 2d 196, 202 (App. 1980). 
"To prevail in this case, the state must prove the co-existence of probable 
cause and exigent circumstances, justifying the officer's conduct at the de-
fendant's residence. We hold that there was ample evidence supporting 
the trial court's ruling that the officer's entry was justified on the basis of 
both probable cause and exigent circumstances. Entry to effect a war-
rantless arrest in a residence is subject to the limitations imposed by both 
the United States and the Wisconsin Constitutions. U. S. Const. amend. 
N ; Wis. Const. art. I, sec. 11 ." 108 Wis. 2d, at 320-321, 326-327, 321 
N. W. 2d, at 24&-247, 249-250 (emphasis added) (citations and footnotes 
omitted). 
6 Because state law provides that evidence of the petitioner's refusal to 
submit to a breath test is inadmissible if the underlying arrest was unlaw-
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As noted, in this case the petitioner refused to submit to a 
breath test; he subsequently filed a timely request for a re-
fusal hearing. Before that hearing was held, however, the 
State filed a criminal complaint against the petitioner for 
driving while intoxicated. 6 The petitioner responded by fil-
ing a motion to dismiss the complaint, relying on his conten-
tion that the underlying arrest was invalid. After receiving 
evidence at a hearing on this motion in July 1980, the trial 
court concluded that the criminal complaint would not be dis-
missed because the existence of both probable cause and exi-
gent circumstances justified the warrantless arrest. The de-
cision at the refusal hearing, which was not held until 
September 1980, was therefore preordained. In fact, the 
primary issue at the refusal hearing-whether the petitioner 
acted reasonably in refusing to submit to a breath test be-
cause he was unlawfully placed under arrest, see supra, at 
---.had already been determined two months earlier by 
the same trial court. 
As expected, after the refusal hearing, the trial court con-
cluded that the arrest of the petitioner was lawful and that 
the petitioner's refusal to take the breath test was therefore 
unreasonable. 7 Accordingly, the court issued an order sus-
6 The petitioner was charged with a criminal misdemeanor because this 
was his second such citation in the previous five years. See § 346.65(2) 
(1975). Although the petitioner was subject to a criminal charge, the po-
lice conducting the warrantless entry of his home did not know that the 
petitioner had ever been charged with, or much less convicted of, a prior 
violation for driving while intoxicated. It must be assumed, therefore, 
that at the time of the arrest the police were acting as if they were investi-
gating and eventually arresting for a nonjailable traffic offense that consti-
tuted only a civil violation under the applicable state law. See Beck v. 
Ohio, 379 U. S. 89, 91, 96 (1964). 
7 When ruling from the bench after the refusal hearing, the trial judge 
specifically indicated: 
"[T]he Court is bound by its earlier ruling that that was a valid arrest. 
And, I think [counsel for the petitioner] certainly will have the right to 
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pending the petitioner's operating license for 60 days. On 
appeal, the suspension order was vacated by the Wisconsin 
Court of Appeals. See State v. Welsh, No. 80-1686, App. 
114--125. Contrary to the trial court, the appellate court 
concluded that the warrantless arrest of the petitioner in his 
home violated the Fourth Amendment because the State, al-
though demonstrating probable cause to arrest, had not es-
tablished the existence of exigent circumstances. The peti-
tioner's refusal to submit to a breath test was therefore 
reasonable. 8 The Supreme Court of Wisconsin in turn re-
versed the Court of Appeals, relying on the existence of 
three factors that it believed constituted exigent circum-
stances: the need for "hot pursuit" of a suspect, the need to 
prevent physical harm to the offender and the public, and the 
need to prevent destruction of evidence. See State v. 
Welsh, 108 Wis. 2d 319, 336--338, 321 N. W. 2d 245, 254--255 
(1982). Because of the important Fourth Amendment impli-
cations of the decision below, we granted certiorari. 459 
u. s. - (1983). 9 
II 
It is axiomatic that "the physical entry of the home is the 
chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amend-
challenge that on appeal if he appeals this matter, as well as the previous 
ruling should there be a conviction on the underlying charge. " App. 111. 
See also App. 112-113. 
8 The court remanded the case for further findings as to whether the 
police had entered the petitioner's home with consent. See n. 1, supra. 
• Although the state courts differed in their respective conclusions con-
cerning exigent circumstances, they each found that the facts known to the 
police at the time of the warrantless home entry were sufficient to establish 
probable cause to arrest. The petitioner has not challenged that finding 
before this Court. 
The parallel criminal proceedings against the petitioner, see supra, at 
- , and n. 6, resulted in a misdemeanor conviction for driving while in-
toxicated. During the jury trial, held in early 1982, the State introduced 
evidence of the petitioner's refusal to submit to a breath test. His appeal 
from that conviction, now before the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, has been 
stayed pending our decision in this case. See Brief for Petitioner 17, n. 5. 
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ment is directed." United States v. United States District 
Court, 407 U. S. 297, 313 (1972). And a principal protection 
against unnecessary intrusions into private dwellings is the 
warrant requirement imposed by the Fourth Amendment on 
agents of the government who seek to enter the home for 
purposes of search or arrest. See Johnson v. United States, 
333 U. S. 10, 13-14 (1948). 10 It is not surprising, therefore, 
that the Court has recognized, as "a 'basic principle of Fourth 
Amendment law[,]' that searches and seizures inside a home 
without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable." 
Payton v. New York, 445 U. S., at 586. See Coolidge v. 
New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 474-475 (1971) ("a search or 
seizure carried out on a suspect's premises without a warrant 
is per se unreasonable, unless the police can show . . . the 
presence of 'exigent circumstances'"). See also Michigan v. 
Clifford, - U.S. -, - (1984) (plurality opinion); 
Steagald v. United States, 451 U. S. 204, 211-212 (1981); Mc-
Donald v. United States, 335 U. S. 451, 456 (1948); Johnson 
v. United States, supra, at 13-15; Boyd v. United States, 116 
u. s. 616, 630 (1886). 
Consistently with these long-recognized principles, the 
Court decided in Payton v. New York, supra, that warrant-
less felony arrests in the home are prohibited by the Fourth 
10 In Johnson, Justice Jackson eloquently explained the warrant require-
ment in the context of a home search: 
"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by 
zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the 
usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protec-
tion consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and 
detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the 
often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime .... The right of offi-
cers to thrust themselves into a home is ... a grave concern, not only to 
the individual but to a society which chooses to dwell in reasonable security 
and freedom from surveillance. When the right of privacy must reason-
ably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial 
officer, not by a policeman or government enforcement agent." Id., at 
13-14 (footnote omitted). 
82-5466--0PINION 
WELSH v. WISCONSIN 9 
Amendment, absent probable cause and exigent circum-
stances. I d., at 583-590. At the same time, the Court de-
clined to consider the scope of any exception for exigent cir-
cumstances that might justify warrantless home arrests, id., 
at 583, thereby leaving to the lower courts the initial applica-
tion of the exigent-circumstances exception. 11 Prior deci-
sions of this Court, however, have emphasized that excep-
tions to the warrant requirement are "few in number and 
carefully delineated," United States v. United States District 
Court, 407 U. S., at 318, and that the police bear a heavy 
burden when attempting to demonstrate an urgent need that 
might justify warrantless searches or arrests. Indeed, the 
Court has recognized only a few such emergency conditions, 
see, e. g., United States v. Santana, 427 U. S. 38, 42-43 
(1976) (hot pursuit of a fleeing felon); Warden v. Hayden, 387 
U. S. 294, 298-299 (1967) (same); Schmerber v. California, 
384 U. S. 757, 770-771 (1966) (destruction of evidence); Mich-
igan v. Tyler, 436 U. S. 499, 509 (1978) (ongoing fire), and 
has actually applied only the "hot pursuit" doctrine to arrests 
in the home, see Santana, supra. 
Our hesitation in finding exigent circumstances, especially 
when warrantless arrests in the home are at issue, is espe-
cially appropriate when the underlying offense for which 
there is probable cause to arrest is relatively minor. Before I 
agents of the government may invade the sanctity of the 
home, the government is r8'P.Jired to demonstrate a compel-
ling need that overcomes the presumption of unreasonable-
ness that attaches to all warrantless home entries. See 
Payton v. New York, supra, at 586. When the govern-
11 Our decision in Payton, allowing warrantless home arrests upon a 
showing of probable cause and exigent circumstances, was also expressly 
limited to felony arrests. See, e. g., 445 U. S., at 574, 602. Because we 
conclude that, in the circumstances presented by this case, there were no 
exigent circumstances sufficient to justify a warrantless home entry, we 
have no occasion to consider whether the Fourth Amendment may impose 
an absolute ban on warrantless home arrests for certain minor offenses. 
7 
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ment's interest is only to arrest for a minor offense, 12 that 
presumption of unreasonableness is difficult to rebut, and the 
government usually should be allowed to make such arrests 
only with a warrant issued upon probable cause by a neutral 
and detached magistrate. 
This is not a novel idea. Writing in concurrence in M c-
Donald v. United States, 335 U. S. 451 (1948), Justice Jack-
son explained why a finding of exigent circumstances to jus-
tify a warrantless home entry should be severely restricted 
when only a minor offense has been committed: 
"Even if one were to conclude that urgent circum-
stances might justify a forced entry without a warrant, 
no such emergency was present in this case. This 
method of law enforcement displays a shocking lack of all 
sense of proportion. Whether there is reasonable ne-
cessity for a search without waiting to obtain a warrant 
certainly depends somewhat upon the gravity of the of-
fense thought to be in progress as well as the hazards of 
the method of attempting to reach it. . . . It is to me a 
shocking proposition that private homes, even quarters 
in a tenement, may be indiscriminately invaded at the 
discretion of any suspicious police officer engaged in fol-
lowing up offenses that involve no violence or threats of 
it. While I should be human enough to apply the letter 
of the law with some indulgence to officers acting to deal 
with threats or crimes of violence which endanger life or 
security, it is notable that few of the searches found by 
this Court to be unlawful dealt with that category of 
crime. . . . While the enterprise of parting fools from 
their money by the 'numbers' lottery is one that ought to 
12 Even the dissenters in Payton, although believing that warrantless 
home arrests are not prohibited by the Fourth Amendment, recognized the 
importance of the felony limitation on such arrests. See 445 U. S., at 603, 
616-617 (WHITE, J., dissenting) ("The felony requirement guards against 
abusive or arbitrary enforcement and ensures that invasions of the home 
occur only in case of the most serious crimes."). 
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be suppressed, I do not think that its suppression is 
more important to society than the security of the people 
against unreasonable searches and seizures. When an 
officer undertakes to act as his own magistrate, he ought 
to be in a position to justify it by pointing to some real 
immediate and serious consequences if he postponed ac-
tion to get a warrant." I d., at 459-460 (Jackson, J., con-
curring) (footnote omitted). 
Consistently with this approach, the lower courts have 
looked to the nature of the underlying offense as an impor-
tant factor to be considered in the exigent-circumstances cal-
culus. In a leading federal case defining exigent circum-
stances, for example, the en bane United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia recognized that the 
gravity of the underlying offense was a principal factor to be 
weighed. Dorman v. United States, 140 U. S. App. D. C. 
313, 320, 435 F. 2d 385, 392 (1970). 13 Without approving all 
of the factors included in the standard adopted by that court, 
it is sufficient to note that many other lower courts have also 
considered the gravity of the offense an important part of 
their constitutional analysis. 
For example, courts have permitted warrantless home ar-
rests for major felonies if identifiable exigencies, independent 
ofthe gravity of the offense, existed at the time of the arrest. 
Compare United States v. Campbell, 581 F. 2d 22 (CA2 1978) 
(allowing warrantless home arrest for armed robbery when 
exigent circumstances existed), with Commonwealth v. Wil-
liams, 483 Pa. 293, 396 A. 2d 1177 (1978) (disallowing war-
rantless home arrest for murder due to absence of exigent 
circumstances). But of those courts addressing the issue, 
most have refused to permit warrantless home arrests for 
13 See generally Donnino & Girese, Exigent Circumstances for a War-
rantless Home Arrest, 45 Alb. L. Rev. 90 (1980); Harbaugh & Faust, 
"Knock on Any Door"-Home Arrests After Payton and Steagald, 86 
Dick. L. Rev. 191, 220-233 (1982); Note, Exigent Circumstances for War-
rantless Home Arrests, 23 Ariz. L. Rev. 1171 (1981). 
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nonfelonious crimes. See, e. g., State v. Guertin, 190 Conn. 
440, 453, 461 A. 2d 963, 970 (1983) ("The [exigent circum-
stances] exception is narrowly drawn to cover cases of real 
and not contrived emergencies. The exception is limited to 
the investigation of serious crimes; misdemeanors are ex-
cluded."); People v. Strelow, 96 Mich. App. 182, 190-193, 292 
N. W. 2d 517, 521-522 (1980). See also People v. Sanders, 
59 Ill. App. 3d 6, 374 N. E. 2d 139 (1978) (burglary without 
weapons not grave offense of violence for this purpose); State 
v. Bennett, 295 N. W. 2d 5 (S. D. 1980) (distribution of con-
trolled substances not a grave offense for these purposes). 
But cf. State v. Penas, 200 Neb. 387, 263 N. W. 2d 835 (1978) 
(allowing warrantless home arrest upon hot pursuit from 
commission of misdemeanor in the officer's presence; decided 
before Payton); State v. Niedermeyer, 48 Or. App. 665, 617 
P. 2d 911 (1980) (allowing warrantless home arrest upon hot 
pursuit from commission of misdemeanor in the officer's pres-
ence). The approach taken in these cases should not be sur-
prising. Indeed, without necessarily approving any of these 
particular holdings or considering every possible factual situ-
ation, we note that it is difficult to conceive of a warrantless 
home arrest that would not be unreasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment when the underlying offense is ex-
tremely minor. 
We therefore conclude that the commonsense approach uti-
lized by most lower courts is required by the Fourth Amend-
ment prohibition on "unreasonable searches and seizures," 
and hold that an important factor to be considered when 
determining whether any exigency exists is the gravity of the 
underlying offense for which the arrest is being made. 
Moreover, although no exigency is created simply because ~ 
there is probable cause to believe that a serious crime has ( 
been committed, see Payton, supra, [application of the exi-
gent-circumstances exception in the context of a home entry 
should rarely be sanctioned when there is probable cause to 
believe that only a minor offense has been committed. 
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Application of this principle to the facts of the present case 
is relatively straightforward. The petitioner was arrested in 
the privacy of his own bedroom for a noncriminal, traffic of-
fense. The State attempts to justify the arrest by relying on 
the hot-pursuit doctrine, on the threat to public safety, and 
on the need to preserve evidence of the petitioner's blood-al-
cohollevel. On the facts of this case, however, the claim of 
hot pursuit is unconvincing because there was no immediate 
or continuous pursuit of the petitioner from the scene of a 
crime. Moreover, because the petitioner had already ar-
rived home, and had abandoned his car at the scene of the ac-
cident, there was little remaining threat to the public safety. 
Hence, the only potential emergency claimed by the State 
was the need to ascertain the petitioner's blood-alcohol level. 
Even assuming, however, that the underlying facts would 
support a finding of this exigent circumstance, mere similar-
ity to other cases involving the imminent destruction of evi-
dence is not sufficient. The State of Wisconsin has chosen to 
classify the first offense for driving while intoxicated as a 
noncriminal, civil forfeiture offense for which no imprison-
ment is possible. See Wis. Stat. § 346. 65(2) (1975); id., 
§ 346.65(2)(a) (1981-82); supra, at-. This is the best indi-
cation of the state's interest in precipitating an arrest, and is 
one that can be easily identified both by the courts and by of-
ficers faced with a decision to arrest. See n. 6, supra. 
Given this expression of the state's interest, a warrantless 
home arrest cannot be upheld simply because evidence of the 
petitioner's blood-alcohol level might have dissipated while 
the police obtained a warrant. 14 To allow a warrantless home 
14 Nor do we mean to suggest that the prevention of drunk driving is not 
properly of major concern to the States. The State of Wisconsin, how-
ever, along with several other States, see, e. g., Minn. Stat. § 169.121 
subd. 4 (1982); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 39-669.07(1) (Supp. 1982); S. D. Codified 
Laws § 32-23-2 (Supp. 1983), has chosen to limit severely the penalties 
that may be imposed after a first conviction for driving while intoxicated. 
Given that the classification of state crimes differs widely among the 
States, the penalty that may attach to any particular offense seems to pro-
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entry on these facts would be to approve unreasonable police 
behavior that the principles of the Fourth Amendment will 
not sanction. 
III 
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin let stand a warrantless, 
nighttime entry into the petitioner's home to arrest him for 
violation of a civil traffic offense. Such an arrest, however, 
is clearly prohibited by the special protection afforded the in-
dividual in his home by the Fourth Amendment. The peti-
tioner's arrest was therefore invalid, the judgment of the Su-
preme Court of Wisconsin is vacated, and the case is 
remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this 
opinion. 15 
It is so ordered. 
vide the clearest and most consistent indication of the state's interest in 
arresting individuals suspected of committing that offense. 
'
5 On remand, the state courts may consider whether the petitioner's ar-
rest was justified because the police had validly obtained consent to enter 
his home. Seen. 1, supra. 
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Ju~TICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573 (1980), held that, ab-
sent probable cause and exigent circumstances, warrantless 
arrests in the home are prohibited by the Fourth Amend-
ment. But the Court in that case explicitly refused "to con-
sider the sort of emergency or dangerous situation, described 
in our cases as 'exigent circumstances,' that would justify a 
warrantless entry into a home for the purpose of either arrest 
or search." !d., at 583. Certiorari was granted in this case 
to decide at least one aspect of the unresolved question: 
whether, and if so under what circumstances, the Fourth 
Amendment prohibits the police from making a warrantless 
night entry of a person's home in order to arrest him for vi-
olation of a nonjailable traffic offense. 
I 
A 
Shortly before 9:00 p. m. on the rainy night of April 24, 
1978, a lone witness, Randy Jablonic, observed a car being 
driven erratically. After changing speeds and veering from 
side to side, the car eventually swerved off the road and came 
to a stop in an open field. No damage to any person or prop-
erty occurred. Concerned about the driver and fearing that 
the car would get back on the highway, Jablonic drove his 
truck up behind the car so as to block it from returning to the 
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road. Another passerby also stopped at the scene, and 
J ablonic asked her to call the police. Before the police ar-
rived, however, the driver of the car emerged from his vehi-
cle, approached Jablonic's truck, and asked Jablonic for a ride 
home. J ablonic instead suggested that they wait for assist-
ance in removing or repairing the car. Ignoring Jablonic's 
suggestion, the driver walked away from the scene. 
A few minutes later, the police arrived and questioned 
J ablonic. He told one officer what he had seen, specifically 
noting that the driver was either very inebriated or very 
sick. The officer checked the motor vehicle registration of 
the abandoned car and learned that it was registered to the 
petitioner, Edward G. Welsh. In addition, the officer noted 
that the petitioner's residence was a short distance from the 
scene, and therefore easily within walking distance. 
Without securing any type of warrant, the police pro-
ceeded to the petitioner's home, arriving about 9:00 p. m. 
When the petitioner's stepdaughter answered the door, the 
police gained entry into the house. 1 Proceeding upstairs to 
the petitioner's bedroom, they found him lying naked in bed. 
At this point, the petitioner was placed under arrest for driv-
ing or operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of 
an intoxicant, in violation of Wis. Stat. § 346. 63(1) (1977). 2 
1 The state trial court never decided whether there was consent to the 
entry because it deemed decision of that issue unnecessary in light of its 
finding that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless arrest. After 
reversing the lower coUrt's finding of exigent circumstances, the Wisconsin 
Court of Appeals remanded for full consideration of the consent issue. See 
State v. Welsh, No. 80-1686, App. 114-125. That remand never occurred, 
however, because the Supreme Court of Wisconsin reversed its court of 
appeals and reinstated the trial court's judgment. See State v. Welsh, 108 
Wis. 2d 319, 321 N. W. 2d 245 (1982). For purposes of this decision, 
therefore , we assume that there was no valid consent to enter the petition-
er's home. 
2 Since the petitioner's arrest, § 346.63 has been amended to provide 
that it is a code violation to drive or operate a motor vehicle while under 
the influence of an intoxicant or while evidencing certain blood- or breath-
... 
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The petitioner was taken to the police station, where he re-
fused to submit to a breathalyzer test. 
B 
As a result of these events, the petitioner was subjected to 
two separate but related proceedings: one concerning his re-
fusal to submit to a breath test and the other involving the 
alleged code violation for driving while intoxicated. Under 
the Wisconsin vehicle code in effect in April 1978, one ar-
rested for driving while intoxicated under§ 346.63(1) could be 
requested by a law enforcement officer to provide breath, 
blood, or urine samples for the purpose of determining the 
presence or quantity of alcohol. Wis. Stat. § 343.305(1) 
(1975). If such a request was made, the arrestee was re-
quired to submit to the appropriate testing or risk a revoca-
tion of operating privileges. Cf. South Dakota v. Neville, 
459 U. S. -- (1983) (admission into evidence of a defend-
ant's refusal to submit to a blood-alcohol test does not offend 
constitutional right against self-incrimination). The arrestee 
could challenge the officer's request, however, by refusing to 
undergo testing and then asking for a hearing to determine 
whether the refusal was,justified. If, after the hearing, it 
was determined that the refusal was not justified, the arrest-
ee's operating privileges would be revoked for 60 days. 3 
The statute also set forth specific criteria to be applied by a 
court when determining whether an arrestee's refusal to take 
alcohol levels. See Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(a)-(b) (1981-82). This amend-
ment, however, has no bearing on the issues raised by the present case. 
3 Since the petitioner's arrest, this statute also has been amended, with 
the current version found at Wis. Stat. § 343.305 (1981-82). Although the 
procedures to be followed by the law enforcement officer and the arrestee 
have remained essentially unchanged, § 343.305(3), (8), the potential length 
of any revocation of operating privileges has been increased, depending on 
the arrestee's prior driving record, § 343.305(9)(a)-(b). An arrestee who 
improperly refuses to submit to a required test may also be required to 
comply with an assessment order and a driver safety plan. 
§ 343.305(9)(c)-(e). These amendments, however, also have no direct 
bearing on the issues raised by the present case . 
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a breath test was justified. Included among these criteria 
was a requirement that, before revoking the arrestee's op-
erating privileges, the court determine that "the refusal ... 
to submit to a test was unreasonable." § 343.305(2)(b)(5) 
(1975). It is not disputed by the parties that an arrestee's 
refusal to take a breath test would be reasonable, and there-
fore operating privileges could not be revoked, if the underly-
ing arrest was not lawful. Indeed, state law has consistently 
provided that a valid arrest is a necessary prerequisite to the 
imposition of a breath test. See Scales v. State, 64 Wis. 2d 
485, 494, 219 N. W. 2d 286, 292 (1974). 4 Although the stat-
' "The implied consent law does not limit the right to take a blood sam-
ple as an incident to a lawful arrest. It should be emphasized, however, 
that the arrest, and therefore probable cause for making it, must precede 
the taking of the blood sample. We conclude that the sample was constitu-
tionally taken incident to the lawful arrest." 64 Wis. 2d, at 494, 219 
N. W. 2d, at 292 (emphasis added). 
Nor is there any doubt that the Supreme Court of Wisconsin applies fed-
eral constitutional standards when determining whether an arrest, even 
for a nonjailable traffic offense, is lawful. The court, for example, ex-
plained the basis for its holding in this case as follows: 
' "The trial court revoked the defendant's motor vehicle operator's license 
for sixty days pursuant to his unreasonable refusal to submit to a breatha-
lyzer test, as required by [state statute]. 
"The defendant challenges the officer's warrantless arrest in his resi-
dence as violating the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion and Article I, section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution. The [trial 
court] upheld this warrantless arrest concluding that probable cause to be-
lieve that the defendant had been operating a motor vehicle while under 
the influence of an intoxicant, coupled with the existence of exigent circum-
stances, justified the officers' entry into the defendant's residence. . . . 
[T]he court of appeals reversed the trial court, holding that, although the 
officers' warrantless arrest was unreasonable, thereby violating the 
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, the absence of a finding regarding 
the consensual entry necessitated remanding the case on that issue. We 
affirm the findings of the [trial court], holding that the co-existence of prob-
able cause and exigent circumstances in this case justifies the warrantless 
arrest .... 
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ute in effect in April1978 referred to reasonableness, the cur-
rent version of§ 343.305 explicitly recognizes that one of the 
issues that an arrestee may raise at a refusal hearing is 
"whether [he] was lawfully placed under arrest for violation 
of s.346.63(1)." § 343.305(3)(b)(5)(a), (8)(b) (1981-82). See 
also 67 Op. Wis. Atty. Gen. 93-78 (Dec. 27, 1978) ("statutory 
scheme ... contemplates that a lawful arrest be made prior 
to a request for submission to a test"). 5 
Separate statutory provisions control the penalty that 
might be imposed for the substantive offense of driving while 
intoxicated. At the time in question, the vehicle code pro-
vided that a first offense for driving while intoxicated was a 
noncriminal violation subject to a civil forfeiture proceeding 
for a maximum fine of $200; a second or subsequent offense in 
the previous five years was a potential misdemeanor that 
could be punished by imprisonment for up to one year and a 
maximum fine of $500. Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2) (1975). Since 
that time, the State has made only minor amendments to 
these penalty provisions. Indeed, the statute continues to 
categorize a first offense as a civil v~olation that allows for 
only a monetary forfeiture of no more than $300. 
§ 346.65(2)(a) (1981-82). See State v. Albright, 98 Wis. 2d 
663, 672-673, 298 N. W. 2d 196, 202 (App. 1980). 
"To prevail in this case, the state must prove the co-existence of probable 
cause and exigent circumstances, justifying the officer's conduct at the de-
fendant's residence. We hold that there was ample evidence supporting 
the trial court's ruling that the officer's entry was justified on the basis of 
both probable cause and exigent circumstances. Entry to effect a war-
rantless arrest in a residence is subject to the limitations imposed by both 
the United States and the Wisconsin Constitutions. U. S . Canst. amend. 
IV; Wis. Canst. art. I, sec. 11." 108 Wis. 2d, at 320-321, 32~27, 321 
N. W. 2d, at 246-247, 249--250 (emphasis added) (citations and footnotes 
omitted). 
5 Because state law provides that evidence of the petitioner's refusal to 
submit to a breath test is inadmissible if the underlying arrest was unlaw-
ful, this case does not implicate the exclusionary rule under the Federal 
Constitution. 
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As noted, in this case the petitioner refused to submit to a 
breath test; he subsequently filed a timely request for a re-
fusal hearing. Before that hearing was held, however, the 
State filed a criminal complaint against the petitioner for 
driving while intoxicated. 6 The petitioner responded by fil-
ing a motion to dismiss the complaint, relying on his conten-
tion that the underlying arrest was invalid. After receiving 
evidence at a hearing on this motion in July 1980, the trial 
court concluded that the criminal complaint would not be dis-
missed because the existence of both probable cause and exi-
gent circumstances justified the warrantless arrest. The de-
cision at the refusal hearing, which was not held until 
September 1980, was therefore preordained. In fact, the 
primary issue at the refusal hearing-whether the petitioner 
acted reasonably in refusing to submit to a breath test be-
cause he was, unlawfully placed under arrest, ·.see supra, at 
3-5--had already been determined two months earlier by the 
same trial court. 
As expected, after the refusal hearing, the trial court con-
cluded that .the arrest of the petitioner was lawful and that 
the petitioner's refusal to take the breath test was therefore 
unreasonable. 7 Accordingly, the court issued an order sus-
6 The petitioner was charged with a criminal misdemeanor because this 
was his second such citation in the previous five years. See § 346. 65(2) 
(1975). Although the petitioner was subject to a criminal charge, the po-
lice conducting the warrantless entry of his home did not know that the 
petitioner had ever been charged with, or much less convicted of, a prior 
violation for driving while intoxicated. It must be assumed, therefore, 
that at the time of the arrest the police were acting as if they were investi-
gating and eventually arresting for a nonjailable traffic offense that consti-
tuted only a civil violation under the applicable state law. See Beck v. 
Ohio, 379 U. S. 89, 91, 96 (1964). 
7 When ruling from the bench after the refusal hearing, the trial judge 
specifically indicated: 
"[T]he Court is bound by its earlier ruling that that was a valid arrest. 
And, I think [counsel for the petitioner] certainly will have the right to 
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pending the petitioner's operating license for 60 days. On 
appeal, the suspension order was vacated by the Wisconsin 
Court of Appeals. See State v. Welsh, No. 80-1686, App. 
114-125. Contrary to the trial court, the appellate court 
concluded that the warrantless arrest of the petitioner in his 
home violated the Fourth Amendment because the State, al-
though demonstrating probable cause to arrest, had not es-
tablished the existence of exigent circumstances. The peti-
tioner's refusal to submit to a breath test was therefore 
reasonable. 8 The Supreme Court of Wisconsin in turn re-
versed the Court of Appeals, relying on the existence of 
three factors that it believed constituted exigent circum-
stances: the need for "hot pursuit" of a suspect, the need to 
prevent physical harm to the offender and the public, and the 
need to prevent destruction of evidence. See State v. 
Welsh, 108 Wis. 2d 319, 336-338, 321 N. W. 2d 245, 254-255 
(1982). Because of the important Fourth Amendment impli-
cations of the decision below, we granted certiorari. 459 
u.s.- (1983). 9 
II 
It is axiomatic that "the physical entry of the home is the 
chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amend-
challenge that on appeal if he appeals this matter, as well as the previous 
ruling should there be a conviction on the underlying charge." App. 111. 
See also App. 112-113. 
8 The court remanded the case for further findings as to whether the 
police had entered the petitioner's home with consent. Seen. 1, supra. 
9 Although the state courts differed in their respective conclusions con-
cerning exigent circumstances, they each found that the facts known to the 
police at the time of the warrantless home entry were sufficient to establish 
probable cause to arrest. The petitioner has not challenged that finding 
before this Court. 
The parallel criminal proceedings against the petitioner, see supra, at 6, 
and n. 6, resulted in a misdemeanor conviction for driving while intoxi-
cated. During the jury trial, held in early 1982, the State introduced evi-
dence of the petitioner's refusal to submit to a breath test. His appeal 
from that conviction, now before the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, has been 
stayed pending our decision in this case. See Brief for Petitioner 17, n. 5. 
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ment is directed." United States v. United States District 
Court, 407 U. S. 297, 313 (1972). And a principal protection 
against unnecessary intrusions into private dwellings is the 
warrant requirement imposed by the Fourth Amendment on 
agents of the government who seek to enter the home for 
purposes of search or arrest. See Johnson v. United States, 
333 U. S. 10, 13-14 (1948). 10 It is not surprising, therefore, 
that the Court has recognized, as "a 'basic principle of Fourth 
Amendment law[,]' that searches and seizures inside a home 
without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable." 
Payton v. New York, 445 U. S., at 586. See Coolidge v. 
New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 474-475 (1971) ("a search or 
seizure carried out on a suspect's premises without a warrant 
is per se unreasonable, unless the police can show . . . the 
presence of 'exigent circumstances'"). See also Michigan v. 
Clifford, -- U. S. -, - (1984) (plurality opinion); 
Steagald v. United States, 451 U. S. 204, 211-212 (1981); Mc-
Donald v. United States, 335 U. S. 451, 456 (1948); Johnson 
v. United States, supra, at 13-15; Boyd v. United States, 116 
u. s. 616, 630 (1886). 
Consistently with these long-recognized principles, the 
Court decided in Payton v. New York, supra, that warrant-
less felony arrests in the home are prohibited by the Fourth 
'
0 In Johnson, Justice Jackson eloquently explained the warrant require-
ment in the context of a home search: 
"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by 
zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the 
usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protec-
tion consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and 
detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the 
often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime .... The right of offi-
cers to thrust themselves into a home is ... a grave concern, not only to 
the individual but to a society which chooses to dwell in reasonable security 
and freedom from surveillance. When the right of privacy must reason-
ably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial 
officer, not by a policeman or government enforcement agent." !d., at 
13-14 (footnote omitted). 
82-546~0PINION 
WELSH v. WISCONSIN 9 
Amendment, absent probable cause and exigent circum-
stances. ld., at 583-590. At the same time, the Court de-
clined to consider the scope of any exception for exigent cir-
cumstances that might justify warrantless home arrests, id., 
at 583, thereby leaving to the lower courts the initial applica-
tion of the exigent-circumstances exception. 11 Prior deci-
sions of this Court, however, have emphasized that excep-
tions to the warrant requirement are "few in number and 
carefully delineated," United States v. United States District 
Court, 407 U. S., at 318, and that the police bear a heavy 
burden when attempting to demonstrate an urgent need that 
might justify warrantless searches or arrests. Indeed, the 
Court has recognized only a few such emergency conditions, 
see, e. g., United States v. Santana, 427 U. S. 38, 42-43 
(1976) (hot pursuit of a fleeing felon); Warden v. Hayden, 387 
U. S. 294, 298-299 (1967) (same); Schmerber v. California, 
384 U. S. 757, 770-771 (1966) (destruction of evidence); Mich-
igan v. Tyler, 436 U. S. 499, 509 (1978) (ongoing fire), and 
has actually applied only the "hot pursuit" doctrine to arrests 
in the home, see Santana, supra. 
Our hesitation in finding exigent circumstances, especially 
when warrantless arrests in the home are at issue, is espe-
cially appropriate when the underlying offense for which 
there is probable cause to arrest is relatively minor. Before 
agents of the government may invade the sanctity of the 
home, the burden is on the government to demonstrate exi- ~ 
gent circumstances that overcome the presumption of un-
reasonableness that attaches to all warrantless home entries. 
See Payton v. New York, supra, at 586. When the govern-
11 Our decision in Payton, allowing warrantless home arrests upon a 
showing of probable cause and exigent circumstances, was also expressly 
limited to felony arrests. See, e. g., 445 U. S., at 574, 602. Because we 
conclude that, in the circumstances presented by this case, there were no 
exigent circumstances sufficient to justify a warrantless home entry, we 
have no occasion to consider whether the Fourth Amendment may impose 
an absolute ban on warrantless home arrests for certain minor .offenses. 
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ment's interest is only to arrest for a minor offense, 12 that 
presumption of unreasonableness is difficult to rebut, and the 
government usually should be allowed to make such arrests 
only with a warrant issued upon probable cause by a neutral 
and detached magistrate. 
This is not a novel idea. Writing in concurrence in M c-
Donald v. United States, 335 U. S. 451 (1948), Justice Jack-
son explained why a finding of exigent circumstances to jus-
tify a warrantless home entry should be severely restricted 
when only a minor offense has been committed: 
"Even if one were to conclude that urgent circum-
stances might justify a forced entry without a warrant, 
no such emergency was present in this case. This 
method of law enforcement displays a shocking lack of all 
sense of proportion. Whether there is reasonable ne-
cessity for a search without waiting to obtain a warrant 
certainly depends somewhat upon the gravity of the of-
fense thought to be in progress as well as the hazards of 
the method of attempting to reach it. . . . It is to me a 
shocking proposition that private homes, even quarters 
in a tenement, may be indiscriminately invaded at the 
discretion of any suspicious police officer engaged in fol-
lowing up offenses that involve no violence or threats of 
it. While I should be human enough to apply the letter 
of the law with some indulgence to officers acting to deal 
with threats or crimes of violence which endanger life or 
security, it is notable that few of the searches found by 
this Court to be unlawful dealt with that category of 
crime. . . . While the enterprise of parting fools from 
their money by the 'numbers' lottery is one that ought to 
12 Even the dissenters in Payton, although believing that warrantless 
home arrests are not prohibited by the Fourth Amendment, recognized the 
importance of the felony limitation on such arrests. See 445 U. S., at 603, 
61&-617 (WHITE, J. , dissenting) ("The felony requirement guards against 
abusive or arbitrary enforcement and ensures that invasions of the home 
occur only in case of the most s~rious crimes."). 
82--M66-0PINION 
WELSH v. WISCONSIN 11 
be suppressed, I do not think that its suppression is 
more important to society than the security of the people 
against unreasonable searches and seizures. When an 
officer undertakes to act as his own magistrate, he ought 
to be in a position to justify it by pointing to some real 
immediate and serious consequences if he postponed ac-
tion to get a warrant." I d., at 459-460 (Jackson, J., con-
curring) (footnote omitted). 
Consistently with this approach, the lower courts have 
looked to the nature of the underlying offense as an impor-
tant factor to be considered in the exigent-circumstances cal-
culus. In a leading federal case defining exigent circum-
stances, for example, the en bane United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia recognized that the 
gravity of the underlying offense was a principal factor to be 
weighed. Dorman v. United States, 140 U. S. App. D. C. 
313, 320, 435 F. 2d 385, 392 (1970). 13 Without approving all 
of the factors included in the standard adopted by that court, 
it is sufficient to note that many other lower courts have also 
considered the gravity of the offense an important part of 
their constitutional analysis. 
For example, courts have permitted warrantless home ar-
. rests for major felonies if identifiable exigencies, independent 
of the gravity of the offense, existed at the time of the arrest. 
Compare United States v. Campbell, 581 F. 2d 22 (CA2 1978) 
(allowing warrantless home arrest for armed robbery when 
exigent circumstances existed), with Commonwealth v. Wil-
liams, 483 Pa. 293, 396 A. 2d 1177 (1978) (disallowing war-
rantless home arrest for murder due to absence of exigent 
circumstances). But of those courts addressing the issue, 
most have refused to permit warrantless home arrests for 
13 See generally Donnino & Girese, Exigent Circumstances for a War-
rantless Home Arrest, 45 Alb. L. Rev. 90 (1980); Harbaugh & Faust, 
"Knock on Any Door"-Home Arrests After Payton and Steagald, 86 
Dick. L. Rev. 191, 220-233 (1982); Note, Exigent Circumstances for War-
.rantless Home Arrests, 23 Ariz. L. Rev. 1171 (1981). 
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nonfelonious crimes. See, e. g., State v. Guertin, 190 Conn. 
440, 453, 461 A. 2d 963, 970 (1983) ("The [exigent circum-
stances] exception is narrowly drawn to cover cases of real 
and not contrived emergencies. The exception is limited to 
the investigation of serious crimes; misdemeanors are ex-
cluded."); People v. Strelow, 96 Mich. App. 182, 190-193, 292 
N. W. 2d 517, 521-522 (1980). See also People v. Sanders, 
59 Ill. App. 3d 6, 374 N. E. 2d 139 (1978) (burglary without 
weapons not grave offense of violence for this purpose); State 
v. Bennett, 295 N. W. 2d 5 (S. D. 1980) (distribution of con-
trolled substances not a grave offense for these purposes). 
But cf. State v. Penas, 200 Neb. 387, 263 N. W. 2d 835 (1978) 
(allowing warrantless home arrest upon hot pursuit from 
commission of misdemeanor in the officer's presence; decided 
before Payton); State v. Niedermeyer, 48 Or. App. 665, 617 
P. 2d 911 (1980) (allowing warrantless home arrest upon hot 
pursuit from commission of misdemeanor in the officer's pres-
ence). The approach taken in these cases should not be sur-
prising. Indeed, without necessarily approving any of these 
particular holdings or considering every possible factual situ-
ation, we note that it is difficult to conceive of a warrantless 
home arrest that would not be unreasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment when the underlying offense is ex-
tremely minor. 
We therefore conclude that the commonsense approach uti-
lized by most lower courts is required by the Fourth Amend-
ment prohibition on "unreasonable searches and seizures," 
and hold that an important factor to be considered when 
determining whether any exigency exists is the gravity of the 
underlying offense for which the arrest is being made. 
Moreover, although no exigency is created simply because 
there is probable cause to believe that a serious crime has 
been committed, see Payton, supra, application of the exi-
gent-circumstances exception in the context of a home entry 
should rarely be sanctioned when there is probable cause to 
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believe that only a minor offense, such as the kind at issue in 
this case, has been committed. 
Application of this principle to the facts of the present case 
is relatively straightforward. The petitioner was arrested in 
the privacy of his own bedroom for a noncriminal, traffic of-
fense. The State attempts to justify the arrest by relying on 
the hot-pursuit doctrine, on the threat to public safety, and 
on the need to preserve evidence of the petitioner's blood-al-
cohol level. On the facts of this case, however, the claim of 
hot pursuit is unconvincing because there was no immediate 
or continuous pursuit of the petitioner from the scene Qf a 
crime. Moreover, because the petitioner had already ar-
rived home, and had abandoned his car at the scene of the ac-
cident, there was little remaining threat to the public safety. 
Hence, the only potential emergency claimed by the State 
was the need to ascertain the petitioner's blood-alcohol level. 
Even assuming, however, that the underlying facts would 
support a finding of this exigent circumstance, mere similar-
ity to other cases involving the imminent destruction of evi-
dence is not sufficient. The State of Wisconsin has chosen to 
classify the first offense for driving while intoxicated as a 
noncriminal, civil forfeiture offense for which no imprison-
ment is possible. See Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2) (1975); id., 
§ 346.65(2)(a) (1981-82); supra, at 5. This is the best indica-
tion of the state's interest in precipitating an arrest, and is 
one that can be easily identified both by the courts and by of-
ficers faced with a decision to arrest. See n. 6, supra. 
Given this expression of the state's interest, a warrantless 
home arrest cannot be upheld simply because evidence of the 
petitioner's blood-alcohol level might have dissipated while 
the police obtained a warrant. 14 To allow a warrantless home 
14 Nor do we mean to suggest that the prevention of drunk driving is not 
properly of major concern to the States. The State of Wisconsin, how-
ever, along with several other States, see, e. g., Minn. Stat. § 169.121 
subd. 4 (1982); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 39-669.07(1) (Supp. 1982); S. D. Codified 
Laws § 32-23-2 (Supp. 1983), has chosen to limit severely the penalties 
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entry on these facts would be to approve unreasonable police 
behavior that the principles of the Fourth Amendment will 
not sanction. 
III 
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin let stand a warrantless, 
nighttime entry into the petitioner's home to arrest him for 
violation of ~ civil traffic offense. Such an arrest, however, 
is clearly prohibited by the special protection afforded the in-
dividual in his home by the Fourth Amendment. The peti-
tioner's arrest was therefore invalid, the judgment of the Su-
preme Court of Wisconsin is vacated, and the case is 
remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this 
opinion. 15 
It is so ordered. 
that may be imposed after a first conviction for driving while intoxicated. 
Given that the classification of state crimes differs widely among the 
States, the penalty that may attach to any particular offense seems to pro-
vide the clearest and most consistent indication of the state's interest in 
arresting individuals suspected of committing that offense. 
15 On remand, the state courts may consider whether the petitioner's ar-
rest was justified because the police had validly obtained consent to enter 
his home. See n. 1, supra. 
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JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573 (1980), held that, ab-
sent probable cause and exigent circumstances, warrantless 
arrests in the home are prohibited by the Fourth Amend-
ment. But the Court in that case explicitly refused "to con-
sider the sort of emergency or dangerous situation, described 
in our cases as 'exigent circumstances,' that would justify a 
warrantless entry into a home for the purpose of either arrest 
or search." Id., at 583. Certiorari was granted in this case 
to decide at least one aspect of the unresolved question: 
whether, and if so under what circumstances, the Fourth 
Amendment prohibits the police from making a warrantless 
night entry of a person's home in order to arrest him for vi-
olation of a nonjailable traffic offense. 
I 
A 
Shortly before 9:00 p. m. on the rainy night of April 24, 
1978, a lone witness, Randy J ablonic, observed a car being 
driven erratically. After changing speeds and veering from 
side to side, the car eventually swerved off the road and came 
to a stop in an open field. No damage to any person or prop-
erty occurred. Concerned about the driver and fearing that 
the car would get back on the highway, J ablonic drove his 
truck up behind the car so as to block it from returning to the 
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road. Another passerby also stopped at the scene, and 
J ablonic asked her to call the police. Before the police ar-
rived, however, the driver of the car emerged from his vehi-
cle, approached Jablonic's truck, and asked Jablonic for a ride 
home. J ablonic instead suggested that they wait for assist-
ance in removing or repairing the car. Ignoring Jablonic's 
suggestion, the driver walked away from the scene. 
A few minutes later, the police arrived and questioned 
J ablonic. He told one officer what he had seen, specifically 
noting that the driver was either very inebriated or very 
sick. The officer checked the motor vehicle registration of 
the abandoned car and learned that it was registered to the 
petitioner, Edward G. Welsh. In addition, the officer noted 
that the petitioner's residence was a short distance from the 
scene, and therefore easily within walking distance. 
Without securing any type of warrant, the police pro-
ceeded to the petitioner's home, arriving about 9:00 p. m. 
When the petitioner's stepdaughter answered the door, the 
police gained entry into the house.' Proceeding upstairs to 
the petitioner's bedroom, they found him lying naked in bed. 
At this point, the petitioner was placed under arrest for driv-
ing or operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of 
an intoxicant, in violation of Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1) (1977). 2 
' The state trial court never decided whether there was consent to the 
entry because it deemed decision of that issue unnecessary in light of its 
finding that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless arrest. After 
reversing the lower court's finding of exigent circumstances, the Wisconsin 
Court of Appeals remanded for full consideration of the consent issue. See 
State v. Welsh, No. 80-1686, App. 114-125. That remand never occurred, 
however, because the Supreme Court of Wisconsin reversed its court of 
appeals and reinstated the trial court's judgment. See State v. Welsh, 108 
Wis. 2d 319, 321 N. W. 2d 245 (1982). For purposes of this decision, 
therefore, we assume that there was no valid consent to enter the petition-
er's home. 
2 Since the petitioner's arrest, § 346.63 has been amended to provide 
that it is a code violation to drive or operate a motor vehicle while under 
the influence of an intoxicant or while evidencing certain blood- or breath-
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The petitioner was taken to the police station, where he re-
fused to submit to a breathalyzer test. 
B 
As a result of these events, the petitioner was subjected to 
two separate but related proceedings: one concerning his re-
fusal to submit to a breath test and the other involving the 
alleged code violation for driving while intoxicated. Under 
the Wisconsin vehicle code in effect in April 1978, one ar-
rested for driving while intoxicated under§ 346.63(1) could be 
requested by a law enforcement officer to provide breath, 
blood, or urine samples for the purpose of determining the 
presence or quantity of alcohol. Wis. Stat. § 343.305(1) 
(1975). If such a request was made, the arrestee was re-
quired to submit to the appropriate testing or risk a revoca-
tion of operating privileges. Cf. South Dakota v. Neville, 
459 U. S. -- (1983) (admission into evidence of a defend-
ant's refusal to submit to a blood-alcohol test does not offend 
constitutional right against self-incrimination). The arrestee 
could challenge the officer's request, however, by refusing to 
undergo testing and then asking for a hearing to determine 
whether the refusal was justified. If, after the hearing, it 
was determined that the refusal was not justified, the arrest-
ee's operating privileges would be revoked for 60 days. 3 
The statute also set forth specific criteria to be applied by a 
court when determining whether an arrestee's refusal to take 
alcohol levels. See Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(a)-(b) (1981-82). This amend-
ment, however, has no bearing on the issues raised by the present case. 
8 Since the petitioner's arrest, this statute also has been amended, with 
the current version found at Wis. Stat. § 343.305 (1981-82). Although the 
procedures to be followed by the law enforcement officer and the arrestee 
have remained essentially unchanged, § 343.305(3), (8), the potential length 
of any revocation of operating privileges has been increased, depending on 
the arrestee's prior driving record , § 343.305(9)(a)-(b). An arrestee who 
improperly refuses to submit to a required test may also be required to 
comply with an assessment order and a driver safety plan. 
§ 343.305(9)(c)-(e). These amendments, however, also have no direct 
bearing on the issues raised by the present case. 
. . 
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a breath test was justified. Included among these criteria 
was a requirement that, before revoking the arrestee's op... · 
erating privileges, the court determine that "the refusal ... 
to submit to a test was unreasonable." § 343.305(2)(b)(5) 
(1975). It is not disputed by the parties that an arrestee's 
refusal to take a breath test would be reasonable, and there-
fore operating privileges could not be revoked, if the underly-
ing arrest was not lawful. Indeed, state law has consistently 
provided that a valid arrest is a necessary prerequisite to the 
imposition of a breath test. See Scales v. State, 64 Wis. 2d 
485, 494, 219 N. W. 2d 286, 292 (1974).• Although the stat-
'"The implied consent law does not limit the right to take a blood sam-
ple as an incident to a lawful arrest. It should be emphasized, however, 
that the arrest, and therefore probable cause for making it, must precede 
the taking of the blood sample. We conclude that the sample was constitu-
tionally taken incident to the lawful arrest." 64 Wts. 2d, at 494, 219 
N. W. 2d, at 292 (emphasis added). 
Nor is there any doubt that the Supreme Court of Wisconsin applies fed-
eral constitutional standards when determining whether an arrest, even 
for a nonjailable traffic offense, is lawful. The court, for example, ex-
plained the basis for its holding in this case as follows: 
"The trial court revoked the defendant's motor vehicle operator's license 
for sixty days pursuant to his unreasonable refusal to submit to a breatha-
lyzer test, as required by [state statute]. 
"The defendant challenges the officer's warrantless arrest in his resi-
dence as violating the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion and Article I, section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution. The [trial 
court] upheld this warrantless arrest concluding that probable cause to be-
lieve that the defendant had been operating a motor vehicle while under 
the influence of an intoxicant, coupled with the existence of exigent circum-
stances, justified the officers' entry into the defendant's residence .... 
[T]he court of appeals reversed the trial court, holding that, although the 
officers' warrantless arrest was unreasonable, thereby violating the 
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, the absence of a finding regarding 
the consensual entry necessitated remanding the case on that issue. We 
affirm the findings of the [trial court], holding that the co-existence of prob-
able cause and exigent circumstances in this case justifies the warrantless 
arrest .. . . 
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ute in effect in April1978 referred to reasonableness, the cur-
rent version of§ 343.305 explicitly "Fecognizes that one of the 
issues that an arrestee may raise at a refusal hearing is 
"whether [he] was lawfully placed under arrest for violation 
of s.346.63(1)." § 343.305(3)(b)(5)(a), (8)(b) (1981-82). See 
also 67 Op. Wis. Atty. Gen. 93-78 (Dec. 27, 1978) ("statutory 
scheme ... contemplates that a lawful arrest be made prior 
to a request for submission to a test"). 5 
Separate statutory provisions control the penalty that 
might be imposed for the substantive offense of driving while 
intoxicated. At the time in question, the vehicle code pro-
vided that a first offense for driving while intoxicated was a 
noncriminal violation subject to a civil forfeiture proceeding 
for a maximum.fine of $200; a second or subsequent offense in 
the previous five years was a potential misdemeanor that 
could be punished by imprisonment for up to one year and a 
maximum fine of $500. Wis. Stat. § 346. 65(2) (1975). Since 
that time, the State has made only minor amendments to 
these penalty provisions. Indeed, the statute continues to 
categorize a first offense as a civil violation that allows for 
only a monetary forfeiture of no more than $300. 
§ 346.65(2)(a) (1981-82). See State v. Albright, 98 Wis. 2d 
663, 672-673, 298 N. W. 2d 196, 202 (App. 1980). 
"To prevail in this case, the state must prove the co-existence of probable 
cause and exigent circumstances, justifying the officer's conduct at the de-
fendant's residence. We hold that there was ample evidence supporting 
the trial court's ruling that the officer's entry was justified on the basis of 
both probable cause and exigent circumstances. Entry to effect a war-
rantless arrest in a residence is subject to the limitations imposed by both 
the United States and the Wisconsin Constitutions. U. S. Canst. amend. 
N; Wis. Canst. art. I, sec. 11." 108 Wis. 2d, at 320-321, 326-327, 321 
N. W. 2d, at 24&-247, 249-250 (emphasis added) (citations and footnotes 
omitted). 
5 Because state law provides that evidence of the petitioner's refusal to 
submit to a breath test is inadmissible if the underlying arrest was unlaw-
ful, this case does not implicate the exclusionary rule under the Federal 
Constitution. 
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As noted, in this case the petitioner refused to submit to a 
breath test; he subsequently filed a timely request for a re-
fusal hearing. Before that hearing was held, however, the 
State filed a criminal complaint against the petitioner for 
driving while intoxicated. 6 The petitioner responded by fil-
ing a motion to dismiss the complaint, relying on his conten-
tion that the underlying arrest was invalid. After receiving 
evidence at a hearing on this motion in July 1980, the trial 
court concluded that the criminal complaint would not be dis-
missed because the existence of both probable cause and exi-
gent circumstances justified the warrantless arrest. The de-
cision at the refusal hearing, which was not held until 
September 1980, was therefore preordained. In fact, the 
primary issue at the refusal hearing-whether the petitioner 
acted reasonably in refusing to submit to a breath test be-
cause he was unlawfully placed under arrest, see supra, at 
3-5--had already been determined two months earlier by the 
same trial court. 
As expected, after the refusal hearing, the trial court con-
cluded that the arrest of the petitioner was lawful and that 
the petitioner's refusal to take the breath test was therefore 
unreasonable. 7 Accordingly, the court issued an order sus-
6 The petitioner was charged with a criminal misdemeanor because this 
was his second such citation in the previous five years. See § 346.65(2) 
(1975). Although the petitioner was subject to a criminal charge, the po-
lice conducting the warrantless entry of his home did not know that the 
petitioner had ever been charged with, or much less convicted of, a prior 
violation for driving while intoxicated. It must be assumed, therefore, 
that at the time of the arrest the police were acting as if they were investi-
gating and eventually arresting for a nonjailable traffic offense that consti-
tuted only a civil violation under the applicable state law. See Beck v. 
Ohio, 379 U. S. 89, 91, 96 (1964). 
7 When ruling from the bench after the refusal hearing, the trial judge 
specifically indicated: 
"[T]he Court is bound by its earlier ruling that that was a valid arrest. 
And, I think [counsel for the petitioner] certainly will have the right to 
. . 
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pending the petitioner's operating license for 60 days. On 
appeal, the suspension order was vacated by the Wisconsin 
Court of Appeals. See State v. Welsh, No. 80-1686, App. 
114-125. Contrary to the trial court, the appellate court 
concluded that the warrantless arrest of the petitioner in his 
home violated the Fourth Amendment because the State, al-
though demonstrating probable cause to arrest, had not es-
tablished the existence of exigent circumstances. The peti-
tioner's refusal to submit to a breath test was therefore 
reasonable. 8 The Supreme Court of Wisconsin in turn re-
versed the Court of Appeals, relying on the existence of 
three factors that it believed constituted exigent circum-
stances: the need for "hot pursuit" of a suspect, the need to 
prevent physical harm to the offender and the public, and the 
need to prevent destruction of evidence. See State v. 
Welsh, 108 Wis. 2d 319, 336-338, 321 N. W. 2d 245, 254-255 
(1982). Because of the important Fourth Amendment impli-
cations of the decision below, we granted certiorari. 459 
u. s.- (1983). 9 
II 
It is axiomatic that "the physical entry of the home is the 
chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amend-
challenge that on appeal if he appeals this matter, as well as the preVious 
ruling should there be a conviction on the underlying charge." App. 111. 
See also App. 112-113. 
8 The court remanded the case for further findings as to whether the 
police had entered the petitioner's home with consent. See n. 1, supra. 
9 Although the state courts differed in their respective conclusions con-
cerning exigent circumstances, they each found that the facts known to the 
police at the time of the warrantless home entry were sufficient to establish 
probable cause to arrest. The petitioner has not challenged that finding 
before this Court. 
The parallel criminal proceedings against the petitioner, see supra, at 6, 
and n. 6, resulted in a misdemeanor conviction for driving while intoxi-
cated. During the jury trial, held in early 1982, the State introduced evi-
dence of the petitioner's refusal to submit to a breath test. His appeal 
from that conviction, now before the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, has been 
stayed pending our decision in this case. See Brief for Petitioner 17, n. 5. 
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ment is directed." United States v. United States District 
Court, 407 U. S. 297, 313 (1972). And a principal protection 
against unnecessary intrusions into private dwellings is the 
warrant requirement imposed by the Fourth Amendment on 
agents of the government who seek to enter the home for 
purposes of search or arrest. See Johnson v. United States, 
333 U. S. 10, 13-14 (1948).'0 It is not surprising, therefore, 
that the Court has recognized, as "a 'basic principle of Fourth 
Amendment law[,]' that searches and seizures inside a home 
without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable." 
Payton v. New York, 445 U. S., at 586. See Coolidge v. 
New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 474-475 (1971) ("a search or 
seizure carried out on a suspect's premises without a warrant 
is per se unreasonable, unless the police can show . . . the 
presence of 'exigent circumstances'"). See also Michigan v. 
Clifford, -- U. S. --, -- (1984) (plurality opinion); 
Steagald v. United States, 451 U. S. 204, 211-212 (1981); Mc-
Donald v. United States, 335 U. S. 451, 456 (1948); Johnson 
v. United States, supra, at 13-15; Boyd v. United States, 116 
u. s. 616, 630 (1886). 
Consistently with these long-recognized principles, the 
Court decided in Payton v. New York, supra, that warrant-
less felony arrests in the home are prohibited by the Fourth 
10 In Johnson, Justice Jackson eloquently explained the warrant require-
ment in the context of a home search: 
"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by 
zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the 
usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protec-
tion consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and 
detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the 
often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime .... The right of offi-
cers to thrust themselves into a home is ... a grave concern, not only to 
the individual but to a society which chooses to dwell in reasonable security 
and freedom from surveillance. When the right of privacy must reason-
ably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial 
officer, not by a policeman or government enforcement agent." Id., at 
1~14 (footnote omitted). 
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Amendment, absent probable cause and exigent circum-
stances. I d., at 58~90. At the same time, the Court de-
clined to consider the scope of any exception for exigent cir-
cumstances that might justify warrantless home arrests, id., 
at 583, thereby leaving tothe lower courts the initial applica-
tion of the exigent-circumstances exception. 11 Prior deci-
sions of this Court, however, have emphasized that excep-
tions to the warrant requirement are "few in number and 
carefully delineated," United States v. United States District 
Court, 407 U. S., at 318, and that the police bear a heavy 
burden when attempting to demonstrate an urgent need that 
might justify warrantless searches or arrests. Indeed, the 
Court has recognized only a few such emergency conditions, 
see, e. g., United States v. Santana, 427 U. S. 38, 42-43 
(1976) (hot pursuit of a fleeing felon); Warden v. Hayden, 387 
U. S. 294, 298-299 (1967) (same); Schmerber v. California, 
384 U. S. 757, 770-771 (1966) (destruction of evidence); Mich-
igan v. Tyler, 436 U. S. 499, 509 (1978) (ongoing fire), and 
has actually applied only the "hot pursuit" doctrine to arrests 
in the home, see Santana 1 supra.· 
Our hesitation in finding exigent circumstances, especially 
when warrantless arrests in the home are at issue, is espe-
cially appropriate when the underlying offense for which 
there is probable cause to arrest is relatively minor. Before 
agents of the government may invade the sanctity of the 
home, the burden is on the government to demonstrate exi-
gent circumstances that overcome the presumption of un-
reasonableness that attaches to all warrantless home entries. 
See Payton v. New York, supra, at 586. When the govern-
11 Our decision in Payton, allowing warrantless home arrests upon a 
showing of probable cause and exigent circumstances, was also expressly 
limited to felony arrests. See, e. g., 445 U. S. , at 574, 602. Because we 
conclude that, in the circumstances presented by this case, there were no 
exigent circumstances sufficient to justify a warrantless home entry, we 
have no occasion to consider whether the Fourth Amendment may impose 
an absolute ban on warrantless home arrests for certain minor offenses. 
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ment's interest is only to arrest for a minor offense, 12 that 
presumption of unreasonableness is difficult to rebut, and the 
government usually should be allowed to make such arrests 
only with a warrant issued upon probable cause by a neutral 
and detached magistrate. 
· This is not a novel idea. Writing in concurrence in M c-
Donald v. United States, 335 U. S. 451 (1948), Justice Jack-
son explained why a finding of exigent circumstances to jus-
tify a warrantless home entry should be severely restricted 
when only a minor offense has been committed: 
"Even if one were to conclude that urgent circum-
stances might justify a forced entry without a warrant, 
no such emergency was present in this case. This 
method of law enforcement displays a shocking lack of all 
sense of proportion. Whether there is reasonable ne-
cessity for a search without waiting to obtain a warrant 
certainly depends somewhat upon the gravity of the of-
fense thought to be in progress as well as the hazards of 
the method of attempting to reach it. . . . It is to me a 
sho£king proposition that private homes, even quarters 
in a tenement, may be indiscriminately invaded at the 
discretion of any suspicious police officer engaged in fol-
lowing up offenses that involve no violence or threats of 
it. While I should be human enough to apply the letter 
of the law with some indulgence to officers acting to deal 
with threats or crimes of violence which endanger life or 
security, it is notable that few of the searches found by 
this Court to be unlawful dealt with that category of 
crime. . . . While the enterprise of parting fools from 
their money by the 'numbers' lottery is one that ought to 
12 Even the dissenters in Payton, although believing that warrantless 
home arrests are not prohibited by the Fourth Amendment, recognized the 
importance of the felony limitation on such arrests. See 445 U. S., at 603, 
616--617 (WHITE, J., dissenting) ("The felony requirement guards against 
abusive or arbitrary enforcement and ensures that invasions of the home 
occur only in case of the most serious crimes."). 
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be suppressed, I do not think that its suppression is 
more important to society than the security of the people 
against unreasonable searches and seizures. When an 
officer undertakes to act as his own magistrate, he ought 
to be in a position to justify it by pointing to some real 
immediate and serious consequences if he postponed ac-
tion to get a warrant." I d., at 459-460 (Jackson, J., con-
curring) (footnote omitted). 
Consistently with this approach, the lower courts have 
looked to the nature of the underlying offense as an impor-
tant factor to be considered in the exigent-circumstances cal-
culus. In a leading federal case defining exigent circum-
stances, for example, the en bane United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia recognized that the 
gravity of the underlying offense was a principal factor to be 
weighed. Dorman v. United States, 140 U. S. App. D. C. 
313, 320, 435 F. 2d 385, 392 (1970).'3 Without approving all 
of the factors included in the standard adopted by that court, 
it is sufficient to note that many other lower courts have also 
considered the gravity of the offense an important part of 
their constitutional analysis. 
For example, courts have permitted warrantless home ar-
rests for major felonies if identifiable exigencies, independent 
of the gravity of the offense, existed at the time of the arrest. 
Compare United States v. Campbell, 581 F. 2d 22 (CA2 1978) 
(allowing warrantless home arrest for armed robbery when 
exigent circumstances existed), with Commonwealth v. Wil-
liams, 483 Pa. 293, 396 A. 2d 1177 (1978) (disallowing war-
rantless home arrest for murder due to absence of exigent 
circumstances). But of those courts addressing the issue, 
most have refused to permit warrantless home arrests for 
18 See generally Donnino & Girese, Exigent Circumstances for a War-
rantless Home Arrest, 45 Alb. L. Rev. 90 (1980); Harbaugh & Faust, 
"Knock on Any Door"-Home Arrests After Payton and Steagald, 86 
Dick. L. Rev. 191, 220-233 (1982); Note, Exigent Circumstances for War-
rantless Home Arrests, 23 Ariz. L. Rev. 1171 (1981). 
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nonfelonious crimes. See, e. g., State v. Guertin, 190 Conn. 
440, 453, 461 A. 2d 963, 970 (1983) ("The [exigent circum-
stances] exception is narrowly drawn to cover cases of real 
and not contrived emergencies. The exception is limited to 
the investigation of serious crimes; misdemeanors are ex-
cluded."); People v. Strelow, 96 Mich. App. 182, 190-193, 292 
N. W. 2d 517, 521-522 (1980). See also People v. Sanders, 
59 Ill. App. 3d 6, 374 N. E. 2d 139 (1978) (burglary without 
weapons not grave offense of violence for this purpose); State 
v. Bennett, 295 N. W. 2d 5 (S. D. 1980) (distribution of con-
trolled substances not a grave offense for these purposes). 
But cf. State v. Penas, 200 Neb. 387, 263 N. ·W. 2d 835 (1978) 
(allowing warrantless home arrest upon hot pursuit from 
commission of misdemeanor in the officer's presence; decided 
before Payton); State v. Niedermeyer, 48 Or. App. 665, 617 
P. 2d 911 (1980) (allowing warrantless home arrest upon hot 
pursuit from .commission of misdemeanor in the officer's pres-
ence). The approach taken in these cases should not be sur-
prising. Indeed, without necessarily approving any of these 
particular holdings or considering every possible factual situ-
ation, we note that it is difficult to conceive of a warrantless 
home arrest that would not be unreasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment when the underlying offense is ex-
tremely minor. 
We therefore conclude that the commonsense approach uti-
lized by most lower courts is required by the Fourth Amend-
ment prohibition on "unreasonable searches and seizures," 
and hold that an important factor to be considered when 
determining whether any exigency exists is the gravity of the 
underlying offense for which the arrest is being made. 
Moreover, although no exigency is created simply because 
there is probable cause to believe that a serious crime has 
been committed, see Payton, supra, application of the exi-
gent-circumstances exception in the context of a home entry 
should rarely be sanctioned when there is probable cause to 
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believe that only a minor offense, such as the kind at issue in 
this case, has been committed. 
Application of this principle to the facts of the present case 
is relatively straightforward. The petitioner was arrested in 
the privacy of his own bedroom for a noncriminal, traffic of-
fense. The State attempts to justify the arrest by relying on 
the hot-pursuit doctrine, on the threat to public safety, and 
on the need to preserve evidence of the petitioner's blood-al-
cohol level. On the facts of this case, however, the claim of 
hot pursuit is unconvincing because there was no immediate 
or continuous pursuit of the petitioner from the scene of a 
crime. Moreover, because the petitioner had already ar-
rived home, and had abandoned his car at the scene of the ac-
cident, there was little remaining threat to the public safety. 
Hence, the only potential emergency claimed by the State 
was the need to ascertain the petitioner's blood-alcohol level. 
Even assuming, however, that the underlying facts would 
support a finding of this exigent circumstance, mere similar-
ity to other cases involving the imminent destruction of evi-
dence is not sufficient. The State of Wisconsin has chosen to 
classify the first offense for driving while intoxicated as a 
noncriminal, civil forfeiture offense for which no imprison-
ment is possible. See Wis. Stat. § 346. 65(2) (1975); id., 
§ 346.65(2)(a) (1981-82); supra, at 5. This is the best indica-
tion of the state's interest in precipitating an arrest, and is 
one that can be easily identified both by the courts and by of-
ficers faced with a decision to arrest. See n. 6, supra. 
Given this expression of the state's interest, a warrantless 
home arrest cannot be upheld simply because evidence of the 
petitioner's blood-alcohol level might have dissipated while 
the police obtained a warrant. •• To allow a warrantless home 
"Nor do we mean to suggest that the prevention of drunk driving is not 
properly of major concern to the States. The State of Wisconsin, how-
ever, along with several other States, see, e. g., Minn. Stat. § 169.121 
subd. 4 (1982); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 39-669.07(1) (Supp. 1982); S. D. Codified 
Laws § 32-23-2 (Supp. 1983), has chosen to limit severely the penalties 
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entry on these facts would be to approve unreasonable police 
behavior that the principles of the Fourth Amendment will 
not sanction. 
III 
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin let stand a warrantless, 
nighttime entry into the petitioner's home to arrest him for 
violation of a civil traffic offense. Such an arrest, however, 
is clearly prohibited by the special protection afforded the in-
dividual in his home by the Fourth Amendment. The peti-
tioner's arrest was therefore invalid, the judgment of the Su-
preme Court of Wisconsin is vacated, and the case is 
remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this 
opinion.'5 
It is so ordered. 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE would dismiss the writ as having been I 
improvidently granted and defer resolution of the question 
presented to a more appropriate case. 
that may be imposed after a first conviction for driving while intoxicated. 
Given that the classification of state crimes differs widely among the 
States, the penalty that may attach to any particular offense seems to pro-
vide the clearest and most consistent indication of the state's interest in 
arresting individuals suspected of committing that offense. 
" On remand, the state courts may consider whether the petitioner's ar-
rest was justified because the police had validly obtained consent to enter 
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JUSTICE WHITE, dissenting. 
At common law, "a peace officer was permitted to arrest 
without a warrant for a misdemeanor or felony committed in 
his presence as well as for a felony not committed in his pres-
ence if there was reasonable ground for making the arrest." 
United States v. Watson, 423 U. S. 411, 418 (1976). But the 
requirement that a misdemeanor must have occurred in the 
officer's presence to justify a warrantless arrest is not 
grounded in the Fourth Amendment, see Street v. Surdyka, 
492 F. 2d 368, 371-372 (CA4 1974); 2 W. LaFave, Search and 
Seizure § 5.1 (1978), and we have never held that a warrant is 
constitutionally required to arrest for nonfelony offenses oc-
curring out of the officer's presence. Thus, "it is generally 
recognized today that the common law authority to arrest 
without a warrant in misdemeanor cases may be enlarged by 
statute, and this has been done in many of the states." 
E. Fisher, Laws of Arrest 130 (1967); see ALI, A Model 
Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure, App. X (1975); 1 C. Al-
exander, The Law of Arrest 445-447 (1949); Wilgas, Arrest 
Without a Warrant, 22 Mich. L. Rev. 541, 673, 706 (1924). 
Wisconsin is one of the states that have expanded the com-
mon-law authority to arrest for nonfelony offenses. Section 
345.22 of the Wisconsin Statutes provides that "[a] person 
may be arrested without a warrant for the violation of a traf-
fic regulation if the traffic officer has reasonable grounds to 
believe that the person is violating or has violated a traffic 
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regulation." Relying on this statutory authority, officers of 
the Madison Police Department arrested Edward Welsh in a 
bedroom in his home for violating Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1) 
(1977), which proscribes the operation of a motor vehicle 
while intoxicated. Welsh refused to submit to a breath or 
blood test, and his operator's ·license was eventually revoked 
for 60 days for this reason pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 343.305 
(1975). 
In the civil license revocation proceeding, Welsh argued 
that his arrest in his house without a warrant was unconstitu-
tional under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
Federal Constitution and that his refusal to submit to the test 
could not be used against him. This contention was not 
based on the proposition that using the refusal in the revoca-
tion proceeding would contravene federal law, but rather 
rested on the fact that Wis. Stat. § 343.305(2)(b)(5) (1975) had 
been interpreted to require that an arrest be legal if a refusal 
to be tested is to be the basis for a license revocation. 
On review of the license revocation, the Supreme Court of 
Wisconsin appears to have recognized that, under the Wis-
consin statute, Welsh's license was wrongfully revoked if the 
officers who arrested him had violated the Federal Constitu-
tion. 108 Wis. 2d 319, 321 N. W. 2d 245 (1982). See Scales 
v. State, 64 Wis. 2d 485, 494, 219 N. W. 2d 286, 292 (1974). 
The court acknowledged that "the individual's right to pri-
vacy in the home is a fundamental freeedom" and made clear 
that the state bore the burden of establishing exigent circum-
stances justifying a warrantless in-home arrest. 108 Wis. 
2d, at 327, 321 N. W. 2d, at 250. But it discerned a strong 
state interest in combating driving under the influence of al-
cohol, id., at 334-335, 321 N. W. 2d, at 253-254, and held 
that the warrantless arrest was proper because (1) the offi-
cers were in hot pursuit of a defendant seeking to avoid a 
chemical sobriety test; (2) Welsh posed a potential threat to 
public safety; and (3) "without an immediate blood alcohol 
test, highly reliable and persuasive evidence facilitating the 
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state's proof of [Welsh's] alleged violation ... would be de-
stroyed." !d., at 338, 321 N. W. 2d, at 255. For two rea-
sons, I would not overturn the judgment of the Supreme 
Court of Wisconsin. 
First, it is not at all clear to me that the important con-
stitutional question decided today should be resolved in a 
case such as this. Although Welsh argues vigorously that 
the State violated his federal constitutional rights, he at no 
point relied on the exclusionary rule, and he does not contend 
that the Federal Constitution or federal law provides the 
remedy he seeks. As a general rule, this Court "reviews 
judgments, not statements in opinions." Black v. Cutter 
Laboratories, 351 U. S. 292, 297 (1956). Because the Court 
does not purport to hold that federal law requires the conclu-
sion that Welsh's refusal to submit to a sobriety test was rea-
sonable, it is not clear to me how the judgment of the Su-
preme Court of Wisconsin offends federal law. 
It is true that under the Wisconsin statutory scheme, an 
arrestee's refusal to take a breath or blood test would be rea-
sonable and would not justify revocation of operating privi-
leges if the underlying arrest violated the Fourth Amend-
ment or was otherwise unlawful. What the State has done, 
' I however, is to attach consequences to an arrest found unlaw-
( ful under the Federal Constitution that we have never de-
• cided federal law itself would attach. The Court has occa-
sionally taken jurisdiction over cases in which the States 
have provided remedies for violations of federally defined ob-
ligations. E. g., Moore v. Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co., 291 
U. S. 205 (1934). But it has done so in contexts where state 
remedies are employed to further federal policies. See 
Greene, Hybrid State Law in the Federal Courts, 83 Harv. 
L. Rev. 289, 300 (1969). The Fourth Amendment of course 
applies to the police conduct at issue here. In providing that 
a driver may reasonably refuse to submit to a sobriety test if 
he was unlawfully arrested, Wisconsin's Legislature and 
courts are pursuing a course that they apparently hope will 
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r reduce police illegality and safeguard their citizens' rights. 
Although the State is entitled to draw this conclusion and to 
implement it as a matter of state law, I am very doubtful that 
the policies underlying the Fourth Amendment would re-
quire exclusion of the fruits of an illegal arrest in a civil 
proceeding to remove from the highways a person who insists 
on driving while under the influence of alcohol. Cf. INS v. -- :Jt~;<A J, ~· { 
Lopez-Mendoza, - U.S. - (1984). If that is the 
case-if it would violate no federal policy to revoke Welsh's 
license even if his arrest was illegal-there is no satisfactory 
reason for us to review the Supreme Court of Wisconsin's 
judgment affirming the revocation, even if that court mistak-
enly applied the Fourth Amendment. For me, this is amp~e ~ 
reason not to disturb the judgment of the Supreme Court of , l 
Wisconsin. 
In any event, I believe that the state court properly con-
strued the Fourth Amendment. It follows from Payton v. 
New York, 445 U. S. 573 (1980), that warrantless nonfelony 
arrests in the home are prohibited by the Fourth Amend-
ment absent probable cause and exigent circumstances. Al-
though I continue to believe that the Court erred in Payton 
in requiring exigent circumstances to justify warrantless in-
home felony arrests, id., at 603 (WHITE, J., dissenting), I do 
not reject the obvious logical implication of the Court's deci-
sion. But I see little to commend an approach that looks to 
"the nature of the underlying offense as an important factor 
to be considered in the exigent-circumstances calculus." 
Ante, at 11. 
The gravity of the underlying offense is, I concede, a factor 
to be considered in determining whether the delay that at-
tends the warrant-issuance process will endanger officers or 
other persons. The seriousness of the offense with which a 
suspect may be charged also bears on the likelihood that he 
will flee and escape apprehension if not arrested immedi-
ately. But if, under all the circumstances of a particular 
case, an officer has probable cause to believe that the delay 
82-5466-DISSENT 
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involved in procuring an arrest warrant will gravely endan-
ger the officer or other persons or will result in the suspect's 
escape, I perceive no reason to disregard those exigencies on 
the ground that the offense for which the suspect is sought is 
a "minor" one. 
As a practical matter, I sUspect, the Court's holding is 
likely to have a greater impact in cases where the officer 
acted without a warrant to prevent the imminent destruction 
or removal of evidence. If the evidence the destruction or 
removal of which is threatened documents only the suspect's 
participation in a "minor" crime, the Court apparently would 
preclude a finding that exigent circumstances justified the 
warrantless arrest. I do not understand why this should be 
so. 
A warrantless home entry to arrest is no more intrusive 
when the crime in "minor" than when the suspect is sought in 
connection with a serious felony. The variable factor, if 
there is one, is the governmental interest that will be served 
by the warrantless entry. Wisconsin's Legislature and its 
Supreme Court have both concluded that warrantless in-
home arrests under circumstances like those present here 
promote valid and substantial state interests. In determin-
ing whether the challenged governmental conduct was rea-
sonable, we are not bound by these determinations. But 
nothing in our previous decisions suggests that the fact that a 
State has defined an offense as a misdemeanor for a variety of 
social, cultural, and political reasons necessarily requires the 
conclusion that warrantless in-home arrests designed to pre-
vent the imminent destruction or removal of evidence of that 
offense are always impermissible. If anything, the Court's 
prior decisions support the opposite conclusion. See 
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523, 539-540 (1967); 
McDonald v. United States, 335 U. S. 451, 454-455 (1948). 
See also State v. Penas, 200 Neb. 387, 263 N. W. 2d 835 
(1978); State v. Niedermeyer, 48 Or. App. 665, 617 P. 2d 911 
(1980), cert. denied, 450 U. S. 1042 (1981). 
82-5466-DISSENT 
6 WELSH v. WISCONSIN 
A test under which the existence of exigent circumstances 
turns on the perceived gravity of the crime would signifi-
cantly hamper law enforcement and burden courts with 
pointless litigation concerning the nature and gradation of 
various crimes. The Court relies heavily on Justice Jack-
son's concurring opinion in · McDonald v. United States, 
supra, which, in minimizing the gravity of the felony at issue 
there, illustrates that the need for an evaluation of the seri-
ousness of particular crimes could not be confined to offenses 
defined by statute as misdemeanors. To the extent that the 
Court implies that the seriousness of a particular felony is a 
factor to be considered in deciding whether the need to pre-
serve evidence of that felony constitutes an exigent circum-
stance justifying a warrantless in-home arrest, I think that 
its approach is misguided. The decision to arrest without a 
warrant typically is made in the field under less-than-optimal 
circumstances; officers have neither the time nor the compe-
tence to determine whether a particular offense for which 
warrantless arrests have been authorized by statute is seri-
ous enough to justify a warrantless home entry to prevent 
the imminent destruction or removal of evidence. 
This problem could be lessened by creating a bright-line 
distinction between felonies and other crimes, but the 
Court-wisely in my view-does not adopt such an approach. 
There may have been a time when the line between misde-
meanors and felonies marked off those offenses involving a 
sufficiently serious threat to society to justify warrantless in-
home arrests under exigent circumstances. But the cate-
gory of misdemeanors today includes enough serious offenses 
to call into question the desirability of such line drawing. 
See ALI, Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedures 
131-132 (Prelim. Draft No. 1, 1965) (discussing ultimately re-
jected provision abandoning "in-presence" requirement for 
misdemeanor arrests). If I am correct in asserting that a 
bright-line distinction between felonies and misdemeanors is 
untenable and that the need to prevent the imminent de-
, . 
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struction or removal of evidence of some nonfelony crimes 
can constitute an exigency justifying warrantless in-home ar-
rests under certain circumstances, the Court's approach will 
necessitate a case-by-case evaluation of the seriousness of 
particular crimes, a difficult task for which officers and courts 
are poorly equipped. 
Even if the Court were correct in concluding that the grav-
ity of the offense is an important factor to consider in deter-
mining whether a warrantless in-home arrest is justified by 
exigent circumstances, it has erred in assessing the serious-
ness of the civil-forfeiture offense for which the officers 
thought they were arresting Welsh. As the Court observes, 
the statutory scheme in force at the time of Welsh's arrest 
provided that the first offense for driving under the influence 
of alcohol involved no potential incarceration. Wis. Stat. 
§ 346.65(2) (1975). Nevertheless, this Court has long recog-
nized the compelling state interest in highway safety, South 
Dakota v. Neville,-- U.S.--,-- (1983), the Supreme 
Court of Wisconsin identified a number of factors suggesting 
a substantial and growing governmental interest in appre-
hending and convicting intoxicated drivers and in deterring 
alcohol-related offenses, 108 Wis. 2d, at 334-335, 321 N. W. 
2d, at 253-254, and recent actions of the Wisconsin Legisla-
ture evince its "belief that significant benefits, in the reduc-
tion of the costs attributable to drunk driving, may be 
achieved by the increased apprehension and conviction of 
even first time ... offenders." Note, 1983 Wis. L. Rev. 
1023, 1053. 
The Court ignores these factors and looks solely to the pen-
alties imposed on first offenders in determining whether the 
State's interest is sufficient to justify warrantless in-home ar-
rests under exigent circumstances. Ante, at 13-14. Al-
though the seriousness of the prescribed sanctions is a valu-
able objective indication of the general normative judgment 
of the seriousness of the offense, Baldwin v. New York, 399 
U. S. 66, 68 (1970) (plurality opinion), other evidence is avail-
,. 
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able and should not be ignored. United States v. Craner, 
652 F. 2d 23, 24-27 (CA9 1981); United States v. Woods, 450 
F. Supp. 1335, 1340 (Md. 1978); Brady v. Blair, 427 F. Supp. 
5, 9 (SD Ohio 1976). Although first offenders are subjected 
only to civil forfeiture under the Wisconsin statute, the seri-
ousness with which the State regards the crime for which 
Welsh was arrested is evinced by (1) the fact that defendants 
charged with driving under the influence are guaranteed the 
right to a jury trial, Wis. Stat. § 345.43 (1981-82); (2) the leg-
islative authorization of warrantless arrests for traffic of-
fenses occurring outside the officer's presence, Wis. Stat. 
345.22 (1981-82); and (3) the collateral consequence of manda-
tory license revocation that attaches to all convictions for 
driving under the influence, Wis. Stat. § 343,30 (1q) 
(1981-82). See also District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U. S. 
63 (1930); United States v. Craner, supra. It is possible, 
moreover, that the Legislature consciously chose to limit the 
penalties imposed on first offenders in order to increase the 
ease of conviction and the overall deterrent effect of the en-
forcement effort. See Note, 35 Me. L. Rev. 385, 395, n. 35, 
399--400, 403 (1983). 
In short, the fact that Wisconsin has chosen to punish the 
first offense for driving under the influence with a fine rather 
than a prison term does not demand the conclusion that the 
State's interest in punishing first offenders is insufficiently 
substantial to justify warrantless in-home arrests under exi-
gent circumstances. As the Supreme Court of Wisconsin ob-
served, "[t]his is a model case demonstrating the urgency 
involved in arresting the suspect in order to preserve evi-
dence of the statutory violation." 108 Wis. 2d, at 338, 321 
N. W. 2d, at 255. We have previously recognized that "the 
percentage of alcohol in the blood begins to diminish shortly 
after drinking stops, as the body functions to eliminate it 
from the -system." Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757, 
770 (1966). Moreover, a suspect could cast substantial doubt 
on the validity of a blood or breath test by consuming addi-
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tional alcohol upon arriving at his home. In light of the 
promptness with which the officers reached Welsh's house, 
therefore, I would hold that the need to prevent the immi-
nent and ongoing destruction of evidence of a serious viola-
tion of Wisconsin's traffic laws provided an exigent circum-
stance justifying the warrantless in-home arrest. See also, 
e. g., People v. Ritchie, 181 Cal. Rptr. 773, 130 Cal. App. 3d 
455 (1982); People v. Smith, 175 Colo. 212, 486 P. 2d 8 (1971); 
State v. Findlay, 259 Iowa 733, 145 N. W. 2d 650 (1966); 
State v. Amaniera, 132 N.J. Super. 597, 334 A. 2d 398 
(1974); State v. Osburn, 13 Or. App. 92, 508 P. 2d 837 (1973). 
I respectfully dissent. 
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JUSTICE WHITE, with whom JUSTICE REHNQUIST joins, { 
dissenting. 
At common law, "a peace officer was permitted to arrest 
without a warrant for a misdemeanor or felony committed in 
his presence as well as for a felony not committed in his pres-
ence if there was reasonable ground for making the arrest." 
United States v. Watson, 423 U. S. 411, 418 (1976). But the 
requirement that a misdemeanor must have occurred in the 
officer's presence to justify a warrantless arrest is not 
grounded in the Fourth Amendment, see Street v. Surdyka, 
492 F. 2d 368, 371-372 (CA4 1974); 2 W. LaFave, Search and 
Seizure § 5.1 (1978), and we have never held that a warrant is 
constitutionally required to arrest for nonfelony offenses oc-
curring out of the officer's presence. Thus, "it is generally 
recognized today that the common law authority to arrest 
without a warrant in misdemeanor cases may be enlarged by 
statute, and this has been done in many of the states." 
E. Fisher, Laws of Arrest 130 (1967); see ALI, A Model 
Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure, App. X (1975); 1 C. Al-
exander, The Law of Arrest 445-447 (1949); Wilgas, Arrest 
Without a Warrant, 22 Mich. L. Rev. 541, 673, 706 (1924). 
Wisconsin is one of the states that have expanded the com-
mon-law authority to arrest for nonfelony offenses. Section 
345.22 of the Wisconsin Statutes provides that "[a] person 
may be arrested without a warrant for the violation of a traf-
fic regulation if the traffic officer has reasonable grounds to 
'·· 
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believe that the person is violating or has violated a traffic 
regulation." Relying on this statutory authority, officers of 
the Madison Police Department arrested Edward Welsh in a 
bedroom in his home for violating Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1) 
(1977) which proscribes the operation of a motor vehicle while 
intoxicated. Welsh refused to submit to a breath or blood 
test, and his operator's license was eventually revoked for 60 
days for this reason pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 343.305 (1975). 
In the civil license revocation proceeding, Welsh argued 
that his arrest in his house without a warrant was unconstitu-
tional under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
Federal Constitution and that his refusal to submit to the test 
could not be used against him. This contention was not 
based on the proposition that using the refusal in the revoca-
tion proceeding would contravene federal law, but rather 
rested on the fact that Wis. Stat. § 343.305(2)(b)(5) (1975) had 
been interpreted to require that an arrest be legal if a refusal 
to be tested is to be the basis for a license revocation. 
On review of the license revocation, the Supreme Court of 
Wisconsin appears to have recognized that, under the Wis-
consin statute, Welsh's license was wrongfully revoked if the 
officers who arrested him had violated the Federal Constitu-
tion. 108 Wis. 2d 319, 321 N. W. 2d 245 (1982). See Scales 
v. State, 64 Wis. 2d 485, 494, 219 N. W. 2d 286, 292 (1974). 
The court acknowledged that "the individual's right to pri-
vacy in the home is a fundamental freeedom" and made clear 
that the state bore the burden of establishing exigent circum-
stances justifying a warrantless in-home arrest. 108 Wis. 
2d, at 327, 321 N. W. 2d, at 250. But it discerned a strong 
state interest in combating driving under the influence of al-
cohol, id., at 334-335, 321 N. W. 2d, at 253-254, and held 
that the warrantless arrest was proper because (1) the offi-
cers were in hot pursuit of a defendant seeking to avoid a 
chemical sobriety test; (2) Welsh posed a potential threat to 
public safety; and (3) "without an immediate blood alcohol 
test, highly reliable and persuasive evidence facilitating the 
82-5466--DISSENT 
WELSH v. WISCONSIN 3 
state's proof of [Welsh's] alleged violation . .. . would be de-
stroyed." !d., at 338, 321 N. W. 2d, at 255. For two rea-
sons, I would not overturn the judgment of the Supreme 
Court of Wisconsin. 
First, it is not at all clear to me that the important con-
stitutional question decided today should be resolved in a 
case such as this. Although Welsh argues vigorously that 
the State violated his federal constitutional rights, he at no 
point relied on the exclusionary rule, and he does not contend 
that the Federal Constitution or federal law provides the 
remedy he seeks. As a general rule, this Court "reviews 
judgments, not statements in opinions." Black v. Cutter 
Laboratories, 351 U. S. 292, 297 (1956). Because the Court 
does not purport to hold that federal law requires the conclu-
sion that Welsh's refusal to submit to a sobriety test was rea-
sonable, it is not clear to me how the judgment of the Su-
preme Court of Wisconsin offends federal law. 
It is true that under the Wisconsin statutory scheme, an 
arrestee's refusal to take a breath or blood test would be rea-
sonable and would not justify revocation of operating privi-
leges if the underlying arrest violated the Fourth Amend-
ment or was otherwise unlawful. What the State has done, 
however, is to attach consequences to an arrest found unlaw-
ful under the Federal Constitution that we have never de-
cided federal law itself would attach. The Court has occa-
sionally taken jurisdiction over cases in which the States 
have provided remedies for violations of federally defined ob-
ligations. E. g. , Moore v. Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co., 291 
U. S. 205 (1934). But it has done so in contexts where state 
remedies are employed to further federal policies. See 
Greene, Hybrid State Law in the Federal Courts, 83 Harv. 
L. Rev. 289, 300 (1969). The Fourth Amendment of course 
applies to the police conduct at issue here. In providing that 
a driver may reasonably refuse to submit to a sobriety test if 
he was unlawfully arrested, Wisconsin's Legislature and 
courts are pursuing a course that they apparently hope will 
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reduce police illegality and safeguard their citizens' rights. 
Although the State. is entitled to draw this conclusion and to 
implement it as a matter of state law, I am very doubtful that 
the policies underlying the Fourth Amendment would re-
quire exclusion of the fruits of an illegal arrest in a civil 
proceeding to remove from the highways a person who insists 
on driving while under the influence of alcohol. Cf. INS v. 
Lopez-Mendoza, -- U. S. -- (1984). If that is the 
case-if it would violate no federal policy to revoke Welsh's 
license even if his arrest was illegal-there is no satisfactory 
reason for us to review the Supreme Court of Wisconsin's 
judgment affirming the revocation, even if that court mistak-
enly applied the Fourth Amendment. For me, this is ample 
reason not to disturb the judgment. 
In any event, I believe that the state court properly con-
strued the Fourth Amendment. It follows from Payton v. 
New York, 445 U. S. 573 (1980), that warrantless nonfelony 
arrests in the home are prohibited by the Fourth Amend-
ment absent probable cause and exigent circumstances. Al-
though I continue to believe that the Court erred in Payton 
in requiring exigent circumstances to justify warrantless in-
home felony arrests, id., at 603 (WHITE, J., dissenting), I do 
not reject the obvious logical implication of the Court's deci-
sion. But I see little to commend an approach that looks to 
"the nature of the underlying offense as an important factor 
to be considered in the exigent-circumstances calculus." 
Ante, at 11. 
The gravity of the underlying offense is, I concede, a factor 
to be considered in determining whether the delay that at-
tends the warrant-issuance process will endanger officers or 
other persons. The seriousness of the offense with which a 
suspect may be charged also bears on the likelihood that he 
will flee and escape apprehension if not arrested immedi-
ately. But if, under all the circumstances of a particular 
case, an officer has probable cause to believe that the delay 
involved in procuring an arrest warrant will gravely endan-
·, 
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ger the officer or other persons or will result in the suspect's 
escape, I perceive no reason to disregard those exigencies on 
the ground that the offense for which the suspect is sought is 
a "minor" one. 
As a practical matter, I suspect, the Court's holding is 
likely to have a greater impact in cases where the officer 
acted without a warrant to prevent the imminent destruction 
or removal of evidence. If the evidence the destruction or 
removal of which is threatened documents only the suspect's 
participation in a "minor" crime, the Court apparently would 
preclude a finding that exigent circumstances justified the 
warrantless arrest. I do not understand why this should be 
so. 
A warrantless home entry to arrest is no more intrusive 
when the crime in "minor" than when the suspect is sought in 
connection with a serious felony. The variable factor, if 
there is one, is the governmental interest that will be served 
by the warrantless entry. Wisconsin's Legislature and its 
Supreme Court have both concluded that warrantless in-
home arrests under circumstances like those present here 
promote valid and substantial state interests. In determin-
ing whether the challenged governmental conduct was rea-
sonable, we are not bound by these determinations. But 
nothing in our previous decisions suggests that the fact that a 
State has defined an offense as a misdemeanor for a variety of 
social, cultural, and political reasons necessarily requires the 
conclusion that warrantless in-home arrests designed to pre-
vent the imminent destruction or removal of evidence of that 
offense are always impermissible. If anything, the Court's 
prior decisions support the opposite conclusion. See 
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523, 539-540 (1967); 
McDonald v. United States, 335 U. S. 451, 454-455 (1948). 
See also State v. Penas, 200 Neb. 387, 263 N. W. 2d 835 
(1978); State v. Niedermeyer, 48 Or. App. 665, 617 P. 2d 911 
(1980), cert. denied, 450 U. S. 1042 (1981). 
,. ·~ 
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A test under which the existence of exigent circumstances 
turns on the perceived gravity of the crime would signifi-
cantly hamper law enforcement and burden courts with 
pointless litigation concerning the nature and gradation of 
various crimes. The Court relies heavily on Justice Jack-
son's concurring opinion in McDonald v. United States, 
supra, which, in minimizing the gravity of the felony at issue 
there, illustrates that the need for an evaluation of the seri-
ousness of particular crimes could not be confined to offenses 
defined by statute as misdemeanors. To the extent that the 
Court implies that the seriousness of a particular felony is a 
factor to be considered in deciding whether the need to pre-
serve evidence of that felony constitutes an exigent circum-
stance justifying a warrantless in-home arrest, I think that 
its approach is misguided. The decision to arrest without a 
warrant typically is made in the field under less-than-optimal 
circumstances; officers have neither the time nor the compe-
tence to determine whether a particular offense for which 
warrantless arrests have been authorized by statute is seri-
ous enough to justify a warrantless home entry to prevent 
the imminent destruction or removal of evidence. 
This problem could be lessened by creating a bright-line 
distinction between felonies and other crimes, but the 
Court-wisely in my view--does not adopt such an approach. 
There may have been a time when the line between misde-
meanors and felonies marked off those offenses involving a 
sufficiently serious threat to society to justify warrantless in-
home arrests under exigent circumstances. But the cate-
gory of misdemeanors today includes enough serious offenses 
to call into question the desirability of such line drawing. 
See ALI, Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedures 
131-132 (Prelim. Draft No. 1, 1965) (discussing ultimately re-
jected provision abandoning "in-presence" requirement for 
misdemeanor arrests). If I am correct in asserting that a 
bright-line distinction between felonies and misdemeanors is 
untenable and that the need to prevent the imminent de-
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struction or removal of evidence of some nonfelony crimes 
can constitute an exigency justifying warrantless in-home ar-
rests under certain circumstances, the Court's approach will 
necessitate a case-by-case evaluation of the seriousness of 
particular crimes, a difficult task for which officers and courts 
are poorly equipped. 
Even if the Court were correct in concluding that the grav-
ity of the offense is an important factor to consider in deter-
mining whether a warrantless in-home arrest is justified by 
exigent circumstances, it has erred in assessing the serious-
ness of the civil-forfeiture offense for which the officers 
thought they were arresting Welsh. As the Court observes, 
the statutory scheme in force at the time of Welsh's arrest 
provided that the first offense for driving under the influence 
of alcohol involved no potential incarceration. Wis. Stat. 
§ 346.65(2) (1975). Nevertheless, this Court has long recog-
nized the compelling state interest in highway safety, South 
Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S.--,-- (1983), the Supreme 
Court of Wisconsin identified a number of factors suggesting 
a substantial and growing governmental interest in appre-
hending and convicting intoxicated drivers and in deterring 
alcohol-related offenses, 108 Wis. 2d, at 334-335, 321 N. W. 
2d, at 253--254, and recent actions of the Wisconsin Legisla-
ture evince its "belief that significant benefits, in the reduc-
tion of the costs attributable to drunk driving, may be 
achieved by the increased apprehension and conviction of 
even first time . . . offenders." Note, 1983 Wis. L. Rev. 
1023, 1053. 
The Court ignores these factors and looks solely to the pen-
alties imposed on first offenders in determining whether the 
State's interest is sufficient to justify warrantless in-home ar-
rests under exigent circumstances. Ante, at 13--14. Al-
though the seriousness of the prescribed sanctions is a valu-
able objective indication of the general normative judgment 
of the seriousness of the offense, Baldwin v. New York, 399 
U. S. 66, 68 (1970) (plurality opinion), other evidence is avail-
·, 
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able and should not be ignored. United States v. Craner, 
652 F. 2d 23, 24-27 (CA9 1981); United States v. Woods, 450 
F. Supp. 1335, 1340 (Md. 1978); Brady v. Blair, 427 F. Supp. 
5, 9 (SD Ohio 1976). Although first offenders are subjected 
only to civil forfeiture under the Wisconsin statute, the seri-
ousness with which the State regards the crime for which 
Welsh was arrested is evinced by (1) the fact that defendants 
charged with driving under the influence are guaranteed the 
right to a jury trial, Wis. Stat. § 345.43 (1981--82); (2) the leg-
islative authorization of warrantless arrests for traffic of-
fenses occurring outside the officer's presence, Wis. Stat. 
345.22 (1981--82); and (3) the collateral consequence of manda-
tory license revocation that attaches to all convictions for 
driving under the influence, Wis. Stat. § 343.30(1q) 
(1981--82). See also District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U. S. 
63 (1930); United States v. Craner, supra. It is possible, 
moreover, that the Legislature consciously chose to limit the 
penalties imposed on first offenders in order to increase the 
ease of conviction and the overall deterrent effect of the en-
forcement effort. See Note, 35 Me. L. Rev. 385, 395, n. 35, 
399-400, 403 (1983). 
In short, the fact that Wisconsin has chosen to punish the 
first offense for driving under the influence with a fine rather 
than a prison term does not demand the conclusion that the 
State's interest in punishing first offenders is insufficiently 
substantial to justify warrantless in-home arrests under exi-
gent circumstances. As the Supreme Court of Wisconsin ob-
served, "[t]his is a model case demonstrating the urgency 
involved in arresting the suspect in order to preserve evi-
dence of the statutory violation." 108 Wis. 2d, at 338, 321 
N. W. 2d, at 255. We have previously recognized that "the 
percentage of alcohol in the blood begins to diminish shortly 
after drinking stops, as the body functions to eliminate it 
from the system." Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757, 
770 (1966). Moreover, a suspect could cast substantial doubt 
on the validity of a blood or breath test by consuming addi-
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tional alcohol upon arriving at his home. In light of the 
promptness with which the officers reached Welsh's house, 
therefore, I would hold that the need to prevent the immi-
nent and ongoing destruction of evidence of a serious viola-
tion of Wisconsin's traffic laws provided an exigent circum-
stance justifying the warrantless in-home arrest. See also, 
e. g., People v. Ritchie, 181 Cal. Rptr. 773, 130 Cal. App. 3d 
455 (1982); People v. Smith, 175 Colo. 212, 486 P. 2d 8 (1971); 
State v. Findlay, 259 Iowa 733, 145 N. W. 2d 650 (1966); 
State v. Amaniera, 132 N.J. Super. 597, 334 A. 2d 398 
(1974); State v. Osburn, 13 Or. App. 92, 508 P. 2d 837 (1973). 
I respectfully dissent. 
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JusTICE WHITE, with whom JUSTICE REHNQUIST joins, / 
dissenting. 
At common law, "a peace officer was permitted to arrest 
without a warrant for a misdemeanor or felony committed in 
his presence as well as for a felony not committed in his pres-
ence if there was reasonable ground for making the arrest." 
United States v. Watson, 423 U. S. 411, 418 (1976). But the 
requirement that a misdemeanor must have occurred in the 
officer's presence to justify a warrantless arrest is not 
grounded in the Fourth Amendment, see Street v. Surdyka, 
492 F. 2d 368, 371-372 (CA4 1974); 2 W. LaFave, Search and 
Seizure § 5.1 (1978), and we have never held that a warrant is 
constitutionally required to arrest for nonfelony offenses oc-
curring out of the officer's presence. Thus, "it is generally 
recognized today that the common law authority to arrest 
without a warrant in misdemeanor cases may be enlarged by 
statute, and this has been done in many of the states." 
E. Fisher, Laws of Arrest 130 (1967); see ALI, A Model 
Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure, App. X (1975); 1 C. Al-
exander, The Law of Arrest 445-447 (1949); Wilgas, Arrest 
Without a Warrant, 22 Mich. L. Rev. 541, 673, 706 (1924). 
Wisconsin is one of the states that have expanded the com-
mon-law authority to arrest for nonfelony offenses. Section 
345.22 of the Wisconsin Statutes provides that "[a] person 
may be arrested without a warrant for the violation of a traf-
fic regulation if the traffic officer has reasonable grounds to 
/ 
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believe that the person is violating or has violated a traffic 
regulation." Relying on this statutory authority, officers of 
the Madison Police Department arrested Edward Welsh in a 
bedroom in his home for violating Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1) 
(1977) which proscribes the operation of a motor vehicle while 
intoxicated. Welsh refused to submit to a breath or blood 
test, and his operator's license was eventually revoked for 60 
days for this reason pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 343.305 (1975). 
In the civil license revocation proceeding, Welsh argued 
that his arrest in his house without a warrant was unconstitu-
tional under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
Federal Constitution and that his refusal to submit to the test 
could not be used against him. This contention was not 
based on the proposition that using the refusal in the revoca-
tion proceeding would contravene federal law, but rather 
rested on the fact that Wis. Stat. § 343.305(2)(b)(5) (1975) had 
been interpreted to require that an arrest be legal if a refusal 
to be tested is to be the basis for a license revocation. 
On review of the license revocation, the Supreme Court of 
Wisconsin appears to have recognized that, under the Wis-
consin statute, Welsh's license was wrongfully revoked if the 
officers who arrested him had violated the Federal Constitu-
tion. 108 Wis. 2d 319, 321 N. W. 2d 245 (1982). See Scales 
v. State, 64 Wis. 2d 485, 494, 219 N. W. 2d 286, 292 (1974). 
The court acknowledged that "the individual's right to pri-
vacy in the home is a fundamental freeedom" and made clear 
that the state bore the burden of establishing exigent circum-
stances justifying a warrantless in-home arrest. 108 Wis. 
2d, at 327, 321 N. W. 2d, at 250. But it discerned a strong 
state interest in combating driving under the influence of al-
cohol, id., at 334--335, 321 N. W. 2d, at 253-254, and held 
that the warrantless arrest was proper because (1) the offi-
cers were in hot pursuit of a defendant seeking to avoid a 
chemical sobriety test; (2) Welsh posed a potential threat to 
public safety; and (3) "without an immediate blood alcohol 
test, highly reliable and persuasive evidence facilitating the 
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state's proof of [Welsh's] alleged violation ... would be de-
stroyed." ld., at 338, 321 N. W. 2d, at 255. For two rea-
sons, I would not overturn the judgment of the Supreme 
Court of Wisconsin. 
First, it is not at all clear to me that the important con-
stitutional question decided today should be resolved in a 
case such as this. Although Welsh argues vigorously that 
the State violated his federal constitutional rights, he at no 
point relied on the exclusionary rule, and he does not contend 
that the Federal Constitution or federal law provides the 
remedy he seeks. As a general rule, this Court "reviews 
judgments, not statements in opinions." Black v. Cutter 
Laboratories, 351 U. S. 292, 297 (1956). Because the Court 
does not purport to hold that federal law requires the conclu-
sion that Welsh's refusal to submit to a sobriety test was rea-
sonable, it is not clear to me how the judgment of the Su-
preme Court of Wisconsin offends federal law. 
It is true that under the Wisconsin statutory scheme, an 
arrestee's refusal to take a breath or blood test would be rea-
sonable and would not justify revocation of operating privi-
leges if the underlying arrest violated the Fourth Amend-
ment or was otherwise unlawful. What the State has done, 
however, is to attach consequences to an arrest found unlaw-
ful under the Federal Constitution that we have never de-
cided federal law itself would attach. The Court has occa-
sionally taken jurisdiction over cases in which the States 
have provided remedies for violations of federally defined ob-
ligations. E. g., Moore v. Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co., 291 
U. S. 205 (1934). But it has done so in contexts where state 
remedies are employed to further federal policies. See 
Greene, Hybrid State Law in the Federal Courts, 83 Harv. 
L. Rev. 289, 300 (1969). The Fourth Amendment of course 
applies to the police conduct at issue here. In providing that 
a driver may reasonably refuse to submit to a sobriety test if 
he was unlawfully arrested, Wisconsin's Legislature and 
courts are pursuing a course that they apparently hope will 
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reduce police illegality and safeguard their citizens' rights. 
Although the State is entitled to draw this conclusion and to 
implement it as a matter of state law, I am very doubtful that 
the policies underlying the Fourth Amendment would re-
quire exclusion of the fruits of an illegal arrest in a civil 
proceeding to remove from the highways a person who insists 
on driving while under the influence of alcohol. Cf. INS v. 
Lopez-Mendoza, -- U. S. -- (1984). If that is the 
c~se-if it would violate no federal policy to revoke Welsh's 
license even if his arrest was illegal-there is no satisfactory 
reason for us to review the Supreme Court of Wisconsin's 
judgment affirming the revocation, even if that court mistak-
enly applied the Fourth Amendment. For me, this is ample 
reason not to disturb the judgment. 
In any event, I believe that the state court properly con-
strued the Fourth Amendment. It follows from Payton v. 
New York, 445 U. S. 573 (1980), that warrantless nonfelony 
arrests in the home are prohibited by the Fourth Amend-
ment absent probable cause and exigent circumstances. Al-
though I continue to believe that the Court erred in Payton 
in requiring exigent circumstances to justify warrantless in-
home felony arrests, id., at 603 (WHITE, J., dissenting), I do 
not reject the obvious logical implication of the Court's deci-
sion. But I see little to commend an approach that looks to 
"the nature of the underlying offense as an important factor 
to be considered in the exigent-circumstances calculus." 
Ante, at 11. 
The gravity of the underlying offense is, I concede, a factor 
to be considered in determining whether the delay that at-
tends the warrant-issuance process will endanger officers or 
other persons. The seriousness of the offense with which a 
suspect may be charged also bears on the likelihood that he 
will flee and escape apprehension if not arrested immedi-
ately. But if, under all the circumstances of a particular 
case, an officer has probable cause to believe that the delay 
involved in procuring an arrest warrant will gravely endan-
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ger the officer or other persons or will result in the suspect's 
escape, I perceive no reason to disregard those exigencies on 
the ground that the offense for which the suspect is sought is 
a "minor" one. 
As a practical matter, I suspect, the Court's holding is 
likely to have a greater impact in cases where the officer 
acted without a warrant to prevent the imminent destruction 
or removal of evidence. If the evidence the destruction or 
removal of which is threatened documents only the suspect's 
participation in a "minor" crime, the Court apparently would 
preclude a finding that exigent circumstances justified the 
warrantless arrest. I do not understand why this should be 
so. 
A warrantless home entry to arrest is no more intrusive 
when the crime in "minor" than when the suspect is sought in 
connection with a serious felony. The variable factor, if 
there is one, is the governmental interest that will be served 
by the warrantless entry. Wisconsin's Legislature and its 
Supreme Court have both concluded that warrantless in-
home arrests under circumstances like those present here 
promote valid and substantial state interests. In determin-
ing whether the challenged governmental conduct was rea-
sonable, we are not bound by these determinations. But 
nothing in our previous decisions suggests that the fact that a 
State has defined an offense as a misdemeanor for a variety of 
social, cultural, and political reasons necessarily requires the 
conclusion that warrantless in-home arrests designed to pre-
vent the imminent destruction or removal of evidence of that 
offense are always impermissible. If anything, the Court's 
prior decisions support the opposite conclusion. See 
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523, 539-540 (1967); 
McDonald v. United States, 335 U. S. 451, 454-455 (1948). 
See also State v. Penas, 200 Neb. 387, 263 N. W. 2d 835 
(1978); State v. Niedermeyer, 48 Or. App. 665, 617 P. 2d 911 
(1980), cert. denied, 450 U. S. 1042 (1981). 
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A test under which the existence of exigent circumstances 
turns on the perceived gravity of the crime would signifi-
cantly hamper law enforcement and burden courts with 
pointless litigation concerning the nature and gradation of 
various crimes. The Court relies heavily on Justice Jack-
son's concurring opinion in McDonald v. United States, 
supra, which, in minimizing the gravity of the felony at issue 
there, illustrates that the need for an evaluation of the seri-
ousness of particular crimes could not be confined to offenses 
defined by statute as misdemeanors. To the extent that the 
Court implies that the seriousness of a particular felony is a 
factor to be considered in deciding whether the need to pre-
serve evidence of that felony constitutes an exigent circum-
stance justifying a warrantless in-home arrest, I think that 
its approach is misguided. The decision to arrest without a 
warrant typically is made in the field under less-than-optimal 
circumstances; officers have neither the time nor the compe-
tence to determine whether a particular offense for which 
warrantless arrests have been authorized by statute is seri-
ous enough to justify a warrantless home entry to prevent 
the imminent destruction or removal of evidence. 
This problem could be lessened by creating a bright-line 
distinction between felonies and other crimes, but the 
Court-wisely in my view-does not adopt such an approach. 
There may have been a time when the line between misde-
meanors and felonies marked off those offenses involving a 
sufficiently serious threat to society to justify warrantless in-
home arrests under exigent circumstances. But the cate-
gory of misdemeanors today includes enough serious offenses 
to call into question the desirability of such line drawing. 
See ALI, Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedures 
131-132 (Prelim. Draft No. 1, 1965) (discussing ultimately re-
jected provision abandoning "in-presence" requirement for 
misdemeanor arrests). If I am correct in asserting that a 
bright-line distinction between felonies and misdemeanors is 
untenable and that the need to prevent the imminent de-
; 
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struction or removal of evidence of some nonfelony crimes 
can constitute an exigency justifying warrantless in-home ar-
rests under certain circumstances, the Court's approach will 
necessitate a case-by-case evaluation of the seriousness of 
particular crimes, a difficult task for which officers and courts 
are poorly equipped. 
Even if the Court were correct in concluding that the grav-
ity of the offense is an important factor to consider in deter-
mining whether a warrantless in-home arrest is justified by 
exigent circumstances, it has erred in assessing the serious-
ness of the civil-forfeiture offense for which the officers 
thought they were arresting Welsh. As the Court observes, 
the statutory scheme in force at the time of Welsh's arrest 
provided that the first offense for driving under the influence 
of alcohol involved no potential incarceration. Wis. Stat. 
§ 346.65(2) (1975). Nevertheless, this Court has long recog-
nized the compelling state interest in highway safety, South . 
Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S.--,-- (1983), the Supreme 
Court of Wisconsin identified a number of factors suggesting 
a substantial and growing governmental interest in appre-
hending and convicting intoxicated drivers and in deterring 
alcohol-related offenses, 108 Wis. 2d, at 334-335, 321 N. W. 
2d, at 253-254, and recent actions of the Wisconsin Legisla-
ture evince its "belief that significant benefits, in the reduc-
tion of the costs attributable to drunk driving, may be 
achieved by the increased apprehension and conviction of 
even first time ... offenders." Note, 1983 Wis. L. Rev. 
1023, 1053. 
The Court ignores these factors and looks solely to the pen-
alties imposed on first offenders in determining whether the 
State's interest is sufficient to justify warrantless in-home ar-
rests under exigent circumstances. Ante, at 13-14. Al-
though the seriousness of the prescribed sanctions is a valu-
able objective indication of the general normative judgment 
of the seriousness of the offense, Baldwin v. New York, 399 
U. S. 66, 68 (1970) (plurality opinion), other evidence is avail-
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able and should not be ignored. United States v. Craner, . 
652 F. 2d 23, 24-27 (CA9 1981); United States v. Woods, 450 
F. Supp. 1335, 1340 (Md. 1978); Brady v. Blair, 427 F. Supp. 
5, 9 (SD Ohio 1976). Although first offenders are subjected 
only to civil forfeiture under the Wisconsin statute, the seri-
ousness with which the State regards the crime for which 
Welsh was arrested is evinced by (1) the fact that defendants 
charged with driving under the influence are guaranteed the 
right to a jury trial, Wis. Stat. § 345.43 (1981--82); (2) the leg-
islative authorization of warrantless arrests for traffic of-
fenses occurring outside the officer's presence, Wis. Stat. 
345.22 (1981--82); and (3) the collateral consequence of manda-
tory license revocation that attaches to all convictions for 
driving under the influence, Wis. Stat. § 343.30(1q) 
(1981--82). See also District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U. S. 
63 (1930); United States v. Craner, supra. It is possible, 
moreover, that the Legislature consciously chose to limit the 
penalties imposed on first offenders in order to increase the 
ease of conviction and the overall deterrent effect of the en-
forcement effort. See Note, 35 Me. L. Rev. 385, 395, n. 35, 
399-400, 403 (1983). 
In short, the fact that Wisconsin has chosen to punish the 
first offense for driving under the influence with a fine rather 
than a prison term does not demand the conclusion that the 
State's interest in punishing first offenders is insufficiently 
substantial to justify warrantless in-home arrests under exi-
gent circumstances. As the Supreme Court of Wisconsin ob-
served, "[t]his is a model case demonstrating the urgency 
involved in arresting the suspect in order to preserve evi-
dence of the statutory violation." 108 Wis. 2d, at 338, 321 
N. W. 2d, at 255. We have previously recognized that "the 
percentage of alcohol in the blood begins to diminish shortly 
after drinking stops, as the body functions to eliminate it 
from the system." Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757, 
770 (1966). Moreover, a suspect could cast substantial doubt 
on the validity of a blood or breath test by consuming addi-
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tiona! alcohol upon arriving at his home. In light of the 
promptness with which the officers reached Welsh's house, 
therefore, I would hold that the need to prevent the immi-
nent and ongoing destruction of evidence of a serious viola-
tion of Wisconsin's traffic laws provided an exigent circum-
stance justifying the warrantless in-home arrest. See also, 
e. g., People v. Ritchie, 181 Cal. Rptr. 773, 130 Cal. App. 3d 
455 (1982); People v. Smith, 175 Colo. 212, 486 P. 2d 8 (1971); 
State v. Findlay, 259 Iowa 733, 145 N. W. 2d 650 (1966); 
State v. Amaniera, 132 N.J. Super. 597, 334 A. 2d 398 
(1974); State v. Osburn, 13 Or. App. 92, 508 P. 2d 837 (1973). 
I respectfully dissent. 
f 
1st DRAFT 








From: Justice Blackmon 
Circulated: DEC 2 3 l983 
Recirculated: ________ _ 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 82--5466 
EDWARD G. WELSH, PETITIONER v. WISCONSIN 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT 
OF WISCONSIN 
[January-, 1984] 
JusTICE BLACKMUN, dissenting. 
I yield to no one in my profound personal concern about the 
unwillingness of our national consciousness to face up t(}-and 
to do something about-the continuing slaughter upon our 
Nation's highways, a good percentage of which is due to driv-
ers who are drunk or semi-incapacitated because of alcohol or 
drug ingestion. I have spoken in these Reports to this point 
before. Perez v. Campbell, 402 U. S. 637, 657 and 672 
(1971) (BLACKMUN, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part); Tate v. Short, 401 U. S. 395, 401 (1971) (BLACKMUN, 
J., concurring). See also South Dakota v. Neville, --
U.S.-,- (1983) (slip op. 5). 
And it is amazing to me that one of our great States-one 
which, by its highway signs, proclaims to be diligent and em-
phatic in its prosecution of the drunk driver-still classifies 
Driving While Intoxicated as a civil violation that allows only 
a money forfeiture of not more than $300 so long as it is a first 
offense. Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2)(a) (Supp. 1983-1984). The 
State, like the indulgent parent, hesitates to spank the 
spoiled child, even though he is engaging in an act that is dan-
gerous to others who are law abiding and helpless in the face 
of the child's act. See BRENNAN, J., dissenting, ante, at 12, 
n. 12 (citing other statutes). Our personal convenience still 
weighs heavily in the balance and the highway deaths and in-
juries continue. But if Wisconsin and other States choose by 
legislation thus to regulate their penalty structure, there is 
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nothing in the United States Constitution that says they may 
not do so. 
The Fourth Amendment, however, does stand as the pro-
tector, particularly of the home. I find myself in agreement 
with much that is said in JUSTICE BRENNAN's dissent, other 
than Part IIA thereof, as to which I reserve judgment. Like 
JUSTICE STEVENS, therefore, I join all but Part IIA of Jus-
TICE BRENNAN's opinion and dissent from the Court's dis-
missal of the case. 
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JUSTICE BLACKMUN, concurring. 
I join the Court's opinion but add a personal observation. 
I yield to no one in my profound personal concern about the 
unwillingness of our national consciousness to face up to-and 
to do something about-the continuing slaughter upon our 
Nation's highways, a good percentage of which is due to driv-
ers who are drunk or semi-incapacitated because of alcohol or 
drug ingestion. I have spoken in these Reports to this point 
before. Perez v. Campbell, 402 U. S. 637, 657 and 672 
(1971) (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part); 
Tate v. Short, 401 U. S. 395, 401 (1971) (concurring opinion). 
See also South Dakota v. Neville, -- U.S. --, --
(1983) (slip op. 5). 
And it is amazing to me that one of our great States-one 
which, by its highway signs, proclaims to be diligent and em-
phatic in its prosecution of the drunk driver-still classifies 
Driving While Intoxicated as a civil violation that allows only 
a money forfeiture of not more than $300 so long as it is a .first 
offense. Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2)(a) (Supp. 1983-1984). The 
State, like the indulgent parent, hesitates to discipline the 
spoiled child very much, even though the child is engaging in 
an act that is dangerous to others who are law abiding and 
helpless in the face of the child's act. See ante, at 13, n. 13 
(citing other statutes). Our personal convenience still 
weighs heavily in the balance and the highway deaths and in-
juries continue. But if Wisconsin and other States choose by 
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legislation thus to regulate their penalty structure, there is, 
unfortunately, nothing in the United States Constitution that 
says they may not do so. 
---
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JUSTICE BLACKMUN, dissenting. 
I yield to no one in my profound personal concern about the 
unwillingness of our national consciousness to face up to-and 
to do something about-the continuing slaughter upon our 
Nation's highways, a good percentage of which is due to driv-
ers who are drunk or semi-incapacitated because of alcohol or 
drug ingestion. I have spoken in these Reports to this point 
before. Perez v. Campbell, 402 U. S. 637, 657 and 672 
(1971) (BLACKMUN, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part); Tate v. Short, 401 U. S. 395, 401 (1971) (BLACKMUN, 
J., concurring). See also South Dakota v. Neville, --
U.S.-,- (1983) (slip op. 5). 
And it is amazing to me that one of our great States-one 
which, by its highway signs, proclaims to be diligent and em-
phatic in its prosecution of the drunk driver-still classifies 
Driving While Intoxicated as a civil violation that allows only 
a money forfeiture of not more than $300 so long as it is a first 
offense. Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2)(a) (Supp. 1983-1984). The 
State, like the indulgent parent, hesitates to spank the 
spoiled child, even though he is engaging in an act that is dan-
gerous to others who are law abiding and helpless in the face 
of the child's act. See BRENNAN, J. , dissenting, ante, at 13, 
n. 13 (citing other statutes). Our personal convenience still 
weighs heavily in the balance and the highway deaths and in-
juries continue. But if Wisconsin and other States choose by 
legislation thus to regulate their penalty structure, there is 
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nothing in the United States Constitution that says they may 
not do so. 
The Fourth Amendment, however, does stand as the pro-
tector, particularly of the home. I find myself in agreement 
with much that is said in JusTICE BRENNAN's dissent, other 
than Part IIA thereof, as to which I reserve judgment. Like 
JusTICE STEVENS, therefore, I join all but Part IIA of Jus-
TICE BRENNAN's opinion and dissent from the Court's dis-
missal of the case. 
1st DRAFT 
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PER CURIAM. 
We granted certiorari to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin 
to decide whether a warrantless home arrest for drunk driv- ~ 
ing, based on probable cause and giv~ al~ed~ir- , 
cumstances, violates the Fourth '"Amenamenf. After full 
briefing and oral argument, however, it appears that while 
the question may technically be presented by the record, it is 
presented, at best, in a highly atypical and totally abstract 
way. We therefore dismiss the writ of certiorari as improvi-
dently granted. Resolution of this admittedly important 
question, see Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573, 583 (1980), 
"can await a day when the issue is posed less abstractly." 
The Monrosa v. Carbon Black E xport, Inc., 359 U. S. 180, 
184 (1959). 
On the night of April 24, 1978, petitioner Welsh drove his 
car off the road, narrowly averting an accident. He 
emerged from the car in an obviously inebriated state and 
asked another motorist for a ride home. Told that he should 
wait for assistance, petitioner left the scene on foot. The po-
lice arrived almost immediately and, after running a license 
check and taking the other driver's statement, proceeded to 
Welsh's home a short distance away. The police were admit- ~~ 
ted by petitioner's stepdaugther who told them that peti- . v) 
tioner "just stumbled in" and was upstairs. ~ \1\./'-"1~_;. d ' 
led th up to his room, where they found him in bed. ~ 
Welsh was a ested an arged with operating a motor ve-
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hicle while under the influence of an intoxicant, in violation of 
Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1) (1977). He was taken to the police sta-
tion where he refused to submit to a breathalyzer test. 
Two separate proceedings, one criminal and one civil, re-
sulted from these events. Petitioner was charged with a 
criminal violation of § 346.63(1). Because it was his second 
such offense within five years, he faced mandatory imprison-
ment from five days to one year and a fine of not more than 
$500. 1 Petitioner moved to dismiss the criminal charge on 
the ground that his warrantless arrest violated the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution. The State 
contended in response that the arrest was legal because the 
police had probable cause to believe Welsh committed the of-
fense and his wife and stepdaughter consented to the war-
rantless entry. Alternatively, the State argued that the 
warrantless entry to arrest Welsh, even absent consent, was 
justified by exigent circumstances. See Payton v. New 
York, 445 U. S. 573, 583 (1980). The Wisconsin trial court, 
without passing on the consent issue, 1oun01or the State. 
The court ruled that the police had probable cause to arrest 
Welsh and that the doctrine of hot pursuit, see Warden v. 
Hayden, 387 U. S. 294 (1967), and the need to take a breath 
sample before Welsh continued drinking or the effects of the 
already consumed alcohol wore off, justified the arrest. 
J. A., at 78-80. 2 
Petition wa also faced with the suspension of his license 
in the civil proceeding hich is the subject of the petition for 
certiorari in Under isconsin law m effect at the 
' Wise. Stat. § 346.65(2) (1975) provided: "Any person violating 
s. 346.63(1) may be required to forfeit not more than $200 for the first of-
fense and, upon the 2nd or subsequent conviction within 5 years, shall be 
imprisoned not less than 5 days nor more than one year and in addition may 
be fined not more than $500." 
2 Following a jury trial in 1982, petitioner was convicted of the misde-
meanor of driving while intoxicated. His appeal from that conviction has 
been stayed pending our decision in this case. See Brief for Petitioner, at 
17, n. 5. 
"f 
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time of petitioner's offense, anyone who operated a motor ve-
hicle upon the public highways thereby consented to submit 
to a sobriety test upon being arrested for drunk driving. 
Wise. Stat. § 343.305(1) (1975). Refusal to submit to such a 
test resulted in automatic suspension of the driver's license 
for 60 days, unless the driver could "establish the reasonable-
ness of his refusal." !d., at§ 343.305(7)(c). Petitioner con-
tended that his refusal to take the sobriet test was "reason-
able' ecause 1s un er n arrest violated the Fourt and -Fourteent Amen ments of the mte States Constitution. 
The trial court, having already ruled that the arrest was legal 
in the criminal pretrial hearing, rejected this contentiQ,!l and 
suspepded petitioner's license for 60 days. 
The Wisconsin Court 6f Appears?eversed the license sus-
pension, concluding that although there was probable cause 
to arrest Welsh, the State had not established the existence 
of exigent circumstances. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin 
in turn reversed the appellate court, finding "ample evidence 
supporting the trial court's ruling that the officer's entry was 
justified on the basis of both probable cause and exigent cir-
cumstances." State v. Welsh, 108 Wis. 2d 319, 326-327, 321 
N. W. 2d 245, 249-250 2 We anted certiorari to de-
cide whether the xigent circumstances rehe U.£9n 1?)r the 
Supreme o 1sconsm were sufficient to support a 
warrantress arrest ill tnehome for the offense with which pe-
titioner was charged. 459 U. S. -- (1983). 
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin undoubtedly decided the 
question which is presented by the petition for certiorari, but 
its opinion leaves us at a loss to understand the relevance of 
the federal constitutional issue to its ultimate conclusion that 
petitioner's license should be suspended. Fourth Amend-
ment issues in state proceedings normally arise because a de-
fendant seeks to exclude evidence that he claims was improp-
erly gathered. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961). 
But the Supreme Court of Wisconsin does not discuss any ev-
idence which Welsh sought to exclude. And if petitoner did 
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seek to invoke the exclusionary rule, we would, before con-
fronting the constitutionality of the arrest, have to decide 
whether the Fourth Amendment requires that unconstitu-
tionally seized evidence be excluded in a state civil proceed-
ing. As we said in United States v. Janis, 428 U. S. 433, 447 
(1976), "[i]n the complex and turbulent history of the rule, . 
the Court has never applied it to exclude evidence from a civib ~ ~..M-~~ ~~~ 
proceeding, Ieaeral or state." 3 The latter issue has been ./'-"'r AI'~:- u 
neither argued nor briefed by the parties, and it would not be ~L, 0 ~ cJ-
appropriate for us to reach it. J vv~ ~ . 
An alternative possible basis for finding the constitutional- ~ 
ity of petitioner's arrest relevant to the license suspension, -~ 
--p.u. ~ ~ ~ h d- which the dissent states with considerable assurance must ()...... 
-\t- tJ- -fh...--=rc~ ~ have been the basis for the ruling of the Supreme Court of 'J) ~ 
f~q_ +o Mc-Ju. C.U.c.JL. Wisconsin, see infra, at 4, is that "an arrestee's refusal t~ ~-:}~~ ~ 
-t1t c.. c..M.o/\ Ww..t.L1-1 take breat te would be unreasonable, and therefore o - ~....v'- !::> 
~ ~ _ cL erating privi could no revoked i e underlying ar- J_.~ ol CY\~V\' 
t cl.(J\o....{ ~~·r~l." e believe, however, that t 1s conclu- l ~ ~ ..__..- -,-·. -~ - ~ · .Jsion is by no means free from doubt. The Supreme Court of ~~ 
4's f4i:.Jr- --ft......... pr~ Wisconsin's opinion never adverts to a connection between ____. 
· +t.....J · L) 1 J ""'-.:1- U.u .c.A the reasonableness inquiry and the federal constitutional 
: ~,:-- ~d..LJ.L._. question. Nor is such a connection evident from the lan-
L-- a) guage of the statute . 
..j-f~o--vJ )~ At the time of the events in question, whenever a driver 
+o f c.J.-t. C<.. ~ -I~ was arrested for drunk driving in Wisconsin and refused to 
. ~ ~c...z.x;:; submit to a sobriety test, the arresting officer was required 
1.4 ~ ~ to file a report stating that the driver was placed "under ar-
~~· 5 rest"; that he refused to take a sobriety test after being in-
~~~~ formed of his rights and of the consequences of his refusal; 
e~ 3 In Janis, the Court held that evidence seized by a state criminal law 
enforcement officer in good faith , but nonetheless unconstitutionally, may · 
be admitted in a federal civil proceeding. The Court specifically declined 
to pass on the question of whether "intrasovereign" violations, in which ev-
idence improperly seized by the State in a criminal investigation is subse-
quently introduced in a state civil proceeding, ar e forbidden by the F ourth 
Amendment . 428 U. S. , at 456. 
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and that the driver's refusal was unreasonable. Wise. Stat. 
§ 343.305(2)(b) (1975). 4 The driver's license was then auto-
matically suspended 60 days after the report was filed, unless 
he requested a reasonableness hearing. The issues that the 
driver could raise at the hearing were specifically limited by 
the statute to those facts required to be stated in the report. 
Id., at §343.305(7)(c). Thus, the driver could claim that he 
was not placed under arrest or that he was not advised of his 
rights. But there was no provision for challenging the con-
stitutionality of the arrest. 5 
'Section 343.305(2)(b) (1975) provided in relevant part: 
"The report shall contain the following infonnation: 
"1. That the person at the time he was requested to submit to a test was 
under arrest for driving or operating a motor vehicle while under the influ-
ence of an intoxicant; 
"2. That the person refused to submit to a test; 
"3. That such person was infonned of the consequences of his refusal to 
submit to the test; and 
"4. That such person was infonned of his rights [as to the nature and 
type of test perfonned] under subs. (4) and (5)(a). 
>-Th_at the refusal of the person to submit to a test was unreasonable." 
' The dissent would have us read the phrase "under arrest" to mean 
"lawfully under arrest" or "legally under arrest." But we decline to re-
write a state statute, and we have no authoritative construction from a 
state court upon which to rely for such an interpretation. Counsel for pe-
titioner at the reasonableness hearing made just such an argument, and it 
was rejected by the trial court. When counsel claimed that the hearing 
was predicated on lawful arrest, the court responded: "It doesn't say 'law-
ful arrest.' The statute just says, ' ... under arrest.'" J. A., at 92. At 
that point, petitioner's counsel changed tacks. First, he argued that peti-
tioner had a Fourth Amendment right to refuse to take the test and to pre-
vent the refusal from being used against him. ld., at 105. And, second, 
he argued that the legality of the arrest was relevant to the reasonableness 
of petitioner's refusal to take the test. Counsel for the State strenuously 
disputed the latter contention. 
"When you get a driver's license you have agreed to consent to take the 
breathalyzer test and you have to have a reason or reasons for not taking 
that. My understanding of the law ... is that the only reasonable reason 
for not taking the test is a physical reason why you can't take it. 
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The Wisconsin law was amended in 1977 specifically to per-
mit a licensee to contest "whether the officer made a law-
1 
ful arrest prior to requesting a test . . . " Wise. Stat. 
§ 343.305(8)(b)1(a) (1977); but that provision did not become 
effective until July 1, 1978, after the events in question here. 
While the import of the amendment is not crystal clear, it 
certainly supports an inference that the prior language relat-
ing only to the "unreasonable" character of the refusal did not 
include the right to challenge the constitutionality of the ar-
rest. See State v. Neitzel, 95 Wis. 2d 191, 202, 289 N. W. 2d 
828, 834 (1980) (holding that physical inability to take the test 
"was the only reasonable ground for exonerating a refusal 
under the statutes as they appeared in 1975") (emphasis 
added). 
In sum, we conclude that the relevance of the constitution- ( 
ality of petitioner's arrest to the suspension of his license is 
too uncertain to justify our reaching the merits of the issue. 
The dissent insists that our dismissal of the writ in this case 
violates the "Rule of Four" as expounded in our earlier cases. 
But, as the Court stated in The Monrosa v. Carbon Black 
Export, Inc., 359 U. S. 180, 184 (1959): "Examination of a 
case on the merits, on oral argument, may bring into 'proper 
focus' a conslc1eration which, though present in the reco~ at 
th~writ, only later indicates th_}t the 
grant was 1m roVlcfent." See also Ferguson v. Moore-
Mc ormack Lines, 352 U. S. 521, 559 (1957) (Harlan, J., con-
curring and dissenting) (dismissal appropriate where consid-
erations arise "which were not manifest or fully apprehended 
at the time certiorari was granted"). 
"The fact that a person is operating under the influence of, or charged 
with that, in. their minds thinks that either the police don't have probable 
cause or that the police didn't see them operating a car, or the fact that 
they had some alcohol to drink-that's irrelevant. That's not an issue in a 
reasonableness hearing." J . A., at 109-110. 
The trial court failed to settle the dispute, relying upon its earlier decision 
in the criminal suppression hearing that the arrest was legal. !d. , at 111. 
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Here, the question is presented in an extraordinarily ab-
stract manner, The Monrosa v. Carbon Black Export, Inc., 
supra, and there have been changes in the Wisconsin statu-
tory scheme which throw further doubt on the relation of the 
constitutional question to the suspension of petitioner's driv-
er's license, Triangle Improvement Council v. Richie, 402 
U. S. 497, 502 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring). If Monrosa, 
supra, and Triangle Improvement Council, supra,-in each 
of which cases the writ of certiorari was dismissed as improv-
idently granted over the dissents of four members of the 
Court-did not violate the "Rule of Four," assuredly our dis-
missal of the writ in this case does not violate that rule. 
Writ of certiorari dismissed. 
3rd DRAFT 








From: Justice Rehnquist 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 82-5466 
EDWARD G. WELSH, PETITIONER v. WISCONSIN 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT 
OF WISCONSIN 
[February -, 1984] 
PER CURIAM. 
We granted certiorari to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin 
to decide whether a warrantless home arrest for drunk driv-
ing, based on probable cause and given allegedly exigent cir-
cumstances, violates the Fourth Amendment. After full 
briefing and oral argument, however, it appears that _while 
the question may technically be presented by the record, it is 
presented, at best, in a highly atypical and totally abstract 
way. We therefore dismiss the writ of certiorari as improvi-
aently granted. Resolution of this admittedly important 
question, see Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573, 583 (1980), 
"can await a day when the issue is posed less abstractly." 
The Monrosa v. Carbon Black Export, Inc., 359 U. S. 180, 
184 (1959). 
On the night of April 24, 1978, petitioner Welsh drove his 
car off the road, narrowly averting an accident. He 
emerged from the car in an obviously inebriated state and 
asked another motorist for a ride home. Told that he should 
wait for assistance, petitioner left the scene on foot. The po-
lice arrived almost immediately and, after running a license 
check and taking the other driver's statement, proceeded to 
Welsh's home a short distance away. The police were admit-
ted by petitioner's stepdaugther who told them that peti-
tioner "just stumbled in" and was upstairs. Petitioner's wife 
led them up to his room, where they found him in bed. 
Welsh was arrested and charged with operating a motor ve-
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hicle while under the influence of an intoxicant, in violation of 
Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1) (1977). He was taken to the police sta-
tion where he refused to submit to a breathalyzer test. 
Two separate proceedings, one criminal and one civil, re-
sulted from these events. Petitioner was charged with a 
criminal violation of§ 346.63(1). Because it was his second 
such offense within five years, he faced mandatory imprison-
ment from five days to one year and a fine of not more than 
$500. 1 Petitioner moved to dismiss the criminal charge on 
the ground that his warrantless arrest violated the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution. The State 
contended in response that the arrest was legal because the 
police had probable cause to believe Welsh committed the of-
fense and his wife and stepdaughter consented to the war-
rantless entry. Alternatively, the State argued that the 
warrantless entry to arrest Welsh, even absent consent, was 
justified by exigent circumstances. See Payton v. New 
York, 445 U. S. 573, 583 (1980). The Wisconsin trial court, 
without passing on the consent issue, found for the State. 
The court ruled that the police had probable cause to arrest 
Welsh and that the doctrine of hot pursuit, see Warden v. 
Hayden, 387 U. S. 294 (1967), and the need to take a breath 
sample before Welsh continued drinking or the effects of the 
already consumed alcohol wore off, justified the arrest. 
J. A., at 78-80. 2 
Petitioner was also faced with the suspension of his license 
in the civil proceeding which is the subject of the petition for 
certiorari in this case. Under Wisconsin law in effect at the 
' Wise. Stat. § 346.65(2) (1975) provided: "Any person violating 
s. 346.63(1) may be required to forfeit not more than $200 for the first of-
fense and, upon the 2nd or subsequent conviction within 5 years, shall be 
imprisoned not less than 5 days nor more than one year and in addition may 
be fined not more than $500." 
2_Following a jury trial in 1982, petitioner was convicted of the misde-
meanor of driving while intoxicated. His appeal from that conviction has 
been stayed pending our decision in this case. See Brief for Petitioner, at 
17, n. 5. 
-
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time of petitioner's offense, anyone who operated a motor ve-
hicle upon the public highways thereby consented to submit 
to a sobriety test upon being arrested for drunk driving. 
Wise. Stat. § 343.305(1) (1975). Refusal to submit to such a 
test resulted in automatic suspension of the driver's license 
for 60 days, unless the'driver could "establish the reasonable-
ness of his refusal." I d., at § 343.305(7)(c). Petitioner con-
tended that his refusal to take the sobriety test was "reason-
able" because his underlying arrest violated the Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendmentsofthe United States Constitution. 
Th~g already ruled that the arrest was legal 
in the criminal pretrial hearing, rejected this contention and 
suspended petitioner's license for 60 days. 
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed the license sus-
pension, concluding that although there was probable cause 
to arrest Welsh, the State had not established the existence 
of exigent circumstances. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin 
in turn reversed the appellate court, finding "ample evidence 
supporting the trial court's ruling that the officer's entry was 
justified on the basis of both probable cause and exigent cir-
cumstances." State v. Welsh, 108 Wis. 2d 319, 326-327, 321 
N. W. 2d 245, 249-250 (1982). We granted certiorari to de- } 
cide whether the exigent circumstances relied upon by the "KL~ ;..,.._. 
Supreme Court of Wisconsin were sufficient to support a a..;...&.+t. L ~. 
~~rrantless arrest in the home for the offense with which pe- s:_;oL · --, 
t1t10ner was charged. 459 U. S. -- (1983). · 
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin undoubtedly decided the 
question which is presented by the petition for certiorari, but 
its opinion leaves us at a loss to understand the relevance of 
the federalc _o_n_s-:-;ti"'"tu__,t,-;-io-ii'aiTsSti'e to its ultim-;te conclusion that 
petitioners 1cense s ou d be suspendea . Fourth Amend-
mentlSsues in stat e proceedings norffially arise because a de-
fendant seeks to exclude evidence that he claims was improp-
erly gathered. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961). 
But the Supreme Court of Wisconsin does not discuss any ev-
idence which Welsh sought to exclude. And if petitoner did 
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seek to invoke the exclusionary rule, we would, before con-
fronting the constitutionality of the arrest, have to decide 
whether the Fourth Amendment requires that unconstitu-
tionally seized evidence be excluded in a state civil proceed-
ing. As we said in United States v. Janis, 428 U. S. 433, 447 
(1976), "[i]n the complex and turbulent history of the rule, 
the Court has never applied it to exclude evidence from a civil 
proceeding, federal or state." 3 The latter issue has been 
neither argued nor briefed by the parties, and it would not be 
appropriate for us to reach it. 
An alternative possible basis for finding the constitutional-
ity of petitioner's arrest relevant to the license suspension, 
which the dissent states with considerable assurance must 
have been the basis for the ruling of the Supreme Court of 
Wisconsin, see infra, at 4, is that "an arrestee's refusal to 
take a breath test would be unreasonable, and therefore 
operatiniPrlvileges coufcl not be revoked, if the underlying 
arrest was not lawful." We believe, however, that this 
conclusion is by no means free from doubt. The Supreme 
Court of Wisconsin's opinion never adverts to a connectiOn 
between the re~ess mquTry and The federal constltu-
tiona ues ion. or 1s sue a connection evident from the 
language of the statute. 
At the time of the events in question, whenever a driver 
was arrested for drunk driving in Wisconsin and refused to 
submit to a sobriety test, the arresting officer was required 
to file a ~rt stating that the driver was placed "under ar-
rest"; that he refuse o ta e a sobnety test a ter being m-
f'Ori'ned of his rights and of the consequences of his refusal; 
a In Janis, the Court held that evidence seized by a state criminal law 
enforcement officer in good faith, but nonetheless unconstitutionally, may 
be admitted in a federal civil proceeding. The Court specifically declined 
to pass on the question of whether "intrasovereign" violations, in which ev-
idence improperly seized by the State in a criminal investigation is subse-
quently introduced in a state civil proceeding, are forbidden by the Fourth 
Amendment. 428 U. S., at 456. 
82-5466-PER CURIAM 
WELSH v. WISCONSIN 5 
and that the driver's refusal was unreasonable. Wise. Stat. 
§ 343.305(2)(b) (1975). 4 The driver's license was then auto-
matically suspended 60 days after the report was filed, unless 
he requested a reasonableness hearing. The issues that the 
driver could raise at the hearing were specifically limited by 
the statute to those facts required to be stated in the report. 
/d., at § 343.305(7)(c). Thus, the driver could claim that he 
was not placed under arrest or that he was not advised ofnis 
rights. ~ere was no rovision for challenging the con-
stitutionality of the arrest. 5 
'Section 343.305(2)(b) (1975) provided in relevant part: 
"The report shall contain the following information: 
"1. That the person at the time he was requested to submit to a test was 
under arrest for driving or operating a motor vehicle while under the influ-
ence of an intoxicant; 
"2. That the person refused to submit to a test; 
"3. That such person was informed of the consequences of his refusal to 
submit to the test; and 
"4. That such person was informed of his rights [as to the nature and 
type of test performed] under subs. (4) and (5)(a). 
"5. That the refusal of the person to submit to a test was unreasonable." 
5 The dissent would have us read the phrase "under arrest" to mean 
"lawfully under arrest" or "legally under arrest." But we decline to re-
write a state statute, and we have no authoritative construction from a 
state court upon which to rely for such an interpretation. Counsel for pe-
titioner at the reasonableness hearing made just such an argument, and it 
was rejected by the trial court. When counsel claimed that the hearing 
was predicated on lawful arrest, the court responded: "It doesn't say 'law-
ful arrest.' The statute just says, ' ... under arrest.'" J. A., at 92. At 
that point, petitioner's counsel changed tacks. First, he argued that peti-
tioner had a Fourth Amendment right to refuse to take the test and to pre-
vent the refusal from being used against him. I d., at 105. And, second, 
he argued that the legality of the arrest was relevant to the reasonableness 
of petitioner's refusal to take the test. Counsel for the State strenuously 
disputed the latter contention. 
"When you get a driver's license you have agreed to consent to take the 
breathalyzer test and you have to have a reason or reasons for not taking 
that. My understanding of the law ... is that the only reasonable reason 







6 WELSH v. WISCONSIN 
The Wisconsin law was amended in 1977 specifically to per-
mit a licensee to contest "whether the officer made a lawful 
arrest prior to requesting a test . . . " Wise. Stat. 
§ 343.305(8)(b)1(a) (1977); but that provision did not become 
effective until July 1, 1978, after the events in question here. 
While the import of the amendment is not crystal clear, it 
certainly supports an inference that the prior language relat-
ing ~e" character of the refusal did not 
include the right to challenge the constitutionality of the ar-
rest. See State v. Neitzel, 95 Wis. 2d 191, 202, 289 N. W. 2d 
828, 834 (1980) (holding that physical inability to take the test 
"was the only reasonable ground for exonerating a refusal 
under the statutes as they appeared in 1975") (emphasis 
added). 6 
"The fact that a person is operating under the influence of, or charged 
with that, in their minds thinks that either the police don't have probable 
cause or that the police didn't see them operating a car, or the fact that 
they had some alcohol to drink-that's irrelevant. That's not an issue in a 
reasonableness hearing." J. A., at 109--110. 
The trial court failed to settle the dispute, relying upon its earlier decision 
in the criminal suppression hearing that the arrest was legal. I d., at 111. 
6 Scales v. State, 64 Wis. 2d 485, 219 N. W. 2d 286 (1974), upon which 
the dissent relies, infra, at 6, n. 5, is not to the contrary. First of all, in 
Scales the defendant was appealing his criminal conviction for homicide by 
the intoxicated use of a vehicle. No one disputes that in most circum-
stances the fruits of an illegal arrest cannot constitutionally be introduced 
in a criminal proceeding against the arrestee. But that is irrelevent to 
whether Wisconsin law requires the suppression of such evidence in a civil 
proceeding. Second, the court in Scales specifically rejected the defend-
ant's claim that the implied consent law, Wise. Stat. § 343.305, gives an 
arrestee asked to take a sobriety test any greater rights than the constitu-
tion compels. 
"It is not our understanding ... that the implied consent law was intended 
to give greater rights to an alleged drunken driver than were constitution-
ally afforded theretofore. Rather, its purpose was to impose a condition 
on the right to obtain a license to drive on a Wisconsin highway. . . . It 
was intended to facilitate the taking of tests for intoxication and not to in-
hibit the ability of the state to remove drunken drivers from the highway. 
82-546~PER CURIAM 
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In sum, we conclude that the relevance of the constitution-
ality of petitioner's arrest to the suspension of his license is 
too uncertain to justify our reaching the merits of the issue. 
The dissent insists that our dismissal of the writ in this case 
violates the "Rule of Four" as expounded in our earlier cases. 
But, as the Court stated in The Monrosa v. Carbon Black 
Export, Inc., 359 U. S. 180, 184 (1959): "Examination of a 
case on the merits, on oral argument, may bring into 'proper 
focus' a consideration which, though present in the record at 
the time of granting the writ, only later indicates that the 
grant was improvident." See also Ferguson v. Moore-
McCormack Lines, 352 U. S. 521, 559 (1957) (Harlan, J., con-
curring and dissenting) (dismissal appropriate where consid-
erations arise "which were not manifest or fully apprehended 
at the time certiorari was granted"). 
Here, the question is presented in an extraordinarily ab-
stract manner, The Monrosa v. Carbon Black Export, In ., 
supra, and there have been changes in the Wisconsin statu-
tory scheme which throw further doubt on the relation of the 
constitutional question to the suspension of petitioner's driv-
er's license, Triangle Improvement Council v. Richie, 402 
U. S. 497, 502 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring). If Monrosa, 
supra, and Triangle Improvement Council, supra,-in each 
of which cases the writ of certiorari was dismissed as improv-
idently granted over the dissents of four members of the 
Court-did not violate the "Rule of Four," assuredly our dis-
missal of the writ in this case does not violate that rule. 
L-.. , 
Writ of certiorari dismissed. 
In light of that purpose, it must be liberally construed to effectuate its poli-




82-5466 WE~H v. WISCONSIN 
JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in 
~1-r 
the judgment. I/~ I 
This is a case the Court should not have taken. The 
Wisconsin statutes with respect to driving "under the influence 
of an intoxicant" may be unique. At least, they suggest an 
unusual degree of tolerance. Driving under the influence is 
classified as a civil offense - in effect only a traffic offense 
- requiring a "forfeiture of not more than $20~ Section 
346.65{2) Wise. Stat. 1975.1 
Under Wisconsin law, one who drives on the public roads 
"shall be deemed to have given consent to a chemical test . 
for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of his blood 
if arrested and issued a citation for driving ••• while under 
the influence of an intoxicant •••• " ~ This constructive consent 
does not allow a chemical test to be given without the actual 
1A second offense within five years is a misde 
a penalty of imprisonment for not less than f" 
than a year and a potential fine of not more t 
346.65{2) Wise. Stat. 1975. 
,'' 
eanor, carrying 
days nor more 
an $500. Section 
2 
consent of the person arrested. If, however, refusal to take the 
test is found to be unreasonable, the State automatically 
suspends the driver's license for 60 days. Sections 343.305(1) 
and 343.305(2) Wise. Stat. 1975. 
In this case, respondent ran his car off the road and 
~t before the police arrived. Some thirty minutes 
later, the police arrived at respondent's home and made a 
warrantless entry and arrest on the reasonable belief that 
respondent had been driving under the influence at the time of 
the accident. Respondent refused to submit to the required 
chemical test on the ground that his warrantless home arrest was 
unconstitutional under ~yton v. New York, 445 u.s. 573 (1980). 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, reversing the state Court of 
Appeals, found that exigent circumstances justified the 
warrantless entry and arrest. It did not address the State's 
further contention that respondent's wife and daughters had 
consented to the entry by the police. Because it found that the 
arrest was lawful, the Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded that 
3 
respondent's refusal to submit to the chemical test was 
unreasonable as a matter of state law and that a 60-day 
suspension of respondent's driving license was warranted. 
There are three reasons why this Court should not have 
granted certiorari: (i) the Wisconsin laws with respect to 
driving while intoxicated may be unique 2 , (ii) the only 
constitutional question in the case - the warrantless entry - was 
resolved essentially by Payton, and (iii) the factual issue 
whether consent was given to the entry was not addressed by the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court. Even absent exigent circumstances, 
therefore, the case therefore should be remanded as there was a 
ilu..~ 
conflict of evidence on ~ issue. 
1 
Nevertheless, there were four votes to grant the case. 
Following argument and consideration at Conference, there were 
five votes to dismiss the case as improvidently granted, a result 
2In view of the current focus of public attention on the 
shocking number of deaths and serious injuries occasioned by 
intoxicated drivers, one reasonably may assume that Wisconsin 
like other states -- will be reexamining its curiously tolerant 
laws. 
4 
that I joined for the reasons above stated. As Justice Brennan's 
opinion states, the four Justices who voted to grant the case 
"remain persuaded that the merits of the case should be decided". 
Ante, at 16. After further consideration, I have concluded that 
in these circumstances it would be inappropriate to dismiss this 
case against the views of the Justices who granted it. In his 
~separate opinion in Ferg~on v. Moore-McCormick Lines, 352 u.s. 
521, 559 (1957) Justice Harlan explained why the Rule of Four 
normally requires decision on the merits in this situation. See, 
ante, at 17. 
I find the reasoning of Justice Harlan persuasive and in 
the best interest of the Court institutionally. Accordingly, I 
also address the merits. Under our decision in Payton, a 
~ 
warrantless nonconsen~ual entry into the home to make a felony 
arrest is unconstitutional absent exigent circumstances. The 
privacy of the home deserves at least as much protection under 
the Fourth Amendment in the case of a warrantless entry to arres 
for a civil traffic offense. In my view the Supreme Court of 
5 
Wisconsin erred in finding that the entry was justified by 
exigent circumstances. 3 There was, however, conflicting evidence 
as to whether the entry had been consent ual, and it is agreed 
there was probable cause to arrest. The issue of consent remains 
to be decided by the Wisconsin courts. 4 Accordingly, I also 
would vacate the judgment of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin and 
remand the case for further proceedings. 
3I agree with the finding of the Wisconsin Court of Appeals 
that in this case there was neither "hot pursuit" nor other 
circumstances that required this night time entry into 
respondent's home. Preservation of evidence, for example, does 
not in every case create an exigency sufficient to justify ( 
warrantless entry into the home. In this case, the State's 
interest in the evidence was relatively slight. Under Wisconsin 
law, only a traffic offense had been committed. Nor had there 
been a showing that a warrant could not have been obtained 
promptly. 
4I do not join the reasoning of the plurality opinion, and 
particularly do not concur in the establishment of a "bright 
line" principle. See, Part II, A, ante, at 8. It is settled 
that exigent circumstances may justify a warrantless entry where 
a felony reasonably is believed to have been committed. I see no 
reason in this case to foreclose the possibility that some 
circumstances may justify a warrantless entry where the offense 
is less serious than a felony. 
lfp/ss 02/18/84 WIS SALLY-POW 
82-5466 WELCH v. WISCONSIN 
JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
I voted to deny certiorari in this case, and the 
opinions of my Brothers filed today reinfore my view that 
it was a mistake for this Court to review this case. The 
Wisconsin laws with respect to driving while intoxicated, 
in effect at the time, may be unique. At least, they 
suggest an extraordinary degree of tolerance. Driving 
under the influence was classified as a civil offense - in 
effect only a traffic offense and requiring a 
"forfeiture of not more than $200". §346.65(2) Wise. 
Stat. 1975. Moreover, the case had been cons ide red by 
three Wisconsin courts and, in the end, could have been 
2. 
decided - at least arguably - on factual grounds. 1 The 
decision of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin therefore has 
little or no precedential importance outside of that 
state. 
Remaining convinced that this is a case the 
Court should not have taken, I agree that the case should 
be dismissed as improvidently granted. I am not in 
accord, however, with either the plurality or dissenting 
opinions. Justice Rehnquist would not reach the 
constitutional question because the Wisconsin statute, at 
the time of petitioner's arrest, did not expressly say 
1The Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed the 
trial court, concluding that the warrantless entry and 
arrest of petitioner violated the Fourth Amendment. That 
court remanded the case, however, for further findings as 
to whether the police had entered petitioner's home with 
consent - an issue the state trial court had not decided. 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed the intermediate 
appellate court, concluding that exigent circumstances 
justified the warrantless entry and arrest. 
~ 3. 
that the required arrest must be "lawful". This argument 
is advanced despite the fact that both the Wisconsin Court 
of Appeals and Supreme Court read the state statute as 
reqyuiring a lawful arrest. Quite apart from this 
construction by the courts of Wisconsin, I find it 
unreasonable to assume that any doubt exists as to the 
statutory intent. When an "arrest" is a statutory 
prerequisite to imposition of a penalty, it can only mean 
a lawful rather than an unlawful arrest. 
I therefore agree with Justice Brennan's view as 
to the construction of the Wisconsin statute. If I 
thought it were appropriate for this Court to decide the 
constitutional issue, I have no doubt that the arrest in 
this case constituted a violation of the Fourth and 




(1980) held that a warrantless nonconsentual entry into a 
home to make a felony arrest is unconstitutional absent 
existent circumstances. The privacy of the home deserves 
at least as much protection under the Fourth Amendment in 
the case of a warrantless entry to arrest for a civil 
traffic offense. 2 
Although it had not occurred to me that there 
would be disagreement - least of all a 4-4 disagreement -
as to the possible meaning of the state statute, this is a 
further reason for dismissing this case as improvidently 
granted. 
2 (Copy of footnote 6 in my first draft of 
the prior opinion that I am now junking). 
lfp/ss 02/18/84 WIS SALLY-POW 
82-5466 WELe H v. WISCONSIN 
JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
I voted to deny certiorari in this case, and the 
opinions of my Brothers filed today reinfore my view that 
it was a mistake for this Court to review this case. The 
Wisconsin laws with respect to driving while intoxicated, 
in effect at the time, may be unique. At least, they 
suggest an extraordinary degree of tolerance. Driving 
under the influence was classified as a civil offense - in 
effect only a traffic offense requiring a 
"forfeiture of not more than $200". § 3 4 6 • 6 5 ( 2 ) w i sc . 
~ 
Stat. 1975. Moreover, the case ~ been considered by 
<! 14&lcl -e. G? I 
three Wisconsin courts and, in the end, '\ e<>1:1ld Aave · beefii'O 
2. 
decided - at: lea-st 
t +l_~ ~ ~Ct. ~-cf' f "L htt L 
arguab.l~ on fa c tual ground)\ 1 The 
decision of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin therefore has 
little or no precedential importance outside of that 
state. 
Remaining convinced that this is a case the 
Court should not have taken, I agree that the case should 
be dismissed as improvidently granted. I am not in 
accord, however, with either the plurality or dissenting 
opinions. Justice Rehnquist would not reach the 
constitutional question because the Wisconsin statute, at 
the time of petitioner's arrest, did not expressly say 
1The Wisconsin Cour Appeals reversed the 
trial court, concluding that warrantless entry and 
arrest of petitioner violated the Fourth Amendment. That 
court remanded the case, however, for further findings as 
to whether the police had entered petitioner's home with 
c_ consent - an issue the state trial court had not decided. 
1 B.t..:,tf'._~ ~ \ Jfhe Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed the intermediate 
-
C:..~ c:t.. ~~ K~ppellate cour t, concluding that exigent circums t ances 
4--ktJ--~~(.,\..L.) justif i e d the war rantless entrv and a r re s t . ~ .:.....:/ '•' /,,h" 
\ I Ia ..( ) 
_____ --.~ ~tuy [..... "':":~ kuJ.., WAM ~ t . . ~ 
~J~JF ~ ~d ~t -<" 
~ t ~d_ ~~' ~k4-t....~ ~ c,.;.c.....;,.. u 
I I I 
3. 
that the required arrest must be "lawful". This argument 
is advanced despite the fact that both the Wisconsin Court 
of Appeals and Supreme Court read the state statute as 
req~ing a lawful arrest. Quite apart from this 
construction by the courts of Wisconsin, I find it 
unreasonable to assume that any doubt exists as to the 
statutory intent. When an "arrest" is a statutory 
~~·~ 
prerequisite to imposition of a penalty, ~ an only me~ 
~~\ :f!L'j~j 1 a lawful rather than an unlawful arrest . 
I therefore agree with Justice Brennan's view as 
to the construction of the Wisconsin statute. 
thought it 
this case 
were appropriate for this Court to decide the 
l~ ~trlt·. /) 
, I have no doubt thatAthe arrest inL~·~~ 
constituted a violation of the Fourth and 





(1980~ held that a warrantless nonconsenJ ual entry into a 
home to make a felony arrest is unconstitutional absent 
.P-4~~~ 
~ t circumstances. The privacy of the home deserves 
t. 
J 
at least as much protection under the Fourth Amendment in 
the case of a warrantless entry to arrest for v 
... , _ _ __.:;;.._J In my view the Su-
traffic offense./\ 
preme Court of Wisconsin errea in finding that the entry was 
justified by exigent circumstances.' l.. There was, however, 
conflicting evidence as to whether the entry had been consen-
Al though ~sual, and it is agreed there was probable cause to arrest. 
The i~ue of sent remained to be derided.blLthe Wisconsin 
courts.( 
would be disagreement - least of all a 4-4 disagreement -
as to the possible meaning of the state statute, this is a 
further reason for dismissing this case as improvidently 
granted. 
/I agree with the finding of the Wisconsin Court of Appeals that in this 
case there was neither "hot pursuit" nor other circumstances that required 
this night time entry into respondent's home. Preservation of evidence, 
for example, does not in every case create an exigency sufficient to justify 
warrantless entry into the home. In this case, the State's interest in the 
evidence was relatively slight. Under Wisconsin law, only a traffic of-
fense had been committed. Nor had there been a showing that a warrant 
could not have been obtained promptly. 
/ I do not think it is necessary in this case to consider a "bright line" rule 
as to less serious offenses. See, JUSTICE BRENNAN's opinion, Part II, A, 
ante, at 8. It is settled that exigent circumstances may justify a warrant-
less entry where a felony reasonably is believed to have been committed. 
I see no reason in this case to foreclose the possibility that some circum-
stances may justify a warrantless entry where the offense is less serious 
than a felony. 
lfp/ss 02/20/84 WIS SALLY-POW 
82-5466 WELSH v. WISCONSIN 
JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
\(1Jt;~4"~ f 
I j vted t deny certiorari in this case, and the 
opinions of my Brothers filed today reinfore my view that 
it was a mistake for this Court to review this case. The 
Wisconsin laws with respect to driving while intoxicated, 
in effect at the time, may be unique. At least, they 
suggest an extraordinary degree of tolerance. Driving 
under the influence was classified as a civil offense - in 
effect only a traffic offense - requiring a "forfeiture of 
not more than $200". §346.65(2) Wise. Stat. 1975. 
}~~J~~~--~ 
Moreover, ase has been considered by three Wisconsin 
-4..'6 ., 
courts ~ in 
I 
~ 




grounds that the state court has yet to consj er • 1 ~
~ u,.;.~.o~ --lkJ ~ ~ ~J... ~ ~ +o 




h..Ju_ ~ ~ ~o../::.,._ ~ 
-lo ~"Lu- ~.L o..rl.d':L 
/;~d. Rem 1n1ng this is a case the 
Court should not have taken, I agree that the case should 
be dismissed as improvidently g~ am not in 
~eew" 
constitutional question because the Wisconsin statute, at 
1The Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed the 
trial court, concluding that absent consent the 
warrantless entry and arrest of petitioner violated the 
Fourth Amendment. That court remanded the case, however, ) 
for further findings as to whether the police had entered 
petitioner's horne with consent - an 'ssue the state trial 
court had not decided. Before the could consider that 
issue, the Wisconsin Supreme Cou t reversed the 
intermediate appellate court, conclud'ng that exigent 
circumstances justified the warrantless entry and arrest. 
Thus~t may be that the warrantless e ry and arrest are 
justified even in the absence of exige t circumstances. 
3. 
the time of petitioner's arrest, did not expressly say 
that the required arrest must be "lawful". This argument 
is advanced despite the fact that both the Wisconsin Court 
of Appeals and Supreme Court read the state statute as 
requiring a lawful arrest. Quite apart from this 
construction by the courts of Wisconsin, I find it 
unreasonable to assume that any doubt exists as to the 
statutory intent. When an "arrest" is a statutory 
prerequisite to imposition of a penalty, this Court should 
assume the statute requires a lawful rather than an 
unlawful arrest. 
I therefore agree with Justice Brennan's view as 
MO'\.J..~J 
to the construction of the Wisconsin statute. 
(\ ~~ 
doubt that abser t epmsemt the warrantless entry and arrest 
in this case constituted a violation of the Fourth and 
••• 
4. 
Fourteenth Amendments. Payton v. New York, 445 u.s. 573 
(1980~held that a warrantless nonconsensual entry into a 
) 
horne to make a felony arrest is unconstitutional absent 
exigent circumstances. The privacy of the horne deserves 
at least as much protection under the Fourth Amendment in 
the case of a warrantless entry to arrest for a civil 
traffic offense., my view the Supreme Court of Wisconsin 
~
bJ bCP t:Lc~ QJ ~' arl,.6 
eli':.~litHii in finding that the entry was justified by exigent 
circurnstances.2 
the entry had been consensual, and it is -- ------------------- ---.....__ 
with the finding of the 
Appeals that in this case there was neither "ho 
pursuit" nor other circumstances that required this night 
time entry into respondent's horne. Preservation of 
evidence, for example, does not in every case create an 
exigency sufficient to justify warrantless entry into the 
horne. In this case, the State's interest in the evidence 
was relatively slight. Under Wisconsin law, only a 
traffic offense had been committed. Nor had there been a 
showing that a warrant could not have been obtain 
promptly. 
5. 
a~ere was probable cause to arrest. The 
remained to be decided by the Wisconsin courts. 3 
Although it had not occurred to me that there 
would be disagreement - least of all a 4-4 disagreement -
as to the possible meaning of the state statute, this is a 
further reason for dismissing this case as improvidently 
granted. 
' . .J.-~ , . 'b. ..~ ·1-Lcx: r' '='~<tV$ f>cevc:el~ ) 
~ ~) -; D ~ 1\ I _f 
.11\ "' J,1,cc:; t¢;:¢;;oct::: f:f5 m:ax J ~ UUrLJ-«-
r'l8>"\:::t:;:.(9. l:ob 'I! C\ r- . 
~ t::J J ~ ~ W/ ~ fl..utJw-L~  
'b-1--k ~~ ~ ~ (!_~ ~ ~ 
~; ~ ~~~ . /"~~ . .J "'-~ 
~ ~~ ~ b a...<....:J i--koJ-
~~&1.~"(. 
... A,M J.. / I do not join the reasoning of ehe plu r -:-r "~ 
drJ.V1)p 1nion, and particularly do not concur in the 
establishment of a "bright line" principle. See, Part II, 
A, ante, at 8. It is settled that exigent circumstances 
may justify a warrantless entry where a felony reasonably 
is believed to have been committed. I see no reason in 
this case to foreclose the possibility that some 
circumstances may justify a warrantless entry where the 
offense is less serious than a felony. 
lfp/ss 02/20/84 WIS SALLY-POW 
82-5466 WELSH v. WISCONSIN 
JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
I voted to deny certiorari in this case, and the 
opinions of my Brothers filed today reinfore my view that 
it was a mistake for this Court to review this case. The 
Wisconsin laws with respect to driving while intoxicated, 
in effect at the time, may be unique. At least, they 
suggest an extraordinary degree of tolerance. Driving 
under the influence was classified as a civil offense - in 
effect only a traffic offense - requiring a "forfeiture of 
not more than $200". §346.65(2) Wise. Stat. 1975. 
Moreover, the case has been considered by three Wisconsin 
courts and, in the end, could be decided on factual 
2. 
grounds that the state court has yet to consder • 1 The 
decision of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin therefore has 
little or no precedential importance outside of that 
state. 
Remaining convinced that this is a case the 
Court should not have taken, I agree that the case should 
be dismissed as improvidently granted. I am not in 
accord, however, with either the plurality or dissenting 
opinions. Justice Rehnquist would not reach the 
constitutional question because the Wisconsin statute, at 
1The Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed the 
trial court, concluding that absent consent the 
warrantless entry and arrest of petitioner violated the 
Fourth Amendment. That court remanded the case, however, 
for further findings as to whether the police had entered 
petitioner's home with consent - an issue the state trial 
court had not decided. Before the TC could consider that 
issue, the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed the 
intermediate appellate court, concluding that exigent 
circumstances justified the warrantless entry and arrest. 
Thus it may be that the warrantless entry and arrest are 
justified even in the absence of exigent circumstances. 
3. 
the time of petitioner's arrest, did not expressly say 
that the required arrest must be "lawful". This argument 
is advanced despite the fact that both the Wisconsin Court 
of Appeals and Supreme Court read the state statute as 
requiring a lawful arrest. Quite apart from this 
construction by the courts of Wisconsin, I find it 
unreasonable to assume that any doubt exists as to the 
statutory intent. When an "arrest" is a statutory 
prerequisite to imposition of a penalty, this Court should 
assume the statute requires a lawful rather than an 
unlawful arrest. 
I therefore agree with Justice Brennan's view as 
to the construction of the Wisconsin statute. I have no 
doubt that absemt cpmsemt the warrantless entry and arrest 
in this case constituted a violation of the Fourth and 
4. 
Fourteenth Amendments. Payton v. New York, 445 u.s. 573 
(1980) held that a warrantless nonconsensual entry into a 
home to make a felony arrest is unconstitutional absent 
exigent circumstances. The privacy of the home deserves 
at least as much protection under the Fourth Amendment in 
the case of a warrantless entry to arrest for a civil 
traffic offense.In my view the Supreme Court of Wisconsin 
erred in finding that the entry was justified by exigent 
circumstances. 2 There was, however, conflicting evidence 
as to whether the entry had been consensual, and it is 
2r agree with the finding of the Wisconsin 
Court of Appeals that in this case there was neither "hot 
pursuit" nor other circumstances that required this night 
time entry into respondent's home. Preservation of 
evidence, for example, does not in every case create an 
exigency sufficient to justify warrantless entry into the 
home. In this case, the State's interest in the evidence 
was relatively slight. Under Wisconsin law, only a 
traffic offense had been committed. Nor had there been a 




agreed there was probable cause to arrest. The issue of1 
consent remained to be decided by the Wisconsin courts. 3 
\ Although it had not occurred to me that there 
would be disagreement - least of all a 4-4 disagreement -
as to the possible meaning of the state statute, this is a 
further reason for dismissing this case as improvidently 
granted. 
3I do not join the reasoning of the plurality 
opinion, and particularly do not concur in the 
establishment of a "bright line" principle. See, Part II, 
A, ante, at 8. It is settled that exigent circumstances 
may justify a warrantless entry where a felony reasonably 
is believed to have been committed. I see no reason in 
this case to foreclose the possibility that some 
circumstances may justify a warrantless entry where the 
offense is less serious than a felony. 
lfp/ss 02/20/84 WIS SALLY-POW 
case, 
82-5466 WELSH v. WISCONSIN 
JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
I originally voted to deny certiorari in this 
. c. 
and the opinions of my Brothers filed today re1nfore 
1'\ 
my view that it was a mistake for this Court to review 
this case. The Wisconsin laws with respect to driving 
while intoxicated, in effect at the time, may be unique. 
At least, they suggest an extraordinary degree of 
tolerance. Driving under the influence was classified as 
a civil offense - in effect only a traffic offense -
requiring a "forfeiture of not more than $200". 
§346.65(2) Wise. Stat. 1975. Moreover, although the case 
has been considered by three Wisconsin courts, in the end, 
~~ 








be decided on factual grounds that the state 
court has yet to consider • 1 It is 
~~~~ 
Court should not rtl;t bo adEiress the cen-stitut:iGAall of 
the warrantless entry and arrest challenged here until the 
$~ 
state court hits had the opportunity to consider these 
1\ 1\ 
additional factual grounds. 
emaining convince is a case t 
Court should not have taken, I agree that the case should 
be dismissed as improvidently granted. I am not i 
~ 
with cj dissenting 
1The Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed the 
trial court, concluding that absent consent the 
warrantless entry and arrest of petitioner violated the 
Fourth Amendment. That court remanded the case, however, 
for further findings as to whether the police had entered 
petitioner's home with consent - an issue the state trial 
court had not decided. Before the trial court could 
consider that issue, the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed 
the intermediate appellate court, concluding that exigent 
circumstances justified the warrantless entry and arrest. 
Thus it may be that the warrantless entry and arrest are 
justified even in the absence of exigent circumstances. 





opinions. The plurality would not reach the 
constitutional question~se the Wisconsin statute, at 
1\ 
the time of petitioner's arrest, did not expressly say 
that the required arrest must be "lawful". This argument 
is advanced despite the fact that both the Wisconsin Court 
of Appeals and Supreme Court read the state statute as 
requiring a lawful arrest. Quite apart from this 
construction by the courts of Wisconsin, I find it 
unreasonable to assume that any doubt exists as to the 
statutory intent. When an "arrest" is a statutory 
prerequisite to imposition of a penalty, this Court should 
assume the statute requires a lawful rather than an 
unlawful arrest. 
I therefore agree with Justice Brennan's view as 











have no doubt that absent consent the warrantless entry 
and arrest in this case constituted a violation of the 
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Payton v. New York, 445 
U.S. 573 (1980), held that a warrantless nonconsensual 
entry into a home to make a felony arrest is 
unconstitutional absent exigent circumstances. The 
privacy of the home deserves at least as much protection 
under the Fourth Amendment in the case of a warrantless 
entry to arrest for a civil traffic offense. In my view 
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin erred in finding that the 
entry was justified by exigent circumstances. I agree 
with the finding of the Wisconsin Court of Appeals that in 
this case there was neither "hot pursuit" nor other 
circumstances that required this night-time entry into 
respondent's home. Preservation of evidence, for example, 
s. 
does not in every case create an exigency sufficient to 
justify warrantless entry into the home. In this case, 
the State's interest in the evidence was relatively 
slight. Under Wisconsin law, only a traffic offense had 
been committed. Nor had there been a showing that a 
warrant could not have been obtained promptly. 2 
In sum, I agree only with the conclusion of the 
plurality that this case should be dismissed as 
improvidently granted. 
been finally determined by the state cou 
'i.,~~ 
2I not JOln ~ r easoning= =tff - Justice 
enting opinion,~ particularly do 1'\et r 
~-E!'&J~~-TH--eff'e-::-te-&6-a.c...u'.$.1=Haen-t of a " b r i g h t 1 in e" p r inc i p 1 e • 
A, ante, at 8. It is settled that exigent 
circumstances may JUStify a warrantless entry where a 
felony reasonably is believed to have been committed. I 
see no reason in this case to foreclose the possibili tv 
that some circumstances may justify a warrantless entry 
where the offense is less serious than a felony. 
6. 
least of all a 4-4 
statute, this is a further 
lfp/ss 02/20/84 WIS SALLY-POW 
82-5466 WELSH v. WISCONSIN 
JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
I originally voted to deny certiorari in this 
case, and the opinions of my Brothers filed today 
reinforce my view that it was a mistake for this Court to 
agree to review the case. The Wisconsin laws with respect 
to driving while intoxicated, in effect at the time, may 
be unique. At least, they suggest an extraordinary degree 
of tolerance. Driving under the influence was classified 
as a civil offense - in effect only a traffic offense -
requiring a "forfeiture of not more than $200". 
§346.65(2) Wise. Stat. 1975. Moreover, although the case 
has been considered by three Wisconsin courts, in the end, 
2. 
it could be decided on factual grounds that the state 
court has yet to consider. 1 It is my opinion that this 
Court should not have. taken this case to consider either 
the meaning of the Wisconsin statute or the validity of 
the warrantless entry and arrest challenged here until the 
state courts have had the opportunity to consider these 
additional factual grounds. 
Although I would dismiss the case as 
improvidently granted, I write briefly to record my views 
on the positions taken by the plurality and dissenting 
1The Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed the 
trial court, concluding that absent consent the 
warrantless entry and arrest of petitioner violated the 
Fourth Amendment. That court remanded the case, however, 
for further findings as to whether the police had entered 
petitioner's home with consent - an issue the state trial 
court had not decided. Before the trial court could 
consider that issue, the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed 
the intermediate appellate court, concluding that exigent 
circumstances justified the warrantless entry and arrest. 
Thus it may be that the warrantless entry and arrest are 
justified even in the absence of exigent circumstances. 
3. 
opinions. The plurality would not reach the 
constitutional question only because the Wisconsin 
statute, at the time of petitioner's arrest, did not 
expressly say that the required arrest must be "lawful". 
This argument is advanced despite the fact that both the 
Wisconsin Court of Appeals and Supreme Court read the 
state statute as requiring a lawful arrest. Quite apart 
from this construction by the courts of Wisconsin, I find 
it unreasonable to assume that any doubt exists as to the 
statutory intent. When an "arrest" is a statutory 
prerequisite to imposition of a penalty, this Court should 
assume the statute requires a lawful rather than an 
unlawful arrest. 
I therefore agree with Justice Brennan's view as 
to the construction of the Wisconsin statute. Moreover, I 
4. 
have no doubt that absent consent the warrantless entry 
and arrest in this case constituted a violation of the 
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Payton v. New York, 445 
u.s. 573 (1980), held that a warrantless nonconsensual 
entry into a home to make a felony arrest is 
unconstitutional absent exigent circumstances. The 
privacy of the home deserves at least as much protection 
under the Fourth Amendment in the case of a warrantless 
entry to arrest for a civil traffic offense. In my view 
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin erred in finding that the 
entry was justified by exigent circumstances. I agree 
with the finding of the Wisconsin Court of Appeals that in 
this case there was neither "hot pursuit" nor other 
circumstances that required this night-time entry into 
respondent's home. Preservation of evidence, for example, 
5. 
does not in every case create an exigency sufficient to 
justify warrantless entry into the home. In this case, 
the State's interest in the evidence was relatively 
slight. Under Wisconsin law, only a traffic offense had 
been committed. Nor had there been a showing that a 
warrant could not have been obtained promptly. 2 
In sum, I agree only with the conclusion of the 
plurality that this case should be dismissed as 
improvidently granted. 
2I do not join Justice Brennan's dissenting 
op1n1on, particularly its approval of a "bright line" 
principle. See, Part II, A, ante, at 8. It is settled 
that exigent circumstances may justify a warrantless entry 
where a felony reasonably is believed to have been 
committed. I see no reason in this case to foreclose the 
possibility that some circumstances may justify a 
warrantless entry where the offense is less serious than a 
felony. 
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in the judgment. 
This is a case the Court should not have taken. The Wis-
consin statutes with respect to driving "under the influence 
of an intoxicant" may be unique. At least, they suggest an 
unusual degree of tolerance. Driving under the influence is 
classified as a civil offense-in effect only a traffic offense-
requiring a "forfeiture of not more than $200." Section 
346.65(2) Wise. Stat. 1975. 1 
Under Wisconsin law, one who drives on the public roads 
"shall be deemed to have given consent to a chemical test ... 
for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of his 
blood if arrested and issued a citation for driving ... while 
under the influence of an intoxicant. . . . " This constructive 
consent does not allow a chemical test to be given without the 
actual consent of th,e person arrested. If, however, refusal 
to take the test is found to be unreasonable, the State auto-
matically suspends the driver's license for 60 days. Sections 
343.305(1) and 343.305(2) Wise. Stat. 1975. 
In this case, respondent ran his car off the road and de-
serted it before the police arrived. Some thirty minutes 
later, the police arrived at respondent's home and made a 
warrantless entry and arrest on the reasonable belief that 
'A second offense within five years is a misdemeanor, carrying a penalty 
of imprisonment for not less than five days nor more than a year and a po-
tential fine of not more than $500. Section 346.65(2) Wise. Stat. 1975. 
82-5466---CONCUR 
2 WELSH v. WISCONSIN 
respondent had been driving under the influence at the time 
of the accident. Respondent refused to submit to the 
required chemical test on the ground that his warrantless 
home arrest was unconstitutional under Payton v. New York, 
445 U. S. 573 (1980). The Wisconsin Supreme Court, 
reversing the state Court of Appeals, found that exigent 
circumstances justified the warrantless entry and arrest. It 
did not address the State's further contention that 
respondent's wife and daughters had consented to the entry 
by the police. Because it found that the arrest was lawful, 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded that respondent's 
refusal to submit to the chemical test was unreasonable as a 
matter of state law and that a 60-day suspension of 
respondent's driving license was warranted. 
There are three reasons why this Court should not have 
granted certiorari: (i) the Wisconsin laws with respect to 
driving while intoxicated may be unique, 2 (ii) the only 
constitutional question in the case--the warrantless entry-
was resolved essentially by Payton, and (iii) the factual issue 
whether consent was given to the entry was not addressed by 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court. Even absent exigent 
circumstances, therefore, the case therefore should be 
remanded as there was a conflict of evidence on the consent 
issue. 
Nevertheless, there were four votes to grant the case. 
Following argument and consideration at Conference, there 
were five votes to dismiss the case as improvidently granted, 
a result that I joined for the reasons above stated. As 
JusTICE BRENNAN'S opinion states, the four Justices who 
voted to grant the case "remain persuaded that the merits of 
the case should be decided." Ante, at 16. After further 
consideration, I have concluded that in these circumstances it 
2 In view of the current focus of public attention on the shocking number 
of deaths and serious injuries occasioned by intoxicated drivers, one rea-
sonably may assume that Wisconsin-like other states-will be reexamin-
ing its curiously tolerant laws. 
J 
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WELSH v. WISCONSIN 3 
would be inappropriate to dismiss this case against the views 
of the Justices who granted it. In his separate opinion in 
Ferguson v. Moore-McCormick Lines, 352 U. S. 521, 559 
(1957) Justice Harlan explained why the Rule of Four 
normally requires decision on the merits in this situation. 
See, ante, at 17. 
I find the reasoning of Justice Harlan persuasive and in the 
best interest of the Court institutionally. Accordingly, I 
also address the merits. Under our decision in Payton, a 
warrantless nonconsensual entry into the home to make a 
felony arrest is unconstitutional absent exigent 
circumstances. The privacy of the home deserves at least as 
much protection under the Fourth Amendment in the case of 
a warrantless entry to arrest for a civil traffic offense. In 
my view the Supreme Court of Wisconsin erred in finding 
that the entry was justified by exigent circumstances. 3 
There was, however, conflicting evidence as to whether the 
entry had been consensual, and it is agreed there was 
probable cause to arrest. The issue of consent remains to be 
decided by the Wisconsin courts. 4 Accordingly, I also would 
vacate the judgment of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin and 
remand the case for further proceedings. 
3 I agree with the finding of the Wisconsin Court of Appeals that in this 
case there was neither "hot pursuit" nor other circumstances that required 
this night time entry into respondent's home. Preservation of evidence, 
for example, does not in every case create an exigency sufficient to justify 
warrantless entry into the home. In this case, the State's interest in the 
evidence was relatively slight. Under Wisconsin law, only a traffic of-
fense had been committed. Nor had there been a showing that a warrant 
could not have been obtained promptly. 
'I do not join the reasoning of the plurality opinion, and particularly 
do not concur in the establishment of a "bright line" principle. See, Part 
II, A, ante, at 8. It is settled that exigent circumstances may justify a 
warrantless entry where a felony reasonably is believed to have been com-
mitted. I see no reason in this case to foreclose the possibility that some 
circumstances may justify a warrantless entry where the offense is less se-
rious than a felony. 
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in the judgment. 
This is a case the Court should not have taken. The Wis-
consin statutes with respect to driving "under the influence 
of an intoxicant" may be unique. At least, they suggest an 
unusual degree of tolerance. Driving under the influence is 
classified as a civil offense-in effect only a traffic offense-
requiring a "forfeiture of not more than $200." Section 
346. 65(2) Wise. Stat. 1975. 1 
Under Wisconsin law, one who drives on the public roads 
"shall be deemed to have given consent to a chemical test . . . 
for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of his 
blood if arrested and issued a citation for driving ... while 
under the influence of an intoxicant. . . . " This constructive 
consent does not allow a chemical test to be given without the 
actual consent of the person arrested. If, however, refusal 
to take the test is found to be unreasonable, the State auto-
matically suspends the driver's license for 60 days. Sections 
343.305(1) and 343.305(2) Wise. Stat. 1975. 
In this case, respondent ran his car off the road and de-
serted it before the police arrived. Some thirty minutes 
later, the police arrived at respondent's home and made a 
warrantless entry and arrest on the reasonable belief that 
'A second offense within five years is a misdemeanor, carrying a penalty 
of imprisonment for not less than five days nor more than a year and a po-
tential fine of not more than $500. Section 346.65(2) Wise. Stat. 1975. 
82-5466-CONCUR 
2 WELSH v. WISCONSIN 
respondent had been driving under the influence at the time 
of the accident. Respondent refused to submit to the 
required chemical test on the ground that his warrantless 
home arrest was unconstitutional under Payton v. New York, 
445 U. S. 573 (1980). The Wisconsin Supreme Court, 
reversing the state Court of Appeals, found that exigent 
circumstances justified the warrantless entry and arrest. It 
did not address the State's further contention that 
respondent's wife and daughters had consented to the entry 
by the police. Because it found that the arrest was lawful, 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded that respondent's 
refusal to submit to the chemical test was unreasonable as a 
matter of state law and that a 60-day suspension of 
respondent's driving license was warranted. 
There are three reasons why this Court should not have 
granted certiorari: (i) the Wisconsin laws with respect to 
driving while intoxicated may be unique, 2 (ii) the only 
constitutional question in the case-the warrantless entry-
was resolved essentially by Payton, and (iii) the factual issue 
whether consent was given to the entry was not addressed by 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court. Even absent exigent 
circumstances, therefore, the case therefore should be 
remanded as there was a conflict of evidence on the consent 
issue. 
Nevertheless, there were four votes to grant the case. 
Following argument and consideration at Conference, there 
were five votes to dismiss the case as improvidently granted, 
a result that I joined for the reasons above stated. As 
JUSTICE BRENNAN's opinion states, the four Justices who 
voted to grant the case "remain persuaded that the merits of 
the case should be decided." Ante, at 16. After further 
consideration, I have concluded that in these circumstances it 
' In view of the current focus of public attention on the shocking number 
of deaths and serious injuries occasioned by intoxicated drivers, one rea-
sonably may assume that Wisconsin-like other states-will be reexamin-
ing its curiously tolerant laws. 
82-546~CONCUR 
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would be inappropriate to dismiss this case against the views 
of the Justices who granted it. In his separate opinion in 
Ferguson v. Moore-McCormick Lines, 352 U. S. 521, 559 
(1957) Justice Harlan explained why the Rule of Four 
normally requires decision on the merits in this situation. 
See, ante, at 17. 
I find the reasoning of Justice Harlan persuasive and in the 
best interest of the Court institutionally. Accordingly, I 
also address the merits. Under our decision in Payton, a 
warrantless nonconsensual entry into the home to make a 
felony arrest is unconstitutional absent exigent 
circumstances. The privacy of the home deserves at least as 
much protection under the Fourth Amendment in the case of 
a warrantless entry to arrest for a civil traffic offense. In 
my view the Supreme Court of Wisconsin erred in finding 
that the entry was justified by exigent circumstances. 3 
There was, however, conflicting evidence as to whether the 
entry had been consensual, and it is agreed there was 
probable cause to arrest. The issue of consent remains to be 
decided by the Wisconsin courts. 4 Accordingly, I also would 
vacate the judgment of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin and 
remand the case for further proceedings. 
3 I agree with the finding of the Wisconsin Court of Appeals that in this 
case there was neither "hot pursuit" nor other circumstances that required 
this night time entry into respondent's home. Preservation of evidence, 
for example, does not in every case create an exigency sufficient to justify 
warrantless entry into the home. In this case, the State's interest in the 
evidence was relatively slight. Under Wisconsin law, only a traffic of-
fense had been committed. Nor had there been a showing that a warrant 
could not have been obtained promptly. 
' I do not join the reasoning of the plurality opinion, and particularly 
do not concur in the establishment of a "bright line" principle. See, Part 
II, A, ante, at 8. It is settled that exigent circumstances may justify a 
warrantless entry where a felony reasonably is believed to have been com-
mitted. I see no reason in this case to foreclose the possibility that some 
circumstances may justify a warrantless entry where the offense is less se-
rious than a felony. 
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in the judgment. 
This is a case the Court should not have taken. The Wis-
consin statutes with respect to driving "under the influence 
of an intoxicant" may be unique. At least, they suggest an 
unusual degree of tolerance. Driving under the influence is 
classified as a civil offense-in effect only a traffic offense-
requiring a "forfeiture of not more than $200." Section 
346.65(2) Wise. Stat. 1975. 1 
Under Wisconsin law, one who drives on the public roads 
"shall be deemed to have given consent to a chemical test ... 
for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of his 
blood if arrested and issued a citation for driving . . . while 
under the influence of an intoxicant. . . . " This constructive 
consent does not allow a chemical test to be given without the 
actual consent of the person arrested. If, however, refusal 
to take the test is found to be unreasonable, the State auto-
matically suspends the driver's license for 60 days. Sections 
343.305(1) and 343.305(2) Wise. Stat. 1975. 
In this case, respondent ran his car off the road and de-
serted it before the police arrived. Some thirty minutes 
later, the police arrived at respondent's home and made a 
warrantless entry and arrest on the reasonable belief that 
1 A second offense within five years is a misdemeanor, carrying a penalty 
of imprisonment for not less than five days nor more than a year and a po-
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EDWARD G. WELSH, PETITIONER v. WISCONSIN 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT 
OF WISCONSIN 
[January -, 1984] 
JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in the judgment. 
This is a case the Court should not have taken. The Wis-
consin statutes with respect to driving "under the influence 
of an intoxicant" may be unique. At least, they suggest an 
unusual degree of tolerance. Driving under the influence is 
classified as a civil offense-in effect only a traffic offense-
requiring a "forfeiture of not more than $200." Section 
346.65(2) Wise. Stat. 1975. 1 
Under Wisconsin law, one who drives on the public roads 
"shall be deemed to have given consent to a chemical test ... 
for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of his 
blood if arrested and issued a citation for driving ... while 
under the influence of an intoxicant .... " This constructive 
consent does not allow a chemical test to be given without the 
actual consent of the person arrested. If, however, refusal 
to take the test is found to be unreasonable, the State auto-
matically suspends the driver's license for 60 days. Sections 
343.305(1) and 343.305(2) Wise. Stat. 1975. 
In this case, respondent ran his car off the road and de-
serted it before the police arrived. Some thirty minutes 
later, the police arrived at respondent's home and made a 
warrantless entry and arrest on the reasonable belief that 
1 A second offense within five years is a misdemeanor, carrying a penalty 
of imprisonment for not less than five days nor more than a year and a po-
tential fine of not more than $500. Section-346.65(2) Wise. Stat. 1975. 
82-5466-CONCUR 
2 WELSH v. WISCONSIN 
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whether consent was given to the entry was not addressed by 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court. Even absent exigent 
circumstances, therefore, the case therefore should be 
remanded as there was a conflict of evidence on the consen 
Nevertheless, there were four votes to grant the case. 
Following argument and consideration at Conference, there 
were five votes to dismiss the case as improvidently granted, 
a result that I joined for the reasons above stated. As 
JUSTICE BRENNAN'S opinion states, the four Justices who 
voted to grant the case "remain persuaded that the merits of 
the case should be decided." Ante, at 16. After further 
consideration, I have concluded that in these circumstances it 
2 In view of the current focus of public attention on the shocking number 
of deaths and serious injuries occasioned by intoxicated drivers, one rea-
sonably may assume that Wisconsin-like other states-will be reexamin-
ing its curiously tolerant laws. 
82-5466-CONCUR 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STArES 
No. 82-5466 
EDWARD G. WELSH, PETITIONER v. WISCONSIN 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT 
OF WISCONSIN 
[February -, 1984] 
JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in the judgment. 
This is a case the Court should not have taken. The Wis-
consin statutes with respect to driving "under the influence 
of an intoxicant" may be unique. At least, they suggest an 
unusual degree of tolerance. Driving under the influence is 
classified as a civil offense-in effect only a traffic offense-
requiring a "forfeiture of not more than $200." Section 
346. 65(2) Wise. Stat. 1975. 1 
Under Wisconsin law, one who drives on the public roads 
"shall be deemed to have given consent to a chemical test ... 
for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of his 
blood if arrested and issued a citation for driving . . . while 
under the influence of an intoxicant .... " This constructive 
consent does not allow a chemical test to be given without the 
actual consent of the person arrested. If, however, refusal 
to take the test is found to be unreasonable, the State auto-
matically suspends the driver's license for 60 days. Sections 
343.305(1) and 343.305(2) Wise. Stat. 1975. 
In this case, respondent ran his car off the road and de-
serted it before the police arrived. Some thirty minutes 
later, the police arrived at respondent's home and made a 
warrantless entry and arrest on the reasonable belief that 
1 A second offense within five years is a misdemeanor, carrying a penalty 
of imprisonment for not less than five days nor more than a year and a po-
tential fine of not more than $500. Section 346.65(2) Wise. Stat. 1975. 
82-5466-CONCUR 
2 WELSH v. WISCONSIN 
respondent had been driving under the influence at the time 
of the accident. Respondent refused to submit to the re-
quired chemical test on the ground that his warrantless home 
arrest was unconstitutional under Payton v. New York, 445 
U. S. 573 (1980). The Wisconsin Supreme Court, reversing 
the state Court of Appeals, found that exigent circumstances 
justified the warrantless entry and arrest. It did not ad-
dress the State's further contention that respondent's wife 
and daughters had consented to the entry by the police. Be-
cause it found that the arrest was lawful, the Wisconsin Su-
preme Court concluded that respondent's refusal to submit to-
the chemical test was unreasonable as a matter of state law 
and that a 60-day suspension of respondent's driving license 
was warranted. 
There are several reasons why this Court should not have 
granted certiorari. The Wisconsin laws with respect to driv-
ing while intoxicated may well be unique. The decision of 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court therefore would have had little 
precedential importance. 2 Moreover, the factual issue 
whether consent was given to the entry was not addressed by 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court even though there was a con-
flict of evidence on the issue. 3 
Nevertheless, there were four votes to grant the case. 
Following argument and consideration at Conference, there 
were five votes to dismiss the case as improvidently granted, 
a result that I joined for the reasons above stated. As Jus-
TICE BRENNAN's opinion states, the four Justices who voted 
to grant the case "remain persuaded that the merits of the 
2 In view of the current focus of public attention on the shocking number 
of deaths and serious injuries occasioned by intoxicated drivers, one rea-
sonably may assume that Wisconsin-like other states-will be reexamin-
ing its curiously tolerant laws. 
3 The Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, concluding 
that the warrantless entry and arrest of petitioner violated the Fourth 
Amendment. That Court remanded the case, however, for further find-
ings as to whether the police had entered petitioner's home with consent-
an issue the state trial court had not decided. 
82-5466--CONCUR 
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case should be decided." Ante, at 16. After further consid-
eration, I have concluded that in these circumstances it 
would be inappropriate to dismiss this case against the views 
of the Justices who granted it. In his separate opinion in 
Ferguson v. Moore-McCormick Lines, 352 U. S. 521, 559, 
560 (1957) Justice Harlan explained why the Rule of Four 
normally requires decision on the merits in this situation. 
See, ante, at 17. 
I find the reasoning of Justice Harlan persuasive and in the 
best interest of the Court as an institution in which rules are 
followed consistently. 4 Accordingly, I also address the mer-
its. Under our decision in Payton, a warrantless non-
consensual entry into the home to make a felony arrest is un-
constitutional absent exigent circumstances. The privacy of 
the home deserves at least as much protection under the 
Fourth Amendment in the case of a warrantless entry to ar-
rest for a civil traffic offense. In my view the Supreme 
Court of Wisconsin erred in finding that the entry was justi-
fied by exigent circumstances. 5 There was, however, con-
flicting evidence as to whether the entry had been consen-
sual, and it is agreed there was probable cause to arrest. 
'Justice Harlen did qualify his strict adherence to the rule of four by 
saying that it must be respected "in the absence of considerations appear-
ing which were not manifest or fully apprehended at the time certiorari 
was granted." ld., at 559. The considerations that prompted me to vote 
to deny the petition for certiorari are essentially the same I have identified 
above. It was my opinion then, as it is now, that the warrentless entry 
and arrest for a civil offense was unlawful, but the case itself falls far short 
of being important enough for this Court to review it. The four Justices 
who voted to grant simply viewed the case differently. 
6 I agree with the finding of the Wisconsin Court of Appeals that in this 
case there was neither "hot pursuit" nor other circumstances that required 
this night time entry into respondent's home. Preservation of evidence, 
for example, does not in every case create an exigency sufficient to justify 
warrantless entry into the home. In this case, the State's interest in the 
evidence was relatively slight. Under Wisconsin law, only a traffic of-
fense had been committed. Nor had there been a showing that a warrant 
could not have been obtained promptly. 
82-5466-CONCUR 
4 WELSH v. WISCONSIN 
The issue of consent remained to be decided by the Wisconsin 
courts. 6 Accordingly, I also would vacate the judgment of 
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin and remand the case for fur-
ther proceedings. 
6 I do not think it is necessary in this case to consider a "bright line" rule 
as to less serious offenses. See, JusTICE BRENNAN's opinion, Part II, A, 
ante, at 8. It is settled that exigent circumstances may justify a warrant-
less entry where a felony reasonably is believed to have been committed. 
I see no reason in this case to foreclose the possibility that some circum-
stances may justify a warrantless entry where the offense is less serious 
than a felony. I therefore join only in the judgment. 
02/15 
· UMt~ 





To: The Chief Justice 
Justice Brennan 
Justice White ....,P t"1 AJ 





From: Justice Powell 
Circulated: ________ _ _ 
Recirculated: ________ _ 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
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EDWARD G. WELSH, PETITIONER v. WISCONSIN 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT 
OF WISCONSIN 
[February -, 1984] 
JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting. 
This is a case the Court should not have taken. The Wis-
consin statutes with respect to driving "under the influence 
of an intoxicant" may be unique. At least, they suggest an 
unusual degree of tolerance. Driving under the influence is 
classified as a civil offense-in effect only a traffic offense-
requiring a "forfeiture of not more than $200." Section 
346.65(2) Wise. Stat. 1975. 1 
Under Wisconsin law, one who drives on the public roads 
"shall be deemed to have given consent to a chemical test ... 
for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of his 
blood if arrested and issued a citation for driving ... while 
under the influence of an intoxicant .... " This constructive 
consent does not allow a chemical test to be given without the 
actual consent of the person arrested. If, however, refusal 
to take the test is found to be unreasonable, the State auto-
matically suspends the driver's license for 60 days. Sections 
343.305(1) and 343.305(2) Wise. Stat. 1975. 
In this case, respondent ran his car off the road and de-
serted it before the police arrived. Some thirty minutes 
later, the police arrived at respondent's home and made a 
warrantless entry and arrest on the reasonable belief that 
1 A second offense within five years is a misdemeanor, carrying a penalty 
of imprisonment for not less than five days nor more than a year and a po-
tential fine of not more than $500. Section 346.65(2) Wise. Stat. 1975. 
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respondent had been driving under the influence at the time 
of the accident. Respondent refused to submit to the re-
quired chemical test on the ground that his warrantless home 
arrest was unconstitutional under Payton v. New York, 445 
U. S. 573 (1980). The Wisconsin Supreme Court, reversing 
the state Court of Appeals, found that exigent circumstances 
justified the warrantless entry and arrest. It did not ad-
dress the State's further contention that respondent's wife 
and daughters had consented to the entry by the police. Be-
cause it found that the arrest was lawful, the Wisconsin Su-
preme Court concluded that respondent's refusal to submit to 
the chemical test was unreasonable as a matter of state law 
and that a 60-day suspension of respondent's driving license 
was warranted. 
There are several reasons why this Court should not have 
granted certiorari. The Wisconsin laws with respect to driv-
ing while intoxicated may well be unique. The decision of 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court therefore would have had little 
precedential importance. 2 Moreover, the factual issue 
whether consent was given to the entry was not addressed by 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court even though there was a con-
flict of evidence on the issue. 3 
Nevertheless, there were four votes to grant the case. 
Following argument and consideration at Conference, there 
were five votes to dismiss the case as improvidently granted, 
a result that I joined for the reasons above stated. The four 
Justices who voted to grant the case remain persuaded that 
the merits of the case should be decided. After further con-
2 In view of the current focus of public attention on the shocking number 
of deaths and serious injuries occasioned by intoxicated drivers, one rea-
sonably may assume that Wisconsin-like other states-will be reexamin-
ing its ~i8lililly talePSHt laws. 
3 The Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, concluding 
that the warrantless entry and arrest of petitioner violated the Fourth 
Amendment. That Court remanded the case, however, for further find-
ings as to whether the police had entered petitioner's home with consent-
an issue the state trial court had not decided. 
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sideration, I have concluded that in these circumstances it 
would be inappropriate to dismiss this case against the views 
of the Justices who granted it. In his separate opinion in 
Ferguson v. Moore-McCormick Lines, 352 U.S. 521, 559, 
560 (1957) Justice Harlan explained why the Rule of Four 
normally requires decision on the merits in this situation. 
"I think the Court should not have heard any of these 
four cases. Nevertheless, the cases having been taken, 
I have conceived it to be my duty to consider them on 
their merits, because I cannot reconcile voting to dismiss 
the writs as 'improvidently granted' with the Court's 
'rule of four.' In my opinion due adherence to that rule 
requires that once certiorari has been granted a case 
should be disposed of on the premise that it is properly 
here, in the absence of considerations appearing which 
were not manifest or fully apprehended at the time cer-
tiorari was granted." Ferguson v. Moore-McCormack 
Lines, 352, U. S. 521, 559 (1957) (separate opinion). 
I find the reasoning of Justice Harlan persuasive and in the 
best interest of the Court as an institution in which rules are 
followed consistently. 4 Accordingly, I reluctantly join Jus-
TICE BRENNAN in dissenting from dismissal of the case and 
address the merits. Under our decision in Payton, a war-
rantless nonconsensual entry into the home to make a felony 
arrest is unconstitutional absent exigent circumstances. 
The privacy of the home deserves at least as much protection 
under the Fourth Amendment in the case of a warrantless 
• Justice Harlen did qualify his strict adherence to the rule of four by 
saying that it must be respected "in the absence of considerations appear-
ing which were not manifest or fully apprehended at the time certiorari 
was granted." Id., at 559. The considerations that prompted me to vote 
to deny the petition for certiorari are essentially the same I have identified 
above. It was my opinion then, as it is now, that the warrentless entry 
and arrest for a civil offense was unlawful, but the case itself falls far short 
of being important enough for this Court to review it. The four Justices 
who voted to grant simply viewed the case differently. 
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entry to arrest for a civil traffic offense. In my view the Su-
preme Court of Wisconsin erred in finding that the entry was 
justified by exigent circumstances. 5 There was, however, 
conflicting evidence as to whether the entry had been consen-
sual, and it is agreed there was probable cause to arrest. 
The issue of consent remained to be decided by the Wisconsin 
courts. 6 Accordingly, I also would vacate the judgment of 
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin and remand the case for fur-
ther proceedings. 
5 I agree with the finding of the Wisconsin Court of Appeals that in this 
case there was neither "hot pursuit" nor other circumstances that required 
this night time entry into respondent's home. Preservation of evidence, 
for example, does not in every case create an exigency sufficient to justify 
warrantless entry into the home. In this case, the State's interest in the 
evidence was relatively slight. Under Wisconsin law, only a traffic of-
fense had been committed. Nor had there been a showing that a warrant 
could not have been obtained promptly. 
6 I do not think it is necessary in this case to consider a "bright line" rule 
as to less serious offenses. See, JUSTICE BRENNAN's opinion, Part II, A, 
ante, at 8. It is settled that exigent circumstances may justify a warrant-
less entry where a felony reasonably is believed to have been committed. 
I see no reason in this case to foreclose the possibility that some circum-
stances may justify a warrantless entry where the offense is less serious 
than a felony. 
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
I originally voted to deny certiorari in this case, and the 
opinions of my Brothers filed today reinforce my view that it 
was a mistake for this Court to agree to review the case. 
The Wisconsin laws with respect to driving while intoxicated, 
in effect at the time, may be unique. At least, they suggest 
an extraordinary degree of tolerance. Driving under the in-
fluence was classified as a civil offense-in effect only a traffic 
offense-requiring a "forfeiture of not more than $200." 
§ 3 . 2) Wise. Stat. 1975. Moreover, although the case 
has been c sidered by three Wisconsin courts, in the end, it 
could be deci on factual grounds that the state court has 
yet to consider. 1 t ~y opinion~  this Court sliould not - 1 
have taken this case to consider eitller the meaning of the -----
Wisconsin statute or the validity of the warrantless entry and 1r:J£:..i:!:! &j /'4>-.. 
arrest coollen~e-lllltir=me:st~ ;~1 l-:14 k ~i: .. 
oppert nit-y--t;&-~iamt-facttta-1-gr~ ( ,~ 
'The Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, concluding 
that absent consent the warrantless entry and arrest of petitioner violated 
the Fourth Amendment. That court remanded the case, however, for fur-
ther findings as to whether the police had entered petitioner's home with 
consent-an issue the state trial court had not decided. Before the trial 
court could consider that issue, the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed the 
intermediate appellate court, concluding that exigent circumstances justi-
fied the warrantless entry and arrest. Thus it may be that the warrant-
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Although I would dismiss the case as improvidently 
granted, I write briefly to record my views on the positions 
taken by the plurality and dissenting opinions. The plurality 
would not reach the constitutional question only because the 
Wisconsin statute, at the time of petitioner's arrest, did not 
expressly say that the required arrest must be "lawful." 
This argument is advanced despite the fact that both the Wis-
consin Court of Appeals and Supreme Court read the state 
statute as requiring a lawful arrest. Quite apart from this 
construction by the courts of Wisconsin, I find it unreason-
able to assume that any doubt exists as to the statutory in-
tent. When an "arrest" is a statutory prerequisite to imposi-
tion of a penalty, this Court should assume the statute 
requires a lawful rather than an unlawful arrest. 
I therefore agree with JUSTICE BRENNAN's view as to the 
construction of the Wisconsin statute. Moreover, I have no 
doubt that absent consent the warrantless entry and arrest in 
this case constituted a violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573 (1980), 
held that a warrantless nonconsensual entry into a home to 
make a felony arrest is unconstitutional absent exigent cir-
cumstances. The privacy of the home deserves at least as 
much protection under the Fourth Amendment in the case of 
a warrantless entry to arrest for a civil traffic offense. In 
my view the Supreme Court of Wisconsin erred in finding 
that the entry was justified by exigent circumstances. I 
agree with the finding of the Wisconsin Court of Appeals that 
in this case there was neither "hot pursuit" nor other circum-
stances that required this night-time entry into respondent's 
home. Preservation of evidence, for example, does not in 
every case create an exigency sufficient to justify warrant-
less entry into the home. In this case, the State's interest in 
the evidence was relatively slight. Under Wisconsin law, 
only a traffic offense had been committed. Nor had there 
.- .· .. ., . 
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been a showing that a warrant could not have been obtained 
promptly. 2 
In sum, I agree only with the conclusion of the plurality 
that this case should be dismissed as improvidently granted. 
' I do not join JUSTICE BRENNAN's dissenting opinion, particularly its 
approval of a "bright line" principle. See, Part II, A, ante, at 8. It is 
settled that exigent circumstances may justify a warrantless entry where a 
felony reasonably is believed to have been committed. I see no reason in 
this case to foreclose the possibility that some circumstances may justify a 
warrantless entry where the offense is less serious than a felony. 
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JUSTICE POWELL, c~b 
~voted to deny certiorari in this case, and the 
opinions, my Jl:r9taePs filed today reinforce my view that it 
was a mistake for this Court to agree to review the case. 
The Wisconsin laws with respect to driving while intoxicated, 
in effect at the time, may be unique. At least, they suggest 
an extraordinary degree of tolerance. Driving under the in-
fluence was classified as a civil offense-in effect only a traffic 
offense-requiring a "forfeiture of not more than $200." 
§ 346.65(2) Wise. Stat. 1975. Moreover, although the ~  
has been considered by three Wisconsin courts, in the en<{bit "'i . ..--~~'"t.- _ J 
couldh decided on factual grounds that the stateAcourt has _ ~ 
yet to consider. 1 The case · · · 
or no precedential impo ance. A 
· ourt s e a is case to consider eith 
the meaning of the Wisconsin statute or the validity of tH 
arrantless entry and arrest of the petitioner. 
' The Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, concluding 
that absent consent the warrantless entry and arrest of petitioner violated 
the Fourth Amendment. That court remanded the case, however, for fur-
ther findings as to whether the police had entered petitioner's home with 
consent-an issue the state trial court had not decided. Before the trial 
court could consider that issue, the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed the 
intermediate appellate court, concluding that exigent circumstances justi-
fied the warrantless entry and arrest. Thus it may be that the warrant-
less entry and arrest are justified even in the absence of exigent 
circumstances. 
~:t 82-5466--SONOU 
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granted, I write briefly to record my views on the p · ions 
taken by the plurality and dissenting opinions. T plurality 
would not reach the constitutional question o y because the 
Wisconsin statute, at the time of petitio 's arrest, did not 
expressly say that the required arr t must be "lawful." 
This argument is advanced despite e fact that both the Wis-
consin Court of Appeals and preme Court read the state 
statute as requiring a la arrest. Quite apart from this 
construction by the co s of Wisconsin, I find it unreason-
able to assume that ny doubt exists as to the statutory in-
tent. When an " rrest" is a statutory prerequisite to imposi-
tion of a R alty, this Court should assume the statute 
requires awful rather than an unlawful arrest. 
It efore agree with JUSTICE BRENNAN's view as to th 
c struction of the Wisconsin statute. oreover, I have no 
doubt that absent consent the warrantless entry and arrest in 
this case constituted a violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573 (1980), 
held that a warrantless nonconsensual entry into a home to 
make a felony arrest is unconstitutional absent exigent cir-
cumstances. The privacy of the home deserves at least as 
much protection under the Fourth Amendment in the case of 
a warrantless entry to arrest for a civil traffic offense. In 
my view the Supreme Court of Wisconsin erred in finding 
that the entry was justified by exigent circumstances. I 
agree with the finding of the Wisconsin Court of Appeals that 
in this case there was neither "hot pursuit" nor other circum-
stances that required this night-time entry into respondent's 
home. Preservation of evidence, for example, does not in 
every case create an exigency sufficient to justify warrant-
less entry into the home. In this case, the State's interest in 
the evidence was relatively slight. Under Wisconsin law, 
only a traffic offense had been committed. Nor had there 
I 
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been a showing that a warrant could not have been obtained 
promptly. 2 
n -sunl,T a ee only with the conclusion of the plurality 
that this case should be dismissed as improvidently granted 
2 I do not join JUSTICE BRENNAN's dissenting opinion, particularly its 
approval of a "bright line" principle. See, Part II, A, ante, at 8. It is 
settled that exigent circumstances may justify a warrantless entry where a 
felony reasonably is believed to have been committed. I see no reason in 
this case to foreclose the possibility that some circumstances may justify a 
warrantless entry where the offense is less serious than a felony. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 82-5466 
EDWARD G. WELSH, PETITIONER v. WISCONSIN 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT 
OF WISCONSIN 
[February -, 1984] 
JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting. 
I voted to deny certiorari in this case, and the opinions filed 
today reinforce my view that it was a mistake for this Court 
to agree to review the case. The Wisconsin laws with re-
spect to driving while intoxicated, in effect at the time, may 
be unique. At least, they suggest an extraordinary degree 
of tolerance. Driving under the influence was classified as a 
civil offense-in effect only a traffic offense-requiring a "for-
feiture of not more than $200." § 346.65(2) Wise. Stat. 1975. 
Moreover, although the case has been considered by three 
Wisconsin courts, in the end it still could be decided on fac-
tual grounds that the state trial court has yet to consider. 1 
We nevertheless granted certiorari, the case has been 
briefed and argued here, and opinions have been written: a 
Per Curiam dismissing the case as improvidently granted and 
dissenting opinions by JUSTICE BRENNAN, JUSTICE BLACK-
'The Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, concluding 
that absent consent the warrantless entry and arrest of petitioner violated 
the Fourth Amendment. That court remanded the case, however, for fur-
ther findings as to whether the police had entered petitioner's home with 
consent-an issue the state trial court had not decided. Before the trial 
court could consider that issue, the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed the 
intermediate appellate court, concluding that exigent circumstances justi-
fied the warrantless entry and arrest. Thus it may be that the warrant-
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MUN, and JUSTICE STEVENS. The Per Curiam dismisses 
the case, concluding that the constitutional question is not 
properly here, primarily because the Wisconsin statute-at 
the time of petitioner's arrest-did not expressly state that 
the required arrest must be "lawful." It is difficult to agree 
with this reasoning. Both the Wisconsin Court of Appeals 
and Supreme Court read the state statute as requiring a law-
ful arrest. But quite apart from this construction by the 
state courts, I find it unreasonable to think that any doubt 
exists as to the statutory intent. When an "arrest" is a stat-
utory prerequisite to the imposition of a penalty, I would as-
sume that the statute requires a lawful rather than an unlaw-
ful arrest. 
I agree with JUSTICE BRENNAN'S construction of the stat-
ute. I therefore think the constitutional question that 
prompted the granting of this case now is properly here. 
Moreover, I have no doubt that absent consent the warrant-
less entry and arrest in this case constituted a violation of the 
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Payton v. New York, 
445 U. S. 573 (1980), held that a warrantless nonconsensual 
entry into a home to make a felony arrest is unconstitutional 
absent exigent circumstances. The privacy of the home de-
serves at least as much protection under the Fourth Amend-
ment in the case of a warrantless entry to arrest for a civil 
traffic offense. In my view the Supreme Court of Wisconsin 
erred in finding that the entry was justified by exigent cir-
cumstances. I agree with the finding of the Wisconsin Court 
of Appeals that in this case there was neither "hot pursuit" 
nor other circumstances that required this night-time entry 
into respondent's home. Preservation of evidence, for ex-
ample, does not in every case create an exigency sufficient to 
justify warrantless entry into the home. In this case, the 
State's interest in the evidence was relatively slight. Under 
Wisconsin law, only a traffic offense had been committed. 
82-546&--DISSENT 
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Nor had there been a showing that a warrant could not have 
been obtained promptly. 2 
In sum, I agree with the dissent that the judgment of the 
Supreme Court of Wisconsin should be vacated and the case 
remanded for further proceedings. 
' I do not join JUSTICE BRENNAN's dissenting opinion, particularly its 
approval of a "bright line" principle. See, Part II, A, ante, at 8. It is 
settled that exigent circumstances may justify a warrantless entry where a 
felony reasonably is believed to have been committed. I see no reason in 
this case to foreclose the possibility that some circumstances may justify a 
warrantless entry where the offense is less serious than a felony. 
I 
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JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting. 
I ~oted to deny certiorari in this case, and the 
opinions filed today reinforce my view that it was a mistake 
for this Court to agree to review the case. The Wisconsin 
laws with respect to driving while intoxicated, in effect at the 
time, may be unique. At least, they suggest an extraordi-
nary degree of tolerance. Driving under the influence was 
classified as a civil offense-in effect only a traffic offense-
requiring a "forfeiture of not more than $200." § 346.65(2) 
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~e n eless granted certwran, the case has been 
briefed and argued here, and opinions have been written: a 
1 The Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, concluding 
that absent consent the warrantless entry and arrest of petitioner violated 
the Fourth Amendment. That court remanded the case, however, for fur-
ther findings as to whether the police had entered petitioner's home with 
consent-an issue the state trial court had not decided. Before the trial 
court could consider that issue, the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed the 
intermediate appellate court, concluding that exigent circumstances justi-
fied the warrantless entry and arrest. Thus it may be that the warrant-
less entry and arrest are justified even in the absence of exigent 
circumstances. 
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Per Curiam dismissing the case as improvidently granted and 
dissenting opinions by JUSTICE BRENNAN, JUSTICE BLACK-
MUN, and JusTICE STEVENS. The Per Curiam dismisses 
the case, concluding that the constitutional question is not 
properly here, primarily because the Wisconsin statute-at 
the time of petitioner's arrest-did not expressly state that 
the required arrest must be "lawful." It is difficult to agree 
with this reasoning. Both the Wisconsin Court of Appeals 
and Supreme Court read the state statute as requiring a law-
ful arrest. But quite apart from this construction by the 
state courts, I find it unreasonable to think that any doubt 
exists as to the statutory intent. When an "arrest" is a stat-
utory prerequisite to the imposition of a penalty, I would as-
sume that the statute requires a lawful rather than an unlaw-
ful arrest. 
I agree with JUSTICE BRENNAN'S construction of the stat-
ute. I therefore think the constitutional question that 
prompted the granting of this cas IS roper y ere. ore-
over, I have no doubt that absent c sent the warrantless en-
try and arrest in this case constituted a violation of the 
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Payton v. New York, 
445 U. S. 573 (1980), held that a warrantless nonconsensual 
entry into a home to make a felony arrest is unconstitutional 
absent exigent circumstances. The privacy of the home de-
serves at least as much protection under the Fourth Amend-
ment in the case of a warrantless entry to arrest for a civil 
traffic offense. In my view the Supreme Court of Wisconsin 
erred in finding that the entry was justified by exigent cir-
cumstances. I agree with the finding of the Wisconsin Court 
of Appeals that in this case there was neither "hot pursuit" 
nor other circumstances that required this night-time entry 
into respondent's home. Preservation of evidence, for ex-
ample, does not in every case create an exigency sufficient to 
justify warrantless entry into the home. In this case, the 
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State's interest in the evidence was relatively slight. Under 
Wisconsin law, only a traffic offense had been committed. 
Nor had there been a showing that a warrant could not have 
been obtained promptly. 2 
In sum, I agree with the dissent that the judgment of the 
Supreme Court of Wisconsin should be vacated and the case 
remanded for further proceedings. 
2 I do not join JusTICE BRENNAN's dissenting opinion, particularly its 
approval of a "bright line" principle. See, Part II, A, ante, at 8. It is 
settled that exigent circumstances may justify a warrantless entry where a 
felony reasonably is believed to have been committed. I see no reason in 
this case to foreclose the possibility that some circumstances may justify a 
warrantless entry where the offense is less serious than a felony. 
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No. 82-5466 
EDWARD G. WELSH, PETITIONER v. WISCONSIN 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT 
OF WISCONSIN 
[February -, 1984] 
JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting. 
I voted to deny certiorari in this case, and the opinions filed 
today reinforce my view that it was a mistake for this Court 
to agree to review the case. The Wisconsin laws with re-
spect to driving while intoxicated, in effect at the time, may 
be unique. At least, they suggest an extraordinary degree 
of tolerance. Driving under the influence was classified as a 
civil offense--in effect only a traffic offense--requiring a "for-
feiture of not more than $200." § 346. 65(2) Wise. Stat. 1975. 
Moreover, although the case has been considered by three 
Wisconsin courts, in the end it still could be decided on fac-
tual grounds that the state trial court has yet to consider. 1 
We nevertheless granted certiorari, the case has been 
briefed and argued here, and opinions have been written: a 
Per Curiam dismissing the case as improvidently granted and 
dissenting opinions by JUSTICE BRENNAN, JUSTICE BLACK-
'The Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, concluding 
that absent consent the warrantless entry and arrest of petitioner violated 
the Fourth Amendment. That court remanded the case, however, for fur-
ther findings as to whether the police had entered petitioner's home with 
consent-an issue the state trial court had not decided. Before the trial 
court could consider that issue, the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed the 
intermediate appellate court, concluding that exigent circumstances justi-
fied the warrantless entry and arrest. Thus it may be that the warrant-
less entry and arrest are justified even in the absence of exigent 
circumstances. 
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MUN, and JUSTICE STEVENS. The Per Curiam dismisses 
the case, concluding that the constitutional question is not 
properly here, primarily because the Wisconsin statute-at 
the time of petitioner's arrest-did not expressly state that 
the required arrest must be "lawful." It is difficult to agree 
with this reasoning. Both the Wisconsin Court of Appeals 
and Supreme Court read the state statute as requiring a law-
ful arrest. But quite apart from this construction by the 
state courts, I find it unreasonable to think that any doubt 
exists as to the statutory intent. When an "arrest" is a stat-
utory prerequisite to the imposition of a penalty, I would as-
sume that the statute requires a lawful rather than an unlaw-
ful arrest. 
I agree with JUSTICE BRENNAN's construction of the stat-
ute. I therefore think the constitutional question that 
prompted the granting of this case now is properly here. 
Moreover, I have no doubt that absent consent the warrant-
less entry and arrest in this case constituted a violation of the 
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Payton v. New York, 
445 U. S. 573 (1980), held that a warrantless nonconsensual 
entry into a home to make a felony arrest is unconstitutional 
absent exigent circumstances. The privacy of the home de-
serves at least as much protection under the Fourth Amend-
ment in the case of a warrantless entry to arrest for a civil 
traffic offense. In my view the Supreme Court of Wisconsin 
erred in finding that the entry was justified by exigent cir-
cumstances. I agree with the finding of the Wisconsin Court 
of Appeals that in this case there was neither "hot pursuit" 
nor other circumstances that required this night-time entry 
into respondent's home. Preservation of evidence, for ex-
ample, does not in every case create an exigency sufficient to 
justify warrantless entry into the home. In this case, the 
State's interest in the evidence was relatively slight. Under 
Wisconsin law, only a traffic offense had been committed. 
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Nor had there been a showing that a warrant could not have 
been obtained promptly. 2 
In sum, I agree with the dissent that the judgment of the 
Supreme Court of Wisconsin should be vacated and the case 
remanded for further proceedings. 
2 I do not join JuSTICE BRENNAN's dissenting opinion, particularly its 
approval of a "bright line" principle. See, Part II , A, ante, at 8. It is 
settled that exigent circumstances may justify a warrantless entry where a 
felony reasonably is believed to have been committed. I see no reason in 
this case to foreclose the possibility that some circumstances may justify a 
warrantless entry where the offense is less serious than a felony. 
